THE
STVMBLING-BLOCK
OF
Disobedience
and
Rebellion
,
Cunningly
laid
by
CALVIN
in
the
Subjects
way
,
Discovered
,
Censured
and
Removed
.
CHAP.
I.
The
Doctrine
of
Obedience
laid
down
by
CALVIN
;
and
of
the
Popular
Officers
supposed
by
him
,
whereby
he
overthroweth
that
Doctrine
.
-
(
I
)
The
purpose
and
design
of
the
work
in
hand
.
-
(
II
)
The
Doctrine
of
Obedience
unto
Kings
and
Princes
,
soundly
and
piously
laid
down
by
CALVIN
.
-
(
III
)
And
that
not
only
to
the
good
and
gracious
,
but
even
to
cruel
Princes
and
ungodly
Tyrants
;
-
(
IV
)
With
Answer
unto
such
Objections
as
are
made
against
it
.
-
(
V
)
The
Principles
of
Disobedience
in
the
supposal
of
some
popular
Officers
ordained
of
purpose
,
to
regulate
the
power
of
Kings
.
-
(
VI
)
How
much
the
practise
of
CALVIN's
followers
doth
differ
from
their
Masters
Doctrine
in
the
point
of
Obedience
.
-
(
VII
)
Several
Articles
and
points
of
Doctrine
,
wherein
the
Disciples
of
CALVIN
are
departed
from
him
.
-
(
VIII
)
More
of
the
differences
in
point
of
Doctrine
betwixt
the
Master
and
his
Scholars
.
-
(
IX
)
The
dangerous
consequences
which
arise
from
his
faulty
Principles
,
in
the
point
or
Article
of
Disobedience
.
-
(
X
)
The
method
and
distribution
of
the
following
Work
.
SOme
Writers
may
be
likened
unto
Jeremies
Figs
,
[
b
](A86304-e13700-b)
b
Ierem.
24
▪
4.
of
which
the
Prophet
saith
,
that
if
they
were
good
,
they
were
very
good
;
if
evil
,
very
evil
,
such
as
could
not
be
eaten
they
were
so
evil
.
Of
such
a
temper
and
esteem
was
Origen
amongst
the
Ancients
,
of
whom
it
was
observed
(
not
without
good
cause
)
that
in
his
Expositions
on
the
Book
of
God
and
other
learned
Tractates
which
he
writ
and
published
,
where
he
did
well
,
none
could
do
it
better
,
and
where
he
failed
at
all
,
no
man
erred
more
grosly
.
And
of
this
sort
and
composition
was
Mr.
Calvin
of
Geneva
,
then
whom
there
is
not
any
Minister
of
the
Reformed
Churches
be●ond
the
seas
,
who
hath
more
positively
and
expresly
laid
down
the
Doctrine
of
Obedience
unto
Kings
and
Princes
,
and
the
unlawfulness
of
Subjects
taking
Arms
against
their
Soveraign
;
nor
opened
a
more
dangerous
gap
to
disobedience
and
rebellions
in
most
States
of
Christendome
.
In
which
it
is
most
strange
to
see
how
prone
we
are
,
(
such
is
the
frailty
and
corruption
of
our
sinful
nature
)
to
refuse
the
good
,
and
choose
the
evill
;
to
take
no
notice
of
his
words
when
it
most
concerns
us
,
when
we
are
plainly
told
our
duties
both
to
God
and
man
;
and
on
the
other
side
to
take
his
words
for
Oracles
,
his
judgement
for
infallible
,
all
his
Geese
for
Swans
,
when
he
saith
any
thing
which
may
be
useful
to
our
purposes
,
or
serve
to
the
advancement
of
our
lewd
designs
.
The
credit
and
authority
of
the
man
was
deservedly
great
amongst
the
people
where
he
lived
;
and
in
short
time
of
such
authority
and
esteem
in
the
world
abroad
,
that
his
works
were
made
the
only
rule
to
which
both
Discipline
and
Doctrine
was
to
be
conformed
:
and
if
a
Controversie
did
arise
either
in
points
Dogmatical
,
or
a
case
of
Conscience
,
his
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
was
sufficient
to
determine
in
it
,
at
least
to
silence
the
gain-sayers
.
And
as
it
is
observed
in
the
works
of
Nature
,
that
corruptio
optimi
est
pessima
,
and
that
the
sweetest
meats
make
the
sowrest
excrements
;
so
the
opinion
and
esteem
which
some
of
the
Reformed
Churches
had
conceived
of
him
(
which
to
say
the
truth
was
great
and
eminent
)
and
the
ill
use
they
made
of
some
words
and
passages
in
his
writings
,
which
most
unfortunately
served
to
advance
their
purposes
,
have
been
the
sad
occasion
of
those
wars
and
miseries
,
which
almost
all
the
Western
parts
of
Christendome
,
have
been
so
fatally
involved
in
since
the
times
he
lived
.
Which
words
and
passages
as
they
are
cautelously
laid
down
,
and
compassed
round
with
many
fair
expressions
of
affection
to
the
Supreme
Powers
,
that
they
might
pass
without
discovery
,
and
be
the
sooner
swallowed
by
unwary
men
:
so
by
his
followers
(
who
are
exceeding
wise
in
their
generations
)
have
they
been
hidden
and
concealed
with
all
art
that
may
be
.
For
though
they
build
their
dangerous
Doctrines
upon
his
foundation
,
and
toss
this
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
,
this
ball
of
discord
and
dissension
from
one
hand
to
another
;
yet
do
they
very
cunningly
conceal
their
Author
,
and
never
use
his
name
to
confirm
their
Tenets
.
And
this
they
do
upon
this
reason
,
that
if
their
Doctrine
give
offence
unto
Christian
Princes
,
and
any
of
their
Pamphlets
be
to
feel
the
fire
,
or
otherwise
come
under
any
publick
censure
,
(
as
not
long
since
hapned
to
Paraeus
)
the
Patron
of
their
Sect
might
escape
untouched
,
and
his
authority
remain
unquestioned
,
to
give
new
life
unto
their
hopes
at
another
time
.
In
which
respects
,
and
withall
seeing
that
the
heads
of
this
monstrous
Hydra
of
sedition
do
grow
the
faster
for
the
cutting
,
and
that
the
lopping
off
the
Branches
keeps
the
trunk
the
fresher
;
I
shall
pass
by
the
petit
Pamphleters
of
these
times
,
and
strike
directly
at
the
head
;
and
without
medling
with
the
boughs
or
branches
,
will
lay
my
Axe
immediately
to
the
root
of
the
tree
,
and
bring
the
first
Author
of
these
factious
and
Antimonarchical
Principles
(
which
have
so
long
disturbed
the
peace
of
Christendome
)
to
a
publick
trial
.
A
dangerous
and
invidious
undertaking
I
must
needs
confess
;
but
for
my
Countreys
and
the
Truthes
sake
,
I
will
venture
on
it
:
and
in
pursuance
of
the
same
will
first
lay
down
the
doctrine
of
Obedience
as
by
him
delivered
,
which
I
shall
faithfully
translate
without
glosse
or
descant
;
and
next
compare
his
Doctrine
with
our
present
practise
,
noting
wherein
his
Scholars
have
forsook
their
Master
,
with
application
unto
those
who
do
most
admire
him
:
and
finally
I
shall
discover
and
remove
that
Stumbling-block
which
he
hath
cunningly
laid
before
us
,
(
but
hid
so
secretly
that
it
can
hardly
be
discerned
)
at
which
so
many
a
man
hath
stumbled
,
both
to
the
breaking
of
his
own
neck
and
his
neighbours
too
.
This
is
the
race
that
I
am
to
run
;
the
prize
I
aim
at
is
no
other
,
then
for
as
much
as
in
me
lieth
to
do
good
to
all
men
,
to
those
especially
who
think
themselves
to
be
of
the
houshold
of
Faith
.
And
therefore
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
,
Let
us
on
in
Gods
Name
.
"
2.
Subditorum
erga
suos
Magistratus
Officium
primum
est
,
to
respect
and
reverence
them
,
as
the
Ministers
and
Deputies
of
God
.
For
some
there
are
,
who
very
dutifully
do
behave
themselves
toward
their
Magistrates
,
and
would
have
all
men
do
the
like
,
because
they
think
it
most
expedient
for
the
Common-wealth
,
and
yet
esteem
no
otherwise
of
them
then
of
some
necessary
evils
which
they
cannot
want
.
But
St.
Peter
looks
for
more
then
this
,
honour
the
King
;
and
so
doth
Solomon
also
where
he
requires
us
to
fear
God
and
the
King
.
good
esteem
,
a
fair
opinion
;
the
other
joyning
God
and
the
King
together
,
shewes
plainly
that
in
the
person
of
a
King
there
is
a
ray
of
sacred
majesty
.
And
that
of
Paul
is
richly
worth
our
observation
,
where
he
commands
us
to
obey
,
not
for
wrath
only
,
but
for
conscience
sake
.
By
which
he
means
,
that
Subjects
are
not
only
to
contain
themselves
within
the
bounds
of
their
obedience
,
for
fear
they
should
incurre
the
anger
and
displeasure
of
their
Prince
or
Governor
(
as
men
submit
themselves
to
an
armed
enemy
,
whom
they
see
ready
to
chastise
them
,
if
they
should
resist
)
;
but
also
to
perswade
themselves
that
the
expressions
of
their
duties
which
they
make
to
them
,
are
made
indeed
to
God
himself
,
from
whom
what
ever
power
they
have
is
devolved
upon
them
.
Nor
speak
I
of
the
men
themselves
,
as
if
the
vizard
of
authority
were
enough
to
hide
either
their
follies
or
their
sloth
,
on
their
lusts
or
cruelties
,
or
gain
the
name
of
virtues
to
their
filthiest
vices
,
but
that
the
function
is
so
venerable
and
so
full
of
honour
,
that
they
who
execute
the
same
and
bear
rule
over
us
,
are
to
be
worthily
esteemed
and
reverenced
for
their
Office
sake
.
"
The
second
duty
of
the
Subjects
doth
arise
from
this
,
Let
every
soul
(
saith
Paul
)
be
subject
to
the
higher
powers
;
for
he
that
doth
resist
the
power
resists
the
ordinance
of
God
.
Put
them
in
minde
(
saith
he
to
Titus
)
to
be
subject
to
Principalities
,
and
powers
,
to
obey
Magistrates
,
and
to
be
ready
to
every
good
work
.
And
Peter
thus
,
Submit
your selves
to
every
Ordinance
of
man
for
the
Lords
sake
,
whether
it
be
to
the
King
▪
as
Supreme
,
or
unto
Governors
as
to
those
which
are
sent
by
him
for
the
punishment
of
evil
doers
,
and
for
the
praise
of
them
that
do
well
.
And
to
the
end
the
subject
may
not
think
that
it
is
sufficient
to
counterfeit
or
pretend
obedience
in
the
outward
shew
,
but
to
perform
it
truly
and
sincerely
from
the
very
heart
,
Paul
adds
that
we
commend
the
health
and
flourishing
estate
of
those
under
whom
we
live
,
I
exhort
(
saith
he
)
that
first
of
all
supplications
,
prayers
,
intercessions
,
and
giving
of
thanks
be
made
for
all
men
;
for
Kings
,
and
for
all
that
are
in
authority
,
that
we
may
lead
a
quiet
and
peaceable
life
in
all
godliness
and
honesty
:
Let
no
man
here
deceive
himself
.
For
seeing
the
Magistrate
cannot
be
resisted
,
but
that
God
is
resisted
also
;
though
the
unarmed
Magistrate
may
possibly
be
contemned
and
slighted
without
fear
of
punishment
,
yet
God
is
armed
sufficiently
to
revenge
those
insolencies
,
which
are
thus
offered
to
himself
in
them
.
Now
under
this
obedience
,
I
also
do
include
that
moderation
and
discretion
,
which
private
persons
ought
to
have
and
to
impose
upon
themselves
as
a
rule
or
law
,
that
so
they
neither
intermeddle
in
affairs
of
State
,
nor
invade
the
office
of
the
Magistrate
,
nor
put
themselves
on
any
publick
undertakings
;
if
any
thing
be
amiss
in
the
publick
Government
,
which
stands
in
need
of
Reformation
,
it
appertains
not
unto
them
to
be
tumultuously
active
in
it
,
or
to
put
their
hands
unto
the
work
,
whose
hands
are
tied
(
and
to
be
tied
)
on
all
such
occasions
;
but
that
they
make
it
known
unto
the
Magistrate
,
whose
hands
are
only
left
at
liberty
to
effect
the
same
.
My
meaning
is
,
that
they
do
nothing
uncommanded
.
For
when
the
power
or
precept
of
the
Governor
doth
intervene
,
they
are
then
armed
with
just
authority
,
and
may
do
accordingly
.
For
as
the
Princes
Privy
Councel
are
said
to
be
his
Ears
,
and
Eyes
,
so
those
inferiour
Ministers
,
by
whom
he
executeth
his
commands
or
mandates
,
are
not
unfitly
called
his
Hands
.
"
"
3.
The
Magistrate
being
such
as
he
ought
to
be
,
Minister
of
Gods
,
as
is
ordained
for
the
incouragement
and
praise
of
those
that
do
well
,
and
for
the
punishment
of
those
that
are
evil
doers
:
they
take
him
not
for
such
a
Governour
whose
office
and
authoritie
is
extolled
so
highly
in
the
Scriptures
.
And
to
say
truth
,
it
hath
been
always
naturally
implanted
in
the
souls
of
men
,
not
more
to
love
and
reverence
a
just
vertuous
Prince
,
then
to
abominate
and
detest
an
ungodly
Tyrant
.
"
But
if
we
look
into
Gods
Book
,
"
And
first
the
reader
must
take
notice
of
the
especial
Act
and
Providence
of
Almighty
God
,
The
Lord
(
saith
Daniel
)
changeth
the
times
and
the
seasons
;
he
removeth
Kings
,
and
setteth
up
Kings
.
And
in
another
place
,
That
the
living
may
know
that
the
most
High
ruleth
in
the
Kingdoms
of
men
,
and
giveth
them
to
whomsoever
he
will
.
Which
kinde
of
sentences
as
they
are
very
frequent
in
the
Scriptures
,
so
is
that
prophesie
most
plentiful
and
abundant
in
them
.
No
man
is
ignorant
that
Nebuchadnezzar
who
destroyed
Hierusalem
,
was
a
great
spoiler
and
oppressor
,
yet
the
Lord
tells
us
by
Ezechiel
,
that
he
had
given
unto
him
the
land
of
Egypt
,
for
the
good
service
he
had
done
in
laying
it
wast
on
his
commandement
.
And
Daniel
said
unto
him
thus
;
Thou
O
King
art
a
King
of
Kings
,
for
the
God
of
Heaven
hath
given
thee
a
Kingdom
,
power
and
strength
and
glory
;
And
wheresoever
the
children
of
men
dwell
,
the
beasts
of
the
field
,
and
the
fowls
of
heaven
hath
he
given
into
thy
hand
,
and
hath
made
thee
Ruler
over
them
all
.
Again
to
Belshazzer
his
son
,
The
most
high
God
gave
unto
Nebuchadnezzar
thy
father
a
Kingdom
,
and
majesty
and
glory
and
honour
;
and
for
the
majesty
that
he
gave
him
,
all
people
,
nations
,
and
languages
trembled
and
feared
before
him
.
Now
when
we
hear
that
Kings
are
placed
over
us
by
God
,
let
us
be
pleased
to
call
to
minde
those
several
precepts
to
fear
and
honour
them
,
which
God
hath
given
us
in
his
Book
;
holding
the
vilest
Tyrant
in
as
high
account
,
as
God
hath
graciously
vouchsafed
to
estate
him
in
.
When
Samuel
told
the
people
of
the
house
of
Israel
what
they
should
suffer
from
their
King
,
he
expressed
it
thus
,
This
will
be
the
manner
of
the
King
which
shall
reign
over
you
,
he
will
take
your
sons
and
appoint
them
for
himself
,
for
his
Chariots
,
and
to
be
his
Horsemen
,
and
some
shall
r●n
before
his
Chariots
;
And
he
will
appoint
him
Captains
over
thousands
,
and
Captains
over
fifties
,
and
will
set
them
to
ear
his
ground
and
to
reap
his
harvest
,
and
to
make
his
instruments
of
war
,
and
instruments
of
his
Chariots
;
And
he
will
take
your
daughters
to
be
his
Confectionaries
,
and
to
be
Co●ks
,
and
to
be
Bakers
;
And
he
will
take
your
fields
,
and
your
Vineyards
,
and
your
Olive-yards
,
even
the
best
of
them
,
and
give
them
to
his
servants
;
And
he
will
take
the
tenth
of
your
seed
,
and
of
your
Vineyards
,
and
give
to
his
Officers
,
and
to
his
Servants
;
And
he
will
take
your
men●servants
,
and
your
maid-servants
,
and
your
goodliest
young
men
and
your
Asses
,
and
put
them
to
his
work
;
He
will
take
the
tenth
of
your
sheep
,
and
ye
shall
be
his
Servants
.
Assuredly
their
Kings
could
not
do
this
lawfully
,
whom
God
had
otherwise
instructed
in
the
Book
of
the
Law
:
but
it
is
therefore
called
Jus
Regis
,
the
right
of
Kings
upon
the
subject
,
which
of
necessitie
the
Subjects
were
to
submit
unto
,
and
not
to
make
the
least
resistance
.
As
if
the
Prophet
had
thus
said
,
So
far
shall
the
licentiousness
of
your
Kings
extend
it self
,
which
you
shall
have
no
power
to
restrain
or
remedie
,
to
whom
there
shall
be
nothing
left
but
to
receive
the
intimation
of
their
pleasures
,
and
fulfil
the
same
.
"
But
most
remarkable
is
that
place
in
the
Prophet
Jeremie
,
I
have
made
the
earth
(
saith
the
Lord
)
the
man
and
the
beast
that
are
upon
the
ground
,
by
my
great
power
and
by
my
out-stretched
Arm
,
and
have
given
it
unto
whom
it
seemed
meet
unto
me
;
And
now
have
▪
I
given
all
these
lands
into
the
hand
of
Nebuchadnezzar
King
of
Babylon
my
servant
,
and
the
beasts
of
the
field
have
I
given
him
also
to
serve
him
;
And
all
Nations
shall
serve
him
,
and
his
son
,
and
his
sons
son
,
until
the
very
time
of
his
land
come
;
And
it
shall
come
to
pass
that
the
Nation
and
Kingdom
which
will
not
serve
the
same
Nebuchadnezzar
King
of
Babylon
,
and
that
will
not
put
their
neck
under
the
y●ke
of
the
King
of
Babylon
,
that
Nation
will
I
punish
,
saith
the
Lord
,
with
the
sword
,
and
with
the
famine
,
and
with
the
pestilence
;
Wherefore
serve
the
King
of
Babylon
,
and
live
.
We
see
by
this
how
great
a
measure
of
obedience
was
required
by
God
towards
that
fierce
and
cruel
Tyrant
,
only
because
he
was
advanced
to
the
Kingly
throne
,
and
did
by
consequence
participate
of
that
Regal
majesty
,
which
is
not
to
be
violated
without
grievous
sin
.
Let
us
therefore
have
this
always
in
our
minde
and
before
our
eyes
,
that
by
the
same
decree
of
God
,
on
which
the
power
of
Kings
is
constituted
,
the
very
wickedest
Princes
are
established
:
and
let
not
such
seditious
thoughts
be
admitted
by
us
,
that
is
to
say
,
that
we
must
deal
with
Kings
no
otherwise
then
they
do
deserve
;
and
that
it
is
no
right
nor
reason
,
that
we
should
shew
our selves
obedient
subjects
unto
him
,
who
doth
not
mutually
perform
the
duty
of
a
King
to
us
.
"
"
4.
It
is
a
poor
objection
which
some
men
have
made
,
I
have
given
,
saith
he
,
the
Kingdom
unto
Nebuchadnezzar
,
wherefore
serve
him
,
and
ye
shall
live
:
and
thereupon
it
needs
must
follow
,
that
upon
whomsoever
God
bestows
a
Kingdom
,
to
whom
we
must
address
our
servrce
;
and
that
assoon
as
God
hath
raised
any
to
the
Regal
Throne
,
he
doth
sufficiently
declare
his
will
to
be
,
that
he
would
have
that
man
to
reign
over
us
.
Some
general
testimonies
of
this
truth
are
in
holy
Scripture
;
SOLOMON
,
For
the
transgression
of
a
land
many
are
the
Princes
thereof
;
JOB
,
He
looseth
the
band
of
Kings
,
and
girdeth
their
loins
with
a
Girdle
.
Which
if
confessed
,
there
is
no
remedy
at
all
,
but
we
must
serve
those
Kings
,
if
we
mean
to
live
.
There
is
another
text
in
the
Prophet
Ieremie
,
by
which
the
people
are
commanded
,
to
seek
the
peace
of
Babylon
,
whither
God
had
caused
them
to
be
carried
away
captive
,
and
to
pray
unto
the
Lord
for
it
,
for
in
the
peace
thereof
was
their
peace
to
be
.
Behold
the
Israelites
being
dispoiled
of
their
estates
,
driven
from
their
houses
,
carried
into
exile
,
and
plunged
in
a
most
miserable
thraldom
,
are
yet
required
to
pray
for
the
prosperitie
of
the
Conquerour
:
not
only
as
we
are
commanded
in
another
place
to
pray
for
them
that
persecute
us
,
but
that
his
Empire
might
continue
in
peace
and
safetie
,
that
they
themselves
might
quietly
enjoy
the
protection
of
it
.
Thus
David
being
appointed
King
by
the
Lords
own
Ordinance
,
and
anointed
with
his
holy
Oyl
,
when
undeserved●y
he
was
persecuted
and
pursued
by
Saul
,
would
not
give
way
that
any
corporal
hurt
should
be
done
to
that
sacred
person
,
whom
God
had
raised
unto
the
Kingdom
.
The
Lord
forbid
,
saith
he
,
that
I
should
do
this
thing
unto
my
Master
the
Lords
anointed
,
to
stretch
forth
my
hand
against
him
,
seeing
he
is
the
Anointed
of
the
Lord
.
Again
,
But
mine
eye
spared
thee
,
a●d
I
said
,
I
will
not
put
forth
my
hand
against
my
Lord
,
for
he
is
the
Lords
Anointed
.
And
again
,
who
can
stretch
forth
his
hand
against
the
Lords
Anointed
,
and
be
guiltless
?
As
the
Lord
liveth
,
the
Lord
shall
smite
him
,
or
his
day
shall
come
to
die
,
or
he
shall
descend
into
battel
and
perish
.
The
Lord
forbid
that
I
should
stretch
my
hand
against
the
Lords
Anointed
.
"
This
reverence
and
dutiful
regard
we
ought
to
carrie
towards
our
Governours
,
unto
wrath
,
be
so
untractable
and
harsh
to
them
,
that
they
do
grieve
them
above
measure
with
continual
sowreness
;
and
that
husbands
who
are
commanded
to
love
their
wives
,
and
to
give
honour
to
them
as
the
weaker
vessel
,
should
use
them
with
contempt
and
scorn
:
should
therefore
children
be
the
less
obedient
to
their
Parents
,
or
wives
less
dutiful
to
their
husbands
?
We
see
the
contrary
,
that
they
are
subject
to
them
though
both
lewd
and
froward
.
Since
there●ore
nothing
doth
concern
us
more
,
then
that
we
trouble
not
our selves
with
looking
into
the
defects
of
other
men
,
but
carefully
endevour
to
perform
those
duties
which
do
belong
unto
our selves
;
more
specially
ought
they
to
observe
this
rule
,
who
live
under
the
authority
and
power
of
others
.
Wherefore
if
we
are
inhumanely
handled
by
a
cruel
Prince
,
or
by
a
covetous
and
luxurious
Prince
dispoiled
and
rifled
;
if
by
a
slothful
one
neglected
,
or
vexed
for
our
Religion
by
a
lewd
and
wicked
:
let
us
look
back
upon
our
sins
,
which
God
most
commonly
correcteth
with
this
kinde
of
scourges
;
the
thought
whereof
will
humble
us
,
and
keep
down
the
impatience
of
our
angry
spirits
.
Let
us
consider
with
our selves
,
that
it
appertains
not
unto
us
to
redress
these
mischiefs
;
that
all
which
doth
belong
to
us
is
to
crie
to
God
,
in
whose
hands
are
the
hearts
of
Kings
,
and
he
turneth
them
whither
soever
he
will
.
He
is
that
God
which
standeth
in
the
Congregation
of
the
mighty
,
and
judgeth
amongst
the
Gods
:
before
whose
face
all
Kings
shall
fall
and
be
confounded
,
and
all
the
Judges
●f
the
earth
who
do
not
reverence
his
CHRIST
,
but
make
unjust
laws
to
oppress
the
poor
,
and
offer
violence
to
the
man
of
low
condion
,
and
make
a
spoil
of
Widows
,
and
a
prey
of
Orphans
.
"
And
here
we
may
aswell
behold
his
goodness
,
"
5.
But
whatsoever
their
designes
and
intentions
were
,
Popular
Officers
,
ordained
to
moderate
the
licentiousness
of
Kings
,
(
such
as
the
Ephori
of
old
set
up
against
the
Kings
of
Sparta
,
the
Tribunes
of
the
people
against
the
Roman
Consuls
,
and
the
Demarchi
against
the
Athenian
Senate
;
and
with
which
power
,
perhaps
,
as
the
world
now
goes
,
the
three
Estates
are
furnished
in
each
several
Kingdom
,
when
they
are
solemnly
assembled
)
:
so
far
am
I
from
hindering
them
from
putting
a
restraint
on
the
exorbitant
power
of
Kings
,
as
their
Office
bindes
them
,
that
I
conceive
them
guiltie
rather
of
a
perfidious
dissimulation
,
if
they
con●ive
at
Kings
when
they
play
the
Tyrants
,
or
wantonly
insult
on
the
common
people
;
in
that
they
treacherously
betray
the
subjects
Libertie
,
of
which
they
know
they
were
made
guardians
by
Gods
own
Ordinance
and
appointment
.
"
But
this
must
always
be
excepted
,
in
the
obedience
which
we
have
determined
to
be
due
to
the
commands
of
our
Governors
,
and
first
of
all
to
be
observed
,
that
it
draw
us
not
from
that
obedience
which
is
due
to
him
,
to
whose
will
all
the
commands
of
Kings
must
be
subordinate
,
to
whose
decrees
their
strongest
mandates
must
give
place
,
and
before
whose
Majestie
they
are
bound
to
lay
down
their
Scepters
.
For
how
preposterous
were
it
to
incur
his
anger
,
by
our
compliance
with
those
men
,
whom
we
are
bound
no
otherwise
to
obey
,
then
for
his
sake
only
?
The
Lord
is
King
of
Kings
,
who
when
he
speaks
,
is
to
be
heard
for
all
,
and
above
them
all
.
We
must
be
subject
to
those
men
who
have
rule
over
us
,
but
in
him
alone
.
If
against
him
they
do
command
us
any
thing
,
it
is
to
be
of
none
account
.
Nor
in
such
cases
is
the
dignity
of
the
Magistrate
to
be
stood
upon
,
to
which
no
injurie
is
done
,
if
in
regard
of
the
more
eminent
and
supreme
power
of
God
,
it
be
restrained
within
its
bounds
.
Golden
Calves
,
they
left
the
Temple
of
the
Lord
,
and
betook
themselves
to
a
new
superstitious
worship
.
And
when
their
Children
and
posteritie
with
the
like
facility
applied
themselves
unto
the
humors
of
their
wicked
Kings
,
the
Prophet
doth
severely
rebuke
them
for
it
.
So
little
praise
doth
that
pretence
of
modesty
deserve
to
have
,
with
which
some
Court-Parasites
do
disguise
themselves
and
abuse
the
simple
,
affirming
it
to
be
a
crime
not
to
yeeld
obedience
to
any
thing
that
Kings
command
:
as
if
God
either
had
resigned
all
his
rights
and
interess
into
the
hands
of
mortal
men
,
when
he
made
them
Rulers
over
others
;
or
that
the
greatest
earthly
power
were
a
jot
diminished
,
by
being
subjected
to
its
Author
,
before
whom
all
the
powers
of
heaven
do
trembling
supplicate
.
I
know
that
great
and
imminent
danger
may
befall
those
men
,
who
dare
give
entertainment
to
so
brave
a
constancy
;
considering
with
what
indignation
Kings
do
take
the
matter
,
when
they
once
see
themselves
neglected
,
whose
indignation
is
as
the
messenger
of
death
,
saith
the
wise
man
Solomon
.
But
when
we
hear
this
Proclamation
made
by
the
heavenly
Cryer
,
we
ought
to
obey
God
rather
then
men
;
let
this
consideration
be
a
comfort
to
us
,
that
then
we
yeeld
that
obedience
unto
God
which
he
looks
for
from
us
,
when
we
rather
choose
to
suffer
any
thing
,
then
to
deviate
from
the
way
of
godliness
.
And
lest
our
hearts
should
fail
us
in
so
great
a
business
,
S.
Paul
subjoyns
another
motive
,
a
price
;
we
should
not
re-inthral
our selves
to
the
lusts
of
men
,
much
less
addict
our selves
to
the
works
of
wickedness
.
"
6.
These
are
the
very
words
of
Calvin
,
from
which
his
followers
and
Disciples
most
extreamly
differ
both
in
their
doctrine
,
and
their
practise
.
First
,
for
their
practise
,
CALVIN
requires
that
we
should
reverence
and
respect
the
Magistrate
for
his
Office
sake
[
a
](A86304-e16890-b)
a
Sect.
22.
;
and
that
we
entertain
no
other
then
a
fair
esteem
,
an
honorable
opinion
both
of
their
actions
,
and
their
Counsels
.
His
followers
(
like
filthy
dreamers
as
they
are
)
do
not
only
despise
dominion
[
b
](A86304-e16940-b)
b
Jude
8.
,
but
speak
evill
of
dignities
;
that
is
to
say
,
they
neither
reverence
the
persons
of
their
Supreme
Magistrate
,
nor
regard
their
Office
:
and
are
so
far
from
cherishing
a
good
opinion
of
those
higher
powers
to
which
the
Lord
hath
made
them
subject
,
that
their
hearts
imagine
mischief
against
them
all
the
day
long
;
and
though
they
see
no
cause
to
condemn
their
actions
,
they
will
be
sure
enough
to
misconstrue
the
end
.
CALVIN
requires
that
we
should
manifest
the
reverence
and
respect
we
bear
them
by
the
outward
actions
of
obedience
[
c
](A86304-e17060-b)
c
Sect.
23.
;
and
to
the
end
,
that
this
obedience
should
proceed
from
the
very
heart
and
not
to
be
counterfeit
and
false
,
he
addes
that
we
commend
their
health
and
flourishing
estate
in
our
prayers
to
God
[
d
](A86304-e17100-b)
d
Ibid.
.
His
Followers
study
nothing
more
then
to
disobey
them
,
in
every
one
of
those
particulars
which
their
Master
speaks
of
,
refusing
to
obey
their
laws
,
and
to
pay
them
tribute
,
and
to
undergoe
such
services
and
burdens
as
are
laid
upon
them
in
reference
to
the
publick
safety
,
&
spare
not
as
occasion
serves
to
manifest
the
disaffection
of
their
hearts
,
by
such
outward
acts
as
disobedience
and
disloyalty
can
suggest
unto
them
:
and
a●e
so
far
from
praying
for
them
,
that
many
times
they
pray
against
them
,
blaspheming
God
because
he
will
not
curse
the
King
,
and
making
that
which
they
call
Prayer
so
dangerous
and
lewd
a
libel
,
that
their
very
prayers
are
turned
to
sin
.
CALVIN
requires
such
moderation
in
the
subject
,
that
they
neither
intermeddle
in
affairs
of
State
,
nor
invade
the
Office
of
the
Magistrate
;
and
that
if
any
thing
be
amiss
in
the
publick
Government
which
stands
in
need
of
Reformation
,
they
presume
not
to
put
their
hands
unto
the
work
,
or
be
tumultuously
active
in
it
[
e
](A86304-e17340-b)
e
Sect.
23.
.
His
followers
will
not
trust
the
Magistrates
in
the
performance
of
their
own
Office
,
but
are
all
Counsellors
and
Statesmen
;
and
think
that
nothing
is
done
well
,
but
what
is
done
as
they
would
have
it
,
and
by
their
own
hands
too
,
none
other
.
Whether
things
be
amiss
or
not
,
they
must
needs
be
doing
.
Not
by
presenting
their
desires
for
a
Reformation
,
and
making
known
the
fault
(
if
such
fault
there
be
)
to
their
Supreme
Magistrates
,
which
was
the
way
their
Master
taught
them
;
but
by
raising
tumults
to
affright
them
:
The
attempt
of
the
French
Hugonots
at
Ambois
upon
Charles
the
ninth
,
and
the
two
tumults
at
Edenburgh
,
the
one
about
the
year
1593.
against
the
person
of
King
James
,
and
the
other
in
the
year
1637.
against
the
Ministers
of
King
Charles
,
will
not
be
forgotten
whilest
Calvin
and
his
Institutions
are
in
print
amongst
us
.
CALVIN
requires
that
we
should
yeeld
obedience
not
only
to
such
Kings
and
Princes
,
which
faithfully
and
as
they
ought
do
discharge
their
Office
,
but
even
to
all
those
also
which
do
nothing
less
then
perform
their
duties
[
f
](A86304-e17550-b)
f
Sect.
25.
,
not
only
to
the
meek
and
gentle
,
but
even
unto
the
fiercest
and
most
cruel
Tyrant
,
if
any
such
be
raised
by
God
to
the
Kingly
throne
[
g
](A86304-e17580-b)
g
Sect.
27.
.
His
followers
resolve
not
to
yeeld
obedience
to
their
Kings
and
Princes
,
though
they
can
charge
them
with
no
fault
but
their
too
much
lenity
;
unless
it
be
that
they
have
caused
them
to
surfeit
upon
peace
and
plenty
,
or
that
the
people
grew
too
rich
,
and
lived
too
happily
,
and
drove
too
great
a
Trade
,
under
their
command
:
and
are
so
far
from
yeelding
obedience
to
a
Tyrant
,
or
a
severer
and
cruel
Prince
,
call
him
which
you
will
,
that
neither
the
innocent
minoritie
of
Charles
the
ninth
,
nor
the
moderate
Government
of
the
Duchess
of
Parma
,
in
the
Netherlands
;
nor
the
milde
peaceable
temper
of
King
James
when
he
reigned
in
Scotland
,
could
save
them
from
their
insolencies
and
insurrections
.
Finally
CALVIN
doth
declare
that
though
we
be
inhumanely
handled
by
a
cruel
Prince
,
or
by
a
covetous
and
luxurious
Prince
dispoyled
and
rifled
;
though
by
a
slothful
one
neglected
,
or
vexed
for
our
Religion
by
a
lewd
and
wicked
,
yet
it
pertains
not
unto
us
to
redress
these
mischiefs
;
that
all
the
remedie
that
we
have
is
to
cry
to
God
[
h
](A86304-e17770-b)
h
Sect.
29.
,
and
till
God
takes
the
work
in
hand
,
to
obey
and
suffer
[
i
](A86304-e17790-b)
i
Sect.
31.
:
and
absolutely
condemns
those
seditious
thoughts
,
(
which
some
men
are
too
apt
to
harbour
)
that
we
must
deal
with
Kings
no
otherwise
then
they
shall
deserve
[
k
](A86304-e17820-b)
k
Sect.
27.
:
His
Followers
,
if
they
think
themselves
oppressed
,
though
indeed
they
are
not
;
or
that
Religion
is
in
danger
,
though
indeed
it
be
not
;
or
the
honor
of
the
State
neglected
,
though
never
of
so
much
repute
,
nor
so
bravely
managed
:
will
not
descend
so
low
as
to
cry
to
God
,
or
be
so
pusillan●mous
and
so
poorly
minded
,
as
only
to
obey
and
suffer
(
that
were
a
weakness
fit
for
none
but
the
primitive
Christians
)
;
but
take
the
sword
into
their
hands
(
be
it
right
or
wrong
)
to
force
their
Kings
to
come
unto
a
reckoning
with
them
,
as
if
they
would
have
reparation
from
them
for
their
former
sufferings
,
and
could
have
reparation
no
way
but
that
.
And
as
for
dealing
with
their
Kings
no
otherwise
then
they
do
deserve
,
although
the
maxime
be
unsafe
,
and
the
very
thought
thereof
seditious
,
as
their
Master
tells
them
;
would
they
would
hold
themselves
to
that
,
which
had
they
done
,
so
many
Kings
in
Christendom
had
not
been
so
unjustly
handled
,
driven
from
their
Palaces
,
expelled
their
Cities
,
robbed
of
their
Fortresses
and
Revenues
,
assaulted
in
the
open
fields
,
and
forced
sometimes
to
change
both
their
Counsel
and
their
Guards
,
(
the
ordinary
practise
by
the
Hugonots
in
France
,
the
Presbyterians
in
Scotland
,
the
Calvinists
in
the
Netherlands
,
and
indeed
where
not
?
)
had
they
been
dealt
withall
no
otherwise
then
they
deserved
.
7.
Next
let
us
look
upon
them
in
their
points
of
doctrine
,
and
we
shall
finde
the
Scholars
and
their
Master
at
a
greater
distance
,
then
before
we
saw
them
at
in
point
of
practise
.
CALVIN
determines
very
soundly
that
Kings
have
their
authoritie
from
none
but
God
,
non
nisi
a
se
habere
imperium
[
l
](A86304-e18050-b)
l
Sect.
25.
,
that
the
supreme
Magistracie
is
a
jurisdiction
devolved
from
God
upon
the
person
of
the
Magistrate
or
delegata
a
Deo
jurisdictio
[
m
](A86304-e18070-b)
m
Sect.
22.
;
that
it
is
the
singular
work
or
act
of
God
to
dispose
of
Kingdoms
,
and
to
set
up
such
Kings
as
to
him
seems
meet
,
which
he
calls
Singularem
Dei
actionem
in
distribuendis
Regnis
,
statuendisque
QUOS
ILLI
VISVM
FVERIT
REGIBVS
[
n
](A86304-e18090-b)
n
Sect.
26.
,
and
finally
that
in
every
King
or
Supreme
Governor
,
there
is
inviolabilis
majestas
,
an
indelible
character
of
Majestia
imprinted
by
the
hand
of
God
.
His
Scholars
tell
us
that
Kings
are
only
creatures
of
the
peoples
making
;
and
that
whatever
power
they
have
,
is
derived
from
them
.
The
Observator
,
and
the
Fuller
Answer
unto
Dr.
Fern
,
and
almost
all
our
later
Scriblers
do
resolve
it
so
.
They
tell
us
secondly
,
(
which
must
needs
follow
from
the
former
)
that
the
people
have
the
sole
power
of
disposing
Kingdoms
,
and
setting
up
such
Kings
as
they
list
themselves
;
and
being
so
set
up
,
that
there
is
no
more
Majestie
,
no
brighter
beam
of
Gods
divinitie
in
them
,
then
in
other
men
.
Buchannan
so
affirms
for
certain
,
Populo
jus
est
,
imperium
cui
velit
deferat
[
o
](A86304-e18190-b)
o
Buchannan
de
jure
regni
.
;
and
confidently
reckoneth
those
reverend
attributes
of
Majestie
and
Highness
,
which
usually
are
given
to
Kings
and
Princes
,
inter
soloecismos
&
barbarismos
Aulicos
[
p
](A86304-e18230-b)
p
Id.
in
Epist.
ad
,
amongst
the
Solecisms
and
absurdities
of
Princes
Courts
.
CALVIN
determines
very
Oxthodoxly
,
that
though
the
King
degenerate
and
become
a
tyrant
,
though
he
infringe
the
subjects
liberties
,
and
invade
their
fortunes
,
persecute
them
for
their
pietie
,
and
neglect
their
safetie
,
and
be
besides
a
vitious
and
libidinous
person
;
yet
still
his
Subjects
are
to
look
upon
him
,
in
all
things
which
pertain
to
their
publick
duties
,
with
as
much
honour
and
obedience
,
as
they
would
do
the
justest
and
most
vertuous
Prince
that
was
ever
given
unto
a
people
.
Eadem
in
reverentia
&
dignatione
habendum
,
quantum
ad
publicam
obedientiam
attinet
,
qua
optimum
Regem
si
dare●ur
habituri
essent
[
q
](A86304-e18300-b)
q
Sect.
25.
.
His
Scholars
sing
another
song
,
and
use
all
arts
imaginable
to
excite
the
people
to
rise
against
them
and
destroy
them
.
The
Author
of
that
scandalous
and
dangerous
Dialogue
,
entituled
Eusebius
Philadelphus
doth
expresly
say
,
that
of
all
good
actions
the
murther
of
a
Tyrant
is
most
commendable
[
r
](A86304-e18360-b)
r
Euseb
Philadelph
.
Dial.
.
Buchannan
accounts
it
a
defect
in
Polities
,
proemia
eorum
interfectoribus
non
decerni
[
s
](A86304-e18390-b)
s
Buchannan
de
jure
regni
.
;
that
publick
honors
and
rewards
are
not
propounded
unto
such
as
shall
kill
a
Tyrant
:
and
some
late
Pamphleters
conclude
it
lawful
to
rebel
in
the
case
of
tyrannie
,
because
forsooth
,
If
a
King
exercising
tyrannie
over
his
subjects
may
not
be
resisted
,
(
that
is
to
say
,
if
the
subject
may
not
take
up
Arms
against
him
)
he
and
his
followers
may
destroy
the
Kingdom
.
And
now
we
are
fallen
upon
the
business
of
resistance
,
CALVIN
allows
of
no
case
(
for
ought
I
can
see
)
in
which
the
Subject
lawfully
may
resist
the
Soveraign
;
quandoquidem
resisti
magistratui
non
potest
quin
simul
resistatur
Deo
[
t
](A86304-e18500-b)
t
Sect.
23.
,
for
as
much
as
the
Magistrate
cannot
be
resisted
,
but
that
God
is
resisted
also
:
and
reckoning
up
those
several
pressures
whereof
Samuel
spake
unto
the
Jews
,
and
which
he
calls
jus
Regis
,
as
himself
translates
it
,
he
concludes
at
last
,
cui
parere
ipsi
necesse
esset
,
nec
obsistere
liceret
[
u
](A86304-e18590-b)
u
Sect.
●6
.
,
that
no
resistance
must
be
made
on
the
Subjects
part
,
though
Kings
entrench
as
much
upon
them
,
both
in
their
liberties
and
properties
,
as
the
Prophet
speaks
of
.
His
Scholars
are
grown
wiser
,
and
instruct
us
otherwise
.
Paraeus
saith
,
that
if
the
King
assault
our
persons
,
or
endevour
to
break
into
our
houses
,
we
may
as
lawfully
resist
him
,
as
we
would
do
a
Theif
or
Robber
on
the
like
occasions
[
x
](A86304-e18660-b)
x
Paraeus
in
Rom.
cap.
13.
.
And
our
new
Masters
have
found
out
many
other
Cases
in
which
the
Subject
may
resist
,
and
which
is
more
then
so
,
is
bound
to
do
it
,
as
namely
in
his
own
behalf
,
and
in
Gods
behalf
,
in
behalf
of
his
Countrey
,
and
in
behalf
of
the
laws
;
and
in
so
many
more
behalfs
,
that
they
have
turned
most
Christian
Kings
out
of
half
their
Kingdoms
.
But
to
go
on
,
CALVIN
determines
very
rightly
,
that
notwithstanding
any
contract
made
or
supposed
to
be
made
between
a
King
and
his
people
,
yet
if
the
King
do
break
his
Covenants
and
oppress
the
subject
,
the
subject
can
no
more
pretend
to
be
discharged
of
his
Allegiance
,
then
the
wife
may
lawfully
divorce
herself
from
a
froward
husband
;
or
children
throw
aside
that
natural
dutie
which
they
owe
their
Parents
,
because
their
Parents
are
unkinde
,
and
it
may
be
cruel
.
Those
which
doe
otherwise
conclude
from
the
foresaid
contract
,
he
calls
insulsos
ratio
cinatores
[
y
](A86304-e18770-b)
y
Sect.
29.
,
but
sorrie
and
unsavorie
disputants
:
and
reckoneth
it
for
a
seditious
imagination
,
that
we
must
deal
no
otherwise
with
Kings
then
they
do
deserve
,
nec
aequum
esse
ut
subditos
einos
praestemus
,
qui
vicissim
Regem
nobis
non
se
praestet
[
z
](A86304-e18810-b)
z
Sect.
27.
,
or
to
imagine
that
it
is
neither
sense
nor
reason
that
we
should
shew
our selves
obedient
subjects
unto
him
,
who
doth
not
mutually
perform
the
dutie
of
a
King
to
us
.
His
Scholars
are
grown
able
to
teach
their
Master
a
new
lesson
,
and
would
tell
him
,
if
he
were
alive
,
that
there
is
a
mutual
contract
between
King
and
Subjects
;
and
if
he
break
the
Covenant
,
he
forfeiteth
the
benefit
of
the
Agreement
,
and
he
not
performing
the
dutie
of
a
King
,
they
are
released
from
the
dutie
of
subjects
.
As
contrary
to
their
Masters
Tenet
as
black
to
white
;
and
yet
some
late
Pamphlets
press
no
doctrine
with
such
strength
and
eagerness
,
as
they
have
done
this
:
Nor
have
the
Pulpits
spared
to
publish
it
to
their
cheated
Auditories
,
as
a
new
Article
of
faith
,
that
if
the
Ruler
perform
not
his
dutie
,
the
contract
is
dissolved
,
and
the
people
are
at
liberty
to
right
themselves
.
What
excellent
uses
have
been
raised
from
this
dangerous
doctrine
,
as
many
Kings
of
Christendom
have
felt
already
,
so
posteritie
will
have
cause
to
lament
the
mischiefs
which
it
will
bring
into
the
world
in
succeeding
Ages
.
Finally
CALVIN
hath
determined
,
and
ex●eeding
piously
,
that
if
the
Magistrate
command
us
any
thing
which
is
contrarie
to
the
Will
and
Word
of
God
,
we
must
observe
S.
Peters
rule
,
and
rather
choose
to
obey
God
,
then
men
:
and
that
witha●l
we
must
prepare
our selves
to
endure
such
punishments
as
the
offended
Magistrate
shall
inflict
upon
us
,
for
the
said
refusal
;
Et
quicquid
potius
perpeti
quam
a
veritate
defiectere
[
a
](A86304-e19030-b)
a
Sect.
32.
,
and
rather
suffer
any
torments
,
then
forsake
the
way
of
Gods
Commandements
.
The
Magistrate
,
as
it
seems
by
him
,
must
at
all
times
be
honoured
by
us
,
either
in
our
active
obedience
,
or
in
our
passive
;
if
we
refuse
to
do
his
will
,
we
must
be
content
to
suffer
for
it
.
His
Scholars
are
too
wise
to
submit
to
that
,
and
are
so
far
from
suffering
for
the
testimony
of
the
Gospel
and
a
good
conscience
,
that
they
take
care
to
teach
the
people
that
it
is
lawful
to
rebel
in
behalf
of
God
,
to
preserve
the
true
religion
when
it
is
in
danger
(
or
when
they
think
it
is
in
danger
)
by
force
of
Arms
,
and
to
procure
the
peace
of
Hierusalem
by
the
destruction
of
Babylon
.
Which
being
so
,
the
difference
being
so
great
and
irreconcileable
between
the
Followers
and
their
leader
in
the
point
of
practise
,
between
the
Master
and
the
Scholars
in
the
points
of
doctrine
:
me
thinks
it
were
exceeding
fit
the
man
were
either
less
admired
,
or
better
followed
;
that
they
who
cry
him
up
for
the
great
Reformer
,
would
either
stand
to
all
his
Tenets
,
or
be
bound
to
none
;
that
they
would
be
so
careful
of
the
Churches
peace
,
and
their
own
salvation
,
as
not
to
swallow
down
his
errors
in
his
points
of
discipline
,
and
pass
him
by
with
a
Magister
non
tenetur
,
when
he
doth
preach
obedience
to
them
,
and
doth
so
solidly
discourse
of
the
powers
of
Government
.
[
b
](A86304-e19290-b)
b
Tully
Philip.
2.
Aut
undique
religionem
[
suam
]
tollant
,
aut
usquequaque
conservent
,
as
Tully
said
of
Antony
in
another
case
.
But
of
this
no
more
.
9.
Hitherto
CALVIN
hath
done
well
,
few
better
;
of
the
Genevian
Doctors
none
,
ne
unus
quidem
,
not
so
much
as
one
.
But
there
's
an
herb
which
spoils
the
pottage
,
an
HERB
so
venomous
,
that
it
is
mors
in
olla
unto
them
that
taste
it
.
The
figs
in
the
next
basket
are
evill
,
very
evill
,
not
to
be
eaten
,
(
as
it
is
in
the
Prophets
words
)
they
are
so
evill
.
In
that
before
he
did
exceeding
soundly
and
judiciously
lay
down
the
doctrine
of
obedience
unto
Kings
and
Princes
,
and
the
unlawfulness
of
Subjects
taking
Arms
against
their
Soveraign
.
In
this
to
come
he
openeth
a
most
dangerous
gap
to
disobedience
and
rebellions
in
most
States
in
Christendom
,
in
which
his
name
is
either
reverenced
or
his
works
esteemed
of
.
For
having
fully
pressed
the
points
before
delivered
unto
the
conscience
of
the
subject
,
and
utterly
disabled
them
from
lifting
up
their
hands
against
the
Supreme
Magistrate
,
or
any
occasion
whatsoever
:
he
shews
them
how
to
help
themselves
,
and
what
course
to
take
,
for
the
asserting
of
their
liberties
,
and
the
recovery
of
their
rights
,
if
the
Prince
invade
them
;
by
telling
them
that
all
he
spake
before
was
of
private
persons
[
c
](A86304-e19550-b)
c
Sect.
31.
,
but
that
if
there
were
any
popular
Officers
,
such
as
the
Ephori
of
Sparta
,
the
Tribunes
of
Rome
,
the
Demarchi
of
Athens
,
ordained
for
the
restraint
of
Kings
,
and
Supreme
Governors
,
it
never
was
his
meaning
to
include
them
in
it
.
And
such
power
he
doth
suppose
to
be
in
the
three
Estates
of
every
Kingdom
,
when
they
are
solemnly
assembled
;
whom
he
condemns
as
guiltie
of
perfidious
dissimulation
,
and
the
betrayers
of
the
Subjects
liberties
,
whereof
they
are
the
proper
and
appointed
Guard●ans
,
if
they
connive
at
Kings
when
they
play
the
Tyrants
,
or
want
only
insult
on
the
Common
people
.
This
is
the
gap
through
which
rebellions
and
seditions
have
found
so
plausible
a
passage
in
the
Christian
world
,
to
the
dethroning
of
some
Kings
and
Princes
,
the
death
of
others
.
For
through
this
gap
,
broke
in
those
dangerous
and
seditious
doctrines
,
that
the
inferiour
Magistrates
are
ordained
by
God
,
and
not
appointed
by
the
King
,
or
the
Supreme
Powers
;
that
being
so
ordained
by
God
,
they
are
by
him
inabled
to
compel
the
King
to
rule
according
unto
justice
and
the
laws
established
;
that
if
the
King
be
refractary
and
and
unreclaimable
,
they
are
to
call
him
to
account
,
and
to
provide
for
the
safety
of
the
Common-wealth
by
all
ways
and
means
which
may
conduce
unto
the
preservation
of
it
:
and
finally
(
which
is
the
darling
doctrine
of
these
later
times
)
that
there
is
a
mixture
in
all
Governments
,
and
that
the
three
Estates
conveened
in
Parliament
(
or
by
what
other
name
so
ever
we
do
call
their
meeting
)
are
not
subordinate
to
the
King
,
but
co-ordinate
with
him
;
and
have
not
only
a
supplemental
power
,
to
supply
what
is
defective
in
him
,
but
a
coercive
also
to
restrain
his
Actions
,
&
a
corrective
too
to
reform
his
Errors
.
But
this
I
give
you
now
in
the
generals
only
;
hereafter
you
shall
see
it
more
particularly
,
and
every
Author
cited
in
his
own
words
for
the
proof
hereof
.
Many
of
which
as
they
did
live
in
CALVINS
time
,
and
by
their
writings
gave
great
scandal
to
all
soveraign
Princes
,
but
more
as
to
the
progress
of
the
Reformation
;
so
could
not
CALVIN
choose
but
be
made
acquainted
with
the
effects
and
consequences
of
his
dangerous
principles
.
Which
since
he
never
did
retract
,
upon
the
sight
of
those
seditious
Pamphlets
,
and
worse
then
those
,
those
bloudie
tumults
and
rebellions
which
ensued
upon
it
;
but
let
it
stand
unaltered
to
his
dying
day
:
is
a
cleer
argument
to
me
,
that
this
passage
fell
not
from
his
pen
by
chance
,
but
was
laid
of
purpose
as
a
Stumbling-block
in
the
Subjects
way
,
to
make
him
fall
in
the
performance
of
his
Christian
duty
both
to
God
and
man
.
For
though
the
Book
of
Institutions
had
been
often
printed
in
his
life
time
,
and
received
many
alterations
and
additions
(
as
being
enlarged
from
a
small
Octavo
,
of
not
above
29
sheets
,
to
a
large
folio
of
160
)
yet
this
particular
passage
still
remained
unchanged
,
and
hath
continued
as
it
is
from
the
first
Edition
of
it
,
which
was
in
the
year
1536.
not
long
after
his
first
coming
to
Geneva
.
10.
But
to
proceed
in
our
design
.
What
fruits
these
dangerous
doctrines
have
produced
amongst
us
,
we
have
seen
too
plainly
;
and
we
may
see
as
plainly
,
if
we
be
not
blinde
,
through
what
gap
these
doctrines
entred
,
on
what
foundation
they
were
built
,
and
unto
whose
authoritie
we
stand
indebted
for
all
those
miseries
and
calamities
which
are
fallen
upon
us
.
Yet
to
say
truth
,
the
man
desired
to
be
concealed
,
and
not
reputed
for
the
Author
of
such
strange
conclusions
which
have
resulted
from
his
principles
:
and
therefore
laies
it
down
with
great
art
and
caution
.
Si
qui
,
and
Fortè
,
and
ut
nunc
res
habent
,
that
is
to
say
,
Perhaps
,
and
as
the
world
now
goes
,
and
if
there
be
such
Officers
as
have
been
formerly
,
are
the
three
disguises
,
which
he
hath
masked
himself
and
the
point
withall
,
that
he
might
pass
away
unseen
.
And
if
there
be
such
Officers
as
perhaps
there
are
,
or
that
the
world
goes
here
as
it
did
at
Sparta
,
or
in
the
States
of
Rome
and
Athens
;
as
perhaps
it
doth
;
or
that
the
three
Estates
,
of
each
several
Kingdom
have
the
same
authoritie
in
them
as
the
Ephori
,
the
Demarchi
,
and
the
Tribunes
had
,
as
perhaps
they
have
;
the
Subject
is
no
doubt
in
a
good
condition
,
as
good
a
man
as
the
best
Monarch
of
them
all
.
But
if
the
Ephori
,
the
Demarchi
and
the
Tribunes
,
were
not
appointed
at
the
first
for
the
restiaint
and
regulating
of
the
Supreme
Powers
,
as
indeed
they
were
not
;
and
if
the
three
Estates
in
each
several
Kingdom
have
not
that
authoritie
,
which
the
Ephori
,
and
the
Tribunes
did
in
fine
usurp
,
and
the
Demarchi
are
supposed
to
have
,
as
indeed
they
have
not
;
perhaps
and
peradventure
will
not
serve
the
turn
.
The
subject
stands
upon
no
better
grounds
,
then
before
he
did
.
Therefore
to
take
away
this
stumbling-block
and
remove
this
rub
,
I
shall
propose
and
prove
these
three
points
ensuing
.
1.
That
the
Ephori
,
the
Demarchi
,
and
the
Roman
Tribunes
were
not
instituted
at
the
first
,
for
those
ends
and
purposes
,
which
are
supposed
by
the
Author
.
2.
If
they
were
instituted
for
those
ends
,
yet
the
illation
thereupon
would
be
weak
and
childish
,
as
it
relates
to
Kings
and
Kingdoms
;
And
3.
That
the
three
Estates
in
each
several
Kingdom
without
all
peradventures
have
no
such
authoritie
,
as
the
Author
dreams
of
,
and
therefore
of
no
power
to
controul
their
King
.
Which
if
I
clearly
prove
,
as
I
hope
I
shall
,
I
doubt
not
but
to
leave
the
cause
in
a
better
condition
then
I
found
it
.
And
in
the
proof
of
these
,
the
first
point
especially
,
if
it
be
thought
that
I
insist
longer
then
I
needed
on
the
condition
of
the
Spartan
Ephori
,
the
Roman
Tribunes
,
and
the
Demarchi
of
Athens
,
and
spend
more
cost
upon
it
then
the
thing
is
worth
;
I
must
intreat
the
Reader
to
excuse
me
in
it
.
I
must
first
lay
my
grounds
and
make
sure
work
there
,
before
I
go
about
my
building
:
And
being
my
design
relates
particularly
to
the
information
and
instruction
of
the
English
Subject
,
I
could
not
make
my
way
unto
it
,
but
by
a
discoverie
of
the
means
and
Artifices
,
by
which
some
petit
popular
Officers
attained
unto
so
great
a
masterie
in
the
game
of
Government
,
as
to
give
the
Check
unto
their
Kings
.
Which
being
premised
once
for
all
,
I
now
proced
unto
the
proof
of
the
points
proposed
,
and
having
proved
these
points
,
I
shall
make
an
end
.
Haec
tria
cum
docuero
perorabo
,
in
the
Orators
language
.
CHAP.
II.
Of
the
Authority
of
Ephori
in
the
State
of
Sparta
;
and
that
they
were
not
instituted
for
the
ends
supposed
by
Calvin
.
-
(
I
)
The
Kings
of
Sparta
absolute
Monarchs
at
the
first
.
-
(
II
)
Of
the
declining
of
the
Regal
power
,
and
the
condition
of
that
State
,
when
Lycurgus
undertook
to
change
the
Government
.
-
(
III
)
What
power
Lycurgus
gave
the
Senate
;
and
what
was
left
unto
the
Kings
.
-
(
IV
)
The
Ephori
appointed
by
the
Kings
of
Sparta
to
ease
themselves
,
and
curb
the
Senate
.
-
(
V
)
The
blundering
and
mistakes
of
Joseph
Scaliger
about
the
first
Institution
of
the
Ephori
.
-
(
VI
)
The
Ephori
from
mean
beginnings
grew
to
great
authoritie
;
and
by
what
advantages
.
-
(
VII
)
The
power
and
influence
which
they
had
in
the
publick
Government
.
-
(
VIII
)
By
what
degrees
the
Ephori
incroached
on
the
Spartan
Kings
.
-
(
IX
)
The
insolencies
of
the
Ephori
towards
their
Kings
altered
the
State
into
a
Tyrannie
.
-
(
X
)
The
Spartan
Kings
stomach
the
insolencie
of
the
Ephori
,
and
at
last
utterly
destroy
them
.
-
(
IX
)
An
application
of
the
former
passages
to
the
point
in
hand
.
I.
I
Know
it
is
conceived
by
some
that
the
Kings
of
Sparta
were
but
titularie
[
a
](A86304-e20770-b)
a
Unlawfulness
of
resistance
,
p.
90.
,
that
they
were
little
more
then
Subjects
,
at
best
of
no
more
power
and
influence
in
the
publick
Government
,
then
the
Duke
of
Venice
at
this
day
in
that
Republick
.
And
to
say
truth
,
they
were
but
little
better
in
the
latter
times
,
(
though
not
altogether
so
restrained
)
after
Lycurgus
first
,
and
the
Ephori
afterwards
,
had
by
their
power
and
practises
intrenched
upon
them
;
and
pared
away
so
many
of
the
fairest
Jewels
in
the
Regal
Diadem
.
But
ab
initio
non
fuit
sic
,
it
was
not
so
from
the
beginning
:
the
Spartan
Kings
being
at
first
as
absolute
Monarchs
as
any
other
of
those
times
,
ubi
addictius
regnabantur
[
b
](A86304-e20870-b)
b
Tacit.
Annal.
,
when
men
were
most
devoted
to
the
will
of
Princes
.
For
if
we
look
into
the
antient
stories
of
the
States
of
Greece
,
it
will
there
be
found
,
that
at
the
return
of
the
Heraclidae
into
Peloponnesus
,
under
the
conduct
of
Temenus
,
Ctesiphon
,
and
Aristodemus
,
the
sons
of
Aristomachus
of
the
race
of
Hercules
;
Temenus
possessed
himself
of
Argos
,
Ctesiphon
of
Messene
,
and
Aristodemus
conquered
the
City
and
Dominion
of
Sparta
;
which
,
dying
very
shortly
after
,
he
left
unto
his
two
sons
Eurysthenes
,
and
Procles
[
c
](A86304-e21010-b)
c
Pausanias
in
Lacon
.
l.
3.
,
with
the
authority
and
name
of
Kings
.
So
that
acquiring
the
estate
by
conquest
,
and
claiming
by
no
other
Title
then
by
that
of
Arms
,
there
is
no
question
to
be
made
but
that
they
governed
in
the
way
of
absolute
Monarchs
:
it
being
not
the
guise
of
such
as
come
in
by
conquest
to
covenant
and
capitulate
with
their
Subjects
,
but
to
impose
their
will
,
for
a
law
,
upon
them
;
In
the
first
times
,
and
in
Dominion
so
acquired
,
Arbitria
Principum
pro
legibus
erant
[
d
](A86304-e21030-b)
d
Justin
.
hist.
l.
1.
,
as
we
read
in
Justine
.
'T
is
true
,
the
Royal
Familie
was
divided
from
the
very
first
,
into
two
Regal
Stems
or
Branches
,
both
honoured
with
the
name
of
Kings
,
both
ruling
the
Estate
in
common
by
their
mutual
Counsels
;
of
which
the
eldest
house
was
that
of
Agidae
,
so
called
from
Agis
,
son
and
Successor
unto
Eurysthenes
;
the
second
that
of
the
Eurypontidae
,
denominated
from
Eurypon
,
the
third
from
Procles
[
e
](A86304-e21110-b)
e
Pausanias
l.
3.
.
It
was
appointed
so
to
be
by
Aristodemus
,
confirmed
by
the
Oracle
of
Apollo
,
and
so
continued
till
the
subjugating
of
all
Greece
to
Macedon
.
But
this
concludes
no
more
against
absolute
Monarchie
,
then
if
it
should
be
said
on
the
like
occasion
,
that
the
Roman
Emperors
were
no
Monarchs
,
or
that
State
no
Monarchie
,
because
Carus
and
Numerianus
,
Diocletian
and
Maximianus
,
Constantius
and
Maximinus
ruled
the
same
together
;
as
after
Valentinian
and
his
Brother
Valens
,
and
the
two
sons
of
Valentinian
and
Theodosius
did
by
their
example
.
And
so
it
seems
it
was
conceived
by
Cleomenes
,
who
having
rooted
out
the
Ephori
,
and
being
grown
almost
as
absolute
in
the
State
of
Sparta
,
as
any
of
his
Predecessors
,
caused
his
Brother
Euclidas
(
upon
the
expiration
of
the
Eurypontidae
)
to
be
made
King
with
him
[
f
](A86304-e21330-b)
f
Plutarch
.
in
Agis
&
Cleomen
.
:
which
certainly
he
would
not
have
done
,
had
he
believed
that
the
assuming
of
a
partner
would
have
made
him
less
.
For
that
the
Spartan
Kings
were
as
absolute
Monarchs
as
any
others
of
those
times
(
when
there
was
almost
no
form
of
Government
in
the
world
but
that
)
doth
appear
by
Plutarch
,
where
speaking
of
the
condition
of
that
Government
in
the
time
of
Eurypon
(
whom
he
calls
Eurytion
)
he
saith
that
it
was
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
[
g
](A86304-e21400-b)
g
Plutarch
.
Lycurgo
.
,
sufficiently
Monarchical
,
if
it
were
not
more
.
And
hereto
Aristotle
doth
agree
,
who
stiles
the
Government
of
Sparta
under
Charilaus
;
before
whose
times
(
by
reason
of
the
negligence
and
connivence
of
some
former
Kings
)
the
people
were
become
too
head-strong
to
be
kept
in
order
,
by
the
name
of
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
[
h
](A86304-e21460-b)
h
Aristot
.
Polit.
lib.
5.
cap.
12.
,
the
tyrannie
or
absolute
command
of
Charilaus
in
the
State
of
Sparta
.
But
whatsoever
it
was
in
the
first
foundation
,
it
held
not
very
long
in
so
good
condition
.
For
Eurypon
the
Nephew
of
Procles
,
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
[
i
](A86304-e21550-b)
i
Plutarch
.
in
Lycurg
.
,
affecting
to
be
plausible
and
gracious
with
the
common
people
,
improvidently
let
loose
the
reigns
of
Government
,
and
was
the
first
that
laid
aside
that
sole
and
absolute
power
of
a
King
;
whereupon
followed
great
disorder
and
distraction
,
which
continued
long
.
For
the
people
finding
themselves
at
liberty
,
became
very
bold
and
disobedient
;
some
of
the
Kings
which
did
succeed
being
hated
to
the
very
death
,
because
they
did
indevour
the
recovery
of
their
old
authoritie
;
others
being
forced
to
dissemble
and
wink
at
any
thing
,
either
in
hope
thereby
to
gain
the
love
of
the
people
,
or
because
indeed
they
were
not
strong
enough
to
rule
them
.
And
this
did
so
increase
the
stomach
of
the
dissolute
and
rebellious
multitude
,
that
Eunomus
the
Father
of
Lycurgus
,
being
the
fifth
King
from
Procles
,
and
the
third
from
Eurypon
,
was
slain
amongst
them
in
a
tumult
.
At
such
a
dear
and
costly
rate
did
Eurypon
procure
the
favour
and
good
will
of
the
rascall
rabble
;
by
which
he
purchased
nothing
but
the
losse
of
Royalty
,
besides
the
empty
honour
of
having
the
second
house
of
the
Royal
Family
to
be
called
by
his
name
,
the
Eurypontidae
.
Things
growing
thus
from
bad
to
worse
,
and
both
the
Kings
and
people
waxing
weary
of
that
disorder
and
confusion
which
did
reign
amongst
them
;
both
parties
cast
their
eyes
upon
Lycurgus
,
of
whose
integrity
and
wisdome
they
had
conceived
a
great
opinion
.
For
the
people
finding
that
their
Kings
had
nothing
but
the
name
and
title
,
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
,
and
nothing
else
whereby
they
differed
from
the
rest
,
sent
many
a
several
message
to
him
to
require
his
counsel
:
And
on
the
other
side
,
the
Kings
were
as
desirous
that
he
should
return
(
being
then
gone
abroad
to
travel
)
in
hope
that
the
authority
of
his
presence
would
bridle
and
restrain
the
people
from
their
insolency
and
disobedience
towards
them
.
[
k
](A86304-e21640-b)
k
Id.
ibid.
But
herein
they
were
both
deceived
.
For
Lycurgus
seeing
how
things
stood
,
resolved
to
apply
himself
to
neither
party
;
but
presently
began
to
project
and
cast
how
he
might
change
and
alter
the
whole
frame
of
Government
:
which
to
effect
,
he
armed
himself
and
his
Associates
,
and
possessed
the
market-place
,
and
so
proceeded
to
the
alteration
which
he
meant
to
make
.
[
l
](A86304-e21660-b)
l
Id.
ibid.
et
in
Agis
&
Cleomen
.
Charilaus
who
was
then
King
,
being
forced
to
fly
for
sanctuary
to
the
Temple
of
Juno
.
But
Plato
saith
there
was
another
motive
which
induced
him
to
attempt
this
change
,
which
was
the
ill
success
the
other
Kings
his
kindred
of
the
house
of
Hercules
had
found
at
Argos
and
Messene
;
where
by
degrees
degenerating
from
a
Monarchy
unto
a
Tyranny
,
they
were
in
a
fair
way
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
,
to
overthrow
themselves
,
their
subjects
,
and
their
whole
estates
.
To
prevent
this
at
Sparta
,
which
he
dearly
loved
,
and
to
preserve
his
Family
and
the
State
together
,
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
[
m
](A86304-e21780-b)
m
P●at
.
Epist.
8.
,
he
set
up
the
authority
of
the
Senate
as
the
only
medicine
,
to
cure
the
miserable
distemper
which
the
State
was
in
.
So
far
,
and
somewhat
further
Plato
;
of
which
more
anon
.
3.
What
the
authority
and
power
of
this
Senate
was
,
we
see
best
from
Plutarch
.
[
n
](A86304-e21860-b)
n
In
Lycurgo
.
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
,
&c.
"
In
this
change
of
State
(
saith
he
)
which
Lycurgus
made
,
his
chiefest
alteration
was
in
the
constitution
of
a
Senate
,
which
he
made
to
have
a
Regal
power
and
equal
authority
with
the
Kings
in
matters
of
the
greatest
weight
and
importance
;
and
was
to
be
the
healthful
counterpoise
of
the
whole
body
of
the
Common-wealth
.
The
other
State
before
was
ever
wavering
,
sometimes
inclining
to
tyrannie
,
when
the
Kings
were
too
mighty
,
and
sometimes
to
confusion
,
when
the
people
did
usurp
authority
:
between
which
two
,
the
Senate
was
ordained
as
the
fittest
medium
to
keep
even
the
scale
,
and
fortifie
the
State
of
the
Common-wealth
.
For
taking
sometimes
the
Kings
part
,
when
it
was
needfull
to
pull
down
the
fury
of
the
people
;
and
sometimes
holding
with
the
people
against
the
Kings
,
to
bridle
their
tyrannical
Government
;
they
were
the
means
that
neither
of
the
two
did
oppress
the
other
.
"
This
Court
or
Senate
had
the
supreme
direction
and
command
in
all
things
of
moment
,
which
did
concern
the
Common-wealth
,
both
for
peace
and
war
;
and
had
the
highest
jurisdiction
and
dernier
resort
,
from
which
there
could
be
no
appeal
:
in
which
regard
Pausasanias
cals
it
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
,
[
o
](A86304-e22040-b)
o
Pausanias
in
Lacon
.
l.
3.
the
soveraign
Court
of
the
Republick
.
It
consisted
of
28.
Senators
,
all
chosen
out
of
the
Nobility
and
chief
men
of
the
City
;
who
together
with
the
two
Kings
(
who
were
allowed
their
voices
in
it
)
made
up
thirty
in
all
;
and
unto
these
it
did
belong
to
call
the
assemblies
of
the
people
,
to
propound
that
to
them
which
they
thought
convenient
,
and
to
dissolve
them
too
when
they
saw
occasion
.
[
p
](A86304-e22080-b)
p
Plutarch
.
ibid.
But
for
the
people
so
assembled
,
it
was
not
lawful
for
them
to
propound
any
thing
to
be
debated
or
determined
,
nor
to
deliver
their
opinion
in
the
point
proposed
:
there
being
nothing
left
to
them
,
but
to
testifie
their
assent
to
the
propositions
,
which
either
by
the
Senate
or
the
two
Kings
had
been
made
unto
them
.
So
that
whatever
the
Kings
lost
,
the
people
got
little
by
the
alteration
,
being
left
out
of
all
imployment
in
affairs
of
State
,
and
forced
to
yeeld
obedience
unto
thirty
Masters
,
whereas
before
they
had
but
two
.
And
as
for
the
authority
which
remained
unto
the
Kings
,
it
consisted
especially
in
the
conducting
of
the
Armies
,
and
the
supremacy
in
matters
that
concerned
Religion
(
for
this
hath
alwaies
gone
along
with
the
Kingly
office
)
.
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
,
&c.
[
q
](A86304-e22130-b)
q
Xenophon
de
Repub.
Lacedamon
.
For
it
was
ordered
by
Lycurgus
,
that
the
King
should
offer
sacrifice
for
the
prospetity
of
the
Common-wealth
,
when
the
necessity
of
their
affairs
did
require
the
same
,
as
one
descended
from
the
gods
;
that
they
should
participate
of
the
thing
sacrificed
when
the
gods
were
served
,
and
have
a
pig
of
every
litter
,
that
they
might
never
want
a
sacrifice
,
if
upon
any
sudden
accident
the
gods
were
to
be
advised
withall
.
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
,
&c.
It
also
appertained
to
them
to
command
the
Armies
,
as
oft
as
they
were
sent
abroad
on
any
military
imployment
;
and
had
a
Pavilion
allowed
them
at
the
publick
charge
,
for
entertainment
of
such
company
as
repaired
unto
them
.
In
these
two
points
the
honour
and
authority
of
the
Kings
consisted
principally
,
which
Aristotle
also
hath
observed
.
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
[
r
](A86304-e22190-b)
r
Aristot
.
Politic
.
l.
3.
c.
10.
.
Supremacy
in
Divine
,
command
in
Military
matters
,
was
all
in
which
they
differed
from
the
other
Senators
;
and
this
command
(
I
mean
in
military
matters
)
was
both
perpetual
and
hereditary
,
as
the
same
Author
tels
us
there
and
in
other
places
[
s
](A86304-e22250-b)
s
Id.
ibid.
&
l.
2
c.
7.
&
l.
3.
c.
11.
.
For
matters
which
were
meerly
honourary
,
they
had
some
prerogatives
:
the
Kings
being
allowed
a
double
Messe
in
all
their
Ordinaries
,
the
Senators
and
all
the
pople
arising
from
their
seats
to
do
him
reverence
,
when
he
came
amongst
them
,
yeelding
him
more
then
humane
honours
when
he
was
deceased
,
as
to
a
Demi-god
at
least
.
And
for
their
maintenance
and
support
when
they
were
alive
,
there
was
allotted
to
them
a
proportion
of
the
richest
lands
in
many
of
the
Villages
and
fields
adjoyning
[
t
](A86304-e22320-b)
t
Xerophon
in
Repub.
Lacedaem
.
;
enough
to
keep
them
out
of
want
,
though
not
sufficient
to
make
them
either
rich
or
powerful
.
4.
The
royalty
and
power
of
the
Kings
being
thus
impaired
,
the
people
absolutely
discharged
from
having
any
hand
at
all
in
the
publick
Government
,
and
the
authority
of
the
Senate
growing
every
day
more
insolent
and
predominant
then
at
first
it
was
,
by
reason
that
they
held
their
place
for
term
of
life
,
as
we
finde
in
[
u
](A86304-e22380-b)
u
Plutarch
in
Agesilao
.
Plutarch
;
the
Kings
resolved
upon
a
course
of
putting
the
people
into
such
condition
as
might
inable
them
to
curb
and
control
the
Senators
.
To
this
end
Theopompus
the
ninth
King
of
the
second
house
,
with
the
consent
of
Polydorus
his
Associate
,
ordained
certain
Officers
,
being
five
in
number
[
x
](A86304-e22450-b)
x
Aristot
.
Pol.
l.
2.
8.
,
and
chosen
out
of
the
body
of
the
common
people
[
y
](A86304-e22470-b)
y
Id.
Polit.
l.
2.
c.
7.
,
and
annually
renewed
or
changed
,
as
occasion
was
[
z
](A86304-e22480-b)
z
Plutarch
in
Agesilao
.
;
to
whom
authority
was
give
,
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
,
even
in
the
highest
points
,
and
of
most
importance
,
as
we
are
told
by
Aristotle
[
a
](A86304-e22510-b)
a
Aristot
.
Politic
.
l.
2.
c.
7.
,
and
shall
see
anon
.
These
Offices
he
caused
to
be
called
by
the
name
of
Ephori
,
that
is
to
say
,
the
Overseers
,
and
Superintendents
of
the
State
,
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
[
b
](A86304-e22570-b)
b
Snidas
.
,
because
they
had
the
charge
and
oversight
of
the
Commonwealth
.
And
as
amongst
the
Archontes
in
the
State
of
Athens
which
were
nine
in
number
,
one
of
them
was
called
the
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
,
or
the
Archon
in
the
way
of
excellency
,
after
whose
name
the
year
was
called
,
and
their
reckonings
made
(
as
Titio
&
Sempronio
Coss
.
in
the
State
of
Rome
)
;
so
had
the
Ephori
their
Eponymus
,
one
who
by
way
of
eminency
was
called
the
Ephorus
[
c
](A86304-e22680-b)
c
Pausan
.
lib.
3.
in
Lacon
.
.
But
for
this
first
reason
of
their
institution
,
take
it
thus
from
Plutarch
,
[
d
](A86304-e22700-b)
d
Plutarch
in
Lycurgo
.
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
,
&c.
"
Lycurgus
having
thus
tempered
the
form
of
his
Common-wealth
,
it
seem'd
notwithstanding
unto
those
which
came
after
him
,
that
this
small
number
of
thirty
persons
which
made
the
Senate
,
was
yet
too
mighty
and
of
too
great
authority
.
Wherefore
to
bridle
them
a
little
,
they
gave
them
(
as
he
cites
from
Plato
)
a
bit
in
their
mouthes
,
which
was
the
authority
of
the
Ephori
,
erected
in
the
time
of
King
Theopompus
,
about
130
years
after
the
death
of
Lycurgus
.
"
A
second
reason
which
induced
those
Kings
to
ordain
these
Ephori
,
was
to
ease
themselves
,
and
delegate
upon
them
that
remainder
of
the
Royal
power
,
which
could
not
be
exercised
but
within
the
City
.
For
the
Kings
having
little
or
no
command
but
in
wars
abroad
,
cared
not
for
being
much
at
home
,
and
thereupon
ordained
these
Officers
,
to
supply
their
places
.
Concerning
which
Cleomenes
thus
discourseth
to
the
Spartans
[
e
](A86304-e22850-b)
e
Id.
in
Agis
&
Cleomenes
.
after
they
had
destroyed
the
Ephori
,
and
suppressed
the
Office
:
"
informing
them
that
Lycurgus
had
joyned
the
Senators
with
the
Kings
,
by
whom
the
Common-wealth
was
a
long
time
governed
,
without
help
of
any
other
Officers
;
that
afterwards
the
City
having
great
wars
with
the
Messenians
,
the
Kings
were
alwaies
so
imployed
in
that
war
that
they
could
not
attend
the
affairs
of
the
State
at
home
,
and
thereupon
made
choice
of
certain
of
their
friends
to
sit
in
judgement
in
their
stead
,
whom
they
called
the
Ephori
,
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
,
and
for
a
long
time
did
govern
only
as
the
Kings
Ministers
,
though
afterwards
by
little
and
little
they
took
unto
themselves
the
supreme
authority
.
"
Another
reason
hath
been
given
of
the
institution
,
which
is
,
that
if
a
difference
grew
between
the
two
Kings
in
a
point
of
judgement
,
there
might
be
some
to
arbitrate
between
them
,
and
to
have
the
casting
voice
amongst
them
when
the
difference
could
not
be
agreed
.
And
this
is
that
which
Lisander
and
Mandroclidas
(
two
that
had
been
Ephori
)
suggested
unto
Agis
and
Cleombrotus
the
two
Kings
of
Sparta
;
declaring
,
[
f
](A86304-e23010-b)
f
Id.
ibid.
"
That
the
office
of
the
Ephori
was
erected
for
no
other
reason
,
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
,
&c.
But
because
they
should
give
their
voices
unto
that
King
who
had
the
best
reason
on
his
side
,
when
the
other
would
wilfully
withstand
both
right
and
reason
;
and
therefore
that
they
two
agreeing
might
lawfully
do
what
they
would
without
controlment
;
that
to
resist
the
Kings
was
a
breach
of
law
,
considering
that
the
Ephori
,
by
law
,
had
no
power
nor
priviledge
,
but
only
to
arbitrate
between
them
,
when
there
was
any
cause
of
jarre
or
controversie
.
"
And
this
was
so
received
at
Sparta
,
for
an
undoubted
truth
,
that
Cleomenes
being
sole
King
,
upon
the
death
of
Agis
of
the
other
house
,
recalled
called
Archidamus
the
brother
of
Agis
from
his
place
of
banishment
,
with
an
intent
to
make
him
King
,
not
doubting
but
they
two
should
agree
together
,
and
thereby
make
the
Ephori
of
no
power
nor
use
.
So
then
we
have
three
reasons
of
the
institution
,
(
and
more
then
these
I
cannot
finde
)
of
which
there
is
not
one
that
favoureth
the
device
of
CALVIN
;
or
intimateth
that
the
authority
of
the
Ephori
was
set
up
,
to
pull
down
the
Kings
.
And
to
say
truth
,
it
is
a
most
unlikely
matter
that
the
Kings
of
Sparta
having
so
little
power
remaining
,
should
need
more
Officers
to
restrain
them
then
they
had
before
;
that
they
should
make
a
new
rod
for
their
own
poor
backs
,
and
add
five
Masters
more
to
those
eight
and
twenty
,
which
Lycurgus
had
imposed
upon
them
.
Which
makes
me
wonder
much
at
Tully
,
who
doth
acknowledge
that
the
Ephori
were
ordained
by
Theopompus
,
(
as
both
Aeristotle
[
h
](A86304-e23250-b)
h
Aristot
.
Polit.
l.
5.
c.
11.
and
Plutarch
do
affirm
)
and
yet
will
have
them
instituted
for
no
other
cause
,
nisi
ut
oppositi
sint
Regibus
,
but
to
oppose
and
curb
the
Kings
[
i
](A86304-e23280-b)
i
Cicero
de
legibus
l.
3.
:
but
more
that
Plato
(
who
had
so
much
advantage
of
him
both
in
time
and
place
)
should
ascribe
the
institution
to
Lycurgus
;
and
tell
us
that
he
did
not
only
ordain
the
Senate
,
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
[
k
](A86304-e23330-b)
k
Plato
Ep.
8.
edit.
gr.
lat.
To.
3.
,
but
that
he
did
also
constitute
the
Ephorate
,
for
the
strength
and
preservation
of
the
Regal
power
.
5.
For
out
of
doubt
it
is
affirmed
by
Plutarch
[
l
](A86304-e23390-b)
l
Plut.
in
Lycurgo
.
,
confirmed
by
Scaliger
[
m
](A86304-e23410-b)
m
Scalig.
animadvers
.
in
Euseb.
Chron.
,
and
may
be
gathered
from
some
passages
in
Eusebius
Chronicon
,
and
the
authoritie
of
Aristotle
,
who
refers
the
same
to
Theopompus
,
as
before
was
shewed
,
that
the
first
Institution
was
no
less
then
130
years
after
the
death
of
Lycurgus
.
Who
was
the
first
that
bore
this
Office
hath
been
made
a
question
,
but
never
till
these
later
times
,
when
men
are
grown
,
such
Sceptics
as
to
doubt
of
every
thing
.
Plutarch
affirms
for
certain
,
[
n
](A86304-e23480-b)
n
Plutarch
.
in
Lycurgo
.
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
,
that
the
first
Ephorus
(
that
is
to
say
,
the
first
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
,
who
had
the
name
of
Ephorus
by
way
of
excellencie
,
for
otherwise
there
were
five
in
all
)
was
called
Elatus
:
and
hereto
Scaliger
did
once
agree
,
as
appears
expressly
,
pag.
67.
of
his
Annotations
on
Eusebius
,
where
he
declares
it
in
these
words
,
Primus
Elatus
renunciatur
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
.
But
after
having
a
desire
to
controll
Eusebius
,
he
takes
occasion
by
some
words
in
Diogenes
Laertius
to
cry
up
Chilo
for
the
man
:
first
positively
,
Primus
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
fuit
Chilon
,
and
next
exclusively
of
Elatus
,
Quibus
animadversis
non
fuerit
Elatus
primus
Ephorus
sed
Chilon
.
To
make
this
good
,
being
a
fancie
of
his
own
(
and
as
his
own
most
dearly
cherished
)
he
produceth
first
the
testimony
of
Laertius
,
and
afterwards
confirms
the
same
by
a
new
emendatio
temporum
,
a
Calculation
and
accompt
of
his
own
inventing
.
The
words
produced
from
Laertius
are
these
verbatim
;
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
,
[
o
](A86304-e23730-b)
o
Diogen
.
Lae●t
.
l.
1.
in
Chilo
.
Which
is
thus
rendred
in
the
Latine
,
and
I
think
exactly
.
Fuit
autem
Ephorus
circa
quinquagesimam
&
quintam
Olympiada
.
Porro
Pamphila
circa
sextam
ait
,
primumque
Ephorum
fuisse
sub
Euthydemo
,
autore
Sosicrate
:
primumque
instituisse
ut
Regibus
Ephori
adjungerentur
,
Satyrus
Lycurgum
dixit
.
If
it
be
granted
in
the
first
place
,
that
Chilo
was
not
made
Ephorus
until
the
55
Olympiad
,
as
't
is
plain
he
was
not
,
and
Scaliger
affirms
as
much
,
it
must
needs
follow
upon
true
account
,
that
either
Chilo
was
not
the
first
Ephorus
,
or
that
the
Ephori
were
not
instituted
in
more
then
twice
an
hundred
and
thirtie
years
,
after
Lycurgus
had
new
molded
the
Common-wealth
,
contrary
unto
that
which
is
said
by
Plutarch
,
and
out
of
him
repeated
by
Joseph
Scaliger
.
For
from
the
time
wherein
Lycurgus
made
his
Laws
,
which
was
in
the
25
year
of
Archelaus
,
the
eighth
King
of
the
elder
house
,
unto
the
death
of
Alcamenes
,
which
was
the
year
before
the
first
Olympiad
[
p
](A86304-e23970-b)
p
Euseb.
Chron.
lib.
post
.
p.
114.
of
Scaligers
edit.
,
were
112
years
just
,
none
under
.
From
thence
unto
the
last
year
of
the
55.
220
years
complete
;
which
put
together
make
no
fewer
then
332
years
full
,
a
large
misreckoning
.
Whereas
the
second
year
of
the
fifth
Olympiad
,
in
which
Eusebius
puts
the
Institution
of
the
Ephori
,
both
in
the
Greek
and
Latine
Copies
set
out
by
Scaliger
himself
[
q
](A86304-e24050-b)
q
Pag.
115.
of
the
Latine
,
&
35.
of
the
Greek
Edition
.
;
that
second
year
I
say
being
added
to
the
112
before-remembred
,
in
which
King
Alcamenes
died
,
makes
up
the
full
number
of
130
,
which
we
finde
in
Plutarch
;
and
agrees
punctually
with
the
time
of
Theopompus
,
who
as
it
is
confessed
by
Scaliger
,
did
first
ordain
them
.
Nor
doth
Laertius
say
,
if
you
mark
him
well
,
either
that
Chilo
was
the
first
that
was
ever
Ephorus
,
or
the
first
that
joyned
the
Ephori
to
the
Kings
of
Sparta
,
both
which
absurdities
are
by
Scaliger
imposed
upon
him
.
For
unto
any
one
who
looks
upon
Laertius
with
a
careful
eye
,
it
may
be
easily
discerned
,
that
he
speaks
no
otherwise
of
the
Ephorate
,
then
of
an
Office
instituted
a
long
time
before
;
with
the
condition
of
the
which
Chilo
was
well
acquainted
,
and
therefore
thought
himself
more
fit
to
undergo
it
then
his
Brother
was
,
who
very
earnestly
desired
it
[
r
](A86304-e24220-b)
r
Laertius
in
visa
Chilon
.
.
All
that
Laertius
saith
,
is
no
more
but
this
,
that
Chilo
was
made
Ephorus
first
,
(
not
the
first
Ephorus
which
was
made
,
as
Scaliger
would
have
it
)
under
Euthydemus
;
and
that
as
Satyrus
affirmed
(
who
therein
questionless
was
misled
by
Plato
)
Lycurgus
was
the
first
who
joyned
the
Ephori
to
the
Spartan
Kings
;
which
words
,
viz.
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
,
he
hath
left
out
of
purpose
to
abuse
his
Author
,
and
make
him
speak
the
thing
which
he
never
meant
.
His
other
blunderings
and
mistakes
to
make
good
this
business
,
first
laying
the
dissolution
of
the
Ephorate
by
Cleomenes
,
non
multo
ante
vel
post
initium
Philippi
[
s
](A86304-e24370-b)
s
Pag.
67.
of
the
Animadvers
.
,
either
not
long
before
or
shortly
after
the
beginning
of
the
reign
of
Philip
the
last
King
of
Macedon
,
but
one
(
which
indeed
is
true
)
and
within
nine
lines
,
no
more
,
laying
it
in
the
13.
year
of
the
self
same
King
Philip
,
(
most
extremely
false
)
the
changing
of
his
Authors
words
from
Fuit
autem
sub
Regibus
Lacedaemon
annis
350
,
as
they
occur
in
the
Translation
of
S.
Hierom
,
printed
at
Basil
,
into
Fuit
sub
Regibus
Lacedaemoniorum
Annis
350
,
against
the
Authors
minde
and
the
rules
of
Grammar
,
only
to
bring
about
his
device
of
Chilo
,
and
blinde
his
Readers
eyes
with
a
new
Chronologie
;
and
others
I
could
point
to
if
my
leisure
served
,
I
purpose
to
forbear
at
the
present
time
.
Nor
had
I
been
so
bold
with
Scaliger
at
all
,
or
at
least
not
now
,
but
that
the
proud
man
is
more
bold
with
the
Antient
Fathers
,
whom
he
is
pleased
to
look
on
with
contempt
,
and
scorn
,
as
often
as
they
come
before
him
:
for
which
see
pag.
255
of
his
Annotations
.
And
so
I
leave
him
with
that
censure
which
he
gives
Eusebius
,
as
learned
and
industrious
an
Antiquarie
,
as
any
Scaliger
of
them
all
,
(
no
man
dispraised
)
:
Erratis
hujus
Autoris
enumerandis
charta
non
suffecerit
[
t
](A86304-e24570-b)
t
Animadvers
.
in
Euseb.
p.
255.
;
and
so
fare
him
well
.
6.
But
to
proceed
,
the
Ephori
being
thus
ordained
by
Theopompus
,
became
not
presently
of
such
authority
and
power
,
as
by
degrees
they
did
attain
to
:
For
being
chosen
by
the
Kings
as
their
proper
Ministers
as
before
was
said
,
and
many
times
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
,
even
from
their
very
neerest
friends
,
as
we
read
in
Plutarch
[
u
](A86304-e24640-b)
u
Plutarch
.
in
Agis
&
Cleomen
.
;
they
were
hard
thrust
at
by
the
Senate
,
and
forced
to
put
up
many
an
affront
from
that
mightier
body
.
And
this
was
it
that
Chilo
aimed
at
,
when
he
told
his
Brother
who
at
the
same
time
desired
the
Office
,
and
seemed
offended
that
he
lost
it
,
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
[
x
](A86304-e24690-b)
x
Laertius
in
vita
Chilon
.
,
that
he
was
better
skilled
in
bearing
injuries
and
affronts
,
then
his
Brother
was
.
But
this
continued
for
no
longer
then
whilest
the
Kings
served
their
turns
upon
them
to
oppose
the
Senate
,
and
kept
the
nomination
of
them
in
their
own
hands
.
For
afterwards
the
Kings
relinquishing
the
election
to
the
common
people
,
upon
a
forlorn
hope
,
of
gaining
their
affections
by
so
great
a
benefit
;
they
began
to
set
up
for
themselves
,
and
in
a
very
little
time
gained
all
the
custom
of
the
City
.
And
of
this
new
election
I
am
apt
to
think
that
Chilo
,
whom
before
we
spake
of
,
was
the
first
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
.
Which
I
propose
not
so
much
out
of
a
desire
to
comply
with
Scaliger
,
who
for
ought
I
can
see
,
aimed
at
no
such
matter
;
as
on
the
credit
of
Eusebius
,
whom
he
so
much
slighteth
.
For
in
Eusebius
Chronicon
of
Joseph
Scaligers
own
Edition
,
after
he
hath
put
down
the
institution
of
the
Ephori
in
the
second
of
the
fifth
Olympiad
,
as
before
I
told
you
;
he
gives
this
Item
in
the
third
of
the
five
and
fiftieth
(
which
is
the
very
same
that
Laertius
speaks
of
)
Chilo
qui
de
Septem
Sapientibus
fuit
,
Lacedaemone
Ephorus
constituitur
[
y
](A86304-e24840-b)
y
Euseb.
Chronic.
lib.
poster
.
p.
127.
,
dispositione
communus
gentis
,
that
Chilo
one
of
the
seven
wise
Masters
was
ordained
Ephorus
at
Sparta
,
by
the
general
consent
of
all
the
people
.
But
whether
this
were
so
,
or
not
,
I
am
not
able
to
determine
absolutely
.
All
I
observe
from
hence
is
this
,
that
it
is
past
all
question
,
that
from
this
time
they
took
upon
them
more
then
they
had
done
formerly
,
and
were
intent
on
all
advantages
to
improve
their
power
.
For
whereas
at
the
first
they
were
appointed
by
the
Kings
to
sit
in
judgement
in
their
steeds
,
as
before
was
said
,
by
little
and
little
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
[
z
](A86304-e24910-b)
z
Plutarch
in
Agis
&
Cleom.
,
they
drew
that
power
unto
themselves
,
and
exercised
it
in
their
own
name
,
by
their
own
authoritie
:
not
as
the
Ministers
of
the
Kings
,
they
would
none
of
that
,
but
as
the
Officers
of
the
Common-wealth
.
And
to
that
end
they
did
erect
a
Court
of
Judicature
,
which
for
power
and
greatness
of
authoritie
was
little
inferiour
to
the
Senate
;
drawing
unto
them
all
such
businesses
as
were
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
[
a
](A86304-e24990-b)
a
Pausan
.
l.
3.
in
Laconicis
.
,
most
worthy
of
care
and
consideration
.
By
means
whereof
,
as
they
drew
many
of
the
people
to
depend
upon
them
,
whose
businesses
and
suits
of
law
were
brought
to
be
determined
by
them
[
b
](A86304-e25000-b)
b
Aristot
.
Polit.
lib.
3.
cap.
1.
;
so
they
increased
that
dependance
,
by
husbanding
such
difference
as
did
oft
arise
between
the
Senate
and
the
Kings
,
to
their
own
advantage
.
For
it
is
well
observed
by
Aristotle
,
that
as
long
as
the
Senate
and
the
Kings
did
agree
together
,
they
kept
all
the
power
in
their
own
hands
:
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
[
c
](A86304-e25050-b)
c
Id.
ibid.
l.
2.
c.
9.
but
when
they
jarred
amongst
themselves
,
they
gave
the
people
opportunitie
to
become
their
Masters
.
But
that
which
raised
them
to
the
height
,
and
made
them
terrible
at
last
both
to
King
and
Senate
,
was
the
mutual
tie
and
correspondence
which
was
between
them
and
the
people
:
by
whom
they
were
not
only
chosen
,
and
therefore
cherished
by
them
as
their
own
de●r
creatures
:
but
for
the
most
part
chosen
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
,
out
of
the
body
of
the
people
,
and
sometime
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
[
d
](A86304-e25110-b)
d
Aristot
.
Polit.
l.
2.
cap.
7.
:
out
of
the
very
meanest
and
the
neediest
of
them
;
which
made
them
on
the
other
side
to
court
the
people
,
and
to
apply
themselves
unto
them
upon
all
occasions
.
And
though
it
happened
many
times
,
that
some
of
them
being
indigent
and
needie
men
,
were
easily
wrought
upon
by
money
,
and
apt
to
sell
as
well
the
justice
as
the
honor
of
the
Common-wealth
,
to
enrich
themselves
and
raise
their
families
;
whereof
Aristotle
much
complains
,
and
that
deservedly
[
e
](A86304-e25130-b)
e
Id.
ibid.
et
c.
8
▪
:
yet
this
corruption
served
to
advance
their
power
,
and
put
them
into
a
condition
to
be
the
better
able
to
oblige
the
people
.
So
that
the
common
sort
of
people
doing
all
they
could
to
advance
the
power
and
reputation
of
the
Ephori
,
whom
they
accounted
for
their
own
,
as
indeed
they
were
;
and
the
Ephori
striving
by
all
possible
means
to
gratifie
the
people
,
by
obtaining
new
laws
and
large
immunities
to
be
enacted
for
them
,
as
they
saw
occasion
:
they
altered
the
whole
frame
of
Government
,
and
made
it
of
an
Aristocracie
to
become
an
Oligarchie
,
and
in
conclusion
a
plain
popular
tyrannie
.
7.
For
trusting
to
the
power
and
interess
which
they
had
in
the
Commonaltie
,
and
the
support
they
were
assured
from
them
,
if
the
case
required
it
;
they
drew
unto
themselves
the
managerie
of
the
State-affairs
;
and
grew
so
powerful
at
the
last
,
that
if
they
did
not
all
things
of
their
own
authoritie
,
yet
they
had
such
an
hand
on
the
Kings
and
Senate
,
that
nothing
could
be
done
without
them
.
Were
any
laws
to
be
enacted
,
who
but
the
Ephori
must
propound
them
?
Or
any
Taxes
to
be
levied
for
the
necessarie
uses
of
the
Common-wealth
,
who
but
the
Ephori
must
impose
them
?
[
f
](A86304-e25250-b)
f
Plutarch
in
Agis
&
Cleomen
.
When
Lysander
had
reduced
the
City
of
Athens
unto
such
extremities
,
that
they
were
glad
to
yeeld
unto
such
conditions
as
the
Conquerors
were
pleased
to
impose
upon
them
:
from
whom
must
the
Capitulations
come
,
but
from
the
Ephori
?
It
was
the
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
[
g
](A86304-e25300-b)
g
Id.
in
.
Lysandro
.
,
the
final
resolution
of
the
Ephori
,
from
which
they
were
to
expect
either
bonds
or
libertie
.
Cynado
is
accused
of
Treason
against
Agesilaus
and
the
State
of
Sparta
,
the
Ephori
must
take
the
information
and
proceed
accordingly
[
h
](A86304-e25360-b)
h
Xenoph●n
.
in
vita
Agesilai
.
:
and
if
Pausanias
be
accused
of
holding
correspondence
with
the
King
of
Persia
,
the
Ephori
send
out
their
commands
,
[
i
](A86304-e25400-b)
i
Thucydides
.
l.
1.
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
,
and
commit
him
presently
to
Prison
.
When
any
Ambassadors
were
sent
forth
on
the
publick
service
,
from
whom
must
they
receive
their
power
,
from
whom
be
furnished
with
instructions
,
but
from
the
Eph●ri
alone
[
k
](A86304-e25430-b)
k
Plut.
in
Nicias
.
?
and
who
but
they
must
appoint
Commanders
for
the
Wars
,
require
accompt
of
their
imployments
,
and
either
punish
or
reward
them
as
they
have
deserved
?
When
Cleonymus
was
displeased
because
Areus
was
preferred
before
him
in
his
pretensions
to
the
Kingdom
:
the
Ephori
did
not
only
take
upon
them
to
sweeten
and
demulce
the
man
by
great
gifts
and
presents
,
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
[
l
](A86304-e25480-b)
l
Pausan
.
l.
3.
in
Lacon
.
but
also
to
confer
upon
him
the
command
of
the
Army
,
though
of
right
belonging
to
the
Kings
.
When
Mindarus
the
Admiral
of
their
Navie
was
miserably
beat
by
the
Athenians
in
the
straight
of
Hellespont
,
an
express
is
presently
dispatched
to
Sparta
,
to
give
unto
the
Ephori
an
account
thereof
[
m
](A86304-e25550-b)
m
Plutarch
.
in
Alcibiades
.
:
Lysander
had
no
sooner
revenged
this
quarrel
,
and
beat
the
Fleet
of
the
Athenians
neer
the
self
same
place
,
but
he
acquaints
the
Ephori
with
his
good
success
,
with
all
speed
that
might
be
[
n
](A86304-e25590-b)
n
Idem
in
Lysandro
.
And
if
the
Wars
prove
fortunate
,
and
the
spoil
so
great
,
that
part
thereof
be
sent
to
Sparta
,
to
be
laid
up
in
the
publick
Treasurie
;
the
Ephori
,
and
none
but
they
must
have
the
fingering
of
the
money
[
o
](A86304-e25630-b)
o
Id.
ibid.
.
Finally
there
was
no
Commander
of
the
Armies
,
or
other
Officer
imployed
by
the
Common-wealth
,
whom
they
called
not
to
an
accompt
as
their
stomachs
served
;
not
staying
till
the
Office
was
expired
,
and
the
Commander
or
the
Officer
become
a
private
man
again
,
as
in
other
States
;
but
even
in
the
midst
of
their
Command
and
Magistracie
whatsoever
it
was
:
and
whom
they
did
not
punish
when
they
came
before
them
,
either
by
imprisonment
or
death
[
p
](A86304-e25640-b)
p
Xenophon
de
Repub.
Lacedaem
.
,
as
to
them
seem'd
best
.
Thus
have
we
brought
them
to
their
height
,
and
seen
them
absolutely
possessed
of
the
Supreme
Power
,
in
making
peace
or
war
as
they
thought
convenient
;
and
in
disposing
of
the
goods
,
the
liberties
,
yea
and
the
lives
too
of
the
Spartan
subject
.
It
had
been
a
strange
temper
in
them
had
they
tarried
there
,
and
not
incroached
as
much
(
whilest
the
tide
went
with
them
)
upon
the
persons
and
the
power
of
the
Kings
themselves
.
8.
For
howsoever
at
the
first
they
were
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
the
Ministers
of
the
Kings
as
before
was
told
you
,
and
accomptable
to
none
but
them
:
yet
after
they
were
reckoned
for
the
Officers
of
the
Common
wealth
,
they
cast
off
all
relation
to
the
Kings
,
their
Masters
,
and
thought
themselves
their
Equals
at
the
best
,
and
at
last
their
betters
.
A
point
which
Theopompus
did
but
little
dream
of
,
when
first
he
set
them
up
to
oppose
the
Senate
,
although
his
Queen
a
wise
and
understanding
Ladie
,
did
evidently
see
,
and
tell
him
,
what
would
follow
on
it
.
Of
which
we
finde
this
storie
in
the
works
of
Aristotle
,
and
from
him
borrowed
by
Plutarch
if
I
guess
aright
,
that
his
wife
seeing
what
design
he
was
bent
upon
,
and
how
unluckily
he
was
carried
on
to
effect
the
same
,
advised
him
to
take
heed
that
by
erecting
this
new
Magistracie
,
he
did
not
leave
the
Kingdom
in
a
worse
condition
to
his
Heirs
and
Successors
,
then
he
received
the
same
from
his
Predecessors
;
and
that
he
answered
thereunto
,
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
[
e
](A86304-e25810-b)
e
Aristot
.
Polit.
l.
5.
c
11.
,
that
by
this
means
he
hoped
to
leave
it
stronger
and
more
durable
then
it
was
before
.
But
the
event
declared
unto
all
the
world
that
the
woman
was
the
better
Prophet
,
and
had
the
greater
insight
into
things
to
come
.
The
power
of
Soveraigntie
when
once
communicated
to
the
common
people
,
or
otherwise
usurped
by
such
popular
Officers
,
as
depend
wholly
on
the
people
for
their
place
and
being
,
is
seldom
times
recovered
into
Regal
hands
.
And
though
some
Kings
may
be
perswaded
by
some
subtile
artifices
(
as
it
seems
Theopompus
was
)
that
by
this
means
the
Chair
of
State
will
stand
the
faster
;
yet
the
proceedings
of
the
Ephori
in
the
State
of
Sparta
will
inform
us
otherwise
,
and
easily
lay
open
the
apparent
danger
of
such
weak
surmises
.
For
being
made
Officers
of
State
,
one
of
the
first
points
they
obtained
,
was
that
the
Kings
made
Oath
unto
them
once
in
every
moneth
,
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
[
q
](A86304-e25880-b)
q
Xenophon
de
Repub.
Laced
.
,
that
they
would
govern
the
Estate
according
to
the
laws
established
in
the
Common-wealth
,
and
that
they
would
preserve
the
Kindom
in
the
best
condition
that
they
could
:
the
Ephori
making
oath
to
them
in
the
name
of
the
Citie
,
whose
Officers
they
were
,
and
by
whom
intrusted
.
Next
they
attempt
to
place
such
Counsellors
about
the
Kings
,
as
they
might
confide
in
,
beginning
with
such
Kings
as
were
under
Age
;
and
the
first
trial
which
they
made
was
in
appointing
one
Cleandrides
to
be
about
King
Plastonax
,
the
19.
of
the
elder
House
,
as
his
chief
Counsellor
and
Director
,
without
whose
approbation
nothing
must
be
done
[
r
](A86304-e25950-b)
r
Plutarch
in
Pericles
.
.
Another
of
their
usurpations
and
incroachments
was
to
restrain
their
Kings
in
the
point
of
marriage
,
and
to
impose
some
fine
or
disgrace
upon
them
,
if
they
presumed
to
marrie
against
their
liking
.
Anaxandrides
the
15.
of
the
elder
house
,
had
married
a
Lady
of
brave
parts
,
but
it
was
her
ill
fortune
to
be
barren
a
long
time
together
.
The
Ephori
command
him
without
more
ado
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
[
s
](A86304-e26000-b)
s
Pausan
.
lib
▪
3.
in
Lacon
.
,
to
give
her
a
Bill
of
divorce
,
and
send
her
going
.
Archidamus
the
17.
of
the
second
House
maried
a
wife
which
brought
him
children
.
But
fault
was
found
she
was
too
little
,
and
thereupon
the
Ephori
condemned
him
in
a
sum
of
money
;
saying
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
,
that
she
would
not
bring
them
Kings
,
but
demy
Kings
[
t
](A86304-e26050-b)
t
Plutarch
.
in
Agesilao
.
.
And
that
you
may
perceive
,
how
difficult
a
thing
it
was
to
please
them
in
this
point
,
Leonidas
had
married
one
that
was
neither
barren
,
nor
too
little
;
and
yet
was
quarrelled
by
the
Ephori
,
and
in
fine
condemned
,
for
marrying
with
a
woman
of
another
Nation
[
u
](A86304-e26080-b)
u
Id.
in
Agis
&
Cleomenes
.
.
The
fundamental
laws
of
Sparta
conferred
upon
the
Kings
the
Supreme
command
over
the
Militarie
men
in
all
wars
abroad
.
The
Ephori
did
not
only
dispose
it
otherwise
,
and
gave
it
unto
such
whom
they
desired
to
oblige
unto
them
,
as
you
heard
before
:
but
kept
the
Kings
at
such
a
bay
,
that
they
neither
could
lead
forth
the
Armies
without
their
consent
,
nor
tarrie
longer
in
the
camp
then
they
li●t
to
let
them
;
and
if
the
action
did
miscarrie
,
the
Kings
were
either
fined
or
imprisoned
for
it
.
Agesilaus
being
a
very
stirring
Prince
,
and
desirous
to
get
honor
in
the
wars
,
was
not
permitted
to
set
forwards
till
he
had
bought
the
Ephori
with
a
sum
of
money
[
x
](A86304-e26150-b)
x
Id.
in
Agesila●
.
:
and
yet
being
in
the
height
of
his
good
success
was
called
b●ck
again
,
and
glad
to
be
conformable
to
the
said
commands
.
And
so
it
fared
with
Agis
and
Cleomenes
both
,
on
the
like
occasions
.
And
for
the
fining
of
their
Kings
,
besides
what
we
have
seen
before
in
the
former
instances
,
Plisto●ax
being
betrayed
by
Cleandrides
,
(
whom
the
Eph●ri
themselves
had
placed
about
him
)
and
his
Army
forced
to
disband
and
turn
home
again
;
is
presently
condemned
in
so
great
a
sum
,
that
he
was
not
able
to
discharge
it
[
y
](A86304-e26220-b)
y
Id.
in
Peri●les
.
.
By
means
whereof
the
Kings
were
brought
at
last
unto
that
condition
,
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
,
as
Aristotle
truly
noteth
[
z
](A86304-e26250-b)
z
Aristot
.
Polit.
l.
2.
cap.
7.
,
that
they
were
forced
to
court
and
bribe
the
Ephori
upon
all
occasions
,
to
the
great
disservice
of
the
State
,
and
sometimes
to
the
fatal
overthrow
of
their
chief
designes
.
So
that
it
is
no
marvail
,
if
considered
rightly
,
either
that
the
Ephori
kept
their
state
and
rose
not
up
to
reverence
their
King
,
when
he
came
before
them
,
though
all
the
residue
of
the
people
and
the
Senate
did
it
,
as
we
read
in
Xenophon
[
a
](A86304-e26300-b)
a
De
Repub.
Lacedaem
.
;
or
that
Agesilaus
used
to
rise
up
to
them
,
as
often
as
they
came
unto
him
about
any
business
,
as
we
finde
in
Plutarch
[
b
](A86304-e26330-b)
b
Plut.
in
Agesila●
.
;
or
that
the
Kings
esteemed
it
such
a
point
of
Soveraigntie
,
that
when
they
were
commanded
to
attend
the
Ephori
,
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
,
they
did
refuse
to
goe
upon
the
first
and
second
summons
,
and
stirred
not
till
the
third
command
,
as
Cleomenes
bragged
in
the
said
Historian
[
c
](A86304-e26380-b)
c
Id.
in
Agis
and
Cleomen
.
.
Which
trust
me
was
a
point
of
no
small
importance
.
(9)
And
yet
they
staid
not
here
,
they
went
further
still
.
They
thought
it
not
enough
to
condemn
their
Kings
in
vast
and
unproportionable
sums
of
money
,
unless
they
laid
restraints
on
their
persons
also
,
and
had
command
upon
their
bodies
.
And
therefore
it
is
noted
by
Thucydides
not
without
good
reason
,
that
they
did
not
only
punish
with
imprisonment
their
great
and
principal
Commanders
;
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
[
d
](A86304-e26440-b)
d
Thucydid
.
hist.
l.
1.
,
but
that
it
was
lawful
for
the
Ephori
to
do
the
like
unto
their
Kings
.
Which
to
avoid
,
Pausanias
was
inforced
to
retire
himself
,
and
live
a
voluntary
exile
in
another
Countrey
[
e
](A86304-e26470-b)
e
Plutarch
in
Lysander
.
.
Nothing
remains
but
they
take
authoritie
to
depose
,
and
in
fine
to
murther
them
;
and
if
they
gain
not
this
,
all
the
rest
is
nothing
.
And
this
they
are
resolved
to
gain
,
or
be
folulie
foiled
;
nor
did
they
fail
in
the
attempt
when
they
went
about
it
.
They
quarrelled
at
Leonidas
as
before
I
told
you
,
for
marrying
with
a
woman
of
another
Countrey
,
without
so
much
as
seeking
for
their
approbation
.
And
that
they
may
be
sure
to
effect
their
business
,
Religion
is
pretended
,
and
a
star
must
fall
,
only
to
warrant
their
proceedings
.
Which
preparations
being
past
they
cite
him
to
appear
before
them
,
and
on
default
of
his
appearance
they
deposed
him
instantly
,
and
conferred
the
Kingom
on
Cleombrotus
[
f
](A86304-e26510-b)
f
Id.
in
Agis
&
Cleomenes
.
B●t
these
men
being
out
of
Office
,
he
came
out
of
Sanctuarie
,
and
was
restored
again
by
the
next
years
Ephori
.
Who
to
make
proof
that
their
anthoritie
was
as
great
as
their
Predecessors
,
thought
it
not
argument
enough
to
restore
one
King
,
except
they
did
depose
and
destroy
another
.
And
thereupon
laid
hands
on
Agis
of
the
other
House
,
and
inhumanelie
haled
him
to
the
common
Prison
,
and
there
most
barbarously
murdered
him
with
his
Mother
and
Grand
mother
.
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
[
g
](A86304-e26560-b)
g
Id.
ibid.
.
And
this
saith
Plutarch
was
the
first
time
,
that
ever
the
Ephori
put
a
King
to
death
.
And
so
perhaps
it
was
the
first
,
but
the
last
it
was
not
.
For
Archidamus
the
Brother
of
Agis
being
recalled
from
banishment
by
Cleomenes
,
to
the
end
he
might
enjoy
the
Kingom
which
did
by
right
belong
unto
him
;
was
preseutly
seised
on
by
the
murderers
,
and
dispatched
in
private
,
for
fear
he
should
revenge
the
death
of
his
slaughtered
Brother
[
h
](A86304-e26620-b)
h
Id.
ibid.
.
By
which
it
is
most
evident
without
further
proof
,
that
the
Spartan
Aristocratie
was
become
a
tyrannie
,
and
of
all
Tyrannies
the
most
insupportable
,
because
meerlie
popular
.
Or
if
more
proof
should
be
desired
,
both
Aristotle
,
and
his
his
Master
Plato
will
not
stick
to
say
it
;
though
they
both
died
,
before
these
two
last
Tragedies
were
acted
on
the
stage
of
Sparta
.
For
Plato
being
to
declare
what
he
conceived
of
the
Government
of
that
Common-wealth
resolves
that
it
did
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
[
i
](A86304-e26730-b)
i
Plato
de
legibus
l.
4.
,
approach
more
neer
to
tyrannie
then
to
any
other
form
what
ever
;
the
power
and
empire
of
the
Ephori
being
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
,
plainly
tyrannical
,
and
no
otherwise
.
And
Aristotle
who
had
studied
the
condition
of
that
State
exactly
,
though
at
the
first
he
seemed
to
think
that
it
was
very
well
compounded
of
the
three
good
forms
;
yet
upon
full
debate
thereof
,
he
concludes
at
last
,
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
[
k
](A86304-e26810-b)
k
Aristot
.
Poli●
▪
l.
2.
c.
4.
,
that
the
dominion
of
the
Ephori
was
an
absolute
Tyrannie
.
Assuredly
had
they
lived
to
have
seen
that
day
,
wherein
the
Ephori
embrued
their
hands
in
the
bloud
of
their
Princes
,
under
pretence
of
safetie
to
the
Common-wealth
,
they
would
have
voted
it
to
have
been
a
tyrannie
in
the
highest
degree
;
and
then
the
most
unsufferable
Tyrants
that
ever
wretched
State
groaned
under
.
For
though
the
Kings
of
Sparta
were
so
lessened
by
Lycurgus
laws
,
that
little
more
was
left
unto
them
then
the
name
and
title
;
yet
they
were
Kings
,
and
held
so
sacred
by
their
neighbors
,
even
their
very
Enemies
,
that
none
d●d
ever
offer
to
lay
hands
upon
them
in
the
heat
and
furie
of
their
fights
,
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
[
l
](A86304-e26910-b)
l
Plutarch
.
in
Agis
&
Cleom.
,
out
of
the
reverence
they
did
bear
to
those
beams
of
Majestie
,
which
most
apparently
shined
in
them
.
(
10
)
The
Ephori
being
grown
to
this
height
of
Tyrannie
,
were
the
more
readie
for
their
fall
;
which
followed
not
long
after
that
most
barbarous
fact
,
upon
the
persons
of
their
Princes
.
The
Kings
had
long
since
stomached
them
and
their
high
proceedings
,
bearing
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
[
m
](A86304-e26960-b)
m
Id.
in
Agesil
.
a
kinde
of
heritable
grudge
betwixt
them
(
as
my
Author
calls
it
)
ever
since
they
took
upon
them
to
control
their
Masters
:
but
either
wanted
opportunitie
or
spirit
,
to
attempt
any
thing
to
their
prejudice
;
and
therefore
thought
it
safer
to
procure
their
favours
,
then
run
themselves
upon
a
hazardous
experiment
.
Pausanias
,
the
20.
of
the
Elder
House
,
was
the
first
that
ever
did
attempt
either
by
force
or
practise
to
subvert
the
Office
:
the
insolencies
of
the
which
were
then
grown
so
great
,
that
being
a
stout
and
active
Prince
,
he
was
not
able
to
endure
them
.
That
he
had
entertained
such
thoughts
is
affirmed
by
Aristotle
,
where
he
informs
us
that
Lysander
had
a
purpose
to
take
away
the
Kingly
Government
(
or
rather
to
acquire
it
to
himself
,
as
we
finde
in
Plutarch
[
n
](A86304-e27030-b)
n
Id.
in
Lysandro
.
,
)
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
,
and
that
Pausanias
had
the
like
to
destroy
the
Ephorate
[
o
](A86304-e27070-b)
o
Aristot
.
Polit.
lib.
5.
c.
1.
.
But
what
he
failed
to
bring
about
,
his
Successors
did
at
last
accomplish
.
Of
which
Cleombrotus
and
Agis
,
joyning
their
hands
and
heads
together
did
proceed
so
far
,
that
going
into
the
Market
place
well
attended
by
their
friends
and
followers
,
they
plucked
the
Ephori
from
their
seats
,
and
substituted
others
in
their
rooms
[
p
](A86304-e27110-b)
p
Plutarch
in
Agis
&
Cleom.
,
whom
they
conceived
would
be
more
pliant
to
their
present
enterprises
:
which
was
the
first
actual
attempt
,
that
ever
had
been
made
against
them
by
the
Kings
of
Sparta
.
But
evulgato
imperii
Arcano
,
when
so
great
a
mysterie
of
State
was
once
discovered
,
that
the
Ephori
were
but
mortal
men
,
and
might
as
easily
be
displaced
and
deposed
as
any
of
the
other
Magistrates
;
Leonidas
immediately
upon
his
restitution
to
the
Kingdom
,
made
the
like
removal
,
and
displaced
those
who
had
took
part
against
him
with
the
former
Kings
[
q
](A86304-e27160-b)
q
Id.
ibid.
.
So
that
the
ice
being
broken
,
and
the
way
made
open
,
Cleomenes
son
unto
Leonidas
had
the
fairer
way
to
abrogate
the
Office
utterly
,
which
at
last
he
did
.
For
being
a
brave
and
gallant
Prince
,
and
seeing
that
the
project
he
was
bent
upon
for
the
reduction
of
the
Common-wealth
to
its
primitive
honour
,
could
not
be
brought
about
but
by
their
destruction
;
he
fell
upon
them
with
his
Souldiers
as
they
sate
sate
at
supper
,
and
killed
four
of
them
in
the
place
,
the
fift
escaping
shrewdly
hurt
to
the
neerest
Sanctuarie
[
r
](A86304-e27190-b)
r
Id
ibid.
.
That
done
he
went
into
the
Market
place
,
and
overthrew
all
the
Chairs
of
the
Ephori
saving
only
one
,
which
he
reserved
for
himself
as
his
Chair
of
State
,
and
sitting
in
the
same
in
the
sight
of
the
people
,
gave
them
an
accompt
of
his
proceedings
,
and
the
reasons
which
induced
him
to
it
:
"
Declaring
how
the
Ephori
were
at
first
appointed
by
the
Kings
themselves
;
that
for
long
time
they
governed
only
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
as
the
Kings
Ministers
,
and
no
otherwise
;
thatt
many
years
after
this
,
Asteropus
one
of
the
Ephori
,
building
upon
a
new
foundation
,
and
being
the
first
Author
of
that
dangerous
change
,
they
took
the
Government
unto
themselves
,
and
exercised
the
same
in
their
own
names
only
;
that
though
they
had
usurped
a
power
which
belonged
not
to
them
,
yet
had
they
managed
it
discreetly
,
they
might
perhaps
have
held
it
longer
,
and
with
better
liking
;
but
that
licentiously
abusing
the
authoritie
which
they
had
usurped
by
suppressing
the
lawful
Governors
ordained
of
old
,
by
taking
upon
them
to
banish
some
of
the
Citizens
,
and
to
put
some
to
death
without
law
and
justice
,
and
finally
by
threatning
those
who
were
desirous
to
restore
the
Government
to
its
antient
form
,
they
were
no
longer
to
be
suffered
:
that
for
his
part
he
should
have
thought
himself
the
happiest
King
that
ever
was
,
if
possibly
he
could
have
cured
his
Countrey
of
that
foul
affection
without
grief
or
sorrow
;
but
being
it
was
not
to
be
done
that
way
,
he
thought
it
better
that
some
few
should
be
put
to
death
,
then
the
whole
Common-wealth
run
on
to
a
swift
destruction
.
"
This
said
,
he
presently
dissolved
the
Assembly
,
and
seriously
betook
himself
to
the
Reformation
which
formerly
he
had
projected
,
and
in
short
time
reduced
the
people
to
the
antient
Discipline
,
the
state
and
reputation
of
the
Common-wealth
to
its
antient
height
.
(
11
)
Thus
have
we
made
a
brief
discoverie
of
the
Spartan
Ephori
,
upon
what
grounds
first
instituted
,
and
on
what
destroyed
;
by
what
foul
practises
and
unlawful
means
they
gained
the
Soveraigntie
of
the
State
,
and
by
what
they
lost
it
:
how
,
and
by
what
degrees
they
came
from
low
and
mean
beginnings
to
so
strange
a
tyrannie
,
and
with
what
suddenness
they
lost
their
power
and
their
lives
together
.
But
in
all
this
there
is
not
any
shew
or
colour
for
that
which
is
affirmed
by
CALVIN
,
no
ground
for
,
nor
veritie
at
all
in
that
assertion
,
that
the
Ephori
were
at
first
ordained
to
oppose
the
Kings
,
to
regulate
their
proceedings
,
and
restrain
their
power
:
but
rather
that
they
were
ordained
(
as
indeed
they
were
)
to
curb
the
Senate
,
to
be
the
Ministers
of
the
Kings
,
and
sub-servient
to
them
;
to
sit
in
Judgement
for
them
,
and
discharge
such
Offices
,
as
the
Kings
pleased
to
trust
them
with
,
in
their
times
of
absence
.
If
Calvins
popular
Magistrates
have
no
more
authoritie
,
then
the
Spartan
Ephori
,
according
to
the
rules
of
their
Institution
,
they
will
have
little
colour
to
controll
their
Princes
,
and
less
for
putting
a
restraint
on
the
Regal
power
.
The
most
they
can
pretend
to
must
be
usurpation
,
and
that
will
hold
no
longer
,
if
it
hold
so
long
,
then
they
have
power
to
make
it
good
by
bloud
and
violence
,
which
I
hope
Calvin
did
not
aim
at
.
And
if
they
have
no
other
ground
then
an
unjust
title
,
prescription
will
not
serve
the
turn
,
(
for
nullum
tempus
occurrit
Regi
,
as
our
Lawyers
tell
us
)
when
a
couragious
Prince
is
concerned
in
it
,
and
oppressed
by
it
.
If
any
Popular
spirits
entertain
such
hopes
,
if
nothing
else
will
satisfie
their
vast
ambitions
but
to
be
equal
with
their
Kings
and
Supreme
Governors
,
and
at
last
above
them
:
let
them
remember
what
became
of
the
Spartan
Ephori
,
and
that
there
was
a
Cleomenes
which
called
them
to
a
sad
account
for
all
those
insolencies
and
affronts
which
they
had
put
upon
himself
and
his
Predecessors
.
And
let
all
Kings
and
Supreme
Governors
take
heed
by
the
example
of
these
Spartan
Princes
,
how
they
let
loose
the
reins
of
Government
,
and
lay
them
on
the
necks
of
the
common
people
:
which
if
unbridled
once
,
and
left
at
libertie
,
will
not
be
easily
induced
to
receive
that
Bit
into
their
mouths
which
before
they
champed
on
:
and
that
they
give
no
way
to
such
popular
Magistrates
as
Calvin
hath
presented
to
us
,
who
whatsoever
colour
and
pretence
they
make
,
aim
at
no
other
mark
then
the
Royal
power
,
though
out
of
too
much
modestie
they
disclaim
the
title
,
and
must
be
either
Kings
or
nothing
.
Of
which
invasions
and
incroachments
on
the
Supreme
Power
,
our
Author
gives
another
hint
in
the
Roman
Tribunes
;
the
truth
and
fitness
of
which
supposition
must
be
looked
on
next
.
CHAP.
III.
Of
the
Incroachments
of
the
Tribunes
on
the
State
of
Rome
;
and
that
they
were
not
instituted
for
the
ends
supposed
by
Calvin
.
-
(
I
)
The
Tribunes
of
the
people
why
first
Instituted
in
the
State
of
Rome
.
-
(
II
)
And
with
what
difficultie
and
conditions
.
-
(
III
)
The
Tribunes
fortifie
themselves
with
large
immunities
,
before
they
went
about
to
change
the
Government
.
-
(
IV
)
The
Tribunes
no
sooner
in
their
Office
,
but
they
set
themselves
against
the
Nobilitie
and
the
Senate
,
contrary
to
the
Articles
of
their
Institution
.
-
(
V
)
The
many
and
dangerous
Seditions
occasioned
by
the
Tribunes
in
the
City
of
Rome
.
-
(
VI
)
The
Tribunes
and
the
people
do
agree
together
to
change
the
Government
of
the
State
.
-
(
VII
)
By
what
degrees
the
people
came
to
be
possessed
of
all
the
Offices
in
the
State
,
both
of
power
and
dignity
.
-
(
VIII
)
The
Plots
and
Practises
of
the
Gracchi
to
put
the
power
of
the
Judicature
,
and
Supreme
Majestie
of
the
State
,
into
the
hands
of
the
people
.
-
(
IX
)
The
Tribunes
take
upon
them
to
commit
the
Consuls
,
and
bring
all
the
Officers
of
the
State
under
their
command
.
-
(
X
)
The
Office
and
authoritie
of
the
Tribunes
reduced
unto
its
antient
bounds
by
Corn.
Sylla
;
and
at
last
utterly
destroyed
.
-
(
XI
)
An
application
of
the
former
passages
to
the
point
in
hand
.
(1)
ALthough
the
reasons
which
induced
the
people
in
the
State
of
Rome
to
desire
some
Officers
of
their
own
,
and
the
considerations
which
induced
the
Senate
to
give
way
unto
it
,
are
obvious
to
the
eyes
of
every
Reader
,
which
hath
perused
the
Roman
stories
:
yet
I
shall
briefly
lay
it
down
,
the
better
to
remove
the
intimation
which
we
finde
in
Calvin
,
that
they
were
purposely
ordained
to
oppose
the
Consuls
.
The
storie
then
in
brief
is
this
.
The
people
having
not
long
before
expulsed
their
Kings
,
and
got
some
reputation
by
their
prowess
in
those
petit
States
which
bordered
neerest
to
the
City
,
found
quickly
that
the
libertie
which
they
expected
was
nothing
but
a
golden
dream
,
not
able
to
protect
them
from
the
common
Gaols
,
and
that
their
reputation
in
the
wars
would
not
pay
their
debts
,
or
save
them
from
the
hands
of
their
cruel
Creditors
.
For
serving
in
the
wars
at
their
own
proper
charges
,
and
having
little
else
to
subsist
upon
but
their
trades
or
labor
,
they
were
fain
sometimes
to
take
up
money
upon
usurie
.
And
though
they
did
return
from
the
wars
with
victorie
,
and
shewed
those
honorable
scars
which
they
had
received
,
fighting
in
defence
of
their
Countrey
and
the
Common-wealth
;
yet
this
did
edifie
but
little
with
their
hungry
Creditors
:
[
a
](A86304-e28080-b)
a
Plutarch
in
M.
Coriolano
.
who
did
not
sell
their
goods
,
if
they
were
not
solvent
,
but
apprehended
their
persons
also
,
and
either
laid
them
up
in
the
common
prisons
,
or
made
them
serve
in
stead
of
Bond-men
,
and
made
them
subject
to
the
whip
and
other
base
corrections
fit
for
none
but
Slaves
.
And
somewhat
to
this
purpose
the
old
man
complained
,
as
we
read
in
Livie
,
declaring
to
the
people
(
who
were
apt
to
hear
it
)
how
his
Patrimonie
had
been
seized
on
by
the
merciless
Usurers
,
his
person
apprehended
by
them
,
and
that
he
was
not
only
made
a
Slave
,
but
marked
out
for
slaughter
:
Inde
ostentare
tergum
foedum
recentibus
vestigiis
verberum
[
b
](A86304-e28130-b)
b
Livie
.
hist.
l.
2.
,
shewing
withall
upon
his
back
the
miserable
prints
which
the
whip
had
left
.
This
made
the
people
murmur
,
and
at
last
to
mutinie
,
and
in
tumultuous
manner
,
minaciter
magis
quam
suppliciter
,
rather
with
threats
then
supplications
to
require
the
Senate
to
take
some
course
for
their
relief
:
resolving
otherwise
to
go
no
more
unto
the
wars
,
serve
the
State
who
would
.
The
Senate
promised
fair
,
as
there
was
good
cause
,
(
the
Volsci
pressing
hard
upon
them
to
their
very
gates
)
;
and
by
that
promise
won
the
people
,
and
obtained
a
victorie
.
But
when
the
wars
were
done
,
and
performance
looked
for
,
in
stead
of
finding
a
redress
of
their
former
grievances
,
the
rigor
of
the
law
took
place
,
&
creditoribus
tradibantur
,
and
they
were
seised
on
by
their
Creditors
as
in
former
times
:
the
Senate
thinking
it
unreasonable
to
make
the
law
submit
to
the
necessities
of
particular
men
,
and
against
law
to
defraud
any
man
of
the
debts
which
were
due
unto
them
.
[
c
](A86304-e28200-b)
c
Dionys.
Halicarnass
.
lib.
6.
But
a
new
war
approaching
,
a
new
promise
made
,
and
that
neglected
also
when
the
war
was
ended
;
the
people
seeing
no
relief
was
like
to
come
from
the
hands
of
the
Senators
,
Longè
aliâ
quam
primò
instituerant
viâ
grassabantur
,
began
to
lend
an
ear
to
some
desperate
Counsels
,
and
fell
to
entertain
such
hopes
,
as
formerly
they
durst
never
dream
of
.
For
drawing
themselves
into
a
body
under
the
conduct
of
Sicinius
a
troublesome
and
seditious
person
,
they
forsook
the
City
,
and
incamped
upon
an
hill
adjoyning
:
resolving
as
they
gave
it
out
,
to
seek
new
dwellings
,
and
that
there
was
no
place
in
Italy
but
would
afford
them
air
and
water
,
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
,
and
ground
in
which
they
might
be
buried
.
There
is
no
question
to
be
made
,
but
if
the
Senate
had
beheld
the
action
with
neglect
and
scorn
,
as
Appius
[
d
](A86304-e28270-b)
d
Dionys.
Halicarn
.
l.
6.
,
and
C.
Martius
[
e
](A86304-e28290-b)
e
Plutarch
in
Coriolano
.
,
did
advise
they
should
;
the
people
out
of
love
to
their
wives
and
children
,
would
have
returned
to
their
houses
:
or
if
they
had
presented
them
in
time
with
any
tolerable
mitigations
of
the
former
laws
,
they
might
have
taken
off
their
edge
,
and
appeased
the
tumult
.
But
giving
way
unto
their
furie
till
it
grew
too
high
,
and
shewing
in
their
resolutions
far
more
fear
then
courage
;
the
people
got
the
better
of
them
,
and
thought
they
stood
upon
the
higher
ground
,
as
indeed
they
did
.
Which
pride
and
high
conceit
of
theirs
was
the
more
increased
,
by
the
authoritie
and
perswasions
of
one
Junius
Brutus
,
who
came
not
to
them
till
they
were
too
far
ingaged
,
to
go
off
with
safetie
.
A
man
,
as
the
Historian
noteth
,
of
a
turbulent
and
seditious
spirit
,
more
apt
to
kindle
a
rebellion
,
then
to
quench
the
flame
;
but
otherwise
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
[
f
](A86304-e28320-b)
f
Dionys.
Halicarnass
.
l.
6.
,
of
very
great
fore-sight
into
business
,
and
one
that
had
a
ready
tongue
upon
all
occasions
.
To
him
they
gave
the
managing
of
the
whole
design
,
and
he
improved
the
trust
to
their
best
advange
.
Insomuch
that
when
Menenius
Agrippa
was
imployed
unto
them
to
demand
their
grievances
,
and
had
brought
the
point
to
such
an
issue
,
that
there
was
nothing
wanting
to
make
up
the
breach
,
but
some
securitie
to
be
given
on
the
part
of
the
Senate
,
that
the
people
should
be
no
more
deluded
with
such
emptie
promises
;
this
Junius
Brutus
took
upon
him
to
propose
the
terms
:
and
no
securitie
would
content
him
(
as
the
plot
was
laid
)
but
that
some
popular
Magistrates
should
be
forthwith
made
,
for
the
protection
of
the
people
.
Concedite
nobis
(
inquit
)
Magistratus
aliquot
quotannis
è
nostro
corpore
creare
,
&c.
[
g
](A86304-e28380-b)
g
Id.
ibid.
"
Let
us
,
saith
he
,
have
certain
Magistrates
to
be
chosen
yearly
out
of
our
own
body
,
on
whom
we
shall
not
ask
you
to
confer
more
power
,
then
that
they
have
authoritie
to
assist
the
Commons
,
when
they
are
either
injured
or
oppressed
by
violence
,
and
to
take
order
that
they
be
not
robbed
of
their
rights
and
liberties
.
Other
securitie
then
this
we
will
trust
to
none
.
"
Which
when
the
people
heard
(
for
few
of
them
were
made
acquainted
with
the
plot
before
)
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
,
they
made
many
a
loud
and
joyful
shout
,
praising
the
man
unto
the
skies
,
and
absolutely
resolving
to
admit
of
no
other
terms
,
then
what
their
Spokesman
had
proposed
.
(2)
But
yet
the
business
was
not
done
.
It
must
first
pass
the
approbation
of
the
Senate
,
and
there
it
met
with
very
grreat
heats
and
opposition
before
it
passed
,
and
passed
not
at
the
last
but
upon
conditions
.
The
people
had
a
faction
in
the
very
Senate
,
and
a
strong
one
too
,
who
laboured
what
they
could
to
obtain
the
point
.
Of
these
Valerius
was
the
chief
,
whose
Brother
had
not
long
before
expulsed
the
Kings
,
and
from
his
courting
of
the
people
was
surnamed
Poplicola
:
a
family
that
had
been
always
favourable
to
the
popular
partie
,
and
more
endevoured
their
content
,
then
the
honor
or
profit
of
the
publick
.
In
which
regard
Appius
charged
him
to
his
face
,
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
[
h
](A86304-e28530-b)
h
Id.
ibid.
,
that
the
whole
generation
of
them
were
so
partial
in
behalf
of
the
people
,
that
they
had
almost
destroyed
the
Common-wealth
.
Others
and
those
of
greater
courage
and
Nobility
,
scorning
that
such
an
innovation
should
be
made
in
the
publick
Government
,
opposed
it
with
all
might
and
main
;
not
sparing
to
assure
the
Senate
that
in
the
setting
up
of
this
new
authoritie
,
they
would
in
fine
put
down
their
own
.
And
of
these
Appius
and
Caius
Martius
,
(
who
after
had
the
name
of
Coriolanus
)
were
the
leading
men
:
who
standing
upon
point
of
honor
,
advised
the
Senate
that
having
shaken
off
the
tyrannie
of
their
Kings
,
they
should
not
prostitute
themselves
to
the
lusts
of
the
people
[
i
](A86304-e28630-b)
i
Id.
ibid.
;
that
they
should
stand
on
their
own
ground
,
and
not
do
any
thing
unworthy
of
their
place
and
dignitie
;
that
these
were
but
the
beginnings
of
sedition
,
and
that
the
purpose
of
the
Commons
was
to
abolish
law
,
and
set
up
a
paritie
[
h
](A86304-e28640-b)
h
Plutarch
in
M.
Coriolano
.
:
Appius
fore-telling
,
as
inspired
with
the
spirit
of
Prophesie
,
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
,
how
great
a
Seminarie
of
mischiefs
it
would
prove
to
the
Common-wealth
,
and
calling
all
the
Gods
to
witness
that
he
had
done
his
best
to
prevent
the
same
.
But
when
they
found
it
like
to
pass
,
and
that
the
major
part
of
the
house
did
incline
that
way
,
it
was
advised
that
they
should
hold
the
people
to
the
terms
by
themselves
proposed
,
and
give
their
Officers
no
more
power
but
to
relieve
the
people
from
unjust
oppression
,
and
that
they
should
only
interpose
,
if
any
thing
were
passed
in
Senate
to
the
peoples
prejudice
,
but
propose
nothing
of
themselves
,
nor
appear
in
any
thing
,
untill
the
Senate
had
before
considered
of
it
;
that
the
election
should
be
made
in
centuriatis
Comitiis
only
,
where
the
Patricii
and
their
followers
bare
the
greatest
stroke
;
and
finally
that
in
their
applications
and
addresses
to
the
Lords
of
the
Senate
,
in
any
business
whatsoever
,
they
should
all
agree
upon
the
point
,
so
that
if
any
one
dissented
,
the
agreement
and
consent
of
all
the
rest
should
pass
for
nothing
.
For
seeing
that
Tribunes
must
be
granted
,
they
hoped
that
by
their
disagreement
the
honor
of
the
State
might
be
kept
upright
,
and
that
the
Common-wealth
was
not
quite
past
help
,
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
[
l
](A86304-e28790-b)
l
Dionys.
Halicarn
.
l.
10.
,
as
long
as
any
discord
or
dissension
might
be
sown
amongst
them
.
Which
last
condition
(
for
all
the
rest
were
broken
assoon
as
they
were
agreed
on
)
was
most
religiously
observed
till
the
very
last
,
as
we
read
in
Plutarch
,
who
gives
it
for
a
rule
amongst
them
,
that
if
one
Tribune
did
oppose
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
r
;
Spartan
Ephori
)
which
they
called
Tribunes
of
the
people
;
of
which
Sicinius
and
Junius
Brutus
must
be
two
at
least
.
We
may
be
sure
they
took
not
all
this
pains
for
nothing
.
(3)
And
yet
all
this
was
nothing
if
they
got
not
more
.
The
Articles
and
Conditions
which
they
had
agreed
on
had
bound
them
too
precisely
to
their
good
behaviour
;
and
if
they
did
not
break
those
bonds
,
they
were
Prisoners
still
.
But
first
they
must
be
fortified
with
some
special
priviledges
,
to
keep
their
persons
out
of
danger
;
that
they
might
boldly
venture
upon
any
project
without
fear
of
law
;
and
put
themselves
into
such
condition
,
that
whatsoever
wrongs
they
did
,
they
would
not
be
called
to
an
accompt
.
To
that
end
Brutus
taking
his
opportunitie
whilest
the
heats
were
up
,
and
the
Senate
in
a
disposition
to
deny
them
nothing
,
causeth
a
law
to
be
propounded
&
obtained
for
the
perpetual
indemnitie
of
the
Tribunes
,
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
,
and
for
declaring
of
their
Office
to
be
sacred
and
inviolable
[
n
](A86304-e29010-b)
n
D●o●ys
.
Halicarn
.
l.
6.
.
The
substance
of
the
law
was
to
this
effect
;
"
That
no
man
should
compell
the
Tribunes
to
doe
any
thing
against
their
wills
,
nor
beat
,
or
cause
them
to
be
beaten
,
nor
kill
,
or
cause
them
to
be
killed
;
if
any
should
presume
to
do
the
contrarie
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
,
he
was
to
be
pursued
as
an
execrable
person
,
and
his
goods
confiscate
,
and
whosoever
slew
him
should
escape
unpunished
,
and
do
a
meritorious
service
to
the
Common-wealth
.
"
A
Priviledge
which
they
found
good
use
of
in
the
times
succeeding
,
and
made
it
serve
their
turns
upon
all
occasions
.
Martius
complained
of
them
in
the
Senate
for
disobedience
to
the
Consuls
,
and
an
intent
to
bring
an
Anarchie
upon
the
State
:
[
o
](A86304-e29090-b)
o
Plutarh
.
in
Coriolano
.
they
vote
this
for
a
breach
of
priviledge
,
and
nothing
but
his
death
or
banishment
will
give
them
satisfaction
for
it
.
Apptus
being
Consul
sends
his
Lictor
to
lay
hands
upon
them
for
raising
tumults
in
the
City
[
p
](A86304-e29150-b)
p
Livie
hist.
Rom.
lib.
2.
;
this
is
another
breach
of
priviledge
,
and
he
shall
answer
for
it
when
his
year
was
out
.
Caeso
Quintius
like
a
noble
Patriot
,
joyns
with
the
Consuls
and
the
Senate
to
oppress
their
insolencies
,
when
neither
law
nor
reason
would
prevail
upon
them
;
this
also
is
a
breach
of
priviledge
,
and
his
life
shall
pay
for
it
[
q
](A86304-e29240-b)
q
Id.
l.
3.
.
But
to
proceed
,
having
obtained
this
law
for
their
own
securitie
,
their
next
work
was
to
break
or
pass
by
those
laws
by
which
the
State
was
governed
in
all
times
before
,
and
which
themselves
had
yeelded
to
at
their
first
creation
.
It
was
the
practise
of
the
City
from
the
first
fnundation
(
and
a
continual
custom
hath
the
force
of
law
)
to
give
such
respect
unto
the
Senate
,
that
the
people
did
not
vote
nor
determine
any
thing
,
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
[
r
](A86304-e29280-b)
r
Dionys.
Halicarnass
.
l.
7.
,
which
the
Senate
had
not
first
debated
and
resolved
upon
.
This
though
no
breach
of
priviledge
was
a
main
impediment
to
the
advancing
of
those
projects
which
they
had
in
hand
,
and
therefore
fit
to
be
removed
,
as
removed
it
was
:
and
so
a
way
made
open
unto
that
confusion
,
which
did
expose
the
State
to
so
many
changes
,
that
it
was
never
constant
to
one
form
of
government
.
Which
being
obtained
,
the
next
thing
to
be
brought
about
,
was
to
bring
the
election
of
the
Tribunes
into
the
hands
of
the
people
(
who
had
before
the
least
part
in
it
)
that
so
depending
mutually
upon
one
another
,
they
might
co-operate
together
to
destroy
the
State
,
and
bring
it
absolutely
under
the
command
of
the
common
people
.
For
at
the
first
,
according
to
the
Articles
of
the
Institution
,
the
Tribunes
were
to
be
elected
in
Comitiis
Centuriatis
as
before
was
said
,
where
none
but
men
of
years
and
substance
(
such
as
were
of
the
Liverie
,
as
we
speak
in
England
)
had
the
right
of
Suffrage
;
By
means
whereof
the
Patricians
had
a
very
great
stroke
in
the
Elections
,
Et
per
Clientum
suffragia
creandi
quos
vellent
potestatem
[
s
](A86304-e29400-b)
s
〈◊〉
.
hist.
,
and
by
the
voyces
of
their
Clients
or
dependents
set
up
whom
they
listed
.
They
must
no
longer
hold
this
power
.
The
Tribunes
were
the
creatures
of
the
Common
people
,
and
must
be
made
by
none
but
them
.
A
law
must
therefore
be
propounded
to
put
the
Election
wholly
into
the
hands
of
the
people
,
and
to
transact
the
same
in
Comitiis
Tributis
,
where
no
Patrician
was
to
vote
,
but
all
things
carried
by
the
voyces
of
the
rascal
Rabble
.
Which
though
it
caused
much
heat
and
no
small
ado
,
yet
it
was
carried
at
the
last
;
Appius
complaining
openly
as
his
custom
was
,
Rempub.
per
metum
prodi
,
that
the
Senate
did
destroy
the
Common-wealth
by
their
want
of
courage
.
And
whereas
at
the
first
they
had
so
much
modestie
as
not
to
come
into
the
Senate
[
t
](A86304-e29490-b)
t
Valer.
Maxim
.
lib.
2.
c.
2.
,
Sed
positis
subselliis
ante
fores
decreta
Patrum
examinare
,
but
to
sit
without
upon
some
benches
,
whilest
they
examined
the
decrees
which
had
passed
the
house
:
they
challenge
now
a
place
,
though
no
vote
in
Senate
t
,
and
had
free
ingress
and
egress
when
they
would
themselves
.
(4)
But
their
main
business
was
to
pull
down
the
Nobles
,
and
make
them
of
no
more
esteem
then
the
common
sort
.
And
upon
this
they
set
their
strength
,
and
made
it
the
first
hansel
of
their
new
authoritie
.
Martius
had
spoke
some
words
in
Senate
which
displeased
the
Tribunes
,
and
they
incense
the
people
to
revenge
the
injury
:
who
promising
to
assist
them
in
their
undertakings
,
an
Officer
is
forthwith
sent
to
apprehend
him
.
This
caused
the
Patricians
whom
the
cause
concerned
,
to
stand
close
together
,
and
to
oppose
this
strange
incroachment
;
and
generally
to
affirm
,
as
most
true
it
was
,
that
when
they
yeelded
to
the
setting
up
of
this
new
authority
,
there
was
no
power
given
them
by
the
Senate
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
[
u
](A86304-e29660-b)
u
Dionys.
Halicarn
.
l.
7.
,
but
only
to
preserve
the
Commons
from
unjust
oppressions
.
The
like
did
Martius
plead
in
his
own
behalf
,
as
we
finde
in
Livie
,
auxilii
non
poenae
jus
datum
illi
potestati
,
plebisque
non
patrum
Tribunos
esse
[
x
](A86304-e29700-b)
x
Livie
.
hist.
lib.
2.
,
that
they
were
trusted
with
a
power
to
help
the
Commons
,
but
with
none
to
punish
,
and
were
not
Tribunes
of
the
Lords
,
but
of
the
people
.
And
so
much
also
was
affirmed
in
the
open
Senate
,
that
the
authority
of
the
Tribunes
was
at
first
ordained
not
to
offend
or
grieve
the
Senate
,
but
that
the
Commons
might
not
suffer
any
grievance
by
it
;
and
that
they
did
not
use
their
power
,
according
to
such
limitations
as
were
first
agreed
on
,
and
as
of
right
they
ought
to
use
it
,
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
[
y
](A86304-e29770-b)
y
Dionys.
Halicarn
.
l.
7.
,
but
to
the
ruine
and
destruction
of
the
Lawes
established
.
Enough
of
conscience
to
have
staved
them
from
the
prosecution
,
but
that
they
had
it
in
design
,
and
resolved
to
carry
it
.
For
Brutus
had
before
given
out
and
assured
the
people
,
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
[
z
](A86304-e29800-b)
z
Id.
ibid.
,
that
he
would
humble
the
Nobility
,
and
bring
down
their
pride
;
and
't
was
no
reason
that
such
a
man
as
he
should
be
disappointed
,
and
not
be
master
of
his
word
.
Martius
being
banished
at
the
last
,
their
next
bout
was
with
Appius
Claudius
,
a
constant
and
professed
enemy
of
the
popular
faction
:
one
who
had
openly
took
part
against
them
in
behalf
of
Martius
,
and
after
seeing
them
apprehend
some
Gentlemen
who
opposed
their
insolencies
,
had
openly
denied
,
jus
esse
Tribuno
in
quenquam
nisi
in
plebeium
[
a
](A86304-e29880-b)
a
Livie
.
l.
2.
,
that
they
could
exercise
their
power
on
any
but
the
Commons
only
.
Him
therefore
they
accused
of
Treason
,
or
at
least
sedition
,
in
that
he
had
intrenched
upon
their
authority
,
which
was
made
sacred
by
the
Lawes
:
and
doubtlesse
had
condemned
him
to
some
shameful
punishment
,
had
he
not
died
before
his
triall
.
Which
victory
on
Martius
,
and
the
death
of
Appius
,
did
so
discourage
the
Nobility
and
puffe
up
the
Tribunes
,
that
from
this
time
forwards
(
as
the
Historian
doth
observe
)
the
Tribunes
cited
whom
they
listed
to
answer
for
themselves
before
the
people
,
and
to
submit
their
lives
to
their
finall
sentence
:
which
as
it
did
increase
the
power
of
the
popular
faction
in
the
depressing
of
the
Nobles
,
and
weakning
the
authority
of
the
Senate
;
so
did
it
open
them
a
way
to
aim
at
and
attain
to
all
those
dignities
in
the
Common
wealth
,
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
[
b
](A86304-e30000-b)
b
Dionys.
Halicarn
.
l.
7.
,
which
were
most
honourable
in
themselves
and
had
formerly
belonged
to
the
Patricians
,
and
to
none
but
them
.
And
yet
the
Senate
and
Nobility
did
not
so
give
over
,
but
that
sometimes
they
put
them
in
remembrance
of
their
first
conditions
,
and
challenged
them
of
breaking
all
those
bonds
and
Covenants
,
which
were
so
solemnly
agreed
on
and
accepted
by
them
,
at
the
first
erection
of
their
Office
.
For
this
did
Fabius
presse
upon
them
when
they
went
about
to
make
some
Law
for
the
restraint
and
regulating
of
the
power
of
the
Consuls
,
viz.
that
their
authority
was
given
them
ad
auxilium
singulorum
,
for
the
relief
of
such
particulars
as
did
want
their
help
,
not
for
the
ruine
of
the
publick
;
and
that
they
should
do
well
to
bethink
themselves
,
[
c
](A86304-e30090-b)
c
Livie
.
l.
3.
Tribunos
plebis
se
creatos
,
non
hostes
Patribus
,
that
they
were
chosen
Tribunes
to
protect
the
people
,
not
enemies
to
oppresse
the
Senate
.
And
the
expostulation
of
the
Senate
was
both
just
and
necessary
,
when
they
demanded
of
the
Tribunes
on
the
same
occasion
,
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
[
d
](A86304-e30170-b)
d
Dionys.
Halicarn
.
l.
10.
,
who
gave
them
power
to
introduce
new
Lawes
and
subvert
the
old
;
and
told
them
in
plain
terms
they
had
broke
their
Covenants
,
and
that
they
were
not
made
upon
such
conditions
as
to
do
all
things
that
they
listed
,
nor
to
do
any
thing
at
all
,
but
only
to
protect
the
poor
,
and
preserve
the
Commons
from
oppression
.
Which
put
together
makes
it
a
most
evident
truth
,
that
in
the
creation
of
the
Tribunes
there
was
nothing
lesse
intended
then
to
curb
the
Senate
,
or
to
set
up
a
power
to
oppose
the
Consuls
;
as
vainly
and
seditiously
is
supposed
by
CALVIN
,
though
true
it
is
they
did
abuse
their
power
with
the
Common
people
,
and
the
authority
of
their
office
to
suppresse
them
both
.
5.
And
this
they
were
resolved
to
do
,
although
they
had
no
other
way
to
effect
the
same
,
then
by
raising
seditions
in
the
State
,
and
putting
the
people
into
Arms
upon
all
occasions
:
at
which
they
were
so
perfect
,
and
so
constant
in
it
,
that
seldome
the
whole
year
went
round
without
some
tumult
or
sedition
of
their
setting
forward
,
as
will
appear
to
any
one
who
is
versed
in
Livie
.
If
they
held
quiet
for
one
year
,
as
they
seldom
did
(
till
they
had
brought
the
City
under
their
obedience
)
they
broke
out
in
the
next
that
followed
with
the
greater
violence
:
and
when
the
course
of
the
distemper
was
so
intermitted
,
that
it
held
not
alwaies
a
Quotidian
,
it
proved
a
Tertian
Feaver
,
or
at
most
a
Quartan
,
and
therefore
like
to
tarry
longer
with
the
afflicted
Patient
.
How
many
seditions
did
they
raise
about
the
law
Agaria
,
of
which
Livie
tels
us
that
it
was
never
moved
[
e
](A86304-e30340-b)
e
H●st
Rom.
l.
2.
sine
maximis
motibus
without
great
tumults
and
dissensions
?
How
many
tumults
did
they
raise
to
oppose
the
Consuls
,
when
they
had
any
wars
in
hand
,
and
were
to
press
the
Souldier
to
pursue
those
wars
?
How
often
finde
we
in
that
Author
,
Tribunitium
bellum
domi
territare
patres
[
f
](A86304-e30380-b)
f
Id.
lib.
3.
,
that
when
the
Fathers
had
no
wars
abroad
,
they
found
a
Tribunitian
war
at
home
which
did
more
affright
them
?
how
often
finde
we
them
complaining
,
non
ultra
ferri
posse
Tribunitios
furores
[
g
](A86304-e30410-b)
g
Id.
lib.
4.
,
that
the
insolencies
of
the
Tribunes
were
no
longer
sufferable
;
and
that
they
could
not
look
to
be
without
continual
alarms
,
and
renewed
distractions
,
whilest
the
seditions
and
the
authors
of
them
did
succeed
so
prosperously
?
Nay
they
were
so
accustomed
to
it
,
that
having
had
some
intermission
(
and
that
no
otherwise
obtained
,
but
by
yeelding
all
things
to
the
people
which
they
had
a
minde
to
)
Livie
takes
notice
of
it
as
a
thing
observable
,
permultos
annos
esse
[
h
](A86304-e30450-b)
h
Id.
lib.
10.
,
that
many
years
had
intervened
since
the
Patricians
and
the
Tribunes
had
their
last
contention
.
And
all
this
while
they
managed
their
seditions
by
the
tongues
end
only
,
seldom
proceeding
unto
blowes
,
and
much
lesse
to
bloud
.
But
when
the
two
Gracchi
came
in
play
and
attained
the
Office
,
they
fell
from
words
to
blowes
,
and
from
blowes
to
murther
:
Tiberius
one
of
the
two
Brothers
,
and
many
of
his
friends
and
followers
being
tumultuously
slain
in
the
Common
Forum
,
as
he
was
acting
the
part
of
a
busie
and
seditious
Tribune
;
whom
Caius
the
other
of
the
two
not
long
after
followed
both
in
life
and
death
.
And
this
,
saith
the
Historian
,
initium
in
urbe
Roma
Civilis
sanguinis
gladiorumque
impunitatis
fuit
[
i
](A86304-e30550-b)
i
Velleius
Patercul
.
hist.
,
was
the
first
time
that
the
sword
was
suffered
to
range
at
liberty
in
the
streets
of
Rome
,
and
to
be
discoloured
with
the
bloud
of
the
Citizens
;
their
differences
before
that
day
(
though
not
often
afterwards
)
being
determined
by
parlies
,
but
not
by
bloudshed
.
Which
being
put
together
and
considered
seriously
,
it
will
appear
to
be
no
Paradox
which
we
finde
in
Florus
,
where
he
affirmeth
,
Seditionum
omnium
causas
Tribunitiam
potestatem
excitasse
[
k
](A86304-e30600-b)
k
Florus
histor.
Rom.
l.
3.
,
that
the
Tribunitian
power
was
the
source
and
fountain
of
all
those
seditions
,
wherewith
the
quiet
of
the
State
had
been
disturbed
.
Nor
was
it
said
by
Quintius
without
very
good
reason
,
that
the
authority
of
the
Tribunes
,
in
seditione
&
ad
seditiones
nata
,
was
born
in
a
sedition
and
to
raise
seditions
;
[
*
](A86304-e30640-b)
*
Cicero
de
Legibus
l.
3.
that
it
was
pestifera
potestas
,
a
pestilent
pernicious
office
,
and
that
Pompey
did
exceeding
ill
to
re-invest
the
Tribunes
with
that
height
of
power
,
of
which
they
had
been
justly
dispossessed
by
Sylla
.
Upon
which
grounds
it
had
been
formerly
averred
by
the
Consuls
and
the
rest
of
the
Senate
,
that
the
Tribunes
were
the
cause
of
those
distractions
(
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
,
are
the
Authors
words
)
which
did
so
miserably
afflict
the
Common-wealth
[
*
](A86304-e30710-b)
*
Dionys.
Halicarn
.
l.
10.
.
But
this
,
to
say
the
truth
,
is
so
clear
a
point
,
that
it
needs
no
proof
.
I
only
shall
observe
and
so
pass
it
by
,
how
justly
the
Nobility
and
Senate
were
punished
by
their
own
example
;
and
for
how
little
time
they
enjoyed
that
Soveraignty
,
which
they
had
wrested
from
their
Kings
.
From
the
expulsion
of
the
Kings
to
the
creating
of
the
Tribunes
were
but
sixteen
years
;
and
from
the
death
of
Tarquin
to
the
reign
of
Brutus
and
Sicinius
,
but
one
year
,
no
more
,
and
in
that
little
span
of
time
the
people
profited
so
well
in
the
school
of
rebellion
,
that
they
did
not
only
beat
the
Senate
at
their
own
weapon
of
disloialty
,
but
choaked
them
with
their
own
objection
.
For
when
it
was
objected
against
the
Tribunes
,
that
their
authority
was
gotten
and
maintained
by
seditious
courses
;
the
Tribunes
handsomely
replyed
,
that
that
objection
might
aswell
be
made
against
the
authority
of
the
Consuls
;
which
had
been
introduced
and
established
by
no
other
means
,
[
m
](A86304-e30830-b)
m
Id.
lib.
10.
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
,
then
the
rebellion
of
the
Nobles
or
Patricians
against
their
Kings
.
A
very
shrewd
retortion
,
if
you
mark
it
well
;
and
fit
to
be
considered
of
in
these
present
times
.
(6)
If
any
ask
to
what
end
all
these
stirs
were
raised
,
and
these
seditions
set
on
foot
,
he
may
please
to
know
,
that
there
was
an
intent
from
the
first
creating
of
the
Tribunes
to
change
the
government
of
the
State
,
and
to
put
the
Supreme
Power
of
all
into
the
hands
of
the
people
;
that
is
to
say
,
to
bring
it
under
the
command
of
a
few
factious
persons
,
on
whom
the
body
of
the
people
had
devolved
their
power
.
And
this
is
positively
affirmed
by
Florus
,
where
having
told
us
that
the
Tribunes
were
the
cause
of
all
the
tumults
and
seditions
which
had
been
raised
within
the
City
,
he
adds
,
that
being
at
first
ordained
specie
quidem
tuendae
plebis
,
re
autem
dominationem
sibi
acquirere
,
and
to
get
the
Supreme
power
into
their
own
hands
.
To
this
end
as
the
Tribunes
strived
to
oblige
the
people
by
causing
new
Lawes
to
be
made
in
their
behalf
,
and
for
the
increase
of
their
authority
;
so
did
the
people
readily
obey
the
Tribunes
,
and
gathered
into
an
head
upon
all
occasions
,
aswell
for
the
protection
of
their
persons
,
as
the
confirmation
of
their
power
.
When
Martius
had
declamed
against
them
in
the
open
Senate
for
their
factious
and
seditious
courses
,
the
Tribunes
presently
made
complaint
to
the
people
of
it
,
calling
upon
them
to
assist
them
,
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
,
and
to
save
their
Tribunes
[
n
](A86304-e31050-b)
n
Plutarch
in
Coriolano
.
:
at
which
the
people
were
so
madded
,
and
ran
on
so
furiously
,
that
they
were
like
to
have
fallen
desperately
upon
all
the
Senate
.
And
Appius
found
unto
his
cost
,
that
in
offering
to
attach
a
Tribune
,
(
though
he
well
deserved
it
)
concio
omnis
coorta
pro
Tribuno
in
Consulem
[
o
](A86304-e31100-b)
o
Livie
.
l.
2.
,
the
whole
assembly
rose
against
him
as
one
man
,
to
defend
their
Tribune
,
the
rascall
multitude
gathering
together
out
of
all
the
City
to
do
him
right
against
the
Consul
.
And
Plutarch
tels
us
in
the
life
of
Tiberius
Gracchus
,
that
the
people
were
so
sottishly
affected
to
him
,
that
many
of
the
needy
and
seditious
rout
waited
upon
him
all
night
long
up
and
down
the
Town
;
[
p
](A86304-e31150-b)
p
Plutarch
in
Tiber.
&
C.
Gracchis
.
some
of
them
buying
tents
and
lying
about
his
house
to
watch
it
,
as
a
guard
to
his
person
.
And
on
the
other
side
the
houses
of
the
Tribunes
were
kept
continually
open
aswell
nights
as
daies
,
that
they
might
serve
as
a
Protection
or
a
Common
Sanctuary
for
men
of
all
sorts
to
repair
unto
,
whom
either
debt
or
misdemeanor
,
or
some
greater
matter
had
made
obnoxious
to
the
Sergeants
,
or
other
Ministers
of
justice
,
to
the
great
prejudice
of
the
honest
and
well
meaning
Subjects
in
their
suits
and
businesses
.
And
besides
this
,
the
Tribunes
never
failed
to
flatter
and
bewitch
the
people
by
some
piece
of
courtship
,
or
by
preferring
some
new
Lawes
(
as
before
was
said
)
for
their
ease
and
benefit
.
They
had
no
sooner
way
then
that
to
advance
their
power
,
or
to
obtain
unto
that
absoluteness
of
command
and
empire
,
which
they
projected
to
themselves
.
For
doubtlesse
that
of
the
Historian
is
exactly
true
,
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
[
q
](A86304-e31210-b)
q
Dionys.
Halicarn
.
lib.
6.
,
that
he
that
means
to
be
a
Tyrant
must
be
first
a
flatterer
;
there
being
no
readier
way
to
advance
a
Tyranny
then
by
being
popular
,
a
profest
servant
of
that
people
whom
he
would
command
.
But
this
confederacy
between
the
Tribunes
and
the
people
and
the
mutual
ties
that
were
between
them
,
I
cannot
better
lay
before
you
then
in
Plutarchs
words
,
[
r
](A86304-e31290-b)
r
Plutarch
in
Agis
&
Cleomen
.
who
speaking
of
the
Gracchi
doth
inform
us
thus
,
"
That
having
received
.
many
favours
from
the
peoples
hands
they
were
ashamed
to
be
indebted
to
them
,
and
therefore
earnestly
endevoured
to
requi●e
their
courtesies
,
by
making
new
Decrees
and
Lawes
which
they
propounded
and
obtained
for
the
peoples
profit
;
and
on
the
other
side
,
the
people
for
their
parts
were
not
wanting
to
admire
and
honour
them
the
more
,
by
how
much
they
perceived
them
studious
of
their
good
and
benefit
.
So
that
with
like
strife
on
either
side
,
the
one
to
gratifie
and
oblige
the
other
,
their
interesses
were
so
mingled
,
and
their
intentions
so
concorporated
,
that
they
must
needs
hold
on
as
they
had
begun
,
and
either
stand
or
fall
together
.
"
By
means
whereof
the
people
in
conclusion
became
lords
of
all
,
the
majesty
of
the
State
and
the
power
of
judicature
being
absolutely
vested
in
them
:
which
since
they
could
not
manage
but
by
their
Atturneys
,
nor
otherwise
execute
and
discharge
then
by
their
Proxies
,
who
but
the
Tribunes
their
own
creatures
must
be
trusted
with
it
?
And
this
is
that
which
Tacitus
observes
to
be
the
issue
of
those
quarrels
which
were
kept
on
foot
between
the
Nobility
and
the
Commons
,
modo
turbulenti
Tribuni
,
[
s
](A86304-e31390-b)
s
Tacit.
hist.
lib.
2.
modo
Consules
praevalidi
,
sometimes
some
factious
Tribunes
carried
it
away
,
and
then
again
the
Consuls
had
the
better
,
and
prevailed
in
power
,
according
as
they
did
comply
with
the
peoples
humours
;
till
Marius
and
Sylla
first
,
and
Julius
Caesar
afterwards
by
their
example
,
by
force
of
Arms
subdued
both
parties
,
and
introduced
an
absolute
Government
.
(7)
Now
for
the
steps
by
which
the
people
did
as●end
to
this
height
of
power
,
they
were
not
raised
at
once
,
but
were
long
a
making
.
When
first
the
discontented
Nobles
had
expulsed
their
Kings
,
and
found
they
could
not
master
all
those
difficulties
which
so
great
a
business
as
that
was
did
present
unto
them
,
without
being
sure
to
have
the
people
theirs
without
fear
of
lapsing
:
Poplicola
advised
,
and
at
last
enacted
it
for
Law
,
that
no
man
should
presume
upon
pain
of
death
to
take
upon
him
any
Office
,
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
[
t
](A86304-e31520-b)
t
Plutarch
.
in
Publicola
.
,
unlesse
it
come
unto
him
by
the
gift
of
the
people
;
and
that
if
any
were
condemned
,
and
appealed
to
them
,
the
execution
should
be
respited
,
till
the
people
should
give
sentence
in
it
.
But
then
withall
the
Nobility
kept
all
Offices
both
of
power
and
State
in
their
own
hands
only
,
the
people
being
uncapable
of
the
meanest
office
which
did
relate
unto
the
Government
of
the
Common-wealth
;
untill
they
gained
the
Tribunes
and
the
two
Aediles
(
which
were
under
officers
to
the
Tribunes
)
to
be
chosen
out
of
their
own
body
.
Which
once
obtained
,
there
was
no
place
,
how
high
soever
,
which
they
did
not
aim
at
,
and
which
their
Tribunes
did
not
finde
some
way
to
compasse
for
them
;
the
Nobles
and
Patricians
still
in
vain
complaining
how
much
they
were
dishonoured
in
the
competition
.
First
therefore
having
gained
a
Law
(
but
with
much
adoe
)
that
the
Commons
might
be
married
into
Noble
Families
,
they
presently
propose
another
,
ut
populo
potestas
esset
,
seu
de
Plebe
,
seu
de
Patribus
vellet
,
Consules
faciendi
,
[
u
](A86304-e31650-b)
u
Livie
.
l.
4.
that
the
people
might
have
liberty
to
choose
the
Consuls
out
of
which
rank
of
men
they
listed
:
and
at
the
first
attempt
did
prevail
so
far
,
that
in
stead
of
the
two
Consuls
which
they
had
before
,
six
Military
Tribunes
should
be
chosen
by
them
,
to
be
possessed
of
all
the
Consular
authority
,
and
they
to
be
promiscuously
elected
out
of
the
Patricians
and
the
People
,
as
they
saw
convenient
[
x
](A86304-e31720-b)
x
Livie
.
l.
4.
;
and
having
got
this
ground
they
went
on
a
main
.
For
not
long
after
,
P.
Licinius
Calvus
a
meer
Plebeian
,
is
made
one
of
these
Military
Tribunes
;
and
shortly
after
that
the
Magister
Equitum
,
or
the
Commander
of
the
horse
.
Thus
Silius
and
Aelius
are
made
Questors
,
those
of
Patrician
rank
having
had
the
canvass
;
and
next
that
followed
a
Decree
,
that
the
Docemviri
Sacrorum
,
who
had
the
custody
and
charge
of
the
Sibyls
Books
,
partim
ex
Plebe
,
partim
ex
Patriciis
,
[
a
](A86304-e31840-b)
a
Id.
lib.
6.
should
be
indifferently
chosen
out
of
both
Estates
.
In
little
time
,
the
Tribunes
pressing
hotly
for
it
,
L.
Sextus
obtains
the
Consulship
[
b
](A86304-e31870-b)
b
Id.
ibid.
,
C.
Martius
Rutilius
is
first
made
Dictator
,
afterwards
one
of
the
Censors
also
[
c
](A86304-e31910-b)
c
Id.
lib.
7.
;
and
P.
Philo
is
advanced
to
the
place
and
dignity
of
the
Prator
[
d
](A86304-e31940-b)
d
Id.
lib.
8.
.
Having
thus
took
possession
of
all
Civil
Magistracy
,
which
were
of
any
power
and
dignity
in
the
Common-wealth
;
the
Tribunes
would
not
rest
nor
content
themselves
,
untill
the
Commons
were
made
capable
of
the
Priesthood
also
:
which
after
some
slight
opposition
made
by
Appius
Claudius
(
a
Family
that
never
yeelded
any
thing
to
advance
the
people
)
was
conferred
upon
them
,
five
Augures
,
and
four
Pontifi●es
being
added
to
the
former
number
,
all
chosen
,
and
for
ever
to
be
chosen
by
and
out
of
the
Commons
[
e
](A86304-e32030-b)
e
Id.
lib.
10.
.
There
were
only
now
two
places
of
respect
and
credit
,
that
of
the
Maximus
Curio
and
the
Pontifex
Maximus
,
both
which
the
Nobles
did
pretend
to
belong
to
them
:
but
the
Tribunes
were
resolved
to
have
it
otherwise
.
According
to
which
resolution
,
C.
Manilius
got
the
Office
of
the
Maximus
Curio
[
f
](A86304-e32100-b)
f
Id.
lib.
26.
:
and
in
the
close
of
all
,
but
a
good
while
after
,
Omnibus
honoribus
plebi
communicatis
[
g
](A86304-e32120-b)
g
Rofin
.
Antiq.
Rom.
l.
3.
c.
22.
,
after
all
other
honors
were
conferred
upon
them
,
or
rather
communicated
to
them
,
one
T.
Coruncanius
was
declared
the
Pontifex
Maximus
.
All
this
and
more
they
had
,
but
it
would
not
satisfie
.
(8)
For
there
was
wanting
still
both
the
power
of
Judicature
,
and
the
Supreme
Majestie
of
the
State
to
make
all
compleat
;
and
to
gain
this
the
Tribunes
must
bestir
themselves
both
with
art
and
violence
;
or
else
they
could
not
hope
to
estate
it
on
them
.
A
business
of
so
high
a
nature
,
that
it
was
never
in
a
way
to
be
brought
about
,
till
the
two
Gracehi
undertook
the
contrivance
of
it
:
who
being
men
of
excellent
parts
and
great
abilities
,
did
most
unfortunately
fall
on
the
undertaking
;
and
being
fallen
upon
it
did
devise
all
ways
which
either
art
or
wit
could
present
unto
them
to
effect
the
work
.
Of
these
Tiberius
was
the
eldest
,
who
stumbling
in
the
way
on
the
Lex
Agraria
,
as
being
a
means
to
make
the
poor
people
more
confiderable
,
and
the
rich
less
powerful
;
and
finding
that
Octavius
one
of
his
Colleagues
did
oppose
him
in
it
,
deposed
him
from
his
Office
by
force
and
violence
,
only
because
he
stood
upon
the
right
of
his
negative
voice
[
h
](A86304-e32250-b)
h
Plutarch
in
Tib.
&
Caio
.
.
He
had
before
inflamed
the
people
by
making
a
seditious
speech
to
prefer
their
business
;
and
now
he
takes
a
course
to
inflame
them
more
,
for
the
advancement
of
his
own
.
For
one
of
his
friends
being
found
dead
upon
a
sudden
,
not
without
some
suspicion
of
poyson
,
as
he
gave
it
out
,
he
put
on
mourning
apparrel
,
and
brought
his
sons
before
the
people
,
into
the
Common
Forum
,
beseeching
them
to
have
compassion
on
his
Wife
and
Children
,
as
one
that
utterly
despaired
of
his
own
safetie
,
having
for
their
sakes
got
the
hatred
of
the
Noble
men
.
And
sometimes
he
would
be
the
first
man
in
the
Market-place
,
apparelled
all
in
black
,
his
face
swelled
with
tears
,
and
looking
heavily
upon
the
matter
,
would
pray
the
people
to
stand
to
him
,
saying
,
he
was
afraid
his
Enemies
would
come
in
the
night
,
and
overthrow
his
house
to
kill
him
.
By
means
of
which
devices
he
so
wrought
upon
them
,
that
many
of
them
bought
tents
and
lay
about
his
house
continually
,
to
keep
him
from
the
hands
of
his
deadly
Enemies
.
So
that
being
sure
of
their
concurrence
and
assistance
in
any
project
which
he
should
set
on
foot
to
advance
himself
,
under
pretence
of
doing
service
to
the
Common-wealth
;
he
presently
proposed
a
law
,
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
,
that
any
man
that
would
might
appeal
from
the
Judges
to
the
people
in
what
cause
soever
.
And
that
he
might
be
sure
to
embase
the
Senate
,
to
the
improvement
and
increase
of
the
peoples
power
,
he
had
prepared
another
of
an
higher
nature
,
which
was
to
adde
unto
the
Senate
an
equal
number
of
the
Equites
,
or
the
Roman
Knights
,
who
were
to
be
of
equal
power
,
and
to
have
libertie
of
voting
in
all
publick
businesses
with
the
antient
Senators
.
In
passing
which
and
other
of
his
Popular
laws
he
got
this
trick
,
(
and
he
was
very
constant
to
it
)
that
if
he
found
the
sense
of
the
house
to
be
against
him
,
and
was
not
like
to
carry
with
him
the
major
part
of
the
voyces
,
he
would
quarrel
with
his
fellow
Tribunes
to
spin
out
the
time
till
his
partie
were
all
come
together
;
and
if
that
could
not
do
it
neither
,
then
he
adjourned
the
Assembly
to
some
other
day
.
But
yet
for
all
these
artifices
and
unworthy
practises
,
he
could
not
compass
the
design
,
but
left
it
to
be
finished
by
his
Brother
Caius
:
Who
taking
the
same
course
to
ingage
the
people
,
which
his
Br●ther
had
pursued
before
,
brought
those
designes
about
which
Tiberius
failed
in
.
[
i
](A86304-e32410-b)
i
Id.
ibid.
For
first
whereas
the
Senate
were
the
only
Judges
in
matters
which
concerned
the
affairs
of
the
Common-wealth
,
which
made
them
no
less
reverenced
by
the
Roman
Knights
,
then
by
others
of
the
common
people
:
Caius
prevailed
so
far
that
he
gained
a
law
for
adding
three
hundred
of
these
Equites
to
as
many
Senators
(
for
the
Senate
did
consist
of
three
hundred
antiently
)
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
,
giving
them
equall
power
of
judging
in
all
causes
which
were
brought
before
them
.
So
that
by
gaining
this
and
the
former
law
of
appealing
to
the
people
upon
all
occasions
,
the
people
were
estated
in
the
power
of
Judicature
,
and
the
dernier
resort
(
as
the
Lawyers
call
it
)
was
in
them
alone
.
The
only
point
now
left
was
the
Supreme
Majestie
,
and
that
did
Caius
very
handsomely
confer
upon
them
without
noise
or
trouble
.
For
whereas
all
other
Orators
when
when
they
made
their
speeches
,
turned
themselves
towards
the
Palace
where
the
Senate
sate
:
he
on
the
contrary
turned
himself
towards
the
Market
place
where
the
people
were
,
and
taught
all
other
Orators
by
his
Example
to
doe
the
like
.
And
thus
(
saith
Plutarch
)
by
the
only
turning
of
his
look
he
gained
a
point
of
infinite
consequence
and
importance
;
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
,
changing
the
Common-wealth
from
an
Aristocratie
,
to
a
meer
Democratie
:
which
was
the
matter
so
aimed
at
by
his
Predecessors
.
(9)
The
Tribunes
had
been
insolent
enough
in
the
former
times
,
but
the
obtaining
of
these
laws
made
them
more
unsufferable
.
Before
they
used
to
quarrel
all
the
greatest
Officers
,
as
if
the
State
could
not
consist
but
by
their
contentions
:
there
being
no
Magistrate
so
great
,
nor
man
so
innocent
,
whom
they
exposed
not
sometimes
to
contempt
and
scorn
,
and
made
not
subject
to
their
tyranni●
.
The
renowned
Scipio
himself
,
the
very
Atlas
of
the
State
when
it
was
in
danger
,
a
man
in
whom
there
was
not
any
thing
but
brave
and
gallant
,
could
not
scape
so
clear
,
but
that
he
was
accused
by
these
factious
Tribunes
[
k
](A86304-e32680-b)
k
Livie
.
hist.
lib.
28.
,
and
forced
to
live
retired
in
his
Countrey-house
,
far
from
the
employments
of
that
State
,
which
did
not
otherwise
subsist
but
by
his
abilities
.
Nor
could
they
look
on
their
Dictators
but
with
eyes
of
malice
,
although
they
had
as
much
authoritie
as
that
State
could
give
them
,
or
any
of
their
Kings
had
enjoyed
before
,
whom
they
endevour
to
make
subject
to
their
pride
and
tyrannie
by
all
means
imaginable
.
And
to
that
end
,
sometimes
denyed
him
the
honor
of
a
Triumph
,
though
he
had
deserved
it
in
all
mens
judgements
but
their
own
;
and
sometimes
making
this
Magister
Equitum
[
l
](A86304-e32730-b)
l
Id.
lib.
22.
,
to
be
of
equal
power
and
authoritie
with
him
:
and
finally
sometimes
they
declaim
against
him
[
m
](A86304-e32740-b)
m
Id.
ibid.
,
to
make
him
of
no
reputation
with
the
common
people
.
And
for
their
dealing
with
the
Consuls
,
it
had
been
a
complaint
of
old
,
even
in
the
dawning
of
the
day
of
their
new
authoritie
,
Consulatum
captum
&
oppressum
a
Tribunitiae
potestate
[
n
](A86304-e32770-b)
n
Id.
lib.
2.
,
that
the
Consulship
was
suppressed
and
captivated
by
the
power
of
the
Tribunes
;
and
we
can
no where
finde
that
they
improved
their
modestie
,
as
they
did
their
power
.
Nor
did
they
only
quarrel
with
the
Consuls
,
and
proceed
no
further
,
(
though
that
had
been
an
high
affront
to
the
Supreme
Magistrate
)
but
threatned
to
commit
them
to
the
Prison
also
,
and
many
times
their
threatnings
were
not
made
in
vain
.
For
thus
we
read
,
that
Caius
Marius
being
Tribune
[
o
](A86304-e32850-b)
o
Plutarch
in
Mario
.
,
threatned
to
send
Cotta
the
Consul
unto
Prison
,
but
afterwards
was
taken
off
by
fair
perswasions
:
and
Sulpitus
,
one
as
violent
as
he
,
though
not
so
valiant
,
assaulted
both
the
Consuls
as
they
sate
in
the
Senate
house
[
p
](A86304-e32910-b)
p
Id.
ibid.
,
and
killed
one
of
their
sons
there
,
who
was
not
so
quick
of
foot
as
to
scape
his
hands
.
Which
though
they
were
but
bare
attempts
were
yet
lewd
enough
,
sufficiently
to
the
dishonor
of
such
eminent
Magistrates
,
and
to
the
infamy
and
disgrace
of
the
publick
Government
.
And
therefore
to
make
sure
work
of
it
,
and
that
the
world
might
see
they
could
more
then
threaten
,
Quintius
will
tell
you
in
the
Dialogue
with
his
Brother
Cicero
,
Brutum
&
P.
Scipionem
tales
tantos
viros
hominum
omnium
infimum
&
sordidissinum
Trib.
Pl.
C.
Curiatium
in
vincula
conjecisse
[
q
](A86304-e32960-b)
q
Cicero
de
Legibus
lib.
3.
,
that
C.
Curiatius
,
a
most
base
and
unworthy
person
,
had
caused
such
gallant
men
as
Brutus
and
P.
Scipio
to
be
cast
in
Prison
.
And
if
we
make
a
further
search
we
shall
quickly
finde
,
that
M.
Drusus
being
Tribune
caused
Philip
the
Consul
to
be
cast
headlong
out
of
his
seat
,
to
the
no
small
danger
of
his
life
,
only
for
interrupting
him
in
the
middle
of
a
factious
speech
;
which
was
an
insolencie
beyond
imprisonment
.
To
speak
of
their
behaviour
towards
the
other
Magistrates
were
a
thing
impertinent
.
For
if
the
Consuls
and
Dictators
could
not
scape
their
hands
,
there
is
no
question
to
be
made
but
that
the
Praetors
,
Censors
,
Quaestors
,
yea
the
Pontifices
themselves
,
were
most
abundantly
debased
and
insulted
on
by
these
popular
Tyrants
.
(
10
)
Thus
have
we
brought
the
Tribunes
to
as
great
an
height
both
for
power
and
insolencie
,
as
were
the
Ephori
before
;
and
thereby
made
them
ready
for
the
greater
fall
.
A
fall
which
was
not
long
a
coming
after
they
had
made
up
the
measure
of
their
pride
and
tyrannie
.
For
Lucius
Sylla
having
brought
the
estate
of
Rome
under
his
command
,
and
knowing
full
well
how
dangerous
these
men
would
be
to
him
,
if
they
were
suffered
to
continue
in
their
former
power
,
set
forth
a
law
by
which
they
were
reduced
to
their
antient
bounds
;
inabled
only
to
relieve
,
not
to
wrong
the
Subject
.
Sylla
Tribunis
Pl●bis
lege
sua
injuriae
faciendae
potestatem
ademit
,
auxilii
ferendi
reliquit
,
as
we
read
in
Tullie
[
r
](A86304-e33190-b)
r
Id.
ibid.
.
A
thing
that
much
displeased
the
people
,
and
the
Tribunes
more
.
But
Sylla
was
no
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
,
no
great
applier
of
himself
to
the
peoples
humors
,
and
therefore
cared
but
little
how
they
took
the
matter
.
Pompey
succeeding
him
in
power
and
in
purpose
too
,
took
a
course
quite
contrary
;
and
re-established
them
in
that
authoritie
whereof
Sylla
had
of
late
deprived
them
.
For
finding
that
the
common
people
longed
for
nothing
more
then
to
see
the
Office
of
the
Tribunes
in
the
height
again
,
and
being
resolved
to
lay
the
foundation
of
his
greatness
on
the
affections
and
dependence
of
the
common
people
[
s
](A86304-e33260-b)
s
Plutarch
.
in
Pompeio
.
,
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
,
he
gratified
them
in
that
point
,
and
thought
himself
an
happy
man
to
finde
so
fair
an
opportunitie
to
oblige
them
to
him
.
On
which
deceitful
grounds
(
for
they
proved
no
other
)
he
set
them
in
their
power
again
,
as
before
was
said
;
for
which
he
stands
accused
by
Quintus
,
[
u
](A86304-e33320-b)
u
Plutarch
in
I.
Caesare
.
,
and
set
up
Caesar
to
oppose
him
.
Who
going
the
same
way
to
work
that
Sylla
did
,
and
knowing
that
a
Tribune
and
a
Tribunitian
spirit
were
no
friends
to
Monarchie
,
left
them
the
name
,
but
nothing
else
.
The
power
and
priviledge
of
the
Office
he
kept
unto
himself
for
his
own
security
[
x
](A86304-e33390-b)
x
Dion
histor.
Rom.
lib.
53.
;
as
one
that
understood
,
none
better
,
how
many
notable
advantanges
he
should
gain
thereby
,
for
the
confirming
of
his
Empire
.
Which
course
Augustus
followed
also
,
taking
the
Tribunitian
power
into
his
own
hands
,
posito
Triumviri
nomine
[
y
](A86304-e33430-b)
y
Tacitus
Annal.
lib.
1.
,
assoon
as
the
Triumvirate
was
expired
by
the
death
of
his
partners
;
and
from
thence
reckoned
the
years
of
his
Government
,
as
Tribunitiae
potestatis
tertium
,
quartum
,
&c.
which
his
Successors
did
after
his
example
till
the
time
of
Constantine
,
when
the
name
of
Tribune
was
laid
by
as
a
thing
forgotten
[
z
](A86304-e33480-b)
z
Rosin
.
Antiq.
Rom.
.
The
Empire
was
then
cast
into
another
kinde
of
mould
then
it
had
been
formerly
;
new
Offices
ordained
,
new
forms
of
Government
introduced
,
and
a
new
Rome
built
:
and
to
what
purpose
should
they
keep
the
name
,
when
the
thing
was
gone
?
(
11
)
Let
us
look
back
on
all
that
is
said
before
,
and
we
shall
finde
but
little
reason
to
relie
upon
Calvins
word
.
He
saith
the
Tribunes
were
fet
up
to
oppose
the
Consuls
;
but
the
best
Writers
do
affirm
that
they
were
instituted
only
to
protect
the
people
,
and
to
protect
the
people
in
such
cases
only
when
they
did
suffer
any
tort
or
unjust
oppression
.
He
reckoneth
them
for
instances
of
such
popular
Magistrates
as
were
ordained
to
moderate
and
restrain
the
vast
power
of
Kings
and
other
Supreme
Magistrates
;
but
the
best
Writers
do
affirm
that
the
Tribunes
were
not
instituted
till
the
Kings
were
outed
;
nor
instituted
at
the
first
to
restrain
the
Consular
power
,
though
by
degrees
they
did
restrain
it
as
they
pleased
;
and
finally
that
they
were
again
abridged
of
their
power
and
tyrannie
,
assoon
as
Monarchie
was
restored
,
and
the
State
brought
to
be
obedient
to
one
Soveraign
Prince
.
He
seems
to
intimate
that
the
Consuls
were
not
wronged
by
such
oppositions
as
the
Tribunes
daily
made
against
them
,
and
that
the
Tribunes
did
no
more
in
such
oppositions
then
by
their
place
and
office
they
were
bound
to
do
.
But
the
best
Writers
do
affirm
that
the
Consuls
made
complaint
from
time
to
time
of
those
wrongs
and
insolencies
which
those
proud
creatures
of
the
people
did
afflict
them
with
;
and
they
complained
not
without
cause
,
as
their
stories
tell
us
.
So
that
there
is
but
little
ground
for
the
supposition
,
touching
the
first
creation
of
these
mighty
Tyrants
,
which
Calvin
trimly
puts
upon
us
;
less
for
the
application
of
it
to
his
end
and
purpose
.
What
other
power
soever
they
enjoyed
or
exercised
more
then
the
power
of
interceding
,
when
any
Bill
or
Ordinance
was
to
pass
the
Senate
,
by
which
the
people
might
have
suffered
in
their
goods
and
liberties
,
was
an
incroachment
on
the
Consuls
,
and
wrested
from
them
by
strong
hand
,
sometimes
with
bloud
,
but
never
without
dangerous
tumults
.
The
best
use
can
be
made
of
such
false
surmises
,
especially
when
they
are
false
and
factious
too
(
and
some
good
uses
may
be
made
of
the
strongest
poysons
)
is
that
an
Item
may
be
taken
by
all
Kings
,
Princes
▪
and
Supreme
Governors
to
have
a
care
of
their
Estates
,
and
neither
suffer
any
Tribunes
,
or
men
of
Tribunitian
spirits
,
or
such
as
challenge
to
themselves
Tribunitian
power
,
to
grow
up
under
them
,
or
live
within
the
verge
of
their
Dominions
.
The
Tribune
and
the
Tribunitian
spirit
are
no
friend
to
Monarchie
;
and
have
so
much
of
Pompey
in
them
(
who
restored
the
Office
)
that
they
will
never
be
content
to
endure
an
equall
,
much
less
to
suffer
a
Superior
.
For
further
proof
of
which
(
if
more
proof
be
requisite
)
and
for
discovering
to
the
world
with
what
arts
and
practises
those
factious
and
seditious
spirits
did
attain
their
height
:
it
would
be
a
most
excellent
piece
of
service
to
all
Soveraign
Princes
,
if
a
just
Tribunitian
historie
were
composed
by
some
man
of
judgement
,
for
the
recovery
of
this
Age
from
the
present
maladies
,
and
a
Memento
to
the
future
.
But
this
I
leave
to
those
who
have
time
and
leisure
,
and
other
fit
abilities
to
goe
through
with
it
.
I
have
another
task
in
hand
,
and
the
Demarchi
call
upon
me
to
pass
on
to
Athens
,
where
we
are
like
to
finde
worse
work
then
we
met
with
hitherto
.
Worse
work
I
mean
in
this
respect
,
that
we
are
like
to
finde
less
ground
for
the
supposition
;
for
otherwise
we
are
like
to
finde
no
work
at
all
,
as
will
appear
more
evidently
by
that
which
followeth
.
CHAP.
IV.
Of
what
authority
the
DEMARCHI
were
in
the
State
of
ATHENS
;
and
of
the
danger
and
unfitness
of
the
instances
produced
by
CALVIN
.
-
(
I
)
Athens
first
governed
by
Kings
,
and
afterwards
by
one
Soveraign
Prince
under
other
titles
.
-
(
II
)
The
Annual
Magistrates
of
Athens
what
they
were
,
and
of
what
authoritie
.
-
(
III
)
By
whom
and
what
degrees
the
State
of
Athens
was
reduced
to
a
Democratie
.
-
(
IV
)
Of
the
authoritie
of
the
Senate
,
and
the
famous
Court
of
the
Areopagites
.
-
(
V
)
What
the
Demarchi
were
in
the
State
of
Athens
,
and
of
what
authoritie
.
-
(
VI
)
The
Demarchi
never
were
of
power
to
oppose
the
Senate
,
nor
were
ordained
to
that
end
.
-
(
VII
)
Calvins
ill
luck
in
making
choyce
of
three
such
instances
,
which
if
true
,
would
not
serve
his
turn
.
-
(
VIII
)
The
danger
which
lyeth
hidden
under
the
disguise
of
such
popular
Magistrates
,
as
are
here
instanced
in
by
Calvin
.
-
(
IX
)
What
moved
Calvin
to
lay
these
dangerous
stumbling-blocks
in
the
Subjects
way
.
-
(
X
)
The
dangerous
oppositions
and
practises
which
have
hence
ensued
in
most
parts
of
Europe
.
-
(
XI
)
The
sect
of
CALVIN
professed
Enemies
to
Monarchie
,
and
the
power
of
Princes
.
(1)
THE
State
of
Athens
,
as
were
all
others
at
the
first
,
was
under
the
Government
of
Kings
,
all
of
them
of
the
race
of
Cecrops
,
from
whom
his
Successors
were
called
Cecropidae
:
and
they
,
as
other
Kings
in
those
antient
times
,
ut
libitum
imperitabant
[
a
](A86304-e34410-b)
a
Tacit.
Annal.
lib.
3.
,
governed
the
people
under
them
by
no
other
rule
then
their
own
discretion
.
Theseus
the
tenth
from
Cecrops
,
was
the
first
King
of
Athens
which
let
goe
his
hold
,
and
parted
with
so
many
of
the
Regal
rights
,
as
made
the
Kings
weak
and
the
Subjects
wanton
.
For
having
a
desire
to
incorporate
all
the
Inhabitants
of
Attica
into
the
City
of
Athens
,
the
better
to
unite
them
against
forein
force
,
and
to
assemble
them
together
as
occasion
served
,
he
was
fain
to
win
them
to
it
by
large
promises
of
giving
them
some
share
in
the
publick
Government
:
without
which
bait
,
the
wealthier
sort
,
and
such
as
had
authoritie
in
their
several
Burroughs
,
could
not
be
drawn
into
the
City
[
b
](A86304-e34490-b)
b
Plutarch
in
Theseo
.
.
Yet
still
he
kept
unto
himself
and
to
his
successors
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
,
as
we
finde
in
Plutarch
,
the
chief
Cnmmandery
in
the
wars
,
and
the
preservation
of
the
laws
,
together
with
a
superintendency
in
matters
which
concerned
Religion
;
the
main
points
of
Soveraigntie
.
And
in
this
State
things
stood
till
the
death
of
Codrus
,
the
seventh
from
Theseus
,
who
giving
up
his
own
life
to
preserve
his
Countrey
,
became
so
honored
and
admired
amongst
his
people
,
that
they
resolved
for
his
sake
to
have
no
more
Kings
,
for
fear
they
should
never
meet
with
any
who
might
be
worthy
to
succeed
him
:
which
was
one
of
the
prettiest
wanton
quarrels
that
ever
was
picked
against
a
Monarchie
.
The
Princes
which
succeeded
after
his
decease
,
they
called
not
Kings
,
but
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
,
or
Governors
;
but
the
change
was
only
in
the
name
,
and
in
the
manner
of
their
getting
the
Supreme
authoritie
.
For
being
once
invested
with
the
Supreme
power
,
they
held
it
during
life
without
check
or
censure
;
as
is
affirmed
by
Africanus
,
an
antient
writer
:
who
laying
down
the
succession
of
the
Kings
of
Athens
,
to
the
death
of
Codrus
[
d
](A86304-e34650-b)
d
African
.
apud
Eusib
.
Chron.
edit.
Scaliger
.
,
addes
this
,
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
,
that
after
them
succeeded
the
perpetual
Archonte●
,
who
held
the
Government
during
life
.
The
like
Eusebius
doth
affirm
[
e
](A86304-e34690-b)
e
Euseb.
in
Chro.
,
and
all
Authors
else
,
which
treat
of
the
affairs
of
Athens
.
The
difference
was
,
that
formerly
the
Kingdom
was
successive
meerly
,
entailed
upon
the
Princes
of
the
line
of
Cecrops
,
now
it
began
to
be
Elective
,
and
to
be
given
to
them
who
best
pleased
the
people
:
Et
loco
libertatis
erat
,
quod
eligi
coeperunt
[
f
](A86304-e34750-b)
f
Tacit.
hist.
l.
1.
,
and
it
was
some
degree
of
liberty
,
(
and
a
great
one
too
)
that
they
had
power
to
nominate
and
elect
their
Princes
.
But
long
they
did
not
like
of
this
,
although
no
doubt
a
great
intrusion
on
the
Regal
dignity
.
The
Princes
were
too
absolute
when
they
held
for
life
,
not
so
observant
of
the
people
as
it
was
expected
;
because
not
liable
to
accompt
,
nor
to
be
called
unto
a
reckoning
till
it
was
too
late
,
till
death
had
freed
them
from
their
faults
,
and
the
peoples
censure
.
And
therefore
having
tryed
the
Government
of
13
of
these
perpetual
Archontes
,
of
which
Medon
the
son
of
Codrus
was
the
first
,
and
the
last
Al●maeon
;
In
decem
annos
Magistratuum
consuetudo
conversa
est
[
g
](A86304-e34820-b)
g
Euseb.
in
Chr.
,
they
introduced
another
custom
,
and
every
tenth
year
changed
their
Governors
.
These
they
called
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
,
[
h
](A86304-e34850-b)
h
African
.
apud
Euseb.
Chronic.
,
or
Decennial
Archontes
;
of
which
they
had
but
seven
in
all
,
and
then
gave
them
over
:
and
from
that
time
were
governed
by
nine
Officers
or
Magistrates
chosen
every
year
,
who
for
that
cause
waa
called
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
,
or
the
Annual
Magistrates
.
And
yet
it
is
to
be
observed
that
in
both
these
changes
,
the
Archon
whosoever
he
was
,
and
whether
he
was
for
term
of
life
or
for
ten
years
only
,
had
all
the
power
which
formerly
was
belonging
to
the
Kings
,
save
the
very
name
;
in
which
regard
Eusebius
doth
not
stick
to
call
them
by
the
name
of
Kings
:
where
speaking
of
the
institution
of
these
Annual
Magistrates
,
he
doth
thus
express
it
,
Athenis
Annui
principes
constituti
sunt
cessantibus
Regibus
[
i
](A86304-e34960-b)
i
Euseb.
Chron.
,
as
St.
Hierom
renders
it
.
(2)
Now
for
these
Annual
Magistrates
,
they
were
these
that
follow
,
that
is
to
say
,
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
[
k
](A86304-e35020-b)
k
Iul.
Pollux
in
Onomast
.
l.
8.
c.
9.
▪
which
we
may
call
the
Provost
(
who
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
was
called
the
Archon
)
the
Bishop
or
High
Priest
,
the
Marshal
,
and
the
six
Chief
Justices
.
Of
these
the
Provost
was
the
chief
,
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
,
of
whom
they
did
denominate
the
ensuing
year
,
and
by
whose
name
they
dated
all
their
private
contracts
,
and
Acts
of
State
.
[
l
](A86304-e35110-b)
l
Id.
ibid.
Sect.
2.
To
him
it
appertained
to
have
a
care
of
celebrating
the
Orgies
of
Bacchus
,
and
the
great
festival
which
they
termed
Thargelia
,
consecrated
to
Apollo
and
Diana
;
as
also
to
take
cognizance
of
misdemeanors
,
and
in
particular
to
punish
those
who
were
common
drunkards
;
and
to
determine
in
all
cases
which
concerned
matter
of
inheritance
:
and
furthermore
to
nominate
Arbitrators
for
the
ending
of
fuits
and
private
differences
,
to
appoint
Guardians
unto
Orphans
,
and
Overseers
unto
women
left
with
childe
by
their
husbands
.
The
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
whom
we
call
the
Bishop
or
high
Priest
,
had
the
charge
of
all
the
sacred
mysteries
[
m
](A86304-e35230-b)
m
Id.
ibid.
Sect.
3.
,
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
,
and
the
administration
of
the
usual
and
accustomed
sacrifices
;
together
with
the
cognizance
of
sacriledge
,
prophaneness
,
and
all
other
actions
which
concerned
Religion
,
as
also
power
to
inter●●ct
litigious
persons
(
or
Common
Barretters
as
we
call
them
)
from
being
present
at
the
celebrating
of
the
holy
mysteries
.
And
he
retained
the
name
of
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
,
because
that
antiently
their
Kings
,
(
as
in
all
places
else
)
had
the
chief
hand
in
matters
which
related
to
the
publick
service
of
the
Gods
,
and
the
solemn
sacrifices
.
On
the
which
reason
and
no
other
,
the
Romans
had
their
Regem
Sacrificulum
,
(
whom
Plutarch
calls
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
[
n
](A86304-e35330-b)
n
Plutarch
in
Problemat
.
,
in
imitation
of
the
Latine
,
but
Dionysius
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
[
o
](A86304-e35370-b)
o
Dionys.
Halicarnens
.
hist.
l.
5.
,
in
the
true
Greek
phrase
)
;
of
which
Livie
thus
.
Rerum
deinde
divinarum
habita
cura
:
&
quia
quaedam
publica
sacra
per
ipsos
Reges
factitata
erant
,
necubi
Regum
desiderium
esset
,
Regem
Sacrificulum
creant
[
p
](A86304-e35440-b)
p
Livie
hist.
Rman
.
lib.
2.
.
But
to
proceed
,
the
Polemarchus
whom
we
English
by
the
name
of
Marshall
,
sate
judge
in
cases
of
sedition
,
and
such
whereby
the
grandour
of
the
State
might
suffer
detriment
;
as
also
in
all
actions
which
concerned
either
Denizens
,
or
Merchant-strangers
:
and
unto
him
it
appertained
to
sacrifice
to
Diana
and
to
Mars
,
the
two
military
Deities
[
q
](A86304-e35520-b)
q
Jul.
Pollux
in
Onomast
.
l.
8.
c.
9.
3.
,
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
,
and
to
prescribe
the
funeral
pomp
for
such
as
lost
their
lives
in
their
Countries
service
.
Each
of
these
had
their
two
Assessors
,
of
their
own
election
;
but
so
that
they
were
bound
to
choose
them
out
of
the
Senate
of
five
hundred
[
r
](A86304-e35550-b)
r
Id.
ibid.
Sect.
,
from
no
lower
rank
.
Finally
for
the
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
,
whom
we
call
Chief
Justices
,
they
were
six
in
number
,
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
[
s
](A86304-e35590-b)
s
Suidas
in
Lex
.
,
and
had
authority
to
give
judgement
absolutely
in
all
civil
pleas
,
to
judge
of
strangers
which
abused
the
priviledges
which
they
had
in
the
City
,
of
briberie
,
conspiracies
,
false
inscriptions
,
in
cases
of
adultery
and
publick
crimes
;
in
points
of
trade
,
and
actions
which
concerned
the
S●annaries
[
t
](A86304-e35620-b)
t
Jul.
Poll●x
in
Onomall
.
l.
8
c.
9.
sect.
1.
;
as
also
to
review
the
sentence
of
the
Provost
,
and
the
decrees
of
the
Senate
if
occasion
were
;
and
to
give
notice
to
the
people
,
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
,
as
Julius
Pollux
,
if
any
man
preferred
a
law
which
was
not
profitable
and
expedient
for
the
Common-wealth
.
Such
were
the
Officers
,
and
such
the
duty
of
those
Officers
,
ordained
at
Athens
,
upon
the
last
alteration
of
the
Government
which
before
we
spake
of
:
and
amongst
these
we
finde
not
any
popular
Magistrate
,
who
was
to
have
a
care
of
the
Common
people
,
and
to
preserve
them
in
their
rights
and
liberties
from
the
oppression
of
the
greater
and
more
powerful
Citizens
;
much
less
set
up
of
purpose
to
oppose
the
Senate
.
And
to
say
truth
,
we
must
not
look
for
any
such
amongst
the
nine
,
nor
in
these
times
in
which
this
alteration
of
the
Government
was
first
established
.
They
could
not
fall
immediately
from
a
Regal
State
,
to
a
Democratical
,
but
they
must
take
the
Aristocratie
in
the
way
unto
it
.
They
had
been
under
Kings
at
first
,
or
such
as
had
the
power
of
Kings
,
although
not
the
name
.
And
when
they
chose
these
Annual
Officers
,
they
chose
them
ex
nobilibus
urbis
,
out
of
the
Nobles
only
,
as
Eusebius
hath
it
[
u
](A86304-e35810-b)
u
Euseb.
Chron.
:
which
Scaliger
is
forced
to
grant
to
be
so
at
first
[
x
](A86304-e35830-b)
x
Scaliger
in
Animadvers
.
,
though
out
of
a
desire
to
confute
his
Author
,
he
would
very
fain
have
had
it
otherwise
.
Whether
or
no
they
had
such
Officers
as
Calvin
dreams
of
,
when
they
had
setled
their
Democratie
,
we
shall
see
anon
:
having
first
shewn
by
whom
and
by
what
degrees
the
government
of
the
State
was
cast
on
the
peoples
shoulders
,
and
the
form
thereof
made
meerly
popular
or
Democratical
.
For
certainly
it
is
most
true
,
that
never
any
Democratical
State
shewed
it self
at
the
first
in
its
proper
colours
,
or
came
into
the
world
by
a
lawful
entrance
;
but
crept
into
it
secretly
at
the
back-dore
either
of
faction
or
sedition
.
(3)
Now
the
first
man
that
gave
the
hint
to
the
Democratie
,
and
made
the
people
fall
in
love
with
a
factious
libertie
,
was
Theseus
,
a
valiant
but
unfortunate
King
,
who
the
better
to
induce
the
people
of
Attica
to
desert
their
dwellings
,
and
be
incorporated
into
Athens
,
promised
them
(
as
before
was
said
)
that
all
of
them
should
have
some
share
in
the
publick
government
,
and
after
the
form
and
manner
of
a
Common-wealth
.
And
so
far
he
performed
his
promise
,
as
to
devest
himself
of
some
parts
of
Soveraigntie
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
,
and
laid
the
first
foundation
of
that
popular
State
,
which
was
after
built
:
but
he
paid
deer
for
it
[
y
](A86304-e36010-b)
y
Plutarch
.
in
Th●seo
.
.
For
the
people
who
before
had
been
so
tractable
,
that
they
would
do
whatsoever
their
Kings
commanded
,
at
the
first
words
speaking
;
began
to
take
more
state
upon
them
,
and
became
so
stub
born
,
that
they
would
do
nothing
on
command
,
but
looked
to
be
flattered
with
and
courted
,
upon
all
occasions
[
z
](A86304-e36040-b)
z
Id●ibid
.
.
Which
being
noted
by
Menestheus
a
popular
man
,
but
otherwise
of
the
Royal
bloud
,
he
so
sed
that
humor
,
and
wrought
so
finely
on
them
by
his
wit
and
cunning
,
that
Theseus
was
in
fine
deposed
,
and
his
sons
disherited
,
and
the
remainder
of
the
Royaltie
conferred
by
them
upon
Menestheu●
,
as
their
deed
of
gift
.
And
though
no
doubt
the
people
did
improve
their
power
,
both
when
their
Kings
became
elective
,
and
when
their
Governors
were
elected
but
for
term
of
years
,
and
specially
when
the
Magistrates
were
no
more
then
Annual
;
yet
they
could
get
no
further
then
an
Aristocratie
,
till
the
time
of
Solon
;
which
were
about
170
years
after
the
Annual
Officers
were
first
established
:
the
Annual
Officers
being
established
in
the
first
year
of
the
5.
Olympiad
,
and
Solons
reformation
hapning
in
the
second
of
the
47.
But
Solon
being
chosen
Provost
(
or
the
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
,
)
and
finding
the
Republick
much
embroyled
in
dangerous
factions
which
had
been
long
since
bred
between
the
Nobles
and
Commons
,
in
the
change
of
Governments
:
took
on
him
by
the
joynt
consent
of
both
parties
,
the
emendation
of
the
laws
,
and
the
reducing
of
the
State
of
the
Common-wealth
to
a
more
peaceable
and
equal
temper
[
a
](A86304-e36240-b)
a
Id.
in
Solone
.
.
And
he
so
ordered
their
affairs
,
that
the
chief
Offices
of
the
City
remained
in
the
hands
of
the
Nobilitie
,
as
before
they
were
;
which
for
the
time
contented
them
:
but
the
election
of
those
Officers
,
and
the
dernier
resort
,
or
the
admittance
of
Appeals
upon
Writs
of
error
(
as
we
call
them
)
;
that
he
confirmed
unto
the
people
;
which
did
not
only
please
the
people
for
the
present
time
,
but
put
them
into
a
condition
of
drawing
to
themselves
the
supreme
authority
.
Insomuch
that
Aristotle
though
he
seem
to
say
,
that
Solon
setled
in
the
City
a
mixt
form
of
Government
,
the
Court
of
Areopagites
(
which
he
also
instituted
)
pretending
to
an
Oligarchie
,
the
Annual
Officers
or
Archontes
to
an
Aristocratie
,
and
the
power
of
judicature
being
vested
in
the
common
people
,
unto
a
Democratie
[
b
](A86304-e36400-b)
b
Aristot
.
Politic
.
l.
2.
c.
10.
:
yet
he
confesseth
at
the
last
,
that
this
power
of
judicature
,
and
the
necessity
which
all
men
found
of
applying
themselves
unto
the
people
,
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
,
changed
the
Republick
in
conclusion
to
a
meer
Democratie
,
as
it
continued
till
his
time
.
But
yet
it
was
not
brought
about
but
with
great
adoe
,
Pisistratus
first
reducing
the
estate
to
an
absolute
Monarchy
[
c
](A86304-e36470-b)
c
Plutarch
.
in
So●one
.
,
(
which
because
he
got
it
from
them
by
fraud
and
force
,
they
called
a
Tyranny
)
and
after
Clisthenes
freeing
his
countrey
from
that
yoke
(
by
driving
his
posterity
out
of
Attica
)
restoring
it
unto
an
Aristocratie
[
d
](A86304-e36520-b)
d
Id.
in
Aristide
,
in
Pericle
,
et
Cim●nc
.
,
as
before
it
was
.
At
last
it
seemed
good
to
Aristides
,
though
for
a
time
he
concurred
with
Clisthenes
in
his
form
of
government
,
to
cast
a
more
indulgent
eye
on
the
common
people
,
who
had
behaved
themselves
exceeding
gallantly
in
the
dreadfull
war
against
the
Persians
:
and
to
cause
a
law
to
be
enacted
that
all
authority
and
power
of
government
should
be
communicated
equally
to
all
the
Citizens
,
[
e
](A86304-e36560-b)
e
Id.
in
Aristide
.
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
,
and
that
they
should
be
capable
of
all
the
Offices
and
honours
in
the
Common-wealth
.
Which
as
it
added
much
to
the
authority
of
the
common
people
,
so
that
authority
was
increased
much
more
by
the
Arts
of
Pericles
;
who
bearing
a
grudge
unto
the
Court
of
the
Areopagites
,
whereof
he
was
never
any
Member
,
and
finding
that
the
power
thereof
,
and
of
the
Senate
of
five
hundred
,
did
derogate
exceeding
much
from
the
power
of
the
people
,
to
whose
faction
he
was
wholly
wedded
:
by
the
help
and
setting
on
of
Ephialtes
(
a
busie
and
popular
man
)
took
from
them
the
hearing
and
determining
of
the
weightiest
causes
[
f
](A86304-e36620-b)
f
Id.
in
Pericle
&
●imone
.
,
and
put
them
over
to
the
judgement
and
decision
of
the
common
people
,
who
had
no
more
before
but
the
last
appeal
:
and
thereby
perfected
and
produced
that
pure
Democratie
,
which
had
so
often
been
desired
,
but
in
vain
attempted
.
(4)
The
people
being
screwed
to
this
height
of
power
▪
and
the
dignity
of
the
supreme
Courts
so
much
diminished
,
a
man
would
think
there
was
but
little
need
of
such
popular
Officers
as
Calvin
speaks
of
,
ordained
of
purpose
(
as
he
thinks
)
to
oppose
the
Senate
,
and
counter-ballance
their
authority
.
Nor
were
those
Courts
at
any
time
so
inclined
to
tyranny
,
or
likely
in
their
constitution
to
oppress
the
people
,
when
their
authority
was
greatest
,
and
their
power
most
eminent
,
as
that
the
people
needed
any
special
Officers
to
restrain
their
insolencies
,
or
to
confine
them
to
the
limits
of
their
Jurisdiction
.
Now
for
the
Senate
,
it
consisted
at
the
first
of
400
persons
,
an
hundred
out
of
every
Tribe
;
and
to
that
number
was
restrained
by
Solon
,
whose
device
it
was
[
g
](A86304-e36730-b)
g
Id.
in
Solone
.
:
but
Clisthenes
,
having
increased
the
number
of
the
Tribes
to
ten
,
added
one
hundred
more
,
which
made
five
in
all
,
(
for
each
tribe
fifty
)
and
so
continued
till
the
expiration
of
that
Common-wealth
.
A
chief
part
of
their
business
was
,
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
,
&c.
to
deliberate
and
debate
of
all
such
matters
as
were
to
be
commended
to
the
care
of
the
common
people
,
that
when
the
whole
body
of
the
people
was
assembled
together
,
no
point
should
be
propounded
to
them
but
what
the
Councell
of
five
hundred
had
fitted
and
prepared
for
their
resolution
[
h
](A86304-e36790-b)
h
Id.
ibid.
.
It
also
appertained
to
them
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
,
&c.
to
consult
about
denouncing
war
and
raising
moneys
,
to
advise
upon
the
making
of
new
Lawes
,
to
judge
of
any
accident
which
at
any
time
hapned
in
the
City
,
and
of
such
matters
which
concerned
their
Allies
and
neighbours
;
to
impose
tribute
on
the
Subject
,
and
to
take
care
both
of
the
Navie
and
the
Temples
;
and
furthermore
to
inqure
into
the
carriage
of
the
City
Magistrates
,
to
appoint
keepers
unto
Prisoners
taken
in
the
wars
,
to
judge
of
suits
concerning
Orphans
,
and
sometimes
in
such
cases
as
belonged
more
properly
to
a
Court
of
war
[
i
](A86304-e36850-b)
i
Xenophon
de
Repub.
Athen.
.
Other
particulars
there
are
which
they
were
to
deal
in
,
but
these
the
principal
:
and
these
though
points
of
great
concernment
,
and
arguments
of
the
power
and
trust
committed
to
them
,
were
little
like
to
tempt
them
to
abuse
their
power
in
the
oppressing
of
the
people
.
For
besides
that
they
were
chosen
but
for
one
year
only
[
k
](A86304-e36860-b)
k
Xen●phon
de
Repub.
Athen.
,
and
that
too
not
without
a
previous
inquisition
into
their
former
life
and
conversation
;
which
were
sufficient
to
induce
them
to
hold
fair
quarter
with
the
people
by
all
means
imaginable
:
they
were
bound
by
oath
at
their
admission
to
that
honour
,
to
consult
the
peoples
good
and
benefit
in
most
special
manner
,
and
not
to
imprison
any
of
them
,
how
mean
soever
,
unlesse
he
were
found
guilty
of
some
practise
to
betray
the
City
,
and
diminish
the
authority
and
power
of
the
people
;
or
that
being
one
of
the
Farmers
of
the
Tolls
and
Taxes
,
or
a
Collector
of
the
Tributes
,
he
became
non-solvent
,
and
had
not
cleared
his
accompt
with
the
Common-wealth
[
l
](A86304-e36890-b)
l
D●mosthen
.
in
oratione
com
.
N●ce●am
.
.
As
for
the
Court
or
Councell
of
the
Areopagites
,
it
consisted
from
the
first
beginning
,
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
,
of
such
and
such
alone
who
had
formerly
been
of
the
number
of
the
nine
chief
Magistrates
[
m
](A86304-e36920-b)
m
Plutarch
in
Solone
,
&
Pericle
.
;
and
they
being
once
admitted
held
for
term
of
life
:
which
made
them
,
being
men
of
eminence
and
reputation
,
to
be
more
able
to
annoy
the
people
,
and
to
int●ench
upon
them
in
their
rights
and
liberties
,
had
their
minde
been
answerable
.
For
unto
them
belonged
the
general
superintendency
of
all
things
in
the
Common-wealth
,
and
them
did
Solon
trust
with
this
speciall
power
,
that
they
shou'd
be
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
[
n
](A86304-e36950-b)
n
Id.
in
.
Solen
.
,
and
see
the
Lawes
to
be
maintained
and
to
have
their
course
:
and
in
particular
to
judge
in
the
case
of
murder
,
and
man-slaughter
,
and
briefly
in
all
Capital
causes
.
And
with
these
Courts
or
Counsels
,
call
them
which
you
will
,
the
prudent
Legislator
thought
that
he
had
setled
and
confirmed
the
Common-wealth
,
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
,
as
with
two
strong
Anchors
,
in
such
a
firm
and
constant
manner
,
that
neither
the
fabrick
of
the
State
should
be
easily
shaken
,
nor
the
people
apt
to
take
offence
,
or
run
themselves
upon
unpeaceable
and
seditious
courses
.
(5)
But
if
the
Senate
or
the
Councell
should
abuse
their
power
,
and
use
that
sword
to
the
oppression
of
the
common
people
,
which
was
committed
to
their
hands
for
their
weal
and
benefit
:
might
not
,
and
did
not
the
Demarchi
take
the
peoples
part
,
and
save
them
from
the
wrongs
and
injuries
intended
towards
them
?
Calvin
so
intimates
indeed
,
but
he
speaks
without
book
,
being
more
guided
to
that
error
by
the
sound
and
etymologie
of
the
word
,
then
by
the
nature
of
the
office
.
The
best
Greek
Authors
who
have
written
the
affairs
of
Rome
,
do
call
the
Tribunes
of
the
people
by
this
name
Demarchi
,
and
their
authority
or
Office
by
the
name
of
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
also
.
Nothing
more
common
in
Polybius
,
Halicarnensis
,
Plutarch
,
and
whosoever
else
have
left
us
any
thing
of
the
Roman
stories
in
that
language
.
But
the
Demarchi
of
Athens
were
of
no
such
power
,
and
had
but
small
authority
(
God
wot
)
in
affairs
of
State
.
Measure
them
by
the
definition
which
is
given
by
Suidas
,
and
he
will
tell
you
that
they
were
certain
Officers
appointed
in
the
Burroughs
and
free
Towns
of
Attica
,
(
being
twelve
in
number
)
[
o
](A86304-e37150-b)
o
Suidas
in
Lex
.
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
.
And
for
his
power
,
he
tels
us
that
it
did
especially
consist
in
making
a
Terrier
of
the
lands
of
every
Township
,
and
keeping
of
the
publick
Registers
which
concerned
the
Burrough
,
in
calling
the
people
of
the
Town
together
when
their
occasions
did
require
it
,
and
calculating
of
their
voices
by
the
poll
,
or
scrutinie
,
and
sometimes
in
distraining
on
their
goods
and
chattels
,
if
any
of
them
were
indebted
to
the
State
either
in
amerciaments
or
contributions
.
But
take
his
own
words
with
you
for
the
more
assurance
.
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
(
saith
he
)
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
[
p
](A86304-e37220-b)
p
Id.
ibid.
.
The
Author
of
the
Etymologicon
magnum
saith
the
same
with
Suidas
,
but
in
sewer
words
;
and
he
describes
this
mighty
man
of
whom
Calvin
dreams
,
to
be
no
other
then
the
Bailiff
of
some
ancient
Burrough
is
with
us
in
England
,
his
power
being
limited
and
confined
within
the
perambulation
of
his
own
Parish
,
in
which
he
could
do
little
more
then
take
the
valuation
of
his
neighbours
estate
,
and
tell
how
much
he
was
to
be
assessed
at
in
the
Subsidie
Book
[
q
](A86304-e37310-b)
q
Etymologicon
Magnum
in
De●archo
.
,
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
.
So
he
,
which
is
in
sum
what
we
had
before
.
'T
is
true
,
there
was
another
Officer
of
the
same
name
in
the
City
also
,
and
for
each
tribe
one
;
the
Alderman
of
the
Ward
we
may
fitliest
call
him
;
but
not
of
much
more
power
and
reputation
then
the
Countrey-Bailiff
.
Of
these
saith
Harpocration
an
old
Grammarian
,
that
they
were
called
Naucrari
at
the
first
,
and
had
authority
to
arrest
or
destrain
such
persons
as
stood
indebted
to
the
Exchequer
or
the
Common-wealth
.
[
r
](A86304-e37400-b)
r
Harpocrat
.
in
Demarcho
.
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
,
so
Harpocration
briefly
in
his
wonted
manner
.
But
Julius
Pollux
in
his
Onomasticon
goes
to
work
more
plainly
,
and
telleth
us
of
these
Demarchi
,
that
they
were
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
[
s
](A86304-e37470-b)
s
Jul.
Pollux
l.
8.
c.
9.
sect.
30.
,
the
governours
or
Aldermen
of
their
severall
Wards
,
that
formerly
they
were
called
Naucrari
;
that
anciently
the
twelfth
part
of
a
Tribe
or
Ward
was
called
Naucraria
,
and
in
the
later
times
the
whole
Ward
it self
;
that
these
Demarchi
had
the
ordering
of
the
Taxes
raised
in
every
Ward
,
and
looked
unto
the
issuing
of
them
for
the
publick
use
;
and
finally
,
that
every
Naucraria
or
Ward
was
to
finde
two
horse-men
and
one
ship
for
the
service
of
the
Common-wealth
,
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
,
from
whence
in
probability
they
derived
the
word
.
Add
unto
this
from
Suidas
,
as
the
close
of
all
,
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
[
t
](A86304-e37610-b)
t
Suidas
in
Lex
.
,
that
they
had
also
the
setting
forth
of
the
great
festivall
called
Panathenaea
;
ordained
by
Theseus
on
the
incorporating
of
all
the
people
of
Attica
into
the
City
of
Athens
[
u
](A86304-e37660-b)
u
Plutarch
in
Theseo
.
.
(6)
Put
all
that
hath
been
said
together
touching
these
Demarchi
(
and
more
then
this
I
cannot
finde
which
concerns
that
Office
)
and
we
may
easily
perceive
that
they
were
men
of
no
authority
in
affairs
of
State
:
so
far
from
being
likely
to
protect
the
people
from
the
power
and
pressures
of
the
Senate
,
that
they
were
rather
executioners
,
or
Ministers
of
justice
to
afflict
the
people
when
the
occasions
of
the
Senate
did
require
it
of
them
.
That
the
Demarchi
were
ordained
to
oppose
the
Senate
,
when
it
lay
heavy
on
the
necks
of
the
common
people
;
or
actually
did
make
head
against
them
in
behalf
of
the
people
if
at
any
time
they
were
oppressed
and
injured
by
it
,
cannot
be
found
(
I
dare
with
confidence
affirm
)
in
any
Author
of
good
credit
,
either
Greek
or
Latine
.
'T
is
true
,
there
were
some
people-pleasers
in
the
State
of
Athens
,
whom
they
called
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
,
who
by
applying
themselves
to
the
peoples
humour
,
and
seeming
zealously
affected
to
their
power
and
profit
,
could
lead
them
whither
they
would
,
and
to
what
they
listed
:
and
sometimes
did
oppose
themselves
for
the
peoples
sake
,
not
only
against
the
Senate
,
but
all
other
Magistrates
.
Of
these
it
is
that
Aristotle
doth
make
frequent
mention
in
his
books
of
Politicks
,
and
seems
to
prophecy
,
that
if
not
looked
into
in
time
,
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
[
x
](A86304-e37830-b)
x
Aristot
.
Politi
c.
l.
5
c
5.
,
they
would
change
the
State
into
a
Tyrannie
.
But
these
were
neither
Officers
of
State
,
nor
justice
,
nor
indeed
any
Officers
at
all
,
though
many
times
they
did
ill
Offices
to
the
Common-wealth
,
the
better
to
advance
the
hopes
of
the
popular
faction
,
and
by
it
themselves
.
And
it
is
true
which
Aristotle
tells
us
in
another
place
,
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
,
that
the
people
had
not
only
power
to
elect
their
Magistrates
[
y
](A86304-e37900-b)
y
Id.
ibid.
l
2.
c.
12.
,
but
to
call
them
also
to
accompt
,
in
case
of
mal-administration
;
and
had
their
proper
Officers
appointed
to
that
end
and
purpose
.
But
then
it
is
true
withall
,
that
amongst
them
we
meet
not
these
Demarchi
of
whom
Calvin
dreams
;
or
any
others
which
stood
up
in
behalf
of
the
common
people
,
but
only
in
behalf
of
the
Common-wealth
.
Of
this
sort
were
the
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
superadded
to
the
nine
Archontes
,
and
of
authority
to
call
them
to
an
after-reckoning
,
if
they
found
them
guilty
of
extortion
[
z
](A86304-e37970-b)
z
Jul.
Pollux
.
l.
8.
c.
9.
Sect.
16.
:
and
of
this
sect
were
also
those
whom
they
called
Logistae
,
some
of
the
which
(
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
[
a
](A86304-e38000-b)
a
Id.
ibid.
Sect.
13.
,
saith
mine
Author
)
were
purposely
appointed
to
observe
and
enquire
into
the
Acts
of
the
Senate
,
and
to
proceed
against
them
when
their
time
was
out
,
according
as
they
saw
occasion
:
which
kinde
of
Overseers
had
an
eye
also
on
the
Areopagites
.
And
this
is
that
which
is
observed
by
Aeschines
the
famous
Orator
,
where
speaking
of
the
Fundamental
constitutions
of
the
Common-wealth
,
he
tells
us
,
that
it
was
ordained
by
the
Legislators
,
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
[
b
](A86304-e38060-b)
b
Aeschin
.
in
Orat.
contra
Dem●sto
.
&
Ctesiphon
.
,
that
even
the
Senate
of
five
hundred
should
give
up
an
accompt
of
their
ministration
;
and
that
the
holy
Councel
of
the
Areopagites
should
be
obnoxious
to
the
censure
of
the
Logistae
,
for
by
that
very
name
he
calls
them
.
Of
any
accompt
they
were
to
give
to
these
Demarchi
,
or
any
thing
they
did
de
facto
,
or
might
do
de
jure
,
with
reference
to
the
ease
and
benefit
of
the
common
people
,
nothing
but
sile●ce
to
be
found
in
all
Antiquity
.
And
to
say
truth
,
it
was
not
necessary
that
any
popular
Magistrates
should
be
made
of
purpose
,
to
save
the
people
from
the
pride
and
tyrannie
of
the
higher
Courts
,
which
were
accomptable
to
the
people
upon
all
occasions
,
and
were
to
be
accomptable
to
them
according
to
the
fundamental
institution
of
the
Common-wealth
.
The
State
of
Athens
being
one
of
the
absolutest
Democraties
which
was
ever
extant
,
and
so
accounted
of
by
all
who
write
of
Politicks
,
had
little
need
or
use
of
such
popular
Magistrates
which
Calvin
fancieth
in
that
place
;
which
may
be
serviceable
to
the
people
in
an
Aristocratie
,
but
in
a
popular
estate
of
no
use
at
all
.
Which
makes
me
wonder
by
the
way
,
why
Plato
should
affirm
against
right
&
reason
,
that
the
State
of
Athens
in
his
time
and
the
times
before
(
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
)
was
an
Aristocratie
[
c
](A86304-e38250-b)
c
Plato
in
Meneximo
.
:
when
by
the
current
of
all
writers
and
the
course
of
story
,
it
app●ars
most
evidently
that
it
was
not
only
a
Democratie
,
but
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
[
d
](A86304-e38280-b)
d
Plutarch
.
in
Cimone
.
,
the
purest
and
most
unmixt
Democratie
that
was
ever
read
of
.
(7)
Thus
have
we
proved
the
first
of
the
three
points
propounded
in
the
beginning
of
this
work
,
viz.
that
the
Ephori
,
the
Demarchi
,
and
the
Roman
Tribunes
were
not
ordained
at
first
for
those
ends
and
purposes
which
are
supposed
by
the
Author
:
but
more
particularly
,
that
neither
the
Ephori
of
Sparta
were
first
instituted
to
oppose
the
Kings
,
nor
the
Tribunes
first
ordained
to
oppose
the
Consuls
,
nor
the
Demarchi
of
authority
to
oppose
the
Senate
.
And
we
have
proved
(
which
is
directly
contrary
unto
Calvins
aim
)
that
the
Ephori
were
at
first
ordained
to
ease
the
Kings
,
and
to
be
aiding
to
them
against
the
Senate
,
who
began
sensibly
to
incroach
on
the
Regal
power
:
that
the
Tribunes
were
first
instituted
to
no
other
end
but
to
preserve
the
people
from
unjust
oppression
,
and
that
their
opposition
to
the
Consuls
was
accounted
alwayes
to
be
against
the
rules
of
their
institution
,
and
a
breach
of
Articles
:
And
as
for
these
Demarchi
whom
we
spake
of
last
,
that
neither
by
their
institution
nor
by
usurpation
,
they
did
oppose
against
the
Senate
in
behalf
of
the
people
,
but
executed
their
commands
upon
the
people
,
as
their
duty
bound
them
.
So
that
the
great
imagination
which
the
Author
had
of
shewing
to
the
world
a
view
of
such
popular
Magistrates
,
as
might
incourage
men
of
place
and
eminence
to
think
themselves
ordained
after
these
examples
to
moderate
their
licentiousness
of
Kings
and
Princes
;
is
fallen
directly
to
the
ground
without
more
ado
,
as
being
built
upon
a
weak
,
nay
a
false
foundation
,
not
able
to
support
the
building
.
And
more
then
so
,
in
case
the
instances
proposed
had
been
rightly
chosen
,
and
that
the
Ephori
in
Sparta
had
been
first
ordained
to
oppose
the
Kings
,
the
Tribunes
to
oppose
the
Consuls
,
and
the
Demarchi
to
keep
under
the
Athenian
Senate
:
yet
these
would
prove
but
sorry
instances
of
such
popular
Officers
as
were
ordained
ad
moderandum
Regum
libidinem
,
to
moderate
the
licentiousness
of
Kings
&
soveraign
Princes
,
for
proof
of
which
they
were
produced
.
The
Ephori
were
not
instituted
in
the
State
of
Sparta
till
the
Kings
were
brought
under
the
command
of
the
Senate
,
and
the
State
become
an
Aristocratie
,
in
which
the
Kings
had
very
little
left
them
of
the
Royal
dignity
but
the
empty
name
,
and
were
in
power
no
other
then
the
Dukes
of
Venice
;
save
that
they
were
to
have
the
command
of
the
Armies
,
which
those
Dukes
have
not
.
And
for
the
Tribunes
,
't
is
well
known
to
every
one
who
hath
perused
the
Roman
story
,
that
there
were
no
such
creatures
to
be
found
in
Rome
,
till
the
Romans
had
expu●sed
their
Kings
,
&
were
under
the
command
of
Co●suls
;
the
Monarchie
being
changed
to
an
Optimatie
,
and
the
people
bound
by
solemn
oaths
never
to
admit
of
a
King
amongst
them
.
The
like
may
be
affirmed
also
of
the
Demarchi
of
Athens
,
supposing
that
they
were
of
as
great
authority
,
as
either
the
Ephori
or
the
Tribunes
;
that
they
were
instituted
in
a
time
when
the
affairs
of
State
were
managed
by
nine
Annual
Magistrates
,
all
of
them
chosen
by
the
people
and
accomptable
to
them
.
In
all
these
cases
,
●um
non
in
regno
populus
esset
sed
in
libertate
[
e
](A86304-e38870-b)
e
Livie
his●
.
lib.
2.
,
when
the
people
had
sued
out
their
Wardship
,
and
thought
themselves
to
be
at
liberty
,
freed
from
those
bonds
which
nature
and
allegiance
formerly
had
laid
upon
them
:
they
did
no
more
then
what
a
wise
and
understanding
people
had
good
cause
to
do
,
in
taking
the
best
course
they
could
for
their
future
safety
.
And
in
my
minde
the
people
pleaded
most
unanswerably
in
their
own
behalf
,
when
they
alleadged
,
se
foris
pro
imperio
&
libertate
dimicantes
,
domi
a
civibus
captos
&
oppressos
[
f
](A86304-e38930-b)
f
Id.
ibid.
,
that
fighting
valiantly
abroad
both
for
their
own
liberty
and
their
Countries
honor
,
against
their
Kings
,
they
were
oppressed
and
wronged
at
home
by
their
fellow
Citizens
;
that
their
condition
as
things
stood
,
was
better
in
times
of
war
,
then
in
times
of
peace
;
their
liberty
never
more
assured
then
when
they
were
amongst
their
Enemies
:
and
therefore
being
no
otherwise
bound
to
submit
themselves
to
that
change
of
Government
,
then
as
it
had
been
introduced
by
their
own
consent
,
they
had
all
the
reason
in
the
world
to
get
as
good
terms
as
they
could
,
and
be
no
losers
by
the
bargain
.
Which
though
it
were
the
case
and
plea
particularly
of
the
people
of
Rome
,
might
be
used
also
very
fitly
by
the
Spartans
and
Athenians
on
the
self
same
reasons
.
But
this
can
no
way
be
pretended
or
alleadged
by
those
,
who
live
in
an
established
and
successional
Monarchie
,
where
there
is
one
only
to
command
in
chief
,
and
nothing
left
to
the
Subject
[
g
](A86304-e39020-b)
g
Tacit.
Annal.
praeter
obsequii
gloriam
,
but
the
glory
of
obedience
only
,
and
the
necessity
of
submitting
with
a
loyal
heart
to
those
commands
and
impositions
which
may
be
●aid
upon
them
with
an
unjust
hand
.
So
that
admitting
it
for
true
(
as
indeed
it
is
not
)
that
the
Ephori
,
the
Demarchi
,
and
the
Tribunes
were
ordained
for
the
ends
supposed
;
yet
it
can
follow
by
no
rules
of
law
or
logick
,
that
because
such
popular
Officers
have
been
sometimes
instituted
to
keep
the
scale
upright
and
the
balance
even
,
betwixt
the
Nobles
and
the
People
in
an
Aristocratie
,
therefore
the
like
are
to
be
fancied
in
a
setled
Monarchie
,
for
moderating
the
licentiousness
,
that
is
to
say
,
(
for
that
no
doubt
must
be
his
meaning
)
for
regulating
the
authority
of
the
Soveraign
Prince
.
(8)
Thus
have
we
seen
a
manifest
discovery
of
Calvins
purpose
for
setting
up
some
popular
Officers
in
every
Kingdom
to
regulate
the
authority
and
restrain
the
power
of
Soveraign
Princes
;
and
we
may
see
a
secret
and
more
subtile
danger
included
in
that
short
Parenthesis
,
then
what
is
obvious
at
first
sight
to
the
unwary
Reader
.
For
by
the
instances
proposed
and
presented
to
us
,
it
seems
to
be
his
meaning
,
that
these
popular
Officers
should
not
h●ve
power
only
to
restrain
their
Kings
when
they
transgress
the
bounds
of
law
or
equity
,
and
either
tyrannically
oppress
the
Subject
,
or
wilfully
dilapidate
the
patrimony
of
the
Common-wealth
:
but
that
they
should
set
themselves
against
them
and
control
their
doings
,
in
the
same
way
&
after
the
same
manner
,
as
the
Ephori
did
the
Kings
of
Sparta
,
or
the
Tribunes
did
the
Roman
Consuls
.
Now
we
have
shewn
before
out
of
several
Authors
[
h
](A86304-e39270-b)
h
Vide
chap.
2.
,
that
the
Ephori
did
not
only
take
upon
them
to
appoint
such
Privie
Counsellors
about
their
Kings
as
to
them
seemed
best
,
to
limit
and
prescribe
them
in
the
choyce
of
their
wives
;
to
send
them
out
unto
the
wars
and
recall
them
home
,
as
if
they
had
been
hirelings
only
and
of
no
more
reckoning
;
to
put
them
upon
fine
and
ransome
,
if
they
did
any
thing
which
was
not
pleasing
to
these
humorous
Gentlemen
;
to
have
them
at
command
both
to
come
and
goe
as
often
as
they
whistled
for
them
,
or
held
up
a
finger
,
and
finally
to
look
for
lowly
reverence
from
them
,
whensoever
they
vouchsafed
to
summon
them
to
attend
their
pleasures
:
but
also
to
imprison
;
next
to
banish
,
and
in
fine
to
murder
them
.
And
we
have
shewed
you
of
the
Tribunes
[
i
](A86304-e39310-b)
i
Vide
chap.
3●
,
that
after
they
had
fortified
themselves
with
large
priviledges
,
and
grew
predominant
in
the
affections
of
the
common
people
;
they
did
not
only
quarrel
and
oppose
the
Consuls
under
pretence
of
setting
forth
new
laws
for
the
peoples
benefit
,
nor
were
content
to
put
the
people
into
the
possession
of
all
the
offices
and
honors
of
the
Common-wealth
(
which
formerly
belonged
to
the
Nobles
only
)
whether
the
Consuls
would
or
not
:
but
sometimes
clapt
them
up
in
prison
,
and
sometimes
forced
them
to
flie
the
Senate-house
for
their
lives
and
safety
,
and
sometimes
threw
them
down
headlong
out
of
their
Chairs
of
State
,
to
the
great
danger
of
their
lives
,
and
disgrace
of
their
persons
.
Princes
should
be
in
worse
condition
then
their
meanest
subjects
,
if
they
were
under
the
command
of
such
powerful
masters
,
who
being
exalted
from
mean
fortunes
and
ignoble
families
,
little
acquainted
with
good
manners
,
and
less
with
any
thing
which
is
brave
and
royal
,
would
think
themselves
unworthy
of
so
great
an
Office
,
should
they
not
Lord
it
to
the
purpose
,
and
exercise
all
kinde
of
tyrannie
on
their
captived
Kings
,
which
insolence
and
malice
could
suggest
unto
them
.
If
Jack
be
once
in
office
he
must
be
a
Gentleman
;
and
gallop
to
the
Devil
if
he
get
on
Horse-back
.
Asperius
nihil
est
humili
cum
surgit
in
altum
,
as
the
Poet
hath
it
[
k
](A86304-e39390-b)
k
Juvenal
.
S●i
.
.
If
once
the
bramble
come
to
have
Dominion
over
the
trees
of
the
Forrest
,
he
will
not
only
rob
the
Olive
of
his
fatness
,
the
Vine
of
his
rich
Wines
,
and
the
Fig-tree
of
his
sweetness
,
but
also
will
devour
the
Cedars
[
l
](A86304-e39480-b)
l
Judg.
c.
9.
,
even
the
Cedars
of
Lebanon
.
No
King
or
other
Supreme
Magistrate
shall
dare
to
stand
before
them
;
or
if
he
do
,
a
fire
shall
come
out
of
the
Bramble
,
and
consume
him
utterly
.
Such
popular
Officers
as
those
of
whom
Calvin
speaks
,
are
of
such
credit
and
authority
with
the
common
people
(
whose
Officers
they
are
in
name
,
but
in
fact
their
masters
)
that
if
they
do
but
blow
the
Trumpet
,
and
say
,
We
have
no
part
in
David
,
nor
no
inheritance
at
all
in
the
son
of
Jesse
;
[
m
](A86304-e39590-b)
m
2
Sam.
●0
.
every
man
will
unto
his
tents
,
and
forsake
the
King
or
Supreme
Magistrate
to
follow
after
them
though
men
of
Belial
.
And
this
I
do
believe
the
rather
to
be
Calvins
meaning
,
because
G.
Buchannan
who
built
on
his
foundation
,
and
pursued
●is
Principles
,
doth
not
only
exceedingly
commend
the
act
of
Theopompus
,
in
setting
up
the
Ephori
in
the
State
of
Sparta
,
and
the
Answer
which
he
made
his
wife
when
she
murmured
at
it
:
but
thinks
it
very
meet
and
reasonable
that
a
free
people
(
as
all
Subjects
are
in
his
opinion
)
should
be
armed
with
the
like
authority
in
reprimenda
tyrannidis
acerbitate
[
n
](A86304-e39680-b)
n
De
jure
regn●
apud
Scotos
.
,
for
the
suppressing
of
tyrannical
Government
(
in
which
themselves
must
be
Judges
)
which
the
Ephori
enjoyed
at
Sparta
,
and
the
Tribunes
in
the
City
of
Rome
.
For
though
he
durst
not
go
so
far
in
terminis
,
as
to
advise
the
instituting
of
such
popular
Magistrates
as
Calvin
speaks
of
in
this
place
;
yet
he
comes
very
neer
it
,
to
a
tantamont
.
For
that
which
Calvin
doth
ascribe
to
his
popular
Magistrates
,
Buchannan
gives
to
the
whole
body
of
the
people
generally
,
to
whom
he
doth
allow
as
much
authority
over
the
persons
of
their
Kings
,
Quod
illi
in
singulos
è
multitndine
habent
[
o
](A86304-e39800-b)
o
Id.
ibid.
,
as
they
have
over
any
one
of
the
common
people
:
and
thinks
it
both
unreasonable
and
absurd
that
they
should
not
be
called
to
accompt
before
the
ordinary
Judges
of
their
several
Kingdomes
(
which
must
supply
the
place
of
these
popular
Magistrates
)
as
often
as
any
of
their
subjects
shall
accuse
them
,
of
murder
,
or
adultery
,
or
neglects
in
government
,
or
whatsoever
else
they
shall
charge
them
with
;
instancing
in
no
fewer
then
twelve
Kings
of
Scotland
,
who
either
were
condemned
to
perpetual
prison
,
or
else
by
voluntary
death
or
exile
,
Justas
scelerum
poenas
●ugerunt
,
escaped
the
punishment
which
was
most
justly
due
unto
them
(
as
he
most
impudently
saith
)
for
their
wicked
lives
.
(9)
If
any
ask
(
as
some
justly
may
)
what
might
induce
our
Author
to
these
different
courses
,
to
la●
so
sure
a
ground-work
for
obedience
in
the
first
part
of
his
discourse
,
and
afterward
to
build
upon
it
such
a
superstructure
,
as
absolutely
pulls
up
his
own
foundation
:
the
answer
is
,
that
the
man
was
very
much
distracted
between
his
reason
and
his
passion
,
his
conscience
and
his
private
interess
.
Aliudque
cupido
,
mens
aliud
suadet
.
His
reason
and
his
conscience
told
him
,
that
every
subject
was
to
yeeld
obedience
to
the
authoritie
and
commands
of
the
Soveraign
Prince
;
and
that
if
any
other
doctrine
should
be
plainly
preached
,
it
would
conduce
both
to
the
scandal
and
the
hinderance
of
the
Reformation
.
And
his
experience
in
the
world
could
not
choose
but
tell
him
,
that
many
of
the
chief
Reformers
by
their
heat
and
violence
had
given
too
great
advantage
to
the
publick
Enemy
;
and
made
the
Protestant
Religion
to
be
much
suspected
,
Nil
aliud
quaerere
&
captare
quam
Seditionum
opportunitatem
[
p
](A86304-e39940-b)
p
Calvin
in
Epistola
Dedic
.
ad
Franciscum
.
l.
1536.
,
for
giving
too
much
ground
to
seditious
courses
,
and
publishing
some
doctrines
which
were
inconsistent
with
the
rules
of
Government
.
This
made
him
write
so
soundly
of
the
Subjects
duty
even
to
wicked
Princes
,
and
the
unlawfulness
of
resisting
in
the
way
of
Arms
,
though
open
force
and
violence
were
offered
to
them
by
ungodly
Tyrants
:
and
this
he
doth
so
well
,
that
few
do
it
better
.
Utinam
sic
semper
errasset
CALVINUS
,
as
once
the
learned
Cardinal
said
of
him
in
another
case
.
But
then
his
interess
in
the
cause
and
quarrel
of
Geneva
,
who
by
the
help
of
some
such
popular
Officers
as
he
speaks
of
here
,
had
not
long
before
expelled
their
Bishop
,
who
had
also
all
the
jurisdiction
of
a
temporal
Prince
within
the
City
and
the
territory
which
belonged
unto
it
,
inclined
him
to
say
somewhat
which
might
serve
to
defend
that
action
,
and
give
the
like
advantage
unto
other
Cities
to
follow
the
example
which
was
laid
before
them
.
The
case
is
briefly
touched
by
Thuanus
thus
;
[
q
](A86304-e40030-b)
q
Thuan.
Hist.
sui
temp.
l.
Jus
Supremi
Dominii
in
Civitatem
Genevae
Episcopos
semper
penes
se
retinuisse
,
donec
mutata
religione
,
Syndici
qui
sub
Episcopali
autoritate
libertatem
antea
tuebantur
,
illud
proprium
sibi
fecere
,
&
ejectis
Episcopis
sub
imperii
patrocinio
Rempub.
administrabant
.
The
Soveraigntie
(
saith
he
)
or
Supreme
Dominion
over
the
City
of
Geneva
the
Bishops
still
kept
unto
themselves
,
till
in
the
alteration
of
Religion
the
Syndi●ks
,
who
before
preserved
the
libertie
of
the
people
under
the
government
of
the
Bishops
,
assumed
the
same
unto
themselves
,
and
absolutely
casting
out
the
Bishops
governed
it
like
a
Common●wealth
under
the
patronage
or
protection
of
the
German
Emperours
.
In
which
it
is
first
clear
on
the
Bishops
side
,
that
they
had
jus
Supremi
Dominii
,
the
Soveraigntie
or
Supreme
Dominion
of
the
City
.
And
so
much
is
affirmed
by
Calvin
,
in
another
place
,
Habebat
jus
gladii
&
alias
civilis
juridictionis
[
r
](A86304-e40210-b)
r
Calvin
in
Epistola
ad
Sadoletum
.
partes
He
had
,
saith
he
,
the
power
of
the
Sword
,
and
other
parts
of
temporal
jurisdiction
;
but
as
he
thinks
(
but
foolishly
and
against
all
records
)
Magistrat●i
er●ptas
,
either
by
fraud
or
force
extorted
from
the
Civil
Magistrate
.
Next
it
is
clear
,
that
the
Bishops
did
continue
the
possession
of
this
Supreme
Power
,
till
Viret
and
Farellus
,
two
zealous
Gospellers
,
came
to
live
amongst
them
;
who
finding
that
those
of
Berne
in
the
year
1528.
had
made
an
al●eration
of
Religion
,
practised
the
like
upon
the
City
of
Geneva
.
Which
not
being
likely
to
effect
with
the
Bishops
leave
,
and
as
little
able
to
effect
against
his
liking
,
considering
the
great
power
and
sway
,
which
legally
and
properly
was
inherent
in
him
:
they
set
the
Syndicks
(
whom
they
had
wrought
upon
before
)
to
make
head
against
him
;
who
by
a
popular
tumult
made
him
fl●e
the
City
,
which
presently
they
changed
to
a
Common-wealth
,
after
the
manner
of
the
Free
or
Imperial
Cities
.
In
which
respect
Calvin
bestows
upon
Farellus
the
title
of
libertatis
Patrem
[
s
](A86304-e40370-b)
s
In
Epistola
ad
Minist.
Tigurin
.
1553.
,
the
Father
of
that
common
libertie
,
which
by
his
means
the
people
of
Geneva
at
that
time
enjoyed
.
As
for
the
Syndicks
by
whose
power
and
countenance
they
advanced
the
business
,
they
were
a
kinde
of
popular
Officer
,
who
had
the
care
of
looking
to
the
conservation
of
the
peoples
liberties
,
as
Thuanus
intimates
;
and
were
much
used
in
many
parts
of
France
and
Italy
,
as
Bodinus
tells
us
[
t
](A86304-e40470-b)
t
Bodin
de
Repub.
lib.
●
.
c.
●
.
.
Their
Office
did
consist
of
two
special
points
:
the
one
a
Magistratibus
rationem
reposcere
,
to
call
the
ordinary
Magistrates
to
an
after
reckoning
,
[
u
](A86304-e40500-b)
u
Id.
ibid.
if
they
did
any
thing
unworthy
of
their
place
and
dignitie
,
or
to
the
hinderance
and
disservice
of
the
Common-wealth
;
which
had
somewhat
in
it
of
the
Ephori
in
the
State
of
Sparta
:
the
other
was
,
prospicere
ne
tenuiores
&
infimae
sortis
homines
a
nobilibus
,
uti
fit
,
●premerentur
,
to
have
a
care
that
the
poor
people
be
not
wronged
or
injured
(
as
many
times
it
hapneth
)
by
the
power
of
the
Nobles
;
which
was
the
main
reason
for
the
institution
of
the
Roman
Tribunes
.
In
this
regard
the
Civil
laws
interpret
Syndicu●
to
be
the
same
with
defensor
Civitatis
[
y
](A86304-e40590-b)
y
Calvin
in
Le●ico
Jurid
.
verbo
Syndicus
.
,
the
Conservator
of
the
liberties
of
a
Town
or
City
,
as
full
well
they
might
:
the
Office
being
made
up
(
as
it
seems
it
was
)
of
that
of
the
Ephori
and
the
Tribunes
mixt
together
.
Now
though
this
change
was
made
before
Calvins
coming
to
Geneva
,
which
was
not
till
the
year
1535
,
yet
he
affirms
it
of
himself
that
whatsoever
had
been
done
in
the
alteration
,
suffragio
meo
comprobavi
[
z
](A86304-e40660-b)
z
Calvin
in
Epistola
ad
Cardinal
.
Sadolet
.
,
he
had
confirmed
and
approved
as
a
thing
well
done
:
and
therefore
thought
himself
to
be
no
less
obliged
to
defend
the
action
,
then
if
it
had
been
done
at
first
by
his
own
command
.
For
doubtless
that
of
Tully
is
exceeding
true
,
Nil
refert
utrum
voluerim
fieri
vel
gaudeam
factum
[
a
](A86304-e40690-b)
a
Cicero
in
Philip.
2.
:
between
the
doing
of
a
foul
and
d●sloyal
act
,
and
the
approbation
of
it
when
it
is
done
,
is
but
little
difference
.
(
10
)
But
to
proceed
;
our
Author
being
thus
made
a
party
in
the
cause
and
quarrel
of
Geneva
,
thought
himself
bound
not
only
to
justifie
unto
others
what
himself
approved
;
but
also
to
lay
down
such
grounds
whereby
the
example
might
be
followed
,
and
their
dislo●altie
and
rebellion
the
less
observed
,
because
they
did
not
goe
alone
without
company
.
In
which
respect
(
and
't
is
a
thing
to
be
observed
)
although
that
Book
of
Institutions
hath
been
often
printed
,
and
received
many
alterations
and
additions
(
as
before
was
noted
)
yet
this
particular
passage
still
remains
unal●ered
,
and
hath
continued
as
it
is
from
the
first
Edition
,
which
was
in
the
year
1536.
when
the
rebellion
of
Geneva
was
yet
fresh
and
talked
of
as
an
ill
example
.
Nor
was
the
man
deceived
in
his
expectation
;
For
as
he
grew
into
esteem
and
reputation
in
the
world
abroad
,
so
he
attained
at
last
to
that
power
and
empire
over
the
souls
and
consciences
of
his
followers
,
that
his
errors
were
accounted
Orthodox
,
his
defects
perfections
,
and
the
revolt
of
the
Genevians
from
rheir
natural
Prince
must
by
no
means
be
called
Rebellion
,
because
projected
and
pursued
by
such
popular
Officers
,
to
whom
it
appertained
of
common
course
to
regulate
the
authoritie
of
Kings
and
Princes
.
And
though
he
doth
not
say
expressly
that
there
either
are
or
ought
to
be
such
popular
Officers
in
every
Realm
or
Common-wealth
,
but
brings
it
in
upon
the
by
with
his
ifs
and
ands
:
yet
ifs
and
ands
are
not
allowed
of
in
the
laws
to
excuse
rebellions
[
b
](A86304-e40840-b)
b
Bacons
history
of
King
Henry
the
seventh
.
,
and
by
the
setting
up
of
that
dangerous
Si
quis
(
si
qui
sint
populares
Magistratus
,
as
his
words
there
are
)
he
seems
to
make
a
Proclamation
that
where
there
were
such
popular
Officers
,
it
was
their
bounden
duty
to
correct
their
Princes
after
the
manner
of
Geneva
;
where
there
were
none
,
the
people
were
(
God
help
them
)
in
an
ill
condition
,
unless
some
other
means
were
thought
of
,
for
their
ease
and
remedie
.
Upon
which
Principles
of
his
,
his
followers
raised
such
Positions
,
and
pursued
such
practises
as
have
distracted
and
embroyled
the
most
parts
of
Europe
,
and
made
it
of
a
Garden
to
become
a
Wilderness
.
For
finding
that
they
could
not
easily
create
such
Popular
Magistrates
to
lord
it
over
Kings
and
Princes
who
had
not
been
accustomed
to
the
like
controlments
;
they
put
that
power
of
regulating
the
Supreme
Authoritie
either
upon
the
body
of
the
people
generally
,
whereof
you
were
told
before
from
Buchannan
,
or
upon
such
to
whom
they
should
communicate
or
transfer
their
power
,
as
occasion
served
,
whereof
you
may
hear
further
in
that
which
followeth
.
And
that
not
only
in
the
case
of
civil
libertie
,
for
which
the
examples
of
the
Ephori
and
the
Roman
Tribunes
were
at
first
found
out
,
and
that
of
the
Demarchi
thrust
upon
the
Readers
for
the
like
foul
end
;
but
specially
in
such
matters
which
concerned
Religion
,
wherein
the
extraordinary
calling
of
some
men
in
the
holy
Scriptures
must
serve
for
Precedents
and
examples
to
confirm
their
practises
.
From
hence
it
was
that
Buchannan
doth
not
only
subject
his
King
unto
the
Ordinary
Judges
and
Courts
of
Justice
as
before
was
noted
:
but
fearing
that
Kings
would
be
too
potent
to
be
so
kept
under
,
adviseth
this
,
Eorum
interfectoribus
praemia
decerni
[
c
](A86304-e41060-b)
c
Buchann
.
de
jure
Regni
.
,
that
rewards
should
publickly
be
decreed
for
those
who
kill
a
Tyrant
(
and
Kings
and
Tyrants
are
the
same
as
heretofore
in
the
word
and
notion
,
so
now
in
the
opinion
of
the
Presbyterian
or
Calvinian
faction
)
as
usually
are
proposed
to
those
who
kill
Wolves
,
or
Bears
.
From
hence
it
was
that
the
inferiour
or
Subordinate
Magistrate
is
advanced
so
high
,
as
to
be
entituled
to
a
power
,
adversus
Superiorem
Magistratum
se
,
Rempub.
&
Ecclesiam
etiam
armis
defendere
[
d
](A86304-e41120-b)
d
Paraeus
in
Epistola
ad
Rom.
cap.
13.
,
of
taking
Arms
against
the
King
or
superiour
Magistrate
,
in
defence
of
himself
,
his
Countrey
and
true
Religion
:
which
though
they
are
the
words
of
Paraeus
only
,
yet
they
contain
the
minde
and
meaning
of
all
the
rest
of
that
faction
,
as
his
son
Philip
doth
demonstrate
[
e
](A86304-e41150-b)
e
In
Append.
ad
Cap.
13.
Epist.
ad
Rom.
.
Hence
was
it
that
John
Knox
,
delivered
for
sound
Orthodox
doctrine
,
Procerum
esse
propria
autorit●te
Idololatrian
tollere
,
&
Principes
intra
legum
rescripta
per
vim
reducere
[
f
](A86304-e41220-b)
f
Camden
.
Annal.
Eliz.
An.
1559.
,
that
it
belonged
unto
the
Peers
of
each
several
Kingdom
to
reform
matters
of
the
Church
by
their
own
authoritie
,
and
to
confine
their
Kings
and
Princes
within
the
bounds
prescribed
by
law
,
even
by
force
of
Arms.
Hence
that
Geselius
one
of
the
Lecturers
of
Roterdam
preached
unto
his
people
,
that
if
the
Magistrates
and
Clergie
did
neglect
their
duty
in
the
reformation
of
Religion
,
necesse
est
id
facere
pl●beios
,
that
then
it
did
belong
to
the
Common
people
[
g
](A86304-e41280-b)
g
Necessaria
Respons.
,
who
were
bound
to
have
a
care
thereof
and
proceed
accordingly
.
And
as
for
points
of
practise
,
should
we
look
that
way
,
what
a
confusion
should
we
finde
in
most
parts
of
Europe
,
occasioned
by
no
other
ground
then
the
entertainment
of
these
principles
and
the
scattering
of
these
positions
amongst
the
people
?
Witness
the
Civil
wars
of
France
[
g
](A86304-e41340-b)
g
Jean
de
Serres
inventaire
de
Fr.
,
the
revolt
of
Holland
[
h
](A86304-e41360-b)
h
History
of
the
Netherlands
.
,
the
expulsion
of
the
Earl
of
East-Friezland
out
the
City
of
Embden
[
i
](A86304-e41400-b)
i
Thuan
h●st
.
l.
114.
,
the
insurrections
of
the
Scots
[
k
](A86304-e41420-b)
k
Camden
.
Annal.
An.
1559.
,
the
tumults
of
Bohemia
[
l
](A86304-e41440-b)
l
Laurca
Austriaca
.
,
the
commotions
of
Brandenbourg
[
m
](A86304-e41460-b)
m
Continuati
.
Thuan.
hist
l.
8.
,
the
translation
of
the
Crown
of
Sweden
from
the
King
of
Pole
to
Charles
Duke
of
Finland
[
n
](A86304-e41510-b)
n
Thuan.
hist.
l.
8.
the
change
of
Government
in
England
:
all
acted
by
the
Presbyterian
or
Calvinian
partie
in
those
several
States
,
under
pretence
of
Reformation
and
redress
of
grievances
.
(
11
)
And
to
say
truth
,
such
is
the
Genius
of
the
sect
,
that
though
they
may
admit
an
equal
(
as
paritie
is
the
thing
most
aimed
at
by
them
both
in
Church
and
State
)
yet
they
will
hardly
be
perswaded
to
submit
themselves
to
a
Superiour
;
to
no
Superiours
more
unwillingly
then
to
Kings
and
Princes
:
whose
persons
they
disgrace
,
whose
power
they
ruinate
,
whose
calling
they
indevour
to
decry
and
blemish
by
all
means
imaginable
.
First
for
their
calling
,
they
say
it
is
no
other
then
an
humane
Ordinance
,
and
that
the
King
is
but
a
creature
of
the
peoples
making
;
whom
having
made
,
they
may
as
easily
destroy
and
unmake
make
again
.
Which
as
it
is
the
darling
doctrine
of
this
present
time
,
so
is
it
very
eagerly
pursued
by
Buchannan
,
who
affirms
expressly
,
Quicquid
juris
populus
alicui
dederit
,
idem
justis
de
causis
posse
reposcere
[
o
](A86304-e41670-b)
o
Buchann
.
de
●ure
Regni
.
,
that
whatsoever
power
the
people
give
unto
their
King
or
Supreme
Magistrate
,
they
may
resume
again
upon
just
occasions
.
Their
power
they
make
so
small
and
inconsiderable
,
that
they
afford
them
very
little
even
in
matters
temporal
,
and
no
authoritie
at
all
in
things
spiritual
.
CALVIN
professeth
for
himself
,
that
he
was
very
much
agrieved
to
hear
that
King
Henry
the
eight
,
had
took
unto
himself
the
title
of
Supreme
Head
of
the
Church
of
England
,
accuseth
them
of
inconsiderate
zeal
,
nay
blasphemie
,
who
conferred
it
on
him
;
and
though
he
be
content
at
last
to
allow
Kings
a
Ministerial
power
in
matters
which
concern
the
Reformation
of
Gods
Publick
Worship
,
yet
he
condemns
them
as
before
of
great
inconsiderateness
,
Qui
facerent
eos
nimis
spirituales
[
p
](A86304-e41760-b)
p
Calvin
in
Amos
cap.
7.
,
who
did
ascribe
unto
them
any
great
authoritie
in
spiritual
matters
.
The
designation
of
all
those
who
bear
publick
office
in
the
Church
,
the
calling
of
Councels
or
Assemblies
,
the
Presidencie
in
those
Councels
,
ordaining
publick
Fasts
,
and
appointing
Festivals
,
which
anciently
belonged
unto
Christian
Princes
as
the
chief
branches
of
the
Ecclesiastical
Jurisdiction
which
is
vested
in
them
;
are
utterly
denied
to
Kings
and
Princes
in
their
Books
of
Discipline
.
In
so
much
that
when
the
Citizens
of
Embden
did
expel
their
Earl
,
they
did
it
chiefly
for
this
reason
,
Quod
se
negotiis
Ecclesiasticis
&
Consistorialibus
praeter
jus
&
aequitatem
immisceret
[
q
](A86304-e41870-b)
q
Thuan.
hist.
l.
114.
,
that
he
had
intermedled
more
then
they
thought
fit
in
Ecclesiastical
causes
,
and
intrenched
too
much
upon
their
Consistorie
.
As
for
their
power
in
temporal
or
civil
causes
,
by
that
time
Knoxes
Peers
and
Buchannans
Judges
,
Paraeus
his
inferior
Magistrates
,
and
CALVINS
popular
Officers
have
performed
their
parts
,
in
keeping
them
within
the
compass
of
the
laws
;
arraigning
them
for
their
offences
,
if
they
should
transgress
;
opposing
them
by
force
of
arms
,
if
any
thing
be
done
unto
the
prejudice
of
the
Church
or
State
;
and
finally
in
regulating
their
authoritie
,
after
the
manner
of
the
Spartan
Ephori
,
and
the
Roman
Tribunes
:
all
that
is
left
will
be
by
much
too
little
for
a
Roy
d'
Ivitot
,
or
for
a
King
of
Clouts
,
as
we
English
phrase
it
.
Last
of
all
,
for
their
persons
which
God
held
so
sacred
,
that
he
gave
it
for
a
law
to
his
people
Israel
,
not
to
speak
evill
of
their
Princes
,
saying
,
Thou
shalt
not
speak
evil
of
the
Ruler
of
thy
people
;
Let
us
but
look
upon
these
men
,
and
we
shall
finde
the
basest
attributes
too
,
good
for
the
greatest
Kings
.
Calvin
calls
Mary
Queen
of
England
by
the
name
of
Proserpine
[
r
](A86304-e42070-b)
r
Calvin
in
Amos
cap.
7.
,
and
saith
that
she
did
superare
omnes
Diabolos
,
that
all
the
Devils
of
hell
were
not
half
so
mischeivous
.
Beza
affords
Queen
Mary
of
Scotland
no
better
titles
then
those
of
Medea
and
Athaliah
[
s
](A86304-e42140-b)
s
Beza
in
Epist.
ad
Jo.
;
of
which
the
last
was
most
infamous
in
divine
;
the
other
no
less
scandalous
in
humane
stories
;
the
one
a
Sorceress
and
a
Witch
,
the
other
a
Tyrant
and
usurper
.
The
Author
of
the
Altare
Damascenum
,
whosoever
he
was
,
can
fin●e
no
better
a
tribute
for
King
James
of
most
blessed
memorie
,
then
infensissimus
Evangelii
hostis
[
t
](A86304-e42200-b)
t
Didoclavius
in
Epistola
ad
L●ctor
.
,
the
greatest
and
deadly
enemie
of
the
Gospel
of
Christ
.
And
Queen
Elizabeth
her self
did
not
scape
so
clear
,
but
that
the
zealous
Brethren
were
too
bold
sometimes
with
her
name
and
honor
,
though
some
of
them
paid
dearly
for
it
,
and
were
hanged
for
their
labour
.
How
that
seditious
Hugonot
,
the
Author
of
the
lewd
and
unworthy
Dialogue
,
entituled
Eusebius
Philadelphus
,
hath
dealt
with
three
great
Princes
of
the
House
of
France
,
and
what
reproachful
names
he
gives
them
,
I
had
rather
you
should
look
for
in
the
Author
then
expect
from
me
;
being
loath
to
wade
too
far
in
these
dirtie
pudoles
;
save
that
I
shall
be
bold
to
adde
this
general
Character
which
Didoclavius
gives
to
all
Kings
in
general
;
viz.
Naturâ
insitum
est
in
●mnibus
Regibus
Christi
odium
,
that
all
Kings
naturally
hate
Christ
;
which
may
serve
for
all
.
This
is
enough
to
let
us
see
,
how
irreconcileable
an
hatred
▪
these
of
the
Calvinian
faction
bear
against
Kings
and
Princes
;
how
well
they
play
the
part
of
the
very
Antichrist
in
exalting
themselves
against
whatsoever
is
called
God
;
and
that
the
special
reason
why
they
affect
so
much
to
be
called
the
Saints
,
is
out
of
a
strong
probable
hope
to
see
the
day
in
which
they
shall
binde
Kings
in
chains
,
and
all
the
Princes
of
the
earth
in
fetters
of
iron
.
Finally
such
is
their
disaffection
unto
sacred
Monarchie
,
which
they
have
sucked
out
of
the
grounds
and
principles
here
laid
down
by
Calvin
,
that
we
may
justly
say
of
them
what
was
most
truly
said
of
the
ancient
Romans
,
quasi
nefas
esset
Regem
aliquem
prope
eorum
terminos
esse
[
u
](A86304-e42370-b)
u
Justin
.
hist.
l.
29.
,
they
have
bestirred
themselves
so
bravely
in
defiance
of
the
Regal
Government
,
as
if
they
did
account
it
an
unpardonable
sin
to
suffer
any
King
,
though
most
good
and
gracious
,
to
border
near
them
.
Which
lest
they
should
not
be
of
power
to
compass
by
their
popular
Magistrates
,
or
by
the
Judges
,
or
the
Peers
,
or
the
People
severally
;
which
make
the
main
Battel
for
this
combat
:
let
us
next
look
on
the
Reserve
,
and
see
what
hopes
they
have
to
effect
the
business
by
the
three
Estates
conjoyned
in
Parliament
,
(
or
by
what
other
name
soever
we
shall
call
their
meeting
)
which
CALVIN
in
the
last
place
doth
reflect
upon
,
but
cautiously
with
a
qua
forte
,
or
a
peradventure
,
as
in
that
before
.
CHAP.
V.
What
are
the
three
Estates
in
each
severall
Kingdome
,
of
which
CALVIN
speaks
,
and
what
particularly
in
the
Realm
of
ENGLAND
.
-
(
I
)
Of
the
division
of
a
People
into
three
Estates
;
and
that
the
Priests
or
Clergie
have
been
alwaies
one
.
-
(
II
)
The
Priests
employed
in
Civill
matters
and
affairs
of
State
,
by
the
Egyptians
and
the
Persians
,
the
Greeks
,
Gaules
,
and
Romans
.
-
(
III
)
The
Priests
and
Levites
exercised
in
afaffairs
of
Civill
Government
by
Gods
own
appointment
.
-
(
IV
)
The
Prelates
versed
in
Civill
matters
and
fairs
of
State
,
in
the
best
and
happiest
times
of
Christianity
.
-
(
V
)
The
Clergie
make
the
third
Estate
in
Germany
,
France
,
Spain
,
and
the
Northern
Kingdomes
.
-
(
VI
)
That
anciently
in
the
Saxon
times
the
Ecclesiasticks
of
this
Realm
were
called
to
all
publick
Councels
.
-
(
VII
)
The
Prelates
an
essential
fundamental
part
of
the
English
Parliament
.
-
(
VIII
)
Objections
answered
,
and
that
the
word
Clerus
in
the
Legal
notion
,
doth
not
extend
unto
the
Prelates
.
-
(
IX
)
That
the
inferior
Clergie
of
the
Realm
of
England
had
anciently
their
votes
in
Parliament
,
to
all
intents
and
purposes
as
the
Commons
had
.
-
(
X
)
Objections
answered
;
and
that
the
calling
of
the
Clergie
to
Parliaments
and
Convocations
,
were
after
different
manners
,
and
by
several
writs
.
-
(
XI
)
The
great
disfranchisement
and
slavery
obtruded
on
the
English
Clergie
,
by
the
Idepriving
of
the
Bishops
of
their
Votes
in
Parliament
.
-
(
XII
)
A
brief
discussion
of
the
question
,
whether
any
two
of
the
three
Estates
conspiring
or
agreeing
together
,
can
conclude
any
thing
unto
the
prejudice
of
the
third
.
BUt
first
before
we
fall
on
the
point
it self
,
and
search
into
the
power
ascribed
by
Calvin
to
the
three
Estates
of
every
Kingdome
,
we
must
first
see
what
kinde
of
men
they
are
,
and
of
what
condition
,
who
constitute
the
said
Estates
:
which
being
fi●st
setled
and
determined
,
we
shall
the
better
be
inabled
to
proceed
accordingly
in
the
inquiry
after
that
authority
which
our
Author
gives
them
of
regulating
the
proceedings
of
the
soveraign
Prince
,
and
putting
a
restraint
on
the
exorbitant
power
of
Kings
.
In
which
we
shall
presume
for
granted
what
our
Author
gives
us
,
viz.
tres
Ordines
in
singulis
Regnis
,
that
in
each
several
Kingdome
there
are
three
Estates
;
and
those
three
we
shall
prove
to
be
(
though
our
Author
is
no
otherwise
to
be
understood
)
the
Clergy
,
the
Nobility
,
and
the
Common
people
:
which
distribution
of
the
Subject
into
three
Estates
as
't
is
very
ancient
,
so
was
the
distribution
of
them
into
three
,
neither
more
nor
less
,
founded
on
good
prudential
motives
and
grounds
of
Polity
.
For
as
judicious
Bodin
very
well
observeth
,
should
there
be
only
two
Estates
,
and
no
more
then
so
,
either
upon
such
differences
as
might
rise
between
them
the
one
side
would
be
apt
to
compell
the
other
by
force
of
violence
;
or
else
,
aequatis
Ordinum
suffragiis
[
a
](A86304-e43190-b)
a
Bodin
de
Repub.
l.
3.
cap.
u●t
.
,
the
ballance
being
even
between
them
,
their
meetings
would
be
many
times
dissolved
without
producing
any
notable
effect
to
the
benefit
of
the
Common-wealth
.
In
which
respect
the
counterpoise
or
addition
of
a
third
Esta●e
was
exceeding
necessary
,
ut
alterutri
sese
adjungens
utrumque
conciliet
,
that
joyning
unto
either
of
the
other
two
,
it
might
unite
them
both
into
one
opinion
,
and
advance
the
service
of
the
publick
.
And
on
the
other
side
were
there
more
then
three
,
opinionum
multitudo
,
the
difference
of
opinions
,
and
pretence
of
interesses
,
would
keep
them
at
perpetual
distance
,
and
hinder
them
from
pitching
upon
any
point
,
in
which
all
their
purposes
and
aims
were
to
be
concentred
.
So
that
the
casting
of
the
body
of
a
people
into
three
Estates
,
seems
most
convenient
for
the
furtherance
of
the
publick
service
:
and
of
those
three
three
Estates
the
Priests
(
or
Clergy
,
as
we
call
them
since
the
times
of
CHRIST
)
have
generally
been
accounted
one
.
For
though
Hippodamus
(
whom
Aristotle
justly
taxeth
for
defects
[
b
](A86304-e43320-b)
b
Aristot
.
Politic
.
l.
in
Politic
)
ordained
his
three
Estates
to
be
the
Souldiery
,
the
Handicrafts-man
,
and
the
Husbandman
:
yet
wiser
Statists
saw
no
reason
that
the
two
last
should
passe
for
severall
estates
or
ranks
of
men
,
being
that
both
might
be
more
fitly
comprehended
under
the
name
and
rank
of
the
common
people
.
And
therefore
the
Egyptians
did
divide
the
people
into
these
three
ranks
,
the
Priest
,
which
is
respondent
to
the
Christian
Clergy
;
the
Souldier
,
who
carrieth
most
resemblance
to
the
State
of
Nebles
;
and
those
which
lived
by
trades
and
labours
,
whom
by
one
generall
name
they
called
Operarii
[
c
](A86304-e43450-b)
c
Diodor.
Siculus
.
,
as
we
now
the
Commons
:
which
cours●
we
finde
to
be
observed
also
by
the
ancient
Gaules
dividing
their
whole
body
into
these
three
orders
,
[
d
](A86304-e43490-b)
d
Caesar
.
de
Bel
●o
Gallico
.
l.
6.
the
Druides
,
who
had
the
charge
of
matters
which
concerned
Religion
;
the
Equites
who
managed
the
affairs
of
war
;
and
then
the
Plebs
,
or
common
people
,
who
were
subordinate
to
the
other
two
,
and
directed
by
them
.
How
this
division
hath
succeeded
in
the
States
of
Christendom
we
shall
see
hereafter
.
(2)
In
the
mean
time
we
may
take
notice
that
the
Priests
of
Egypt
,
the
Druides
of
Gaul
,
and
those
who
had
the
ordering
of
those
services
which
concerned
the
gods
,
by
whatsoever
name
or
title
they
were
known
and
called
in
other
Countreys
,
were
not
so
tied
unto
the
Altars
,
and
other
ministerial
Offices
which
concerned
the
gods
,
as
not
to
have
some
special
influence
in
ordering
the
affairs
of
the
Common-wealth
.
The
Priests
of
Egypt
,
as
we
read
in
Aelian
(
an
Author
of
unquestioned
credit
)
possessed
the
highest
seats
of
judicature
,
and
were
the
only
Judges
which
that
people
had
:
Judices
apud
Egyptios
iidem
qu●ndam
fuerunt
qui
&
sacerdotes
,
[
e
](A86304-e43680-b)
e
Aelian
in
Varia
histor.
l.
14.
c.
34.
as
that
Author
hath
it
.
And
so
much
is
assured
us
by
Synesius
also
a
Christian
Bishop
of
the
East
[
f
](A86304-e43700-b)
f
Syn●sius
Ep.
57.
,
where
he
resembleth
them
in
this
particular
to
the
Priests
of
Judah
.
The
like
we
finde
in
Agathias
of
the
Priests
of
Persia
,
men
better
known
in
ancient
Writers
by
the
name
of
Magi
:
of
whom
he
telleth
us
,
eorum
consilio
publica
omnia
administrari
,
&c.
[
g
](A86304-e43770-b)
g
Agathias
in
hist.
Perfic
.
l.
2.
that
by
their
counsell
and
advice
the
principal
affairs
of
the
State
were
ordered
,
rewards
proportioned
and
conferred
upon
well-deservers
,
and
several
punishments
inflicted
on
the
Malefactors
,
according
to
the
quality
of
the
misdemeanor
;
and
finally
that
nothing
was
conceived
to
be
rightly
done
,
quod
Magorum
sententia
non
sit
confirmatum
,
which
had
not
passed
the
approbation
of
these
Priests
or
Magi.
If
we
draw
nearer
towards
the
West
,
and
look
into
the
Government
of
the
State
of
Athens
,
we
shall
finde
the
chief
authority
thereof
to
consist
in
the
Senate
of
500
,
and
in
the
famous
Court
of
the
Areopagites
,
as
was
no●ed
in
the
●ormer
Chapter
:
in
which
the
Priests
,
or
at
the
least
the
pri●cipal
of
that
rank
or
order
had
both
place
and
suffrage
.
For
in
that
honour●ry
Edict
which
they
made
in
favour
of
Hyrcanus
,
we
may
clearly
see
that
Dionysius
the
son
of
Asclepiades
was
one
of
the
Priests
,
and
also
one
of
the
Prytanaei
[
h
](A86304-e43920-b)
h
Joseph
.
Judaic
.
Antiqu.
l.
14.
c.
16.
,
or
Presidents
of
the
Councell
,
as
we
call
them
now
;
and
that
in
calculating
of
the
voices
,
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
,
Dorotheus
the
chief
Priest
had
the
greatest
stroke
,
and
pronounced
the
Edict
to
be
passed
.
And
for
the
Court
of
Areopagites
,
it
consisted
as
before
we
told
you
of
such
and
such
alone
as
formerly
had
bore
the
Office
of
the
nine
Annual
Magistrates
,
whereof
the
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
,
or
Rex
Sacrorum
,
(
whom
we
may
English
the
chief
Bishop
)
had
the
second
place
[
i
](A86304-e44010-b)
i
Suidas
in
verbo
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
.
.
And
this
appears
yet
further
by
a
passage
in
the
life
of
Pericles
,
where
we
are
told
of
his
design
for
the
abasing
of
the
power
of
the
Areopagites
,
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
[
k
](A86304-e44060-b)
k
Plutarch
in
Pericle
.
,
of
which
Court
he
was
not
any
Member
,
as
the
Author
tels
us
,
in
that
he
had
never
borne
the
Office
either
of
the
Provost
,
or
the
King
,
or
the
Polemarchus
,
or
any
of
the
six
chief
Justices
.
So
that
the
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
,
the
Rex
Sacrorum
,
or
chief
Bishop
being
of
course
to
be
admitted
into
the
Court
or
Councel
of
the
Areopagites
when
his
year
was
ended
,
it
cannot
be
,
but
that
there
must
be
many
of
them
in
that
famous
Session
;
an
equall
number
at
the
least
,
with
those
who
had
been
Polemarchi
,
or
the
yearly
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
.
Add
here
,
that
we
are
told
by
Julius
Pollux
in
his
Onomasticon
[
l
](A86304-e44190-b)
l
Lib
8.
cap.
8.
sect.
3.
,
that
it
pertained
to
this
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
,
or
Rex
Sacrorum
,
besides
the
service
of
the
Gods
,
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
,
to
endite
those
before
the
Court
who
were
guilty
of
murther
;
but
then
withall
,
that
having
put
in
the
enditement
,
and
laid
by
his
Crown
,
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
,
he
sate
upon
the
Bench
with
the
other
Judges
and
passed
sentence
on
them
.
Thus
was
it
with
the
Druides
or
the
Priests
of
Gallia
,
who
did
not
only
take
the
charge
of
all
sacred
matters
which
did
relate
unto
the
service
of
the
gods
,
but
de
omnibus
fere
controversiis
publicis
privatisque
[
m
](A86304-e44270-b)
m
Caesar
de
Bello
Gallico
l.
6.
,
they
did
determine
in
almost
all
suits
and
controversies
,
as
well
publick
as
private
;
particularly
in
matters
of
inheritance
,
reall
actions
,
capitall
crimes
,
as
murther
and
the
like
offences
;
and
also
had
a
power
to
decree
both
rewards
and
punishments
as
they
saw
occasion
.
And
for
the
better
dispatch
of
business
both
for
their
own
ease
and
the
peoples
too
,
they
chose
some
certain
times
or
Terms
in
which
they
met
together
not
far
from
Chartres
(
being
in
the
middle
of
the
Countrey
)
whither
all
sorts
of
people
who
had
suits
and
differences
did
repair
unto
them
,
eorumque
judiciis
&
decretis
parebant
,
and
to
their
Judgements
and
Decrees
did
submit
themselves
.
And
thus
it
also
was
with
the
P●tifices
or
Priests
of
Rome
who
had
not
only
a
chief
place
in
the
holy
Mysteries
,
such
as
concerned
the
publick
worship
of
their
gods
;
but
also
a
great
power
and
sway
,
in
the
greatest
and
most
important
businesses
which
concerned
the
State
:
which
Tully
makes
one
of
those
Constitutions
or
Arts
of
Government
,
which
seemed
to
have
been
devised
by
the
gods
themselves
.
[
n
](A86304-e44370-b)
n
Cicero
in
Orat
.
pro
Domo
●ua
.
Cum
multa
divinitus
a
majoribus
nostris
inventa
atque
instituta
sunt
,
tum
nihil
praeclarius
quam
quod
Pontifices
cosdem
&
Religionibus
Deorum
immortalium
&
summae
reipub
.
prae●sse
voluerunt
.
And
as
the
principal
Priests
in
Athens
had
their
place
and
Vote
not
only
in
the
Court
of
Areopagites
,
but
in
the
Senate
of
five
hundred
as
before
was
noted
:
so
some
of
the
more
eminent
sort
of
Priests
had
the
like
preheminence
,
of
sitting
and
voting
in
the
Roman
Senate
,
which
was
as
high
an
honour
as
that
State
could
give
them
.
For
besides
that
Rosinus
hath
observed
that
some
of
the
Pries●s
were
chosen
out
of
the
number
of
the
Senators
[
o
](A86304-e44480-b)
o
Rosin
.
Antiqu.
Rom.
,
who
doubtless
did
not
lose
the
right
of
suffrage
which
before
they
had
;
there
is
a
memorable
case
in
Livie
touching
C.
Flaccus
:
who
was
no
sooner
chosen
the
Flamen
Dialis
,
or
P●iest
of
Jupiter
,
but
pres●ntly
he
put
in
his
title
to
a
place
in
Senate
,
which
anciently
belonged
unto
his
predecessors
in
the
right
of
their
Office
,
though
of
late
years
it
seemed
to
have
been
for●eited
by
discontinuance
,
The
issue
of
which
plea
was
this
,
that
though
Licinius
the
Pretor
did
the
best
he
could
to
crosse
the
business
,
alleadging
,
Non
exoletis
vetustate
Annalium
exemplis
stare
jus
[
p
](A86304-e44580-b)
p
Livie
hist.
Rom.
lib.
26.
,
that
they
were
not
to
be
guided
in
the
case
by
worm
eaten
Precedents
,
but
by
the
late
practise
of
the
Sta●e
;
yet
it
was
otherwise
determined
by
the
Fathers
generally
,
and
Flaccus
setled
in
his
place
in
the
Roman
▪
Senate
,
Magno
assensu
Patrum
Plebisque
with
the
joynt
consent
of
all
the
people
.
But
what
need
these
particulars
have
been
brought
to
confirm
this
point
,
when
as
it
affirmed
in
generals
by
Synesius
,
a
right
godly
Bishop
of
the
Primitive
times
?
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
[
q
](A86304-e44650-b)
q
Synes.
Epist.
57.
,
that
in
old
times
the
same
men
were
both
Priests
and
Judges
.
Which
said
,
he
instanceth
in
the
particulars
of
the
Jews
and
Egyptians
who
for
long
time
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
,
had
been
chiefly
governed
by
their
Priests
.
(3)
This
brings
me
on
to
the
power
and
practise
of
the
Priests
in
the
land
of
Judah
,
who
from
the
very
first
beginning
of
that
State
and
Nation
to
the
final
dissolution
of
it
,
were
of
great
authoritie
;
not
only
in
composing
of
inferiour
dif●erences
which
casually
did
arise
amongst
the
people
,
but
in
the
managerie
of
the
chief
affairs
both
of
State
and
Government
:
and
that
not
gained
by
connivence
of
Princes
,
or
by
entrenching
on
the
rights
of
the
secular
powers
,
but
by
the
institution
and
appointment
of
the
Lord
himself
.
When
Moses
first
complained
that
the
sole
Government
of
the
people
was
a
burden
too
heavie
for
him
to
bear
,
it
pleased
God
to
appoint
a
standing
Consistory
of
[
r
](A86304-e44830-b)
r
Numb.
11.
v.
16.
Seventie
Elders
,
men
of
abilitie
and
wisdom
,
who
were
to
have
a
share
in
the
publick
Government
,
and
to
decide
amongst
themselves
such
weightie
businesses
,
great
matters
[
s
](A86304-e44860-b)
s
Exod.
18.
v.
22.
,
as
the
Scripture
calls
them
,
which
were
reserved
to
Moses
by
a
former
Ordinance
.
Of
these
,
the
Priests
,
as
men
who
for
the
most
part
were
at
better
leisure
then
the
rest
to
attend
the
service
,
and
generally
of
more
abilities
to
goe
through
with
it
,
made
alwayes
a
considerable
number
,
and
many
times
the
major
part
.
In
which
respect
it
was
ordained
by
the
Lord
,
when
a
matter
did
arise
to
be
scanned
in
judgement
between
bloud
and
bloud
,
between
plea
and
plea
,
and
stroke
and
stroke
,
being
matters
of
controversie
within
their
gates
,
the
people
should
arise
and
goe
unto
the
place
which
the
Lord
should
choose
,
and
come
unto
the
Priests
,
the
Levites
,
and
unto
the
Judge
that
shall
be
in
those
days
,
and
enquire
and
they
shall
shew
them
the
sentence
of
judgement
[
t
](A86304-e44980-b)
t
Deut.
c.
17.
v.
8
,
9.
.
The
like
is
also
ordered
in
the
case
of
false
wit●esses
,
where
it
is
said
,
that
If
a
false
witness
rise
up
against
any
man
to
testifie
against
him
that
which
is
wrong
;
then
both
the
men
between
whom
the
controversie
is
shall
stand
before
the
LORD
,
before
the
Priests
and
Judges
which
shall
be
in
those
dayes
[
u
](A86304-e45030-b)
u
Deut.
19.
v.
17.
.
Which
passages
are
not
understood
of
any
particular
Priests
or
Judges
,
dispersed
in
their
several
dwellings
up
and
down
the
Countrey
;
but
of
the
Priests
and
other
Judges
united
and
assembled
in
that
famous
Consistorie
of
the
70
Elders
,
conveened
together
in
that
place
which
the
Lord
should
choose
;
called
by
the
Jews
the
Sanhedrim
,
by
the
Greeks
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
,
and
was
the
great
Councel
of
estate
for
the
Jewish
Nation
.
To
this
Josephus
doth
attest
,
where
he
informeth
us
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
[
x
](A86304-e45170-b)
x
Joseph
.
adv.
App●on
.
lib.
2.
,
that
the
Priests
of
Jewrie
had
the
cogn●zarce
of
all
doubtful
matters
;
more
plainly
Philo
,
who
knew
well
the
customs
of
his
native
Countrey
,
where
he
affirms
expressly
and
in
terminis
;
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
[
y
](A86304-e45230-b)
y
Philo
de
vita
Mesis
.
,
that
the
Priests
had
place
and
suffrage
in
this
great
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
,
or
Court
of
Sanhedrim
.
And
this
is
that
which
Casaubon
doth
also
tell
us
from
the
most
learned
and
expert
of
the
Jewish
Rabbins
,
Non
nisi
nobilissimos
●e
sacerdotibus
,
Levitis
,
caeteroque
populo
,
&
in
lege
peritissimos
in
Sanhedrim
eligi
[
z
](A86304-e45310-b)
z
Casaub
Exercit
.
in
Baron
.
1.
Sect
3.
,
that
is
to
say
,
that
none
but
the
most
eminent
of
the
Priests
,
the
Levites
and
the
rest
of
the
people
,
and
such
as
were
most
conversant
in
the
Book
of
the
Law
,
were
to
be
chosen
into
the
Sanhedrim
.
But
to
return
again
to
the
Book
of
God
,
the
power
and
reputation
of
this
Court
and
Consistorie
having
been
much
diminished
in
the
times
of
the
Kings
of
Judah
,
was
again
revived
by
Jehosophat
.
Of
whom
we
read
,
that
he
not
only
did
appoint
Judges
in
the
la●d
throughout
all
the
fenced
Cities
of
IVDAH
[
a
](A86304-e45380-b)
a
2
Chron.
19.
5.
:
but
that
he
established
at
HIERVSALEM
a
standing
Councel
,
consisting
of
the
Levites
and
of
the
Priests
,
and
of
the
chief
of
the
Fathers
of
ISRAEL
,
for
the
judgements
of
the
Lord
and
for
controversies
[
b
](A86304-e45410-b)
b
Ibid.
r.
8.
:
according
to
the
model
formerly
laid
by
God
himself
in
the
Book
of
Deuteronomie
.
Which
Court
or
Councel
thus
revived
continued
in
full
force
,
authoritie
and
power
,
during
the
time
of
the
captivitie
of
Babylon
;
as
appears
plainly
by
that
passage
in
the
prophesie
of
Ezekiel
,
where
it
is
said
of
the
Priests
even
by
God
himself
,
in
controversie
they
shall
stand
in
judgement
[
c
](A86304-e45470-b)
c
Ezeck
▪
44.
v
▪
●24
.
;
compared
with
another
place
of
the
same
Prophet
,
where
he
makes
mention
of
the
Seventie
,
of
the
Antients
of
the
house
of
ISRAEL
[
d
](A86304-e45490-b)
d
Id.
c.
8.
v.
11.
,
and
Jaazaniah
the
son
of
Shaphan
standing
in
the
midst
,
as
Prince
of
the
Senate
.
And
after
their
return
from
that
house
of
bondage
,
they
were
confirmed
in
this
authoritie
by
the
Edict
and
Decree
of
Artaxerxes
,
who
gave
Commission
unto
EZRA
to
set
Magistrates
and
Judges
[
e
](A86304-e45550-b)
e
Ezra
c.
7.
●
.
25.
over
the
people
;
not
after
a
new
way
of
his
own
devising
,
but
after
the
wisdom
of
his
God
[
e
](A86304-e45570-b)
e
Ezra
c.
7.
●
.
25.
,
declared
in
the
foregoing
Ages
by
his
servant
Moses
.
In
which
estate
they
stood
all
the
times
succeeding
,
until
the
final
dissolution
of
that
State
and
Nation
:
with
this
addition
to
the
power
of
the
holy
Priesthood
,
that
they
had
not
only
all
that
while
their
place
and
suffrage
in
the
Court
of
Sanhedrim
,
as
will
appear
to
any
one
who
hath
either
read
Josephus
or
the
four
Evangelists
;
but
for
a
great
part
of
that
time
,
till
the
reign
of
Herod
,
the
Supreme
Government
of
the
State
was
in
the
hands
of
the
Priests
.
In
which
regard
,
besides
what
was
affirmed
from
Synesius
formerly
,
it
is
said
by
Justin
,
Morem
esse
apud
Judaeos
ut
eosdem
Reges
&
sacerdotes
haberent
,
that
it
was
the
custom
of
the
Jews
for
the
same
men
to
be
Kings
and
Priests
[
f
](A86304-e45730-b)
f
Justin
.
hist.
l.
36.
:
and
Tacitus
gives
this
general
note
,
Judaeis
Sacerdotii
honorem
firmamentum
potentiae
esse
,
that
the
honour
given
unto
the
Priesthood
amongst
the
Jews
,
did
most
especially
conduce
to
the
establishment
of
their
power
and
Empire
[
g
](A86304-e45790-b)
g
Tacit.
hist.
l
3.
.
And
yet
I
cannot
yeeld
to
Baronius
neither
,
where
he
affirms
(
the
better
to
establish
a
Supremacie
in
the
Popes
of
Rome
)
Summum
Pont.
arbitrio
suo
moderari
magnum
illud
Concili●m
,
&c.
[
h
](A86304-e45840-b)
h
Baron
.
Annal.
●n.
57.
,
that
the
high
Priest
was
alwayes
President
of
the
Councel
or
Court
of
Sanhedrim
:
it
being
generally
declared
in
the
Jewish
Writers
,
that
the
High
Priest
could
challenge
no
place
at
all
therein
,
in
regard
of
his
office
and
descent
,
but
meerly
in
respect
of
such
personal
abilities
as
made
himself
to
undergo
such
a
weightie
burden
;
for
which
see
Phagius
in
his
notes
on
the
16.
of
Deuteronomie
.
(4)
Thus
have
we
seen
of
what
authoritie
and
power
the
Priests
were
formerly
as
well
amongst
the
Jews
as
amongst
the
Gentiles
;
we
must
next
see
whether
they
have
not
been
employed
in
the
like
affairs
,
under
the
Gospel
of
Christ
,
and
that
too
in
the
best
and
happiest
times
of
the
Christian
Church
.
In
search
whereof
it
is
not
to
be
looked
for
by
the
ingenuous
Reader
,
that
we
should
aim
fo
high
as
the
first
300
years
after
Christs
Nativitie
.
The
Prelates
of
the
Church
were
suspected
then
to
have
their
different
aims
and
interesses
,
from
those
who
had
the
government
of
the
Civil
State
,
and
therefore
thought
uncapable
of
trust
and
imployment
in
it
.
But
after
that
,
according
to
that
memorable
maxime
of
Optatus
,
Ecclesia
erat
in
Republicâ
[
i
](A86304-e46030-b)
i
Deschismat
.
Den●●●st
.
l
3.
,
the
Church
became
a
part
of
the
Common●wealth
,
and
had
their
ends
and
aims
united
;
there
followed
these
two
things
upon
it
:
first
that
the
Supreme
Government
of
the
Church
depended
much
upon
the
will
and
pleasure
of
the
Supreme
Magistrate
,
insomuch
as
Socrates
observeth
,
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
[
k
](A86304-e46070-b)
k
Socrat.
Eccl.
hist.
lib.
5.
c.
1.
,
that
the
greatest
Councels
have
been
called
by
their
authoritie
and
appointment
;
And
2ly
,
that
the
Governours
and
Rulers
of
the
Church
of
God
,
came
to
have
place
and
power
in
disposing
matters
that
appertained
to
the
well
ordering
of
the
Civil
State
.
And
this
they
did
,
not
out
of
any
busie
or
pragmatical
desire
to
draw
the
cognizance
of
secular
causes
into
their
own
hands
,
or
to
increase
their
power
and
reputation
with
the
common
people
:
but
meerly
for
the
ease
and
benefit
of
those
who
did
repair
unto
them
for
their
help
and
counsel
,
and
to
comply
with
the
command
of
the
Apostle
,
who
imposed
it
on
them
.
S.
Austin
tells
us
of
S.
Ambrose
with
how
great
difficultie
he
obtained
an
opportunitie
of
conversing
with
him
privately
,
and
at
large
,
as
his
case
required
:
Secludentibus
●um
ab
ejus
aure
atque
ore
catervis
negociosorum
hominum
,
the
multitude
of
those
who
had
business
to
him
,
[
l
](A86304-e46140-b)
l
August
.
Confes
.
l.
6.
c.
3.
and
suits
to
be
determined
.
by
him
,
debarring
him
from
all
advantages
of
access
and
conference
.
Which
took
up
so
much
of
his
time
,
that
he
had
little
leasure
to
refresh
his
body
with
necessary
food
,
or
his
minde
with
the
reading
of
good
Authors
.
And
Posidonius
tel●s
us
of
S.
Austin
,
causas
audisse
diligenter
&
piè
,
that
he
diligently
and
religiously
attended
such
businesses
as
were
brought
before
him
,
not
only
spending
all
the
morning
in
that
troublesome
exercise
[
m
](A86304-e46170-b)
m
Posidon
.
in
vita
August
.
c.
19.
,
but
sometimes
fasting
all
day
long
,
the
better
to
content
the
suitor
,
and
dispatch
the
business
.
The
like
S.
Austin
tells
us
of
himself
,
and
his
fellow
Prelates
,
first
that
the
Christians
of
those
times
pro
secularibus
causis
suis
nos
non
raro
quaererent
[
n
](A86304-e46200-b)
n
August
.
in
Psalm
.
1
:
8.
serm.
74
&
Epist.
147.
,
did
ordinarily
apply
themselves
unto
them
for
the
determing
of
secular
causes
,
and
cheerfully
submitted
unto
their
decisions
:
next
that
the
Prelates
did
comply
with
their
earnest
solicitations
and
desires
,
therein
Tu
multuosissimas
causarum
alienarum
perplexitates
patiendo
[
o
](A86304-e46240-b)
o
Id.
de
ope●e
Monach
c.
29.
,
by
intermitting
their
own
studies
to
ingage
themselves
in
the
determining
of
such
secular
causes
as
were
brought
before
them
,
for
the
contentation
of
the
people
,
and
the
discharge
of
their
own
duty
both
to
God
and
man
.
And
this
is
that
which
both
S.
Ambrose
and
S.
Augustine
tell
us
in
their
several
writings
,
viz.
that
they
did
undergoe
this
trouble
for
no
other
reason
then
out
of
a
conformitie
and
obedience
to
the
words
and
intimation
of
S.
Paul
,
1
Cor.
cap.
6.
touching
the
ending
of
such
suits
and
differences
as
did
arise
amongst
the
Faithful
:
S.
Austin
saying
,
Constituisse
Apostolum
talibus
causis
Ecclesiasticos
cognitores
[
p
](A86304-e46330-b)
p
Id.
in
Psal.
118.
serm.
174.
,
and
iisdem
molestiis
eos
affixisse
Apostolos
;
[
q
](A86304-e46350-b)
q
Id.
de
opere
Monach.
29.
S.
Ambrose
,
that
he
had
undertook
the
businesses
which
were
brought
before
him
,
Secundum
sacrae
formam
praeceptionis
qua
eum
Apostolus
induebat
[
r
](A86304-e46380-b)
r
Amb.
Epist.
24.
,
which
did
impose
such
a
necessitie
upon
him
,
that
he
was
not
able
to
decline
it
.
Both
of
them
doe
agree
,
in
this
,
and
Posidonius
doth
agree
with
both
in
the
same
particular
[
s
](A86304-e46400-b)
s
Posidon
.
in
vita
August
.
c.
19.
,
that
they
were
not
only
warranted
,
but
obliged
by
S.
Pauls
injunction
,
to
undertake
the
cognizance
of
such
secular
causes
as
were
from
time
to
time
committed
to
their
care
and
trust
;
and
that
they
had
not
done
their
dutie
,
had
they
made
any
scruple
of
the
undertaking
.
But
these
being
only
private
matters
,
let
us
next
see
,
whether
their
service
was
not
used
in
affairs
of
State
,
and
we
shall
finde
that
Constantine
did
always
take
some
Bishops
with
him
when
he
went
to
war
;
not
only
for
their
ghostly
counsel
in
spiritual
matters
,
but
for
advise
in
matters
which
concerned
the
occasion
[
t
](A86304-e46450-b)
t
Euseb.
in
vita
Constant
.
l.
4.
c.
54.
,
the
prosecution
of
the
war
which
was
then
in
hand
:
that
Ambrose
was
twice
sent
Ambassadour
from
Valentinian
the
younger
to
the
Tyrant
Maximus
,
which
he
performed
to
the
great
contentment
of
his
Prince
,
and
the
preservation
of
the
Empire
[
u
](A86304-e46490-b)
u
Amb.
Epist.
27.
lib.
5.
;
whereof
he
gives
us
an
accompt
in
an
express
unto
the
Emperour
:
that
when
Firmus
had
rebelled
in
Africk
,
and
saw
himself
too
weak
to
resist
the
Forces
which
were
raised
against
him
under
Theodosius
,
Antistites
ritus
Christiani
pacem
oraturos
misit
[
x
](A86304-e46530-b)
x
Ammian
.
Marcel
.
hist.
l.
29.
,
he
sent
the
African
Prelates
his
Ambassadours
to
treat
of
peace
:
that
Marutha
Bishop
of
Mesopotamia
was
in
like
nature
sent
to
the
Court
of
Persia
[
y
](A86304-e46580-b)
y
Socrat.
Eccles.
hist.
l.
7.
c.
8.
,
in
the
time
of
the
Emperour
Honorius
.
I.
as
after
that
Epiphanius
Bishop
of
Ticinum
(
which
we
now
call
Pavie
)
employed
from
the
Ligurians
to
Athalaricus
King
of
the
Gothes
in
Italy
,
from
him
unto
the
Court
of
Burgundie
,
as
Cassiodorus
and
Ennodius
doe
describe
at
large
:
that
James
the
godly
Bishop
of
Nisibis
,
(
a
frontier
Town
against
the
Persians
)
was
also
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
,
both
Governour
of
the
place
,
and
Captain
of
the
Souldiers
which
were
there
in
Garrison
[
z
](A86304-e46770-b)
z
Theodoret.
hist.
Eccl.
l.
2.
c.
30.
;
and
did
most
manfully
defend
it
,
against
all
the
force
and
fury
of
the
Persian
Armies
,
An.
338.
or
thereabouts
:
and
finally
(
which
was
an
argument
of
great
power
and
trust
)
that
the
Bishops
in
Justinians
time
were
by
him
appointed
to
oversee
the
Civil
Magistrates
,
and
to
give
notice
to
the
Emperour
if
they
failed
in
any
thing
which
did
concern
the
Government
o●
the
Estate
in
their
several
places
;
of
which
the
very
Edicts
are
still
extant
in
the
Book
of
Novels
[
a
](A86304-e46830-b)
a
Novel.
56.
&
in
Append.
ad
Novel.
8.
.
(5)
The
Prelates
being
grown
into
this
esteem
for
their
integritie
and
wisdom
,
with
the
Roman
Emperours
;
it
is
no
wonder
if
they
were
imployed
in
the
greatest
Offices
of
trust
and
counsel
,
after
the
Empire
was
dismembred
and
shared
betwixt
such
several
Princes
as
grew
up
in
the
place
of
those
mighty
Monarchs
:
And
this
they
did
on
so
good
motives
,
and
with
such
success
,
that
in
short
time
the
Prelates
were
not
only
used
for
advice
and
counsel
,
but
the
inferiour
Clergie
also
were
called
unto
imployments
of
the
highest
nature
,
and
in
conclusion
with
the
Prelates
made
up
the
third
Estate
in
most
Christian
Kingdomes
.
For
being
that
the
study
of
Divinitie
is
diffused
and
large
,
and
that
the
knowledge
of
Philosophie
and
the
Arts
and
Histories
,
is
but
attendant
on
the
same
and
subservient
to
it
;
there
was
no
question
made
at
all
in
the
times
we
speak
of
,
but
that
a
Church-man
so
accomplished
might
be
as
useful
in
the
service
of
the
Common-wealth
,
as
those
who
wanted
many
opportunities
to
be
so
versed
in
Books
the
best
guides
to
business
:
especially
when
to
those
helps
in
point
of
learning
,
were
joyned
a
suddenness
of
apprehension
,
a
perspicacity
of
judgement
,
and
which
swayed
most
of
all
integritie
of
life
and
conversation
.
These
when
they
met
together
(
as
they
often
did
)
in
men
admitted
by
the
Church
unto
holy
Orders
,
it
was
not
either
thought
or
found
(
and
indeed
how
could
it
?
)
that
their
admittance
into
Orders
did
take
off
from
any
of
those
natural
or
acquired
indowments
of
which
before
they
were
possessed
,
or
that
it
was
a
disabling
to
them
to
make
use
thereof
,
in
any
matter
of
debate
or
action
which
concerned
the
publick
.
And
that
it
hath
been
so
of
old
in
all
Christian
Kingdomes
,
besides
that
it
is
intimated
by
our
Author
here
,
we
shall
clearly
see
by
looking
over
such
particulars
as
have
most
influence
and
power
in
the
affairs
of
Christendom
.
And
first
beginning
(
as
of
right
)
with
the
German
Empire
,
Thuanus
gives
this
note
in
general
[
b
](A86304-e47120-b)
b
August
.
Thuan
.
hist.
lib.
2.
,
Imperium
in
tria
omnino
membra
dividi
,
that
that
Empire
is
divided
into
three
Estates
,
over
all
which
the
Emperour
is
the
head
or
the
Supreme
Prince
.
Of
these
the
fi●st
Estate
is
ex
sacro
Ordine
,
of
the
holy
Hierarchie
,
composed
of
the
three
spiritual
Electors
,
together
with
the
residue
of
the
Archbishops
and
Bishops
,
and
many
Abbots
,
Priors
,
and
other
Prelates
.
The
second
is
of
the
Nobilitie
consisting
of
the
three
temporal
Electors
,
the
Dukes
,
Marquesses
,
Lantgraves
,
Burgraves
,
Earls
and
Barons
,
of
which
there
is
no
determinate
number
;
the
Emperour
having
power
to
adde
dayly
to
them
,
as
he
sees
occasion
.
T●e
third
Estate
is
of
the
free
or
Imperial
Cities
,
in
number
60.
or
thereabouts
,
who
represent
themselves
at
the
General
Diets
,
by
such
Commissioners
or
Deputies
as
are
authorized
to
that
purpose
.
Now
for
these
Diets
,
(
for
by
that
name
they
call
their
Conventus
Ordinum
,
or
Assembly
of
the
three
Estates
)
they
are
summoned
at
the
will
and
pleasure
of
the
Emperour
only
,
and
at
such
place
and
time
as
to
him
seems
meetest
[
c
](A86304-e47270-b)
c
Id.
ibid.
.
Where
being
met
,
(
as
all
the
three
Estates
must
meet
either
in
person
or
by
their
Ambassadours
)
they
use
to
treat
of
Peace
,
and
War
,
of
raising
Subsidies
and
Taxes
to
support
the
State
,
of
leagues
and
con●ederacies
,
of
raising
and
decrying
moneys
,
of
making
,
abrogating
,
and
expounding
laws
,
and
of
such
other
points
and
matters
as
do
pertain
unto
the
honour
of
the
Empire
and
the
publick
sas●ti●
.
Nor
is
this
any
new
authoritie
which
the
Ecclesiastical
Estate
hath
gained
in
the
latter
times
;
but
such
wherein
they
were
intrusted
●rom
the
first
beginning
of
that
Empire
:
It
being
affi●med
by
Aventinus
(
a
Writer
of
unquestioned
credit
)
that
long
before
the
institution
of
the
seven
Electors
,
(
which
was
in
An.
996.
)
the
Prelates
,
the
Nobilitie
,
and
the
chief
of
the
people
had
the
election
of
the
Emperour
[
d
](A86304-e47350-b)
d
Aventini
Annal.
Bo●o●um
.
l.
5.
.
And
if
the
Prelates
were
intrusted
in
so
high
a
point
,
as
the
election
of
the
Emperour
or
the
Soveraign
Prince
;
no
question
but
they
were
imployed
also
in
his
publick
Councels
,
in
matters
which
concerned
the
managerie
of
the
Common-wealth
.
Next
pass
we
over
into
France
,
and
there
we
finde
the
Subjects
marshalled
into
three
Estates
,
whereof
the
Clergie
is
the
first
.
Rex
coactis
tribus
Ordinibus
,
Sacerdotio
,
Nobilitate
,
Plebe
,
subsidia
rei
pecuniariae
petiit
[
e
](A86304-e47450-b)
e
Paul
.
Aemilius
hist.
Franc.
l
9.
,
that
is
to
say
,
the
King
assembling
or
conveening
the
three
Estates
,
viz.
the
Clergie
,
the
Nobilitie
,
and
the
Commons
,
demanded
subsidies
for
the
support
of
his
Estate
;
So
Paulus
Aemilius
doth
inform
us
:
Out
of
these
three
are
chosen
certain
Delegates
or
Commissioners
,
some
for
each
Estate
,
as
often
as
the
Kings
occasions
doe
require
their
meeting
,
the
time
and
place
whereof
is
absolutely
left
unto
his
disposing
;
and
these
thus
met
doe
make
up
the
Conventus
Ordinum
,
or
L'
Assemblie
des
Estats
,
as
the
French
men
call
it
,
in
form
much
like
the
English
Parliament
,
but
in
nothing
else
:
the
power
and
reputation
of
it
being
much
diminished
in
these
latter
times
,
especially
since
the
great
improvement
of
the
Court
of
Parliament
,
fixed
and
of
long
time
fixed
in
Paris
.
Which
Court
of
Parliament
,
as
it
was
instituted
at
the
first
by
Charles
Martell
,
Mayre
of
the
Pa●ace
to
the
Merov●gnian
line
of
France
and
Grandfather
to
Charle
magne
;
so
it
consisted
at
the
first
of
the
same
ingredients
,
of
which
the
great
Assembly
des
.
Estats
consisteth
now
,
that
is
to
say
,
the
Prelates
,
and
the
Peers
,
and
certain
of
the
principal
Gentrie
which
they
call
La
nobless
,
together
with
some
few
of
the
most
consid●rable
Officers
of
the
Kings
houshold
[
f
](A86304-e47690-b)
f
An●●e
du
Chos●e
.
8.
.
A
Court
of
such
esteem
in
the
former
times
,
that
the
Kings
of
Sicilie
,
Cyprus
,
Bohomia
,
Portugal
,
Scotland
,
and
Navarre
,
have
thought
it
no
disparagement
unto
them
to
be
members
of
it
:
and
which
is
more
,
when
Frederick
the
second
had
spent
much
time
and
treasure
in
his
quarrels
with
Pope
Innocent
the
fourth
,
he
was
content
to
submit
the
whole
cause
in
difference
unto
the
judgement
of
this
Court
.
But
being
at
last
become
sedentaire
and
fixed
at
Paris
,
as
other
ordinary
Courts
of
Justice
were
,
(
which
was
in
An.
1286.
or
thereabouts
)
the
Nobles
first
,
and
after
them
the
Bishops
withdrew
themselves
from
the
troubles
of
it
,
and
left
it
to
the
ordering
of
the
Civil
Lawyers
:
though
still
the
Peeres
doe
challenge
and
enjoy
a
place
therein
as
oft
as
any
point
of
moment
is
in
agitation
;
the
Bishop
of
Paris
,
and
the
Abbor
of
St.
Denys
,
continuing
constant
members
of
it
to
this
very
day
.
But
for
the
Assemblie
des
Estats
,
or
Conventus
Ordinum
,
made
up
of
the
Clergie
,
the
Nobilitie
and
the
Commons
,
as
before
I
told
I
you
:
he
that
would
see
the
manner
of
it
,
the
points
there
handled
,
and
that
remainder
of
authority
which
is
left
unto
them
,
let
him
repair
unto
Thuanne
[
g
](A86304-e47890-b)
g
Thuan
hist.
sui
temp.
lib.
,
and
look
upon
the
great
Assembly
held
at
Bloys
,
An.
1573.
He
shall
finde
it
there
.
Pass
we
next
over
the
Pyrenees
,
to
the
Pealms
of
Spain
,
and
we
shall
finde
in
each
the
same
three
Estates
,
whose
meeting
they
call
there
by
the
name
[
h
](A86304-e47950-b)
h
Bodin
.
de
Repub.
lib.
3.
c.
of
Curia
,
the
Court
,
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
,
or
by
way
of
ominencie
;
consisting
of
the
Clergie
,
the
Nobilitie
,
and
the
Commissioners
of
the
Provinces
and
most
antient
Cities
.
But
we
must
tell
you
by
the
way
,
that
long
before
the
institution
of
these
Courts
,
and
long
before
the
division
of
Spain
into
so
many
Kingdomes
;
the
Prelates
of
that
Church
were
of
such
authority
,
that
a
chief
stroke
in
the
election
of
their
Kings
did
belong
to
them
.
For
in
the
eighth
Council
of
Toledo
summoned
by
Recesvinthus
the
25.
of
the
Gothish
race
of
the
Kings
of
Spain
,
An.
653.
so
long
agoe
,
in
which
were
present
52
Bishops
,
12
Abbots
,
and
the
Delegates
or
Vicars
of
ten
other
Bishops
,
who
could
not
personally
attend
the
service
;
it
was
ordered
with
the
Kings
consent
,
that
from
thenceforth
the
Kings
of
Spain
should
be
elected
in
the
Regal
City
,
or
in
what
other
place
soever
the
King
should
happen
to
decease
,
by
the
joynt
suffrages
of
the
Prelates
,
and
the
great
Lords
of
the
Court
,
Majores
Palatii
as
the
Canon
calls
them
[
i
](A86304-e48120-b)
i
Concil.
Tolet.
VIII
.
Can.
10.
.
But
take
the
whole
Canon
with
you
for
the
more
assurance
,
and
you
finde
it
thus
.
Abninc
ergo
&
deinceps
ita
erunt
in
Regni
gloria
praeficiendi
Rectores
,
ut
aut
in
urbe
Regia
,
aut
in
loco
ubi
Princeps
decesserit
,
cum
Pontificum
Majorumque
Palatii
omnimodo
eligantur
assensu
.
But
after
Spain
became
divided
into
several
Kingdomes
,
and
that
each
Kingdome
had
its
Court
,
or
Curia
,
as
they
call
their
Parliament
,
the
Clergie
were
esteemed
in
each
for
the
third
Estate
(
the
first
indeed
of
all
the
three
)
and
either
in
person
or
by
their
Proxies
,
made
up
the
most
considerable
part
in
those
publick
meetings
.
For
proof
of
which
we
need
but
look
into
the
General
history
of
Spain
,
translated
out
of
French
by
Grimston
,
and
we
shall
finde
a
Court
or
Parliament
for
the
Realm
of
Aragon
,
consisting
of
the
Bishops
,
Nobles
,
and
Deputies
of
Towns
and
Commonalties
,
having
place
in
the
said
Estates
conveened
by
King
James
at
Saragossa
Anno
1325.
for
setling
the
Succession
,
and
declaring
the
Heir
[
k
](A86304-e48280-b)
k
Gen.
hist.
of
Spain
.
l.
14.
,
another
at
Monson
,
where
the
Estates
of
Aragon
and
Catalogne
did
conveen
together
1236
,
to
consult
about
the
conquest
of
Valentia
[
l
](A86304-e48340-b)
l
Id.
lib.
11.
;
and
before
that
another
Assemblie
of
the
Bishops
and
Noblemen
called
at
Saragossa
by
Alfonso
the
Great
,
touching
the
War
against
the
Moores
[
m
](A86304-e48390-b)
m
Id.
lib.
9.
.
And
as
for
the
Realm
of
Naples
,
and
Sicily
,
being
appends
on
this
Crown
,
there
is
little
question
to
be
made
but
that
the
Bishops
and
Clergie
of
both
enjoyed
the
place
and
priviledges
of
the
third
Estate
;
both
Kingdomes
being
antiently
holden
of
the
Pope
,
and
of
his
Erection
and
the
Italian
Bishops
(
as
lying
directly
under
his
nose
)
more
amply
priviledged
for
the
most
part
then
in
other
Countries
.
Thus
for
Castile
,
we
finde
a
Parliament
of
Lords
,
Prelates
,
and
Deputies
of
Towns
summoned
at
Toledo
by
Alfonso
the
Noble
,
An.
1210.
upon
occasion
of
an
invasion
made
by
the
Moores
;
[
n
](A86304-e48500-b)
n
Id.
lib.
10.
another
before
that
at
Burgos
,
under
the
same
King
,
Anno
1179.
for
levying
of
money
on
the
people
to
maintain
the
Wars
n
;
that
great
Convention
of
the
States
held
at
Toledo
by
Ferdinand
the
Catholick
1479.
for
swearing
to
the
succession
of
his
Son
,
Don
John
,
in
which
the
Prelates
,
the
Nobility
,
and
almost
all
the
Towns
and
Cities
,
which
sent
Commissioners
to
the
Assembly
,
are
expressly
named
[
o
](A86304-e48590-b)
o
Id.
lib.
.
Thus
finally
doe
we
finde
a
meeting
of
the
Deputies
of
the
three
Estates
of
Navarre
at
the
Town
of
Tasalla
,
Anno
1481.
for
preserving
the
Kingdome
in
obedience
to
King
Francis
Phoebus
,
being
then
a
minor
,
under
age
[
p
](A86304-e48640-b)
p
Id.
lib.
22.
:
and
that
the
Deputies
of
the
Clergie
,
Nobilitie
,
Provinces
and
good
Towns
of
Portugal
,
assembled
at
Tomara
,
An.
1581.
to
acknowledge
Philip
the
second
for
their
King
,
and
to
settle
the
Government
of
that
Kingdome
for
the
times
to
come
[
q
](A86304-e48680-b)
q
Id.
lib.
30.
.
Now
let
us
take
a
view
of
the
Northern
Kingdomes
,
and
still
we
finde
the
people
ranked
in
the
self
same
manner
,
and
their
great
Councels
to
consist
of
the
Clergie
,
the
N●bilitie
,
and
certain
Deputies
,
sent
from
the
Provinces
and
Cities
,
as
in
those
before
.
In
Hungar●e
,
before
that
Realm
received
the
Gospel
,
we
read
of
none
but
Nobiles
&
Plebeii
[
r
](A86304-e48760-b)
r
Bonfinius
in
hist.
Hungar.
Dec.
l.
1.
,
the
Nobilitie
and
common
people
who
did
concur
to
the
election
of
their
Kings
;
but
no
sooner
was
the
Faith
of
Christ
admitted
,
and
a
Clergie
instituted
,
but
instantly
we
finde
a
third
Estate
,
Epis●opos
&
Sacerdotum
Collegia
[
s
](A86304-e48800-b)
s
Id.
ibid.
De●
.
2.
l.
2.
,
Bishops
and
others
of
the
Clergie
super-added
to
them
,
for
the
election
of
the
Kings
,
and
the
dispatch
of
other
businesses
which
concerned
the
publick
[
t
](A86304-e48820-b)
t
Id.
Decad.
2.
l.
3.
,
as
it
continueth
to
this
day
.
In
Danemark
we
shall
finde
the
same
,
if
we
mark
it
well
.
For
though
Pontanus
seem
to
count
upon
five
Estates
,
making
the
Regall
Family
to
be
the
first
,
and
subdividing
the
Commons
into
two
,
whereof
the.
Yeomanry
makes
one
,
and
the
Tradesman
or
Citizen
the
other
[
u
](A86304-e48870-b)
u
Pontan
in
Doriae
descript.
:
yet
in
the
body
of
the
History
we
finde
only
three
,
which
are
the
Bishops
,
the
Nobility
,
and
Civitatum
delegati
[
x
](A86304-e48920-b)
x
Id.
in
histor.
Rerum
Danic
.
l.
7.
,
the
Deputies
or
Commissioners
of
Towns
and
Cities
:
Take
which
of
these
Accompts
you
will
,
and
reckon
either
upon
Five
or
on
three
Estates
,
yet
still
the
Ecclesiastick
State
,
or
Ordo
Ecclesiasticus
,
as
himself
entituleth
it
,
is
declared
for
one
;
and
hath
been
so
declared
,
as
their
stories
tell
us
,
ever
since
the
first
admittance
of
the
Faith
amongst
them
:
the
Bishops
,
together
with
the
Peers
and
Deputies
,
making
up
the
Comitia
or
Conventus
Ordinum
.
In
Poland
the
chief
sway
and
power
of
government
,
next
to
the
King
,
is
in
the
Councell
of
Estate
.
Secundum
Regem
maxima
&
Augustuissima
Senatus
autoritas
,
as
Thuanus
hath
it
[
y
](A86304-e49040-b)
y
Thuan.
hist.
sui
temp.
l.
56.
.
And
that
consisteth
of
nine
Bishops
,
whereof
the
Archbishops
of
Guisna
and
Leopolis
make
alwaies
two
;
of
fifteen
Palatines
,
for
by
that
name
they
call
the
greater
sort
of
the
Nobility
,
and
of
sixty
five
Chastellans
,
which
are
the
better
sort
of
the
Polish
Gentry
;
who
with
the
nine
great
Officers
of
the
Kingdome
,
(
of
which
the
Clergy
are
as
capable
as
any
other
sort
or
degree
of
subjects
)
doe
complete
that
Councell
.
The
Common
people
there
are
in
no
authority
,
(
a
procuratione
Reipub.
omnino
summota
)
not
having
any
Vote
or
suffrage
in
the
great
Comitia
[
a
](A86304-e49140-b)
a
Thuan.
hist.
sui
.
temp.
l.
56.
,
or
generall
Assemblies
of
the
Kingdome
,
as
in
other
places
.
For
Sweden
,
it
comes
neer
the
government
and
formes
of
Danemark
,
and
hath
the
same
estates
and
degrees
of
people
as
amongst
the
Danes
,
that
is
to
say
,
Proceres
&
Nobiles
,
the
greater
and
the
lesse
Nobility
,
Episcopi
&
Ecclesiastici
,
the
Bishops
and
inferiour
Clergy
,
Civitates
&
universitates
,
the
Cities
and
Towns
Corporate
(
for
so
I
think
he
means
by
vniversitates
)
as
Thuanus
[
b
](A86304-e49240-b)
b
Id.
lib.
131.
mustereth
them
.
And
in
this
Realm
the
Bishops
and
Clergy
enjoy
the
place
and
priviledges
of
the
third
Estate
(
notwithstanding
the
alteration
of
Religion
)
to
this
very
day
;
the
Bishops
in
their
own
persons
,
and
a
certain
number
of
the
Clergy
out
of
every
Sochen
(
a
division
like
our
Rurall
Deanries
)
in
the
name
of
the
rest
,
having
a
necessary
Vote
in
all
their
Parliaments
.
And
as
for
Scotland
,
their
Parliament
consisted
anciently
of
three
Estates
,
as
learned
Camden
doth
informe
us
,
that
is
to
say
,
the
Lords
spirituall
,
as
Bishops
,
Abbots
,
Priors
;
the
Temporall
Lords
,
as
Dukes
,
Marquesses
,
Earles
,
Vicounts
,
Barons
;
and
the
Commissioners
of
the
Cities
and
Burroughs
[
c
](A86304-e49320-b)
c
Camden
in
descript.
Scotiae
.
;
To
which
were
added
by
King
James
two
Delegates
or
Commissioners
out
of
every
County
to
make
it
more
conforme
to
the
English
Parliaments
.
And
in
some
Acts
the
Prelates
are
by
name
declared
to
be
the
third
Estate
,
as
in
the
Parliament
,
Anno
1597.
Anno
1606
,
&c.
for
which
I
do
referre
you
to
the
Book
at
large
.
(6)
And
now
at
last
we
are
come
to
England
,
where
we
shall
find
that
from
the
first
reception
of
the
Christian
Faith
amongst
the
Saxons
,
the
Ecclesiasticks
have
been
called
to
all
Publick
Councels
,
and
their
advice
required
in
the
weightiest
matters
touching
the
safety
of
the
Kingdome
.
No
sooner
had
King
Ethelbert
received
the
Gospell
,
but
presently
we
read
that
as
well
the
Clergy
as
the
Laity
were
called
unto
the
Common
Councell
:
which
the
Saxons
sometimes
called
Mycell
Synoth
,
the
Great
Assembly
,
and
sometimes
Wittenagemots
[
d
](A86304-e49500-b)
d
Coke
on
Li●l
.
2.
sect.
,
the
Councell
or
Assembly
of
the
Wise
men
of
the
Realm
.
Anno
605.
Ethelbertus
Rex
in
fide
roboratus
Catholica
&c.
Cantuariae
convocavit
commune
concilium
●am
Cleri
quam
populi
,
&c.
[
e
](A86304-e49550-b)
e
H.
Spelman
in
Concil.
p.
126.
"
King
Ethelbert
,
as
my
Author
hath
it
,
being
confirmed
in
the
Faith
in
the
year
605.
(
which
was
but
nine
years
after
his
conversion
)
together
with
Bertha
his
Queen
,
their
Son
Eadbald
,
the
most
Reverend
Archbishop
Augustine
,
and
all
the
rest
of
the
Nobility
,
did
solemnize
the
Feast
of
Christs
Nativity
in
the
City
of
Canterbury
;
and
did
there
cause
to
be
assembled
on
the
ninth
of
January
the
Common-Councell
of
his
Kingdome
,
aswell
the
Clergy
as
the
Lay
Subject
,
by
whose
consent
and
approbation
,
he
caused
the
Monastery
by
him
built
,
to
be
dedicated
to
the
honour
of
Almighty
God
,
by
the
hand
of
Augustine
.
"
And
though
no
question
other
examples
of
this
kinde
may
be
found
amongst
the
Saxon
Heptarchs
,
yet
being
the
West
Saxon
Kingdome
did
in
fine
prevail
,
and
united
all
the
rest
into
one
Monarchy
:
we
shall
apply
our selves
unto
that
more
punctually
.
Where
we
shall
finde
besides
two
Charters
issued
out
by
Athelstan
,
Consilio
Wlfelmi
Archiepiscopi
mei
&
aliorum
Episcoporum
meorum
[
f
](A86304-e49710-b)
f
Ap.
eund.
p.
402
,
403.
,
by
the
advice
of
Wlfelm
his
Archbishop
and
his
other
Bishops
:
that
Ina
in
the
year
702.
caused
the
great
Councell
of
his
Realm
to
be
assembled
,
consisting
ex
Episcopis
,
Principibus
,
proceribus
,
&c.
of
Bishops
,
Princes
,
Nobles
,
Earls
,
and
of
all
the
Wise
men
,
Elders
,
and
People
of
the
whole
Kingdome
,
and
there
enacted
divers
lawes
for
the
Weal
of
his
Realm
[
g
](A86304-e49770-b)
g
Apud
eund.
p.
219.
.
Thus
do
we
read
that
Egbert
,
who
first
united
the
seven
Kingdomes
of
the
Saxons
under
the
name
of
England
,
did
cause
to
be
conveened
at
London
his
Bishops
and
the
Peers
of
the
highest
rank
,
pro
consilio
capiendo
adversus
Danicos
Piratas
[
h
](A86304-e49840-b)
h
Charta
Whitlafii
Merciorum
Regis
ap.
Ingulf
.
,
to
advise
upon
some
course
against
the
Danish
Pirates
who
infested
the
sea
coasts
of
England
.
Another
Parliament
or
Councell
,
call
it
which
you
will
,
called
at
Kingsbury
,
Anno
855.
in
the
time
of
Ethelwolph
the
Son
of
Egbert
,
pro
negotiis
regni
[
i
](A86304-e49900-b)
i
Chart.
Bertulfi
.
Merc.
Regis
ap.
Ingulf
.
,
to
treat
of
the
affaires
of
the
Kingdome
:
the
Acts
whereof
are
ratified
and
subscribed
by
the
Bishops
,
Abbots
,
and
other
great
men
of
the
Realme
.
The
same
King
Ethelwolph
in
a
Parliament
or
Assembly
of
his
States
at
Winchester
,
Anno
855.
Cum
consilio
Episcoporum
&
principum
[
k
](A86304-e49960-b)
k
Ingulfi
Croyland
hist.
,
by
the
advice
and
counsell
of
the
Bishops
and
Nobility
,
confirmed
unto
the
Clergy
the
tenth
part
of
all
mens
goods
;
and
ordered
that
the
Tithe
so
confirmed
unto
them
should
be
free
ab
omnibus
secularibus
servitutibus
,
for
all
secular
services
and
impositions
.
In
the
reigne
of
Edred
we
finde
this
,
Anno
948.
In
Festo
igitur
nativitatis
B.
Mariae
cum
universi
Magnates
regni
per
Regium
edictum
summoniti
,
tam
Archiepiscopi
&
Episcopi
ac
Abbates
,
quam
caeteri
totius
regni
proceres
&
optimates
Londoniis
convenissent
ad
tractandum
de
negotiis
publicis
totius
Regni
[
l
](A86304-e50080-b)
l
Id
ibid.
p.
497
edit.
Lond.
:
viz.
That
in
the
Feast
of
the
Nativity
of
the
blessed
Virgin
,
the
great
men
of
the
Realm
,
that
is
to
say
,
Archbishops
,
Bishops
,
Abbots
,
Nobles
,
Peeres
,
were
summoned
by
the
Kings
Writ
to
appear
at
London
,
to
handle
and
conclude
about
the
publick
affaires
of
the
Kingdome
.
Mention
of
this
Assembly
is
made
againe
at
the
foundation
and
endowment
of
the
Abbie
of
Crowland
[
m
](A86304-e50130-b)
m
Id.
p.
500.
:
and
afterwards
a
confirmation
of
the
same
by
Edgar
,
Anno
966.
praesentibus
Archiepiscopis
,
Episcopis
,
Abbatibus
&
Optimatibus
Regni
[
n
](A86304-e50160-b)
n
Id
pag.
501.
&
502.
,
in
the
presence
of
the
Archbishops
,
B●shops
,
Abbots
and
Peers
of
the
Kingdome
.
Like
convention
of
Estates
we
finde
to
have
been
called
by
Canutus
after
the
death
of
Edmund
Ironside
,
for
the
setling
of
the
Crown
on
his
own
head
,
of
which
thus
the
Author
[
o
](A86304-e50210-b)
o
Rog.
Hoveden
.
Annal
pars
prior
.
p.
250.
.
Cujus
post
mortem
Rex
Canutus
omnes
Episcopos
&
Duces
,
nec
non
&
principes
cunctosque
optimates
gentis
Angliae
Londoniae
congregari
jussit
.
Where
still
we
finde
the
Bishops
to
be
called
to
Parliament
as
well
as
the
Dukes
,
Princes
,
and
the
rest
of
the
Nobility
;
and
to
be
ranked
and
marshalled
first
(
which
clearly
shewes
that
they
were
alwaies
reckoned
for
the
first
Estate
)
before
the
greatest
and
most
eminent
of
the
secular
Peers
.
And
so
we
finde
it
also
in
a
Charter
of
King
Edward
the
Confessor
,
the
last
King
of
the
Saxon
race
)
by
which
he
granted
certain
Lands
and
priviledges
to
the
Church
of
Westminster
,
Anno
1066.
Cum
consilio
&
decreto
Archiepiscoporum
,
Episcoporum
,
Comitum
,
aliorumque
Optimatum
[
p
](A86304-e50350-b)
p
Ap.
H.
Spelman
in
Concil.
p.
630.
,
with
the
counsell
and
decree
of
the
Archbishops
,
Bishops
,
Earls
,
and
others
of
his
Nobles
.
And
all
this
while
the
Bishops
and
other
Prelates
of
the
Church
did
hold
their
Lands
by
no
other
tenure
,
then
in
pura
&
perpetua
eleemosyna
[
q
](A86304-e50390-b)
q
Camden
in
Brit.
,
or
Frank
almoigne
,
as
our
Lawyers
call
it
:
and
therefore
sate
in
Parliament
in
no
other
capacity
then
as
spirituall
persons
meerly
,
who
by
their
extraordinary
knowledge
in
the
word
of
God
,
and
in
such
other
parts
of
learning
,
as
the
world
then
knew
,
were
thought
best
able
to
direct
and
advise
their
Princes
in
points
of
judgement
.
In
which
capacity
and
no
other
the
Priors
of
the
Cathedrall
Churches
of
Canterbury
,
Ely
,
Winchester
,
Coventry
,
Bath
,
Worcester
,
Norwich
,
and
Durham
,
the
Deans
of
Exceter
,
York
,
Wells
,
Salisbury
,
and
Lincoln
,
the
Officiall
of
the
Archbishop
of
Canterbury
,
and
the
Dean
of
the
Arches
,
the
Guardian
of
the
Spiritualties
of
any
Bishoprick
when
the
See
was
vacant
,
and
the
Vicars
generall
of
such
Bishops
as
were
absent
beyond
the
Seas
[
r
](A86304-e50550-b)
r
Selden
Titles
of
hon.
part.
2.
c.
5.
,
had
sometimes
place
and
suffrage
in
the
house
of
Lords
in
the
Ages
following
.
7.
But
when
the
Norman
Conqueror
had
possest
the
State
,
then
the
case
was
altered
.
The
Prelates
of
the
Church
were
no
longer
suffered
to
hold
their
Lands
in
Frankalmoigne
as
before
they
did
,
or
to
be
free
from
secular
services
and
commands
,
as
before
they
were
.
Although
they
kept
their
lands
,
yet
they
changed
their
tenure
,
and
by
the
Conqueror
,
were
ordained
to
hold
their
Lands
sub
militari
servitute
[
s
](A86304-e50660-b)
s
Ma●
.
Paris
in
Will.
1.
An.
1070.
,
either
in
●apite
,
or
by
Baronage
,
or
some
such
military
hold
,
and
thereby
were
compellable
to
aid
the
Kings
in
all
times
of
war
,
with
Men
,
Arms
,
and
Horses
,
as
the
Lay-subjects
of
the
same
tenures
were
required
to
do
.
Which
though
it
were
conceived
to
be
a
great
disfranchisement
at
the
first
,
and
an
heavy
burden
to
the
Prelacy
▪
yet
it
conduced
at
last
to
their
greater
honor
;
in
giving
them
a
further
Title
to
their
place
in
Parliament
,
than
that
which
formerly
they
could
pretend
to
.
Before
,
they
claimed
a
place
therein
ratione
Officii
,
only
by
reason
of
their
Offices
or
spiritual
Dignities
;
but
after
this
,
by
reason
also
of
those
antient
Baronies
which
were
annexed
unto
their
Dignities
;
en
respect
de
lour
possessions
,
L'antient
Baronies
annexes
a
lour
dignities
[
t
](A86304-e50780-b)
t
Stamfords
Pl●es
,
l.
3
c.
1.
,
as
our
Lawyers
have
it
.
From
this
time
forwards
we
must
look
upon
them
in
the
House
of
Parliament
,
not
as
Bishops
only
,
but
as
Peers
and
Barons
of
the
Realm
also
,
and
so
themselves
affirmed
to
the
Temporal
Lords
in
the
Parliament
holden
at
Northampton
under
Henry
2.
Non
sedimus
hic
Episcopi
,
sed
Barones
;
nos
Barones
,
ves
Barones
;
Pares
hic
sumus
[
u
](A86304-e50870-b)
u
Ap
Selden
.
titles
of
hon.
p●
.
2.
c.
5.
.
We
fit
not
here
say
they
,
as
Bisho●ps
only
,
but
as
Barons
;
We
are
Baro●s
,
and
you
are
Barons
;
here
we
sit
as
Peers
.
Which
last
is
also
verified
in
terminis
,
by
the
words
of
a
Statute
,
or
Act
of
Parliament
,
wherein
the
Bishops
are
acknowledged
to
be
Peers
of
the
Land
[
x
](A86304-e50960-b)
x
Stat.
25
Edw.
3.
c.
5.
.
Now
that
the
Bishops
are
a
fundamental
and
essential
part
of
the
Parliament
of
England
,
I
shall
endeavour
to
make
good
by
two
manner
of
proofs
;
wherof
the
one
shall
be
de
jure
,
&
the
other
de
facto
.
And
first
we
shal
begin
with
the
proofs
de
jure
,
and
therin
first
with
that
which
doth
occur
in
the
Laws
of
King
Athelstan
,
amongst
the
which
there
is
a
Chapter
(
it
is
Cap.
11.
)
entituled
De
officio
Episcopi
,
&
quid
pertinet
ad
officium
ejus
;
and
therein
it
is
thus
declared
.
Episcopo
jure
pertinet
omnem
rectitudinem
promovere
,
dei
scilicet
&
seculi
&c.
[
z
](A86304-e51060-b)
z
Spelm.
concil
.
p.
402.
et
convenit
ut
per
consilium
&
testimonium
ejus
omne
legis
scitum
,
&
Burgi
mensura
,
&
omne
pondus
sit
secundum
dictionem
ejus
institutum
,
that
is
to
say
,
it
belongeth
of
right
unto
the
Bishop
to
promote
justice
,
in
matters
which
concern
both
the
Church
and
State
;
and
unto
him
it
appertaineth
that
by
his
counsel
and
award
,
all
Laws
&
Weights
,
and
Measures
be
ordained
thorowout
the
Kingdom
.
2.
Next
we
will
have
recourse
to
the
old
Record
entituled
Modus
tenendi
Parliamentum
.
In
which
it
is
affirmed
,
ad
Parliamentum
summoniri
&
venire
debere
Archiepiscopos
,
Episcopos
,
Abbates
,
Pricres
,
&
alios
majores
cleri
,
qui
tenent
per
Comitatum
aut
Baroniam
ratione
hujusmodi
tenurae
,
[
*
](A86304-e51140-b)
*
modus
tenendi
Parliament
.
that
all
the
Arch-bishops
,
Bishops
,
Abbats
,
Priors
,
and
other
Prelates
of
the
Church
,
who
hold
their
lands
either
by
an
Earls
fee
or
a
Barons
fee
,
were
to
be
summoned
and
to
come
to
Parliament
in
regard
of
their
tenure
.
3.
Next
look
we
on
the
chartularies
of
King
Henry
the
first
,
recognized
in
full
Parliament
at
Clarendon
under
Henry
the
2d
.
where
they
are
called
avitas
consuetudines
,
which
declare
it
thus
,
Archipiscopi
,
Episcopi
,
&
universae
personae
qui
de
Regetenent
in
Capite
,
habeant
possessiones
suas
de
Rege
sicut
Baroniam
,
&c.
&
sicut
caeteri
Barones
debent
interesse
judiciis
Curiae
Regis
cum
Baronibus
,
quousque
perveniatur
ad
diminutionem
membrorum
vel
ad
mortem
[
*
](A86304-e51300-b)
*
Matth.
Paris
in
Hen.
2.
.
The
meaning
is
in
brief
,
that
Arch-bishops
,
Bishops
,
and
all
other
ecclesiastical
persons
which
hold
in
Capite
of
the
King
,
are
to
have
and
hold
their
lands
in
Barony
,
and
that
they
ought
as
Barons
to
be
present
in
all
Judgements
with
the
other
Barons
in
the
Court
of
Parliament
,
untill
the
very
sentence
of
death
or
mutilation
(
which
was
very
common
in
those
times
)
was
to
be
pronounced
.
And
then
they
commouly
did
use
to
withdraw
themselves
,
not
out
of
any
incapacity
supposed
to
be
in
them
by
the
Law
of
England
,
but
out
of
a
restraint
imposed
upon
them
by
the
Canons
of
the
Church
of
Rome
.
4.
In
the
great
Charter
made
by
King
John
in
the
last
of
his
reign
,
we
have
the
form
of
summoning
a
Parliament
,
and
calling
those
together
who
have
votes
therein
,
thus
expressed
at
large
.
Ad
habendum
commune
consilium
Regni
de
auxilio
assidendo
,
&c.
&
de
scutagiis
assidendis
,
faciemus
summoneri
Archiepiscopos
,
Episcopos
,
Abba●es
,
Comites
,
&
Majores
Barones
Regni
sigillatim
per
li●eras
nostras
:
Et
praeterea
summoneri
faciemus
in
generali
per
Vice-Cemites
&
Ballivos
nostros
omnes
alios
qui
in
Capite
tenent
ad
certum
diem
,
sc.
ad
terminum
40
dierum
ad
minus
,
et
ad
certum
locum
,
&c.
[
a
](A86304-e51450-b)
a
Id.
in
Ioh.
In
which
we
have
not
only
a
most
evident
proof
,
that
the
Bishops
are
of
right
to
be
called
to
Parliament
,
for
granting
subsidies
and
Escuage
,
and
treating
of
the
great
affairs
which
concern
the
kingdom
,
but
that
they
are
to
be
summoned
by
particular
Letters
,
as
well
as
the
Earls
and
Barons
or
either
of
them
;
A
former
Copy
of
which
summons
issued
in
the
time
of
the
said
King
John
,
is
extant
on
Record
,
and
put
in
print
of
late
in
the
[
b
](A86304-e51520-b)
b
Pt.
2.
c.
5.
Titles
of
Honour
.
And
we
have
here
(
I
note
this
only
by
the
way
)
a
brief
intimation
touching
the
form
of
summoning
the
Commons
to
attend
in
Parliament
,
and
the
time
of
40
daies
expresly
specified
to
intervene
between
the
summons
and
the
beginning
of
the
Parliament
;
Which
Commons
being
such
as
antiently
did
hold
in
Capite
,
and
either
having
a
Knights
fee
or
the
degree
of
Knighthood
,
did
first
promiscuously
attend
in
these
publick
meetings
,
and
after
were
reduced
to
four
(
quatuor
discretos
milites
de
Comitatu
tuo
,
as
[
c
](A86304-e51620-b)
c
Id.
ibid.
the
writ
ran
unto
the
Sheriff
)
and
at
last
to
two
,
as
they
continue
to
this
day
.
5.
We
have
it
thus
in
the
Magna
Charta
of
King
Henry
the
3d.
the
birth-right
of
the
English
Subject
,
according
as
it
stands
translated
in
the
book
of
Statutes
.
First
we
have
granted
to
God
,
and
by
this
our
present
Charter
have
confirmed
for
us
and
our
heirs
for
ever
,
that
the
Church
of
England
shall
be
free
,
and
shall
enjoy
all
her
whole
Rights
and
Liberties
inviolable
[
d
](A86304-e51700-b)
d
Magna
Charta
cap.
1.
.
But
it
was
a
known
Right
and
Liberty
of
the
Church
of
England
,
that
all
the
Bishops
,
and
many
of
the
greater
Clergy
(
and
peradventure
also
the
inferiour
Clergy
wherof
more
anon
)
had
their
Votes
in
Parliament
;
and
therefore
is
to
be
preserved
inviolable
by
the
Kings
of
England
,
their
Heirs
and
Successors
for
ever
.
Which
Charter
as
it
was
confirmed
by
a
solemn
Curse
denounced
on
all
the
Infringers
of
it
by
Boniface
Arch-bishop
of
Canterbury
[
e
](A86304-e51820-b)
e
Matth.
Patis
in
Henr.
3.
,
and
ratified
in
no
fewer
man
30
succeeding
Parliaments
:
so
was
it
enacted
in
the
reign
of
Edward
the
first
,
that
it
should
be
sent
under
the
great
Seal
of
England
,
to
all
the
Cathedral
Churches
of
the
Kingdom
,
to
be
read
twice
a
year
before
the
people
[
f
](A86304-e51860-b)
f
25
Edw.
1.
c.
2.
;
that
they
should
be
read
four
times
every
year
in
a
full
County-Court
[
g
](A86304-e51870-b)
g
28
Edw.
1.
c.
1.
,
and
finally
that
all
judgements
given
against
it
should
be
void
[
h
](A86304-e51890-b)
h
25
Edw.
1.
c.
3.
.
6.
We
have
the
Protestation
of
John
Stratford
Arch-bishop
of
Canterbury
in
the
time
of
King
Edward
the
3d.
who
being
in
disfavour
with
the
King
,
and
denyed
entrance
into
the
House
of
Peers
,
challenged
his
place
and
suffrage
there
as
the
first
Peer
of
the
Realm
,
and
one
that
ought
to
have
the
first
Voice
in
Parliament
in
right
of
his
See
.
But
hear
him
speak
his
own
words
,
which
are
these
that
follow
.
Amici
(
for
he
spake
to
those
who
took
witness
of
it
)
Rexme
ad
hoc
Parliamentum
scripto
suo
vocavit
,
&
ego
tanquam
major
Par
Regni
post
regem
,
&
primam
vocem
habere
debens
in
Parliamento
,
jura
Ecclesiae
meae
Cantuariensis
vendico
,
&
ideo
ingressum
in
Parliamentum
peto
[
i
](A86304-e52020-b)
i
Antiqu.
B●itan
.
in
Joh.
Stratford
.
,
which
is
full
and
plain
.
7.
And
lastly
,
there
is
the
Protestation
on
Record
of
all
the
Bishops
in
the
reign
of
King
Richard
the
2d
.
at
what
time
William
Courtney
was
Arch-bishop
of
Canterbury
:
who
being
to
withdraw
themselves
from
the
House
of
Peers
at
the
pronouncing
of
the
sentence
of
death
on
some
guilty
Lords
,
first
made
their
Procurators
to
supply
their
rooms
,
&
then
put
up
their
Protestation
to
preserve
their
Rights
;
the
sum
whereof
,
for
as
much
as
doth
concern
this
business
,
in
their
own
words
thus
.
De
jure
&
consuetudine
regni
Angliae
ad
Archiepiscopum
Cantuariensem
qui
pro
tempore
fuerit
,
nec
non
coeteros
Suffraganeos
confratres
&
compatres
,
Abbates
&
Priores
aliosque
Praelatos
quoscunque
per
Baroniam
de
domino
Rege
tenentes
,
pertinet
in
Parliamentis
Regis
quibuscunque
,
ut
Pares
regni
praedicti
personaliter
interesse
,
ibidemque
de
regni
negotiis
ac
aliis
tractari
consuetis
cum
caeteris
dicti
regni
Paribus
&
aliis
ibidem
jus
interessendi
habentibns
consulere
&
tractare
,
ordinare
,
statuere
,
&
diffinire
,
ac
c●etera
facere
quae
Parliamento
ibidem
imminent
facienda
.
This
put
together
makes
enough
abundantly
for
the
proofs
de
jure
,
de
facto
.
And
first
beginning
with
the
reign
of
the
Norman
Conquerour
,
we
find
a
Parliament
assembled
in
the
fifth
year
of
that
King
,
wherein
are
present
Episcopi
,
Abbates
,
Comites
,
&
Primates
totius
Angliae
[
l
](A86304-e52300-b)
l
Matth.
Paris
in
Willielmo
1.
,
the
Bishops
,
Abbats
,
Earls
,
and
the
rest
of
the
Baronage
of
England
.
In
the
9th
.
year
of
William
Rufus
an
old
Author
telleth
us
,
de
regni
statu
acturus
,
Episcopos
,
Abbates
,
&
quoscunque
Regni
proceres
in
unum
praecepti
sui
sanctione
egit
;
that
being
to
consult
of
the
affairs
of
the
Kingdom
he
called
together
by
his
writ
the
Bishops
,
Abbots
and
all
the
Peers
of
the
Realm
[
m
](A86304-e52360-b)
m
Eadmer
.
hist.
Nov.
l.
2.
.
During
the
reign
of
Henry
the
2d
.
(
for
we
will
take
but
one
example
out
of
each
King
reign
,
though
each
Kings
reign
would
yield
us
more
)
a
Parliament
was
called
at
London
,
wherein
were
many
things
dispatched
aswell
of
Ecclesiastical
as
secular
nature
;
the
Bishops
and
Abbats
being
present
with
the
other
Lords
.
Coacto
apud
Londoniam
magno
Episcoporum
,
&
.
Procerum
,
Abbatumque
Concili●
,
multa
ecclefiasticarum
&
secularium
rerum
ordinata
negotia
,
decisa
litigia
,
saith
the
Monk
of
Malmes●ury
[
n
](A86304-e52460-b)
n
Malmesb.
hist.
reg.
Angl.
l.
5.
.
And
of
this
Parliament
it
is
,
I
take
it
,
that
Eadmer
speaketh
,
Hist.
Novell
.
l.
4.
p.
91.
Proceed
we
to
King
Henry
the
2d
.
(
for
King
Stephens
reign
was
so
full
of
wars
and
tumults
that
there
is
very
little
to
be
found
of
Parliaments
)
and
there
we
find
the
Bishops
with
the
other
Peers
convened
in
Parliament
for
the
determination
of
the
points
in
controversie
between
Alfonso
King
of
Castile
and
Sancho
King
of
Navarre
,
referred
by
compremise
to
that
King
of
England
,
and
here
determined
by
King
Henry
amongst
other
things
,
habito
cum
Episcopis
Comitibus
et
Baronebus
cum
deliberatione
consilio
,
as
in
Roger
Hoveden
[
o
](A86304-e52640-b)
o
Hoveden
Annal.
pars
poster
.
in
Hen.
2.
.
Next
him
comes
Rich.
the
first
,
his
Son
,
during
whose
imprisonment
by
the
D.
of
Austria
,
his
Brother
John
then
Earl
of
Moriton
indeavoured
by
force
and
cunning
in
Normandy
to
set
the
Crown
on
his
own
head
:
which
caused
Hubert
the
Arch-bishop
of
Canterbury
to
call
a
Parliament
(
Convocatis
coram
eo
Episcopis
,
Comitibus
et
Baronibus
regni
)
[
p
](A86304-e52740-b)
p
Id.
in
Joh.
wherein
the
Bishops
,
Earls
,
and
Barons
did
with
one
consent
agree
to
seize
on
his
estate
,
and
suppress
his
power
,
the
better
to
preserve
the
Kingdom
in
wealth
,
peace
and
safety
.
After
succeeded
John
,
and
he
calls
a
Parliament
,
wherein
were
certain
Laws
made
for
the
defence
of
his
Kingdom
,
Communi
assensu
Archiepiscoporum
,
Episcoporum
,
Comitum
,
Baronum
&
omnium
fidelium
suo●um
Ang●iae
,
by
the
common
counsell
and
assent
of
the
Arch-bishops
,
Bishops
,
Earls
,
Barons
,
and
the
rest
of
his
Leiges
.
(
Remember
what
was
said
before
touching
the
writ
of
Summons
in
the
said
Kings
time
)
From
this
time
till
the
last
Parliament
of
King
Charles
,
there
is
no
Kings
reign
,
of
which
we
have
not
many
(
though
not
all
)
the
Acts
of
Parliament
still
in
print
amongst
us
.
Nor
is
there
any
Act
of
Parliament
in
the
printed
Books
,
to
the
enacting
of
the
which
the
Bishops
approbation
and
consent
is
not
plainly
specified
,
either
in
the
general
Proeme
set
before
the
Acts
,
or
in
the
body
of
the
Act
it
themself
;
as
by
the
books
themselves
doth
at
at
large
appear
.
And
to
this
kind
of
proof
may
be
further
added
the
form
and
manner
of
the
writ
by
which
the
Prelates
in
all
times
have
been
called
to
Parliament
,
being
the
very
same
verbatim
with
that
which
is
directed
to
the
temporal
Barons
,
save
that
the
Spiritual
Lords
are
commanded
to
attend
the
service
,
in
fide
&
dilectione
,
the
temporal
in
fide
&
homagio
,
and
of
late
times
in
fide
&
ligeantia
.
A
form
or
copy
of
which
summons
as
antient
as
King
Johns
time
,
is
still
preserved
upon
Record
,
directed
nominatim
to
the
Arch-bishop
of
Canterbury
[
r
](A86304-e52950-b)
r
V.
Titles
of
hon.
pt.
2.
c.
5.
;
and
then
a
scriptum
est
similiter
to
the
residue
of
the
Bishops
,
Abbats
,
Earls
,
and
Barons
.
Then
adde
the
Privilege
of
Parliament
for
themselves
and
their
servants
,
during
the
time
of
the
Sessions
;
the
liberty
to
kill
,
and
take
one
or
two
of
the
Kings
Deer
as
they
pass
by
any
of
his
Forests
in
coming
to
the
Parliament
upon
his
commandement
[
s
](A86304-e53020-b)
s
Charta
de
Foresta
cap.
;
their
enjoying
of
the
same
immunities
,
which
are
and
have
been
heretofore
enjoyed
by
the
Temporal
Barons
[
t
](A86304-e53040-b)
t
Cambden
in
Britannia
.
:
and
tell
me
if
the
Bishops
did
not
sit
in
Parliament
by
as
good
a
title
,
and
have
not
sate
there
longer
by
some
hundreds
of
years
in
their
Predecessours
,
as
or
than
any
of
the
Temporal
Lords
do
sit
or
have
sat
there
in
their
Progenitours
;
and
therefore
certainly
essential
,
fundamental
parts
of
the
Court
of
Parliament
.
8.
But
against
this
it
is
objected
,
first
,
that
some
Acts
have
passed
in
Parliament
,
to
which
the
Prelates
did
not
vote
,
nor
could
be
present
in
the
House
when
the
Bill
was
passed
;
as
in
the
sentencing
to
death
or
mutilation
of
a
guilty
person
:
as
doth
appear
both
by
the
laws
&
constitutions
recognized
at
Clarendon
,
and
the
following
practice
▪
This
hath
been
touched
on
before
,
&
we
told
you
then
,
that
this
restraint
was
laid
upon
them
,
not
by
the
Common
law
of
England
,
or
any
Act
or
Ordinance
of
the
House
of
Peers
,
by
which
they
were
disabled
to
attend
that
service
.
It
was
their
own
voluntary
Act
,
none
compelled
them
to
it
,
but
only
out
of
a
conformity
to
some
former
Canons
(
ad
sanctorum
Canonum
instituta
[
x
](A86304-e53220-b)
x
Antiqu.
Brit.
in
Gul.
Courtney
.
,
as
their
own
words
are
)
by
which
it
was
not
lawfull
for
the
Clergy
men
to
be
either
Judges
or
Assessors
in
causa
Sanguinis
[
y
](A86304-e53250-b)
y
Constitut
.
Othobon
.
fol.
45.
.
And
yet
they
took
such
care
to
preserve
their
Interests
,
that
they
did
not
only
give
their
Proxies
for
the
representing
of
their
persons
,
but
did
put
up
their
Protestation
with
a
salvo
jure
for
the
preserving
of
their
rights
for
the
time
to
come
:
jure
Paritatis
&
interessendi
in
dicto
Parliamento
[
z
](A86304-e53310-b)
z
Antiqu.
Britan.
in
Gul.
Courtney
.
quoad
omnia
&
singula
ibi
excercenda
in
omnibus
semper
salvo
,
as
the
manner
was
.
Examples
of
the
which
are
as
full
and
frequent
,
as
their
withdrawing
themselves
on
the
said
occasions
.
But
then
the
main
objection
is
,
that
as
some
Acts
have
passed
in
Parliament
absentibus
Praelatis
,
when
the
Bishops
did
absent
themselves
of
their
own
accord
;
so
many
things
have
been
transacted
in
the
Parliament
excluso
Clero
,
when
the
Clergy
have
been
excluded
or
put
out
of
the
House
by
some
Act
or
Ordinance
.
A
precedent
for
this
hath
been
found
and
published
by
such
as
envied
that
poor
remnant
of
the
Churches
honour
:
though
possibly
they
will
find
themselves
deceived
in
their
greatest
hope
,
and
that
the
evidence
will
not
serve
to
evince
the
cause
.
The
Author
of
the
Pamphlet
entituled
,
The
Prerogative
and
practice
of
Parliaments
,
first
laying
down
his
Tenet
,
that
many
good
Acts
of
Parliament
may
be
made
though
the
Arch-bishops
and
Bishops
should
not
consent
unto
them
[
a
](A86304-e53440-b)
a
Printed
at
London
.
1628.
p.
37.
(
which
is
a
point
no
man
doubts
of
,
considering
how
easily
their
negative
may
be
over-ruled
by
the
far
greater
number
in
the
House
of
Peers
)
adds
,
that
at
a
Parliament
holden
at
S.
Edmundsbury
1196
in
the
reign
of
Ed:
1.
a
Statute
was
made
by
the
King
,
the
Barons
,
and
the
Commons
,
Excluso
Clero
,
&
for
the
proof
herof
refers
us
unto
Bishop
Jewell
.
Now
Bishop
Jewell
saith
indeed
,
"
that
in
a
Parliament
solemnly
holden
at
St.
Edmunsbury
by
King
Edward
1.
Anno
1296.
the
Arch-bishops
and
Bishops
were
quite
shut
forth
,
and
yet
the
Parliament
held
on
,
and
good
,
and
wholsome
laws
were
there
enacted
,
the
departing
or
absence
of
the
Lords
Spiritual
notwithstanding
[
b
](A86304-e53610-b)
b
Defence
of
the
Apolog.
pt.
6.
c.
2.
§.
1.
.
In
the
Records
whereof
it
is
written
thus
,
Habito
Rex
cum
Baronibus
suis
Parliamento
,
&
Clero
excluso
statutum
est
,
&c.
the
King
keeping
the
Parliament
with
his
Barons
,
the
Clergy
(
that
is
to
say
,
the
Arch-bishops
,
and
Bishops
)
being
shut
forth
,
it
was
enacted
,
&c.
"
Wherein
who
doth
not
see
,
if
he
hath
any
eyes
,
that
by
this
reason
(
if
the
proof
be
good
)
many
good
Acts
of
Parllament
may
be
made
,
though
the
Commons
either
out
of
absence
or
opposition
should
not
consent
unto
them
?
of
whose
consent
unto
that
Statute
(
whatsoever
it
was
)
there
is
as
little
to
be
found
in
that
Record
,
as
the
concurrence
of
the
Bishops
.
But
for
Answer
unto
so
much
of
this
Record
so
often
spoke
of
and
applauded
as
concerns
the
Bishops
,
we
say
,
that
this
(
if
truly
senced
as
I
think
it
be
not
)
was
the
particular
act
of
an
angry
and
offended
King
against
his
Clergy
,
not
to
be
drawn
into
example
as
a
proof
or
Argument
against
a
most
clear
,
known
,
and
undoubted
right
.
The
case
stood
thus
,
A
Constitution
had
been
made
by
Boniface
the
8th
.
Ne
aliqua
collecta
ex
ecclesiasticis
proventibus
Regi
aut
cuivis
alii
Principi
concedatur
[
c
](A86304-e53760-b)
c
Matth.
Westm.
in
Edw.
1.
,
that
Clergy
men
should
not
pay
any
tax
or
tallage
unto
Kings
or
Princes
out
of
their
Spiritual
preferments
,
without
the
leave
of
the
Pope
:
under
pretence
whereof
the
Clergy
at
this
Parliament
at
S.
Edmundsbury
,
refused
to
be
contributory
to
the
Kings
occasions
,
when
the
Lay-Members
of
the
House
had
been
forwards
in
it
.
The
King
being
herewith
much
offended
,
gives
them
a
further
day
to
consider
of
it
,
adjourning
the
Parliament
to
London
,
there
to
begin
on
the
morrow
after
S.
Hilaries
day
;
and
in
the
mean
time
commanded
all
their
Barns
to
be
fast
sealed
up
.
The
day
being
come
,
and
the
Clergy
still
persisting
in
their
former
obstinacy
,
excluso
e
Parliamento
Clero
Consilium
Rex
cum
solis
Baronibus
&
populo
habuit
,
totumque
statim
Clerum
protectione
sua
privavit
[
d
](A86304-e53880-b)
d
Antiqu.
Brit.
in
R.
Winchelsey
.
;
the
King
(
saith
the
Historian
)
excluding
the
Clergy
out
of
the
Parliament
,
advised
with
his
Barons
and
his
people
only
,
what
was
best
to
be
done
,
by
whose
advise
he
put
the
Clergy
out
of
his
protection
,
and
thereby
forced
them
to
conform
to
his
will
and
pleasure
.
This
is
the
summa
totalis
of
the
business
,
and
comes
unto
no
more
but
this
,
that
a
particular
course
was
advised
in
Parliament
on
a
particular
displeasure
taken
by
the
King
against
the
body
of
his
Clergy
then
convened
together
,
for
their
particular
refusal
to
contribute
to
his
wants
&
wars
,
the
better
to
reduce
them
to
their
natural
duty
.
Which
makes
not
any
thing
at
all
against
the
right
of
Bishops
in
the
House
of
Peers
,
or
for
excluding
them
that
House
,
or
for
the
validity
of
such
Acts
as
are
made
in
Parliament
during
the
time
of
such
exclusion
:
especially
considering
that
the
King
shortly
after
called
his
States
together
,
and
did
excuse
himself
for
many
extravagant
Acts
which
he
had
committed
[
e
](A86304-e53960-b)
e
Walsing●
,
in
Edw.
1.
anno
1297.
against
the
liberties
of
the
Subject
(
whereof
this
was
one
)
laying
the
blame
thereof
on
his
great
occasions
,
and
the
necessities
which
the
wars
which
he
had
abroad
,
did
impose
upon
him
.
And
so
much
as
in
Answer
unto
that
Record
,
supposing
that
the
words
thereof
be
rightly
senced
,
as
I
think
they
are
not
,
and
that
by
Clerus
there
we
are
to
understand
Arch-bishops
and
Bishops
,
as
I
think
we
be
not
,
there
being
no
Record
(
I
dare
boldly
say
it
)
either
of
History
or
Law
,
in
which
the
word
Clerus
serves
to
signifie
the
Arch-bishops
,
and
Bishops
,
exclusive
of
the
other
Clergy
;
or
any
writing
whatsoever
,
wherein
it
doth
not
either
signifie
the
whole
Clergy
generally
,
or
the
inferiour
Clergy
only
exclusive
of
the
Arch-bishops
,
Bishops
,
and
other
Prelates
.
Therefore
in
answer
unto
that
so
much
applauded
Cavil
of
Excluso
Clero
,
from
what
Record
soever
it
either
hath
been
hitherto
or
shall
hereafter
be
produced
,
I
shall
propose
it
to
the
consideration
of
the
sober
Reader
,
whether
by
Clerus
in
that
place
,
or
in
any
other
of
that
kind
and
time
,
we
must
not
understand
the
in●eriour
Clergy
,
as
they
stand
distinguished
in
the
Laws
from
my
Lords
the
Bishops
.
For
howsoever
it
be
true
,
that
Clerus
in
the
ecclesiastical
notion
of
the
word
doth
signifie
the
whole
Clergy
generally
,
Arch-bishops
,
Bishops
,
Priests
,
and
Deacons
:
yet
in
the
legal
notion
of
it
,
it
stands
distinguished
from
the
Prelates
,
and
signifieth
only
the
inferiour
Clergy
.
Thus
do
we
find
the
Ecclesiasticks
of
this
Realm
divided
into
Prelates
,
men
of
Religion
,
and
other
Clerks
,
3.
Edw.
1.
c.
1.
the
Seculars
either
into
Prelates
and
Clerks
,
9
Edw.
2.
c.
3.
1
Rich.
2.
c.
3.
or
Prelates
and
Clerks
beneficed
,
18
Edw.
3.
c.
2.
or
generally
into
the
Prelates
and
the
Clergy
,
9
Edw.
2.
c.
15.
14
Edw.
3.
c.
1
,
&
3.
18
Edw.
3.
2.
7.
&
25
Edw.
3.
2.
4.
&
8
Hen.
6.
c.
1.
and
in
all
acts
and
grants
of
Subsidies
,
made
by
the
Clergy
to
the
Kings
or
Queens
of
England
since
the
32
of
Henry
8.
(
when
the
Clergy
subsidies
first
began
to
be
confirmed
by
act
of
Parliament
)
So
also
in
the
Latin
ideom
,
which
comes
neerest
home
,
Nos
Praelati
&
Clerus
in
the
submission
of
the
Clergy
to
King
Henry
8.
[
f
](A86304-e54410-b)
f
Regist.
Wa●ham
.
,
and
in
the
sentence
of
divorce
against
Anne
of
Cleve
[
g
](A86304-e54440-b)
g
Regist.
Cranmer
.
,
and
in
the
instrument
of
the
grant
of
the
Clergy
subsidies
presented
to
the
Kings
of
England
ever
since
the
27
of
Queen
Elizabeth
,
and
in
the
form
of
the
Certificates
(
per
[
h
](A86304-e54480-b)
h
Statut.
8
Eliz.
c.
17.
&
ever
since
.
Praelat●s
&
Clerum
)
returned
by
every
Bishop
to
the
Lord
High
Treasurer
,
and
finally
,
Nos
Episcopi
&
Clerus
Cantuariensis
Provinciae
in
hac
Synodo
more
nostro
solito
dum
Regni
Parliamentum
celebratur
,
congregati
[
i
](A86304-e54530-b)
i
Stat.
1
Phil.
&
Mar.
c.
8.
,
in
the
petition
to
K.
K.
Phillip
and
Mary
,
about
the
confirmation
of
the
Abby
lands
to
the
Patentees
.
So
that
though
many
Statutes
have
been
made
in
these
later
times
,
excluso
Clero
,
the
Clergy
(
that
is
.
to
say
the
inferiour
Clergy
)
being
quite
shut
out
,
and
utterly
excluded
from
those
publick
Counsails
;
yet
this
proves
nothing
to
the
point
that
auy
act
of
Parliament
hath
been
counted
good
to
which
the
Bishops
were
not
called
,
or
at
the
making
of
which
Act
they
either
were
shut
out
by
force
,
or
excluded
by
cunning
.
As
for
Kilbancies
book
which
that
Author
speaks
of
[
k
](A86304-e54610-b)
k
Prer●g
.
&
pract.
of
Pa●l
.
p.
38.
,
in
which
the
Justices
are
made
to
say
7
H.
8.
that
our
Soveraign
Lord
the
King
may
well
hold
his
Parliament
by
him
and
his
Temporal
Lords
,
and
by
the
Commons
also
,
without
the
Spiritual
Lords
,
for
that
the
Spiritual
Lords
have
not
any
place
in
the
Parliament
chamber
by
reason
of
their
Spiritualties
,
but
by
reason
of
their
Temporal
possessions
:
besides
that
it
is
only
the
opinion
of
a
privat
man
,
of
no
authority
or
credit
in
the
Common
wealth
,
and
contrary
to
the
practice
in
the
Saxon
times
in
which
the
Bishops
sate
in
Parliament
as
Spiritual
persons
,
not
as
Barons
;
the
reason
for
ought
I
can
see
,
will
serve
as
well
to
pretermit
all
or
any
of
the
Temporal
Lords
,
as
it
can
serve
to
pretermit
or
exclude
the
Bishops
,
the
Temporal
Lords
being
called
to
Parliament
on
no
other
ground
,
than
for
the
Temporal
possessions
which
they
hold
by
Barony
.
9.
If
it
be
said
that
my
second
answer
to
the
argument
of
Excluso
Clero
supposeth
that
the
inferiour
●lergy
had
some
place
in
Parliament
,
which
being
not
to
be
supposed
makes
the
Answer
void
:
I
shall
crave
leave
to
offer
some
few
observations
unto
the
consideration
of
the
sober
and
impartial
Reader
,
by
which
I
hope
to
make
that
supposition
probable
,
and
perhaps
demonstrative
.
First
then
we
have
that
famous
Parliament
(
call
it
Concilium
magnum
,
or
Concilium
commune
,
or
by
what
other
name
soever
the
old
writers
called
it
)
summoned
by
King
Ethelbert
,
anno
605.
which
my
[
l
](A86304-e54880-b)
l
Concil.
Hen.
Spelm.
Author
calleth
Commune
concilium
tam
Cleri
quam
Populi
,
where
Clerus
comprehendeth
the
body
of
the
Clergy
generally
,
aswell
the
Presbyters
,
as
the
Bishops
;
as
the
word
populus
doth
the
lay-subject
generally
,
as
well
Lords
as
Commons
;
or
else
the
Lords
and
Commons
one
of
the
two
must
be
needs
left
out
.
And
in
this
sense
we
are
to
understand
these
words
in
the
latter
times
,
as
where
we
read
that
Clerus
[
m
](A86304-e54980-b)
m
Matth.
Paris
▪
in
Hen.
1.
Angliae
&
populus
Vniversus
were
summoned
to
appear
at
Westminster
,
at
the
Coronation
of
King
Henry
the
first
,
where
divers
Laws
were
made
and
declared
,
subscribed
by
the
Arch-bishops
,
Bishops
,
and
others
of
the
principal
persons
that
were
there
assembled
:
that
Clero
&
populo
convocato
[
n
](A86304-e55040-b)
n
Rog.
Hov.
in
Hen
▪
2.
,
the
Clergy
and
people
of
the
Realm
were
called
to
Clarendon
,
anno
1163.
by
King
Henry
the
second
,
for
the
declaring
and
confirming
of
the
Subjects
liberties
:
that
in
the
year
1185
towards
the
later
end
of
the
said
Kings
reign
,
Convocatus
est
Clerus
&
populus
cum
tota
Nobilitate
ad
fontem
Clericorum
[
o
](A86304-e55100-b)
o
Matth.
paris
in
Hen.
2.
,
the
Clergy
,
Commons
,
and
Nobility
were
called
unto
the
Parliament
held
at
Clerkenwell
:
and
finally
that
a
Parliament
was
called
at
London
,
in
which
the
Arch-bishop
of
Canterbury
was
present
,
cum
toto
Clero
&
tota
secta
Laicali
[
p
](A86304-e55160-b)
p
Quadrilog
.
ap.
Selden
Tit.
of
Hon.
pt.
2.
c.
5.
,
in
the
time
of
King
John
.
Hitherto
then
the
Clergy
of
both
ranks
and
orders
,
as
well
as
Populus
or
tota
secta
Laicalis
,
the
Subjects
of
the
Laity
,
or
the
Lords
and
Commons
,
had
their
place
in
Parliament
.
And
in
possession
of
this
right
the
Clergy
stood
when
the
Magna
Charta
was
set
out
by
King
Henry
the
3d
,
wherein
the
freedoms
,
rights
,
and
privileges
of
the
Church
of
England
(
of
which
this
evidently
was
one
)
was
confirmed
unto
her
[
q
](A86304-e55270-b)
q
Magna
Charta
cap.
1.
:
of
the
irrefragable
and
inviolable
authority
whereof
we
have
spoke
before
.
The
Cavill
of
Excluso
Clero
which
hath
been
used
against
the
voting
of
the
Bishops
in
the
house
of
Peers
,
comes
in
next
for
proof
,
that
the
inferiour
Clergy
had
their
place
or
vote
with
the
house
of
Commons
;
(
if
in
those
times
the
Lords
and
Commons
made
two
houses
,
which
I
am
not
sure
of
)
the
Clergy
could
not
be
excluded
in
an
angry
fit
,
or
out
of
a
particular
design
to
deprive
them
of
the
benefit
of
the
Kings
protection
;
if
they
had
not
formerly
a
place
amongst
them
:
&
if
we
will
not
understand
by
Clerus
,
the
inferior
Clergy
,
which
much
about
that
time
(
as
before
we
shewed
)
began
to
be
the
leg●l
English
of
the
word
;
we
must
needs
understand
the
whole
Clergy
generally
,
the
Clergy
of
both
ranks
and
orders
.
But
our
main
proofs
are
yet
to
come
,
which
are
these
that
follow
.
First
it
is
evident
that
antiently
the
Clergy
of
each
several
Diocese
were
chargeable
by
Law
for
the
expences
of
their
Proctors
in
attending
the
service
of
the
Parliament
;
according
as
the
Counties
were
by
Common
law
(
since
confirmed
by
Statute
23
H.
6.
c.
11.
)
to
bear
the
charges
of
their
Knights
,
the
Burroughs
and
Cities
of
their
Representees
:
which
questionless
the
Laws
had
not
taken
care
for
,
but
that
the
Clergy
had
their
place
in
Parliament
,
as
the
Commons
had
.
And
this
appears
by
a
Record
[
z
](A86304-e55490-b)
z
Rotul
.
Parent
.
26
Ed.
3.
pt.
1.
M.
22.
of
26
of
King
Edward
the
3d.
in
which
the
Abbat
of
Leieester
being
then
,
but
never
formerly
commanded
to
attend
in
Parliament
,
amongst
others
of
the
Regular
Prelates
;
petitioned
to
be
discharcharged
from
that
attendance
,
in
regard
he
held
in
Frank-Almoigne
only
,
by
no
other
tenure
.
Which
he
obtained
upon
this
condition
,
ut
semper
in
Procuratores
ad
hujusmodi
Parliamenta
mittendot
consentiat
,
&
,
ut
moris
est
,
eorundem
expensis
contribuat
,
that
is
to
say
,
that
he
and
his
Successors
did
give
their
voyces
in
the
choyse
of
such
Procuratours
,
as
the
Clergy
were
to
send
to
Parliament
,
and
did
contribute
towards
their
charges
as
the
custom
was
.
Next
in
the
Modus
tenendi
Parliamentum
,
which
before
we
spake
of
,
there
is
amodus
convocandi
Clerum
Angliae
ad
Parl.
Regis
[
r
](A86304-e55640-b)
r
Modus
tenendi
Parl.
M●
.
,
a
form
of
calling
the
English
Clergy
(
that
is
the
Prelates
&
Clergy
as
John
Selden
(e)
renders
it
)
to
the
Court
of
Parliament
:
said
to
be
used
in
the
time
of
Edward
the
Son
of
Ethelred
,
[
t
](A86304-e55780-b)
t
Modus
tenendi
Parl.
Ms.
c.
12.
"
The
King
is
the
head
,
the
beginning
and
end
of
the
Parliament
,
and
so
he
hath
not
any
equal
in
the
first
degree
;
the
second
is
of
Arch-bishops
,
Bishops
,
and
Priors
,
and
Abbats
holding
by
Barony
;
the
third
is
of
Procurators
of
the
Clergy
;
the
fourth
of
Earls
,
Barons
,
and
other
Nobles
;
the
fifth
is
of
Knights
of
the
Shire
;
the
sixt
of
Citizens
and
Burgesses
:
and
so
the
whole
Parliament
is
made
up
of
these
six
degrees
.
"
But
the
said
Modus
tells
us
more
,
and
goeth
more
particularly
to
work
than
so
.
For
in
the
ninth
chapter
,
speaking
of
the
course
which
was
observ'd
in
canvassing
hard
and
difficult
matters
,
it
telleth
us
that
they
used
to
choose
25
out
of
all
degrees
,
(
like
a
grand
Committee
)
to
whose
consideration
they
referred
the
point
;
that
is
to
say
,
two
Bishops
,
and
three
Proctors
for
the
Clergy
,
two
Earls
,
three
Barons
,
five
Knights
,
five
Citizens
,
and
as
many
Burgesses
.
And
in
the
12th
.
that
on
the
fourth
day
of
the
Parliament
the
Lord
high
Steward
,
the
Lord
Constable
,
and
the
Lord
Marshal
were
to
call
the
house
,
every
degree
or
rank
of
men
in
its
several
Order
;
and
that
if
any
of
the
Proctors
of
the
Clergy
did
not
make
appearance
,
the
Bishop
of
the
Diocese
was
to
be
fined
100
l.
And
in
the
23d
.
chapter
it
is
said
expresly
,
that
as
the
Knights
,
Citizens
,
&
Burgesses
in
things
which
do
concern
the
Commons
have
more
authority
than
all
the
Lords
;
so
the
Proctors
for
the
Clergy
,
in
things
which
do
concern
the
Clergy
,
have
more
authority
than
all
the
Bishops
.
Which
Modus
if
it
be
as
antient
as
the
Norman
Conquerour
,
as
both
Sir
Edward
Coke
conceiveth
[
u
](A86304-e55990-b)
u
Preface
to
the
9th
.
part
of
Reports
.
,
and
the
title
signieth
,
it
sheweth
the
Clergies
claim
to
a
place
in
Parliament
to
be
more
antient
than
the
Commons
can
pretend
unto
:
but
if
no
older
than
the
reign
of
King
Edward
third
,
as
confidently
is
affirmed
in
the
Titles
of
Honour
[
x
](A86304-e56040-b)
x
Titles
of
hon.
pt
2.
c.
5.
,
if
sheweth
that
in
the
usage
of
those
later
times
the
Procurators
of
the
Clergy
had
a
right
and
place
there
as
well
as
Citizens
and
Burgesses
,
or
the
Knights
of
the
Shires
.
And
this
is
further
proved
by
the
writs
of
Summons
directed
to
the
Arch-bishops
and
Bishops
,
for
their
own
comming
to
the
Parliament
;
in
the
end
whereof
there
is
a
clause
for
warning
the
Dean
and
Chapter
of
their
Cathedralls
,
and
the
Arch-deacons
with
the
whole
Clergy
to
be
present
at
it
,
that
is
to
say
the
Deans
and
Arch-deacons
personally
,
the
Chapter
and
Clergy
in
their
Proctours
,
then
and
there
to
consent
to
such
Acts
and
Ordinances
as
shall
be
made
by
the
Common
counsail
of
the
Kingdom
.
The
whole
clause
word
for
word
is
this
[
y
](A86304-e56220-b)
y
Extant
ibid.
pt.
2.
c.
5.
,
Praemunientes
Priorem
&
Capitulum
(
or
Decanum
&
Capitulum
as
the
case
might
vary
)
Ecclesiae
vestrae
N.
ac
Archidiacanos
totumque
Clerum
vestrae
Dioceseos
,
quod
iidem
Decanus
&
Archichidiaconi
in
propriis
personis
suis
,
ac
dictum
Capitulum
per
unum
,
idemque
Clerus
per
duos
Procuratores
idoneos
plenam
&
sufficientem
potestatem
ab
ipsis
Capitulo
&
Clero
habentes
,
praedicto
die
&
loco
personaliter
intersint
,
ad
consentiendum
iis
quae
tunc
ibidem
de
communi
consilio
ipsius
Regni
nostri
divina
favente
clementia
contigerit
ordinari
.
Which
clause
being
in
the
Writs
of
King
Edward
1.
and
for
the
most
part
of
the
reign
of
his
next
Successors●
,
till
the
middle
of
King
Richard
the
second
,
at
which
time
it
began
to
be
fixt
and
formal
;
hath
still
continued
in
those
writs
(
without
any
difference
almost
between
the
Syllables
)
to
this
very
day
[
z
](A86304-e56400-b)
z
Id.
ibid.
.
Now
that
this
clause
was
more
than
Verbal
,
and
that
the
Proctors
of
the
Clergy
did
attend
in
Parliament
,
is
evident
by
the
Acts
and
Statutes
of
King
Richard
the
second
:
the
passages
whereof
I
shall
cite
at
large
,
the
better
to
conclude
what
I
have
in
hand
.
The
Duke
of
Glocester
and
the
Earl
of
Arundel
having
got
the
mastery
of
the
King
,
obtained
a
Commission
directed
to
themselves
and
others
of
their
nomination
,
to
have
the
rule
of
the
King
and
his
Realm
[
a
](A86304-e56490-b)
a
Statur
21
R.
2.
c.
2.
:
and
having
their
Commission
confirmed
by
Parliament
,
in
the
11
year
of
his
reign
,
did
execute
divers
of
his
Friends
and
Ministers
,
and
seized
on
their
Estates
as
forfeited
.
But
having
got
the
better
of
his
head-strong
and
rebellious
Lords
,
in
the
one
and
twentieth
of
his
reign
he
calls
a
Parliament
,
in
the
Acts
whereof
it
is
declared
,
"
That
on
the
Petition
of
the
Commons
,
of
the
assent
of
all
the
Lords
Spiritual
and
Temporal
,
and
of
the
Proctors
of
the
Clergy
,
he
repealed
the
said
Statute
and
Commission
[
b
](A86304-e56580-b)
b
Ibid.
c.
2.
,
and
with
the
assent
of
the
said
Lords
and
Commons
did
ordain
and
establish
that
no
such
Commission
nor
the
like
be
henceforth
purchased
,
pursued
or
made
.
This
done
,
the
heirs
of
such
as
had
been
condemned
by
vertue
of
the
said
Commission
,
demanded
restitution
of
their
Lands
and
Honors
.
And
thereupon
the
Lords
Spiritual
and
Temporal
,
and
the
Procuratours
of
the
Clergy
(
the
Commons
having
prayed
to
the
King
before
as
the
Appellants
prayed
)
severally
examined
did
assent
expresly
that
the
said
Parliament
and
all
the
Statutes
,
&c.
should
be
voyd
,
&c.
and
restitution
made
as
afore
is
said
.
[
c
](A86304-e56710-b)
c
Ibid.
c.
12.
And
also
the
Lords
Spiritual
and
Temporal
,
the
Procuratours
of
the
Clergy
,
and
the
said
Commons
were
severally
examined
of
the
Questions
proposed
at
Notingham
,
and
of
the
Answer
which
the
Judges
made
unto
the
same
:
which
being
read
aswell
before
the
King
and
the
Lords
,
as
before
the
Commons
,
it
was
demanded
of
all
the
States
of
the
Parliament
,
what
they
thought
of
the
Answers
,
and
they
said
that
they
were
lawfully
&
duly
made
,
&c.
And
then
it
followeth
,
whereupon
the
King
,
by
the
assent
of
the
Lords
Spiritual
and
Temporal
,
and
the
Procuratours
of
the
Clergy
and
the
said
Commons
,
and
by
the
advise
of
the
Justices
and
Sergeants
,
aforesaid
(
who
had
been
asked
their
opinion
in
point
of
Law
)
ordained
and
established
that
the
said
Parliament
should
be
annulled
and
held
for
none
.
"
Adde
unto
this
that
passage
in
the
9
of
Edward
2.
where
it
is
said
,
that
many
Articles
containing
divers
grievances
committed
against
the
Church
of
England
,
the
Prelates
&
Clergy
,
were
propounded
by
the
Prelates
and
Clerks
of
our
Realm
,
in
Parliament
,
and
great
instance
made
that
convenient
remedy
might
be
appointed
therein
[
d
](A86304-e56990-b)
d
Proem
ad
articulos
Cl●ri
.
:
that
of
the
complaints
made
to
the
King
in
Parliament
by
the
Prelates
and
Clergy
of
this
Realm
,
50
Ed.
3.
5.
&
8
Rich.
2.
c.
13.
and
that
of
the
Petition
delivered
to
the
King
in
Parliament
by
the
Clergy
of
England
,
4
Hen.
4.
c.
2.
"
That
no
Act
nor
Ordinance
should
from
thenceforth
be
made
or
granted
on
the
Petition
of
the
said
Clergy
,
without
the
consent
of
Commons
;
and
that
the
said
Commons
should
not
be
bound
in
times
to
come
,
by
any
constitutions
made
by
the
Clergy
of
this
Realm
,
for
their
own
advantage
,
to
which
the
Commons
of
this
Realm
had
not
given
consent
.
"
The
reason
of
the
which
is
this
(
and
't
is
worth
the
marking
)
"
car
eux
ne
veullent
estre
obligez
a
nul
de
vos
estatuz
ne
Ordinances
faitz
sanz
leur
assent
,
because
the
said
Clergy
did
not
think
themselves
bound
,
(
as
indeed
they
were
not
in
those
times
)
by
any
Statute
,
Act
,
or
Ordinance
,
made
without
their
Assent
in
the
Court
of
Parliament
.
"
Which
clearly
shews
that
in
those
times
the
Clergy
had
their
place
in
Parliament
as
the
Commons
had
.
Put
all
which
hath
been
sayd
together
,
and
tell
me
if
it
be
not
cleer
and
evident
that
the
inferiour
Clergie
had
their
place
in
Parliament
;
whether
the
Clause
touching
the
calling
of
them
thither
,
were
not
more
than
verbal
in
the
Bishops
writs
,
and
is
true
that
in
the
writ
of
summons
directed
to
their
several
and
respective
Bishops
they
were
called
only
ad
consentiendum
,
to
manifest
their
consent
to
those
Acts
and
ordinances
,
which
by
the
Common
counsell
of
the
Realm
were
to
be
ordained
.
But
then
it
is
as
tru
withall
,
that
sometimes
their
advice
was
asked
in
the
weighty
matters
,
as
in
the
21
of
K.
Richard
the
2.
and
sometimes
they
petitioned
and
remonstrated
for
redress
of
grievances
,
as
in
the
instances
and
cases
which
were
last
produced
.
And
't
is
as
true
that
if
they
had
been
present
only
ad
consentiendum
,
to
testifie
their
assent
to
those
Acts
which
by
the
common
Counsell
of
the
Realm
were
proposed
unto
them
:
their
presence
was
as
necessary
,
and
their
voice
as
requisite
to
all
intents
and
purposes
(
for
ought
I
can
see
)
as
the
voice
and
presence
of
the
Commons
in
the
times
we
speak
of
.
For
in
the
writs
of
summons
issued
to
the
several
Sheriffs
for
the
electing
of
Knights
,
Citizens
and
Burgesses
to
attend
the
Parliament
,
it
is
said
expressely
,
first
that
the
King
resolveth
upon
weighty
motives
touching
the
weal
and
safety
both
of
Church
and
State
to
hold
his
Parliament
,
[
e
](A86304-e57230-b)
e
Fo●ma
Brevis
pro
fammonit
.
Parliamenti
.
et
ibidem
cum
Praelatis
,
Magnatibus
et
Proceribus
dicti
regni
nostri
colloquium
habere
et
tractare
,
then
and
there
to
advise
and
treat
with
the
Prelates
,
Peers
and
Nobles
of
this
Realm
:
Which
words
are
also
expressely
used
in
the
writs
of
summons
directed
to
the
Bishops
,
and
to
every
of
them
;
who
also
are
required
in
a
further
clause
consilium
suum
impendere
[
f
](A86304-e57280-b)
f
Titles
of
hon.
part
2.
cap.
5.
,
to
give
the
King
their
best
advice
in
his
great
affairs
.
So
that
the
Prelates
and
Nobility
conveened
in
Parliament
made
the
Kings
great
Counsel
,
and
were
called
thither
to
that
end
.
What
then
belonged
unto
the
Commons
?
1.
No
more
than
did
belong
to
the
Clergy
also
,
that
is
to
say
,
the
giving
of
their
consent
to
such
Laws
and
Statutes
as
should
there
be
made
.
Which
notwithstanding
in
tract
of
time
gave
them
such
a
sway
,
and
stroak
in
the
course
of
Parliaments
,
that
no
law
could
be
made
,
nor
no
tax
imposed
without
their
liking
and
allowance
.
And
this
is
that
which
is
expressed
in
the
last
clause
of
the
said
writ
,
by
which
the
Knights
and
Burgesses
are
to
come
prepared
[
g
](A86304-e57310-b)
g
Form
a
Brevis
,
&c.
ad
faciendum
et
consentiendum
iis
quae
tune
ibidem
de
consilio
dicti
Regni
nostri
super
negotiis
antedictis
contigerint
ordinari
.
Which
is
the
very
same
which
you
had
before
in
the
writ
directed
to
the
Bishops
,
for
summoning
the
Clergie
of
their
several
Diocesses
,
and
that
here
is
a
faciendum
which
the
other
had
not
.
A
word
which
if
you
mark
it
well
,
hath
no
operation
in
the
Construction
of
the
text
,
except
it
be
in
paying
subsidies
,
or
doing
such
things
as
are
appointed
to
be
done
by
that
great
Counsel
of
the
Kingdom
;
Which
clause
,
though
it
be
cunningly
left
out
(
that
I
may
say
no
worse
)
in
the
recital
of
the
writ
by
the
Author
of
the
Book
entituled
,
the
Prerogative
and
practice
of
Parliaments
:
is
most
ingenuously
acknowledged
in
the
Declaration
of
the
Lords
and
Commons
assembled
at
Oxon
,
[
h
](A86304-e57400-b)
h
Declaration
of
the
treaty
P.
15.
where
it
is
said
,
that
the
writs
of
summons
,
the
foundation
of
all
power
in
Parliament
,
are
directed
to
the
Lords
in
expresse
termes
to
treat
and
advise
with
the
King
and
the
rest
of
the
Peers
of
the
Kingdom
of
England
;
and
to
the
Commons
to
do
and
consent
to
those
things
,
which
by
that
Common
councell
of
England
should
be
ordained
.
And
thus
it
stands
,
as
with
the
Common
people
generally
in
most
states
of
Christendom
,
so
with
the
Commons
antiently
in
most
states
of
Greece
;
of
which
Plutarch
telleth
us
[
i
](A86304-e57520-b)
i
Plutarch
in
Lyeurgo
:
,
that
when
the
people
were
assembled
in
Counsell
,
"
it
was
not
lawful
for
any
of
them
to
put
forth
matters
to
the
Counsel
to
be
determined
,
neither
might
any
of
them
deliver
his
opinion
what
he
thought
of
any
thing
,
but
the
people
had
only
authority
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
,
to
give
their
assent
unto
such
things
as
either
the
Senators
or
their
Kings
do
propound
unto
them
.
"
10.
But
against
this
it
is
objected
,
first
,
that
it
is
not
to
be
found
at
what
time
the
Clergie
lost
their
place
and
vote
in
Parliament
,
and
therefore
it
may
reasonably
be
presumed
that
they
had
never
any
there
:
and
2ly
.
that
if
they
had
been
called
ad
consentiendum
(
though
no
more
than
so
)
we
should
have
found
more
frequent
mention
of
their
consent
unto
the
Acts
&
Statutes
in
our
printed
Books
.
For
answer
unto
which
it
may
first
be
said
,
that
to
suppose
the
Clergie
had
no
voice
in
Parliament
,
because
it
is
not
to
be
found
when
they
lost
that
Privilege
,
is
such
a
kind
of
Argument
(
if
it
be
an
argument
)
as
is
made
by
Bellarmine
,
[
k
](A86304-e57610-b)
k
Bellarm.
de
Eccl.
lib.
4.
cap.
5.
to
prove
that
many
of
the
controverted
Tenets
of
the
Church
of
Rome
,
are
neither
terroneous
nor
new
,
because
we
cannot
say
expressely
,
quo
tempore
,
quo
autore
,
when
and
by
whose
promoting
they
first
crept
in
.
And
though
we
cannot
say
expressely
when
the
inferiour
Clergy
lost
their
place
in
Parliament
,
in
regard
it
might
be
lost
by
discontinuance
or
non-usage
;
or
that
the
clause
was
pretermitted
for
some
space
of
time
the
better
to
disuse
them
from
it
;
or
that
they
might
neglect
the
service
in
regard
of
their
attendance
in
the
Convocation
,
which
gave
them
power
and
reputation
both
with
the
Common
people
:
yet
I
have
reason
to
beleeve
,
that
this
pretermission
and
disuse
did
chiefly
happen
under
the
government
of
the
Kings
of
the
house
of
Lancaster
,
who
being
the
true
heirs
and
successours
of
Iohn
of
Gaunt
,
cast
many
a
longing
eye
on
the
Church
revenues
,
and
hardly
were
perswaded
to
abstain
from
that
height
of
sacrilege
,
which
Henry
the
8
did
aftercome
to
.
And
this
I
am
induced
to
beleeve
the
rather
,
in
regard
that
in
the
confirmation
of
the
Churches
rights
so
solemnly
confirmed
and
ratified
in
all
former
Parliaments
;
there
was
a
clog
put
to
or
added
in
these
times
,
which
shaked
the
Fabrick
:
the
confirmation
being
first
of
such
rights
and
liberties
as
were
not
repealed
,
3.
Hen.
5.
cap.
1.
&
4
Hen.
5.
cap.
1.
and
afterwards
of
such
as
by
the
Common
law
were
not
repealeable
,
2
Hen.
6.
cap.
1.
which
might
go
very
far
indeed
.
And
secondly
I
find
that
in
the
8
of
Henry
the
6.
an
Act
of
Parliament
was
passed
,
that
all
the
Clergy
called
to
Convocation
by
the
Kings
writ
,
and
their
servants
and
Family
shall
for
ever
hereafter
fully
use
and
enjoy
such
liberty
and
defence
in
comming
tarrying
and
returning
,
as
the
great
men
and
Comminalty
of
the
Realm
of
England
called
to
the
Kings
Parliament
do
enjoy
,
[
l
](A86304-e57900-b)
l
8
Hen.
6.
cap.
1.
&c.
Which
being
an
unnecessary
care
or
caution
when
the
Clergie
had
their
voice
in
Parliament
,
and
very
necessary
to
be
taken
formerly
,
if
they
had
never
had
such
voice
:
makes
me
conceive
,
that
it
was
much
about
this
time
that
they
lost
that
privilege
.
But
this
I
leave
as
a
conjecture
,
and
no
more
than
so
.
For
answer
to
the
second
argument
,
that
if
they
had
been
called
of
old
ad
consentiendum
,
we
should
have
found
more
frequent
mention
of
their
consent
unto
the
Acts
and
Statutes
of
the
former
times
;
besides
that
it
is
a
negative
proof
,
and
so
non
concludent
,
it
strikes
as
much
against
the
presence
and
consent
of
the
Knights
and
Burgesses
in
the
elder
Parliaments
,
as
it
can
do
against
the
Clergie
.
For
in
the
elder
Parliaments
under
K.
Henry
3.
and
K.
Edward
the
first
there
is
no
mention
of
the
Commons
made
at
all
,
either
as
present
or
consenting
;
nor
much
almost
in
all
the
Parliaments
till
K.
Henry
7.
but
that
they
did
petition
for
redresse
of
greivances
,
and
that
upon
their
special
instance
and
request
[
m
](A86304-e58050-b)
m
In
the
Proem
to
the
several
Sessions
.
several
laws
were
made
for
the
behoof
and
benefit
of
the
Commonwealth
:
which
part
the
Clergie
also
acted
in
some
former
Parliaments
,
as
before
was
shewed
.
So
that
this
negative
Argument
must
conclude
against
both
or
neither
.
But
secondly
I
answer
,
that
in
these
elder
times
in
which
the
Proctors
for
the
Clergy
had
their
place
in
Parliament
,
they
are
included
generally
in
the
name
of
the
Commons
.
And
this
I
say
on
the
authority
of
the
old
modus
tenendi
Parliamentum
,
in
which
the
Commons
are
divided
in
the
Spiritualty
and
the
Temporalty
;
and
where
it
is
expressely
said
that
the
Proctors
for
the
Clergie
,
the
Knights
,
the
Citizens
and
the
Burgesses
did
represent
the
whole
Comminalty
of
the
Realm
of
England
[
a
](A86304-e58180-b)
a
Cap.
ult.
.
And
this
holds
good
in
law
(
for
ought
I
find
unto
the
contrary
)
to
this
very
day
.
Certain
I
am
that
Crompton
in
his
book
of
the
Iurisdiction
of
Courts
,
where
he
fpeakes
of
Parliaments
,
doth
tell
us
that
the
Knights
,
Citizens
,
Burgesses
,
and
Barons
of
the
Cinque
ports
,
[
b
](A86304-e58210-b)
b
Grompton
Iurisd.
des
.
Courts
.
ca●
.
ove
le
Clergie
qu'
eux
assemble
au
Pawles
,
represent
le
corps
de
tout
le
Comminalty
Dengliterre
,
together
with
the
Clergie
which
assembled
at
S.
Pauls
,
doe
represent
the
body
of
the
whole
Comminalty
of
England
.
So
then
,
the
Clergie
were
not
only
called
but
were
present
also
,
according
to
that
clause
in
the
writ
of
Summons
(
which
before
I
spake
of
)
directed
to
their
several
and
respective
Bishops
,
as
the
Kings
spiritual
Sheriffs
,
if
I
may
so
say
,
inabled
by
the
Laws
to
that
end
and
purpose
.
Which
some
endeavouring
to
avoid
,
have
at
last
found
out
that
the
clause
before
recited
out
of
the
Writ
to
the
Bishops
,
is
not
a
calling
of
the
Clergy
to
attend
in
Parliament
,
but
to
command
them
to
attend
in
the
Convocation
:
which
I
have
heard
much
pressed
by
those
who
pretend
unto
some
knowledge
in
the
course
of
things
.
Which
though
it
be
a
gross
mistake
,
and
inconsistent
with
the
words
and
circumstances
of
the
Writ
it self
,
which
relates
meerly
to
the
Parliament
,
and
business
of
a
Parllamentarie
nature
:
yet
for
the
clearing
of
the
point
,
and
undeceiving
such
as
have
been
deceived
,
they
may
please
to
know
,
that
besides
this
Writ
by
which
the
Clergy
are
commanded
to
appear
in
Parliament
,
there
is
another
writ
and
another
form
of
calling
them
unto
the
service
of
the
Convocation
,
which
is
briefly
this
.
The
King
sends
out
his
Writ
or
Mandat
to
the
Arch-bishop
of
Canterbury
,
requiring
him
super
quibusdam
arduis
&
urgentibus
negotiis
,
&c.
[
n
](A86304-e58380-b)
n
Regist.
Warham
.
.
for
divers
great
and
weighty
reasons
concerning
the
Kings
honour
,
the
Churches
safety
,
and
the
publick
peace
of
his
dominions
,
to
summon
all
the
Bishops
,
Deans
and
Chapters
,
Arch-deacons
,
and
the
whole
Clergy
of
his
Province
to
meet
in
Convocation
at
a
day
and
place
appointed
.
On
the
reception
of
which
Writ
the
Arch-bishop
sendeth
out
his
Monitory
to
the
Bishop
of
London
(
who
by
his
place
is
Dean
of
the
Episcopal
College
[
o
](A86304-e58460-b)
o
Antiqu.
Britan.
in
initio
.
,
and
to
disperse
the
Mandates
of
the
Metropolitan
)
requiring
him
to
appear
himself
in
person
,
and
to
send
out
his
warrant
unto
every
Bishop
of
the
Province
,
to
appear
there
also
,
and
to
take
order
that
the
Deans
of
the
Cathedrals
,
and
Arch-deacons
personally
,
the
Chapter
by
one
Procurator
,
the
Clergy
of
the
Diocese
by
two
,
(
whom
we
usually
call
Clerks
of
the
Convocation
)
do
attend
that
service
(p)
.
[
b
](A86304-e58540-b)
b
Regist.
Warham
.
.
Which
comming
to
the
hands
of
each
several
Bishop
they
do
accordingly
give
intimation
to
their
Deans
and
Chapters
,
to
their
Arch-deacons
and
the
Clergy
;
and
they
accordingly
prepare
themselves
to
obey
the
Monitory
,
and
to
return
Certificate
of
their
doings
in
it
.
The
like
proceeding
is
observed
also
for
the
Province
of
York
.
So
that
the
calling
of
the
Clergy
to
the
Convocation
being
by
a
different
Writ
and
another
form
,
which
hath
no
reference
to
nor
dependance
on
the
writs
directed
by
the
K.
to
each
several
Bishop
for
their
attendance
in
the
Parliament
,
it
must
needs
be
(
as
I
conceive
it
)
that
by
that
clause
remaining
in
the
Writs
aforesaid
,
the
Clergy
have
good
right
and
title
to
a
voice
in
Parliament
,
though
they
have
lost
their
jus
in
re
,
the
benefit
,
the
use
and
possession
of
it
.
11.
But
I
speak
this
as
once
the
Apostle
said
in
another
case
,
not
by
commandement
but
by
permission
.
For
I
perswade
my self
the
Clergy
do
not
aim
so
high
at
the
recovery
of
a
right
so
long
antiquated
and
disused
,
but
would
be
well
enough
content
with
the
restitution
of
the
Bishops
to
their
vote
in
Parliament
,
of
which
they
stood
possessed
by
so
strong
a
Title
,
as
the
very
constitution
of
the
Parliament
,
and
the
fundamental
laws
of
the
English
government
could
confer
upon
them
.
For
though
the
Bishops
sate
in
Parliament
in
their
own
personal
capacities
,
and
not
as
the
representative
body
of
the
Clergy
;
yet
the
poor
Clergy
found
it
some
respect
unto
them
to
be
thus
honoured
in
their
heads
:
and
were
the
more
obliged
to
obey
such
Acts
as
were
established
in
that
Court
,
wherein
these
heads
had
opportunity
of
interceding
,
if
perhaps
any
thing
were
propounded
which
might
be
grievous
to
the
Clergy
,
and
many
times
a
power
of
hindering
and
diverting
if
not
by
voice
and
numbers
,
yet
by
strength
of
reasons
.
They
were
not
altogether
Slaves
and
Bond-men
whilest
the
Church
held
that
remnant
of
her
antient
rights
;
for
whilest
the
heads
retained
that
honor
,
the
body
could
not
choose
but
rejoyce
in
it
and
be
cherished
by
it
.
But
since
they
have
been
stripped
of
that
(
by
what
unworthy
Acts
the
world
knows
too
well
)
they
are
become
of
such
condition
,
that
the
most
despicable
Tradesman
in
a
Corporate
Town
is
more
considerable
in
the
eye
of
the
State
,
and
hath
a
greater
interesse
in
the
affairs
thereof
,
than
the
greatest
Prelate
,
and
to
say
truth
than
all
the
Clergy
of
the
Realm
.
For
being
there
are
three
Ingredients
which
make
up
a
Freeman
(
as
S.
Francis
Bacon
well
observed
in
his
speech
concerning
the
Post-nati
)
that
is
to
say
,
1.
jus
Civitatis
,
which
did
inable
a
man
to
buy
and
sell
,
and
to
take
Inheritances
;
2.
jus
suffragii
,
a
voice
in
the
passing
of
Laws
and
Election
of
Officers
;
and
3.
jus
honoris
,
a
capability
of
such
offices
and
honors
as
the
State
could
give
him
:
the
Clergy
by
this
means
are
limited
to
the
first
right
only
,
&
utterly
excluded
from
the
other
two
,
and
therby
put
into
a
worse
condition
,
than
the
meanest
Freeman
in
the
Kingdome
.
Insomuch
that
whereas
every
needy
Artizan
if
he
be
free
of
any
Corporate
Town
or
City
,
every
Cottager
that
dwelleth
in
an
antient
Burrough
,
and
every
Clown
which
can
lay
claim
to
forty
shillings
per
Annum
of
free
hold
,
either
for
life
or
of
inheritance
,
hath
a
voyce
in
Parliament
,
either
in
person
or
by
Proxie
;
and
is
not
bound
by
any
law
but
what
himself
consents
to
in
his
Representatives
:
the
Clergy
only
of
this
Realm
(
as
the
case
now
stands
)
being
one
of
the
greatest
States
of
this
Kingdom
,
as
is
acknowledged
expresly
in
terminis
by
Act
of
Parliament
[
p
](A86304-e59020-b)
p
8
Eliz.
c.
1.
,
are
neither
capable
of
place
there
in
their
personal
capacities
,
nor
suffered
to
be
there
in
their
Procuratours
,
as
of
old
they
were
;
nor
have
so
much
as
any
voice
in
choosing
of
the
Knights
and
Burgesses
which
represent
the
body
of
the
people
generally
.
I
know
it
hath
been
said
in
reply
to
this
,
that
the
Clergy
may
give
voices
at
the
election
of
the
Knights
and
Burgesses
,
and
that
it
is
their
own
neglect
if
they
do
it
not
.
But
I
know
too
,
that
this
is
only
yielded
unto
such
of
the
Clergy
,
as
are
possessed
os
Lands
and
Houses
in
those
several
places
where
such
elections
are
to
be
made
,
and
not
then
neither
in
most
places
,
except
it
be
to
make
a
party
for
particular
ends
,
especially
where
some
good
man
or
the
main
cause
it self
is
concerned
therein
:
which
as
it
totally
excludeth
the
greatest
part
of
the
Clergy
from
having
any
voyce
at
all
in
these
Elections
,
(
the
greatest
part
of
the
Clegy
(
the
more
the
pity
)
having
neither
Lands
nor
Houses
to
such
a
value
in
fee
simple
)
so
it
gives
no
more
power
unto
those
that
have
,
than
what
of
necessity
must
serve
(
I
am
sure
occasionally
it
may
)
to
their
own
undoing
.
For
to
say
truth
,
those
that
give
out
that
the
Clergy
may
give
voice
at
such
elections
,
use
it
but
as
a
shift
for
the
present
turn
:
intending
nothing
less
indeed
(
as
hath
oft
been
seen
)
than
that
the
Clergy
should
be
capable
of
so
great
a
trust
.
The
reason
is
,
because
there
is
not
any
Free-man
of
a
City
or
a
Corporate
town
who
hath
a
voice
in
the
election
of
a
Citizen
to
serve
in
Parliament
,
nor
almost
any
Cottager
or
Free-holder
who
hath
a
voice
in
the
election
either
of
a
Knight
or
Burgesse
,
but
is
directly
eligible
to
the
place
himself
.
Of
Citizens
&
Burgesses
●lected
from
the
very
meanest
of
the
people
,
we
have
many
instances
,
and
shall
have
more
according
as
they
find
their
strength
,
and
have
received
a
taste
of
the
sweets
of
Goverment
.
And
for
the
choosing
of
the
Knights
of
the
seveveral
Shires
,
it
is
determined
by
the
Statutes
that
as
40
s.
land
of
free-hold
per
Annum
[
q
](A86304-e59210-b)
q
8
Hen.
6.
c.
7.
,
is
enough
to
qualifie
a
Clown
for
giving
a
voice
at
the
election
;
so
the
same
Clown
if
he
have
20l.
land
per
Annum
is
capable
of
being
chosen
for
a
Knight
of
the
Shire
,
as
appears
plainly
and
expresly
by
the
Statute
law
.
For
though
the
writ
directed
to
the
severall
and
respective
Sheriffs
prescribe
a
choice
of
duos
milites
gladio
cinctos
;
yet
we
know
well
that
by
the
Statute
of
King
Henry
6.
which
is
explanatory
in
this
case
of
the
Common
law
,
such
notable
Esquires
or
Gentlemen
,
born
of
the
same
Counties
,
as
shall
be
able
to
be
Knights
[
r
](A86304-e59280-b)
r
23
Hen.
6.
15.
,
are
made
as
capable
as
a
dubbed
Knight
to
attend
that
service
;
and
he
that
hath
no
more
than
20
l.
per
Annum
either
in
Capite
or
Socage
is
not
only
able
by
the
law
to
be
made
a
Knight
[
s
](A86304-e59360-b)
s
1
Ed.
2.
c.
1.
,
but
was
compellable
thereunto
even
by
the
Statute-Law
it self
,
untill
the
Law
was
lately
altered
in
that
point
[
t
](A86304-e59370-b)
t
17
Car●l
.
c.
1.
.
And
on
the
other
side
it
is
clear
enough
(
for
there
have
been
of
late
some
experiments
of
it
)
that
though
a
Clergy-man
be
born
an
Esquire
or
Gentleman
(
for
they
are
not
all
born
ex
fece
Plebis
,
as
the
late
Lord
Brook
[
u
](A86304-e59410-b)
u
L.
Brook
against
Episcopacy
.
forgetting
his
own
poor
extraction
hath
been
pleased
to
say
)
and
though
he
be
possessed
of
a
fair
Estate
descended
to
him
from
his
Ancestors
,
or
otherwise
possessed
of
some
Lands
or
Houses
in
Town
,
Burrough
,
or
City
,
whereby
he
stands
as
eligible
in
the
eye
of
the
Law
,
as
any
Lay-Gentleman
of
them
all
;
yet
either
he
is
held
uncapable
,
and
so
pretermitted
;
or
if
returned
,
rejected
at
the
House
it self
to
his
fowl
reproach
.
It
is
a
Fundamental
constitution
of
the
Realm
of
England
,
that
every
Free-man
hath
a
voice
in
the
Legislative
power
of
Parliament
:
&
it
is
an
old
rule
in
Politic●s
,
●uod
omnes
tangit
ab
omnibus
tractari
debet
[
x
](A86304-e59450-b)
x
And
so
acknowleged
in
a
writ
of
Summons
of
K.
Edw.
1.
.
Which
being
now
denyed
to
the
English
Clergy
,
reduceth
to
them
to
that
condition
which
St.
Paul
complains
of
;
and
make
them
no
otherwise
accounted
of
by
the
Common
people
,
than
as
,
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
,
the
filth
and
off-scowring
of
the
world
to
this
very
day
.
12.
This
tempts
me
to
a
brief
discussion
of
a
question
exceeding
weighty
in
it self
,
but
not
so
much
as
thought
of
in
this
great
disfranchisement
,
the
slavery
obtruded
lately
on
the
English
Clergy
:
that
is
to
say
,
whether
that
any
two
of
the
three
Estates
conspiring
or
agreeiug
together
can
conclude
on
any
thing
unto
the
prejudice
of
the
third
.
Bodinus
that
renowned
States-man
doth
resolve
it
negatively
;
and
states
it
thus
,
nihil
a
duobus
ordinibus
discerni
posse
,
quo
uni
ex
tribus
incommodum
inferatur
,
si
res
ad
singulos
ordines
seorsum
pertinet
[
z
](A86304-e59590-b)
z
Bodin
.
de
Rep.
l.
3.
c.
7.
,
that
nothing
can
be
done
by
two
of
the
Estates
to
the
disprofit
of
the
third
,
in
case
the
point
proposed
be
such
as
concerns
them
severally
.
The
point
was
brought
into
debate
upon
this
occasion
.
Henry
the
3d.
of
France
had
summoned
an
Assembly
of
the
three
Estates
or
Conventus
Ordinum
to
be
held
at
Bloys
,
Anno
1577.
(
The
form
and
order
of
the
which
we
have
at
large
described
by
Thuanus
Lib.
63.
)
But
finding
that
he
could
not
bring
his
ends
about
so
easily
with
that
numerous
body
,
as
if
they
were
contracted
to
a
narrower
compass
,
he
caused
it
to
be
mov'd
unto
them
that
they
should
make
choice
of
36
,
twelve
of
each
Estate
,
quos●
Rex
cum
de
postulatis
decerneret
in
consilium
adhibere
dignaretur
[
a
](A86304-e59690-b)
a
Thuanus
in
hist.
temp.
l.
63.
,
whom
the
King
would
deign
call
to
counsail
for
the
dispatch
of
such
affairs
and
motions
as
had
been
either
moved
or
proposed
unto
him
.
Which
being
very
readily
assented
to
by
the
Clergy
and
Nobility
,
who
hoped
thereby
to
find
some
favour
in
the
Court
,
and
by
degrees
to
be
admitted
to
the
Privy
Counsel
,
was
very
earnestly
opposed
by
Bodinus
,
being
then
Delegate
or
Commissioner
for
the
Province
of
Veromandois
,
who
saw
full
well
that
if
businesses
were
so
carried
,
the
Commons
(
which
made
the
third
Estate
,
)
would
find
but
little
hopes
to
have
their
grievances
redressed
,
their
petitions
answered
.
[
b
](A86304-e59770-b)
b
Bodin
.
de
Rep.
l.
1.
c.
7
And
therefore
laboured
the
rest
of
the
Commissioners
not
to
yield
unto
it
,
as
being
utterly
destructive
of
the
Rights
and
Liberties
of
the
Common
people
:
which
having
done
,
he
was
by
them
intrusted
to
debate
the
business
before
the
other
two
Estates
,
and
did
it
to
so
good
effect
,
that
at
the
last
he
took
them
off
from
their
resolution
,
and
obtained
the
cause
.
What
Arguments
he
used
in
particular
,
neither
himself
nor
Thuanus
telleth
us
.
But
sure
I
am
that
he
insisted
both
on
the
antient
customes
of
the
Realm
of
France
,
as
also
of
the
Realms
of
Spain
and
England
,
and
the
Roman
Empire
;
in
each
of
which
it
was
received
for
a
ruled
case
,
nihil
a
duobus
ordinibus
statui
posse
,
quo
uni
ex
tribus
prejudicium
crearetur
,
that
nothing
could
be
done
by
any
of
the
two
Estates
unto
the
prejudice
of
the
third
.
And
if
it
were
a
ruled
case
,
then
in
the
Parliament
of
England
,
there
is
no
reason
why
it
should
be
otherwise
in
the
present
times
,
the
equity
and
justice
of
it
being
still
the
same
,
and
the
same
reasons
for
it
now
as
forcible
,
as
they
could
be
then
.
Had
it
been
otherwise
resolved
of
in
the
former
ages
,
wherein
the
Clergy
were
so
prevalent
in
all
publique
Counsails
,
how
easie
a
matter
had
it
been
for
them
either
by
joyning
with
the
Nobility
to
exclude
the
Commons
,
or
by
joyning
with
the
Commonalty
to
exclude
the
Nobles
?
Or
having
too
much
conscience
to
adventure
on
so
great
a
change
,
an
alteration
so
incompatible
and
inconsistent
with
the
Constitution
of
a
Parliament
;
how
easily
might
they
have
suppressed
the
potency
,
and
impaird
the
Privileges
of
either
of
the
other
two
,
by
working
on
the
humours
or
affections
of
the
one
to
keep
down
the
other
?
But
these
were
Arts
not
known
in
the
former
daies
,
nor
had
been
thought
of
in
these
last
,
but
by
men
of
ruine
,
who
were
resolved
to
change
the
Government
(
as
the
event
doth
shew
too
clearly
)
both
of
Church
and
State
.
Nor
doth
it
help
the
matter
in
the
least
degree
,
to
say
that
the
exclusion
of
the
Bishops
from
the
House
of
Peers
,
was
not
done
meerly
by
the
practice
of
the
two
other
Estates
,
but
by
the
asse●t
of
the
King
,
of
whom
the
Laws
say
he
can
do
no
wrong
,
and
by
an
Act
of
Parliament
wherof
our
Laws
yet
say
,
quae
●ul
doit
imaginer
chose
dishonourable
,
[
c
](A86304-e59990-b)
c
Plowden
in
Commentar.
that
no
man
is
to
think
dishonourably
.
For
we
know
well
in
what
condition
the
King
was
when
he
passed
that
Act
,
to
what
extremities
he
was
reduced
,
on
what
terms
he
stood
,
how
he
was
forced
to
flye
from
his
City
of
London
,
to
part
with
his
dear
Wife
and
Children
,
and
in
a
word
so
overpowred
by
the
prevailing
party
in
the
two
Houses
of
Parliament
,
that
it
was
not
safe
for
him
(
as
his
case
then
was
)
to
deny
them
any
thing
.
And
for
the
Act
of
Parliament
so
unduly
gained
,
besides
that
the
Bill
had
been
rejected
when
it
was
first
brought
unto
the
Lords
,
and
that
the
greater
part
of
the
Lords
were
frighted
out
of
the
House
,
when
contrary
unto
the
course
of
Parliament
it
was
brought
again
;
it
is
a
point
resolved
both
in
Law
and
reason
,
that
the
Parliament
can
do
nothing
to
the
destruction
of
it self
,
and
that
such
Acts
as
are
extorted
from
the
King
are
not
good
and
valid
,
whereof
we
have
a
fair
example
in
the
Book
of
Statuers
[
d
](A86304-e60050-b)
d
15
Ed.
3.
.
"
For
whereas
the
King
had
granted
certain
Articles
pretended
to
be
granted
in
the
form
of
a
Statute
,
expresly
contrary
to
the
Laws
of
the
Realm
and
his
own
Prerogative
and
rights
royal
(
mark
it
,
for
this
is
just
the
case
)
which
he
had
yielded
to
eschew
the
dangers
,
which
by
denying
of
the
same
were
like
to
follow
:
"
in
the
same
Parliament
it
was
repealed
in
these
following
words
;
It
seemed
good
io
the
said
Earls
,
Barons
,
and
other
wise
men
,
that
since
the
Statute
did
not
proceed
of
our
free
will
,
the
same
be
void
;
and
ought
not
to
have
the
name
nor
strength
of
a
Statute
,
and
therefore
by
their
counsail
and
assent
we
have
decreed
the
said
Statute
to
be
void
,
&c.
Or
if
it
should
not
be
repealed
in
a
formal
manner
,
yet
is
this
Act
however
gotten
,
void
in
effect
already
by
a
former
Statute
,
in
which
it
was
enacted
in
full
Parliament
,
and
at
the
self
same
place
where
this
Act
was
gained
,
that
the
Great
Charter
(
by
which
and
many
other
Titles
the
Bishops
held
their
place
in
Parliament
)
should
be
kept
in
all
points
,
and
if
any
Statute
be
made
to
the
contrary
,
it
shall
be
holden
for
none
[
e
](A86304-e60190-b)
e
42
Ed.
3.
c.
1.
.
CHAP.
VI.
That
the
three
Estates
of
every
Kingdom
whereof
CALVIN
speaks
,
have
no
authority
either
to
regulate
the
power
,
or
controll
the
Actions
of
the
Soveraign
Prince
.
-
(
I.
)
The
Bishops
and
Clergy
of
England
,
not
the
King
,
make
the
third
Estate
,
and
of
the
dangerous
consequences
which
may
follow
on
the
contrary
Tenet
.
-
(
II.
)
The
different
influence
of
the
three
Estates
upon
conditional
Princes
,
and
an
absolute
Monarch
.
-
(
III.
)
The
Sanhedrim
of
no
authority
over
the
persons
,
or
the
actions
of
the
Kings
of
Judah
.
-
(
IV.
)
The
three
Estates
in
France
of
〈◊〉
small
authority
over
the
actions
of
that
King
.
-
(
V.
)
The
King
of
Spain
not
over-ruled
,
or
regulated
by
the
three
Estates
.
-
(
VI.
)
Of
what
authority
they
have
been
antiently
in
the
Parliaments
of
Scotland
.
-
(
VII
.
)
The
King
of
England
alwaies
accounted
heretofore
for
an
absolute
Monarch
.
-
(
VIII
.
)
〈◊〉
part
of
Soveraignty
invested
legally
in
the
English
Parliaments
.
-
(
IX
.
)
The
three
Estates
assembled
in
the
Parliament
of
England
,
subordinate
unto
the
King
,
not
co-ordinate
with
him
.
-
(
X.
)
The
Legislative
power
of
Parliaments
is
properly
and
legally
in
the
King
alone
.
-
(
XI
.
)
In
what
particulars
the
power
of
the
English
Parliament
doth
consist
especially
.
-
(
XII
.
)
The
Kings
of
England
ordinarily
over-rule
t●eir
Parliaments
by
themselves
,
their
Counsel
,
and
their
Judges
.
-
(
XIII
.
)
Objections
answered
touching
the
power
and
practice
of
some
former
Parliaments
,
and
the
testimonies
given
unto
them
.
-
(
XIV
.
)
No
such
Authority
given
by
God
in
Holy
Scripture
to
any
such
Popular
Magistrates
,
as
CALVIN
dreams
of
and
pretends
.
-
(
XV.
)
The
Application
and
Conclusion
of
the
whole
Discourse
.
I
Have
been
purposely
more
copious
in
the
former
Chapter
,
because
I
thought
it
necessa●y
to
declare
and
manifest
who
made
the
three
Estates
in
each
several
Kingdom
,
which
are
pretended
by
our
Author
to
have
such
power
of
regulating
the
authority
,
and
censuring
the
actions
and
the
persons
of
their
Soveraign
Princes
.
And
this
the
rather
in
regard
it
is
thought
of
late
,
and
(
more
than
thought
)
presented
to
the
world
in
some
publick
writings
,
(
especially
as
it
relates
to
the
Realm
of
England
)
that
the
King
,
the
Lords
,
and
Commons
,
make
the
three
Estates
:
which
brings
the
King
into
an
equal
rank
with
the
other
two
in
reference
to
the
businesse
and
affairs
of
Parliament
.
A
fancy
,
by
what
Accident
soever
it
was
broached
and
published
,
which
hath
no
consistence
either
with
truth
,
or
ordinary
observation
,
or
with
the
practice
of
this
Realm
,
or
of
any
other
.
For
the
proof
of
this
my
position
,
that
the
King
is
none
of
the
three
Estates
as
is
now
pretended
,
if
all
proofs
else
should
fail
,
I
have
one
from
Calvin
,
whose
judgement
in
this
point
amongst
many
of
us
,
will
be
instar
omnium
.
For
where
he
saith
in
singulis
Regnis
tres
esse
Ordines
,
[
e
](A86304-e60830-b)
e
Calvin
,
inst●t
.
4.
cap.
ult.
that
there
are
three
Estates
in
each
several
Kingdom
,
and
that
these
three
Estates
convened
in
Parliament
,
(
or
by
what
other
name
soever
they
call
their
meeting
)
are
furnished
with
a
power
Regum
libidinem
moderandi
,
of
moderating
the
licentiousness
of
Kings
and
Princes
;
and
that
they
become
guilty
of
perfidious
dissimulation
,
si
Regibus
impotenter
grassantibus
,
&c.
If
they
connive
at
Kings
,
when
they
play
the
Tyrants
,
or
wantonly
insult
on
the
Common-people
:
I
trow
it
cannot
be
conceived
that
the
King
is
any
one
of
the
three
Estates
,
who
are
here
trusted
(
or
at
least
supposed
to
be
intrusted
)
with
sufficient
power
,
as
well
to
regulate
his
authority
,
as
to
controll
his
actions
.
If
Calvin
be
allowed
to
have
common
sense
,
and
to
have
wit
and
words
enough
to
expresse
his
meaning
,
(
as
even
his
greatest
Adversaries
do
confesse
he
had
)
it
must
be
granted
that
he
did
not
take
the
King
of
what
Realm
soever
,
to
be
any
of
the
three
Estates
:
or
if
he
did
,
he
would
have
thought
of
other
means
to
restrain
his
insolencies
,
than
by
leaving
him
in
his
own
hands
,
to
his
own
correction
.
Either
then
Calvin
is
mistaken
in
the
three
Estates
,
(
&
if
he
be
mistaken
in
designing
the
men
he
aims
at
,
may
he
not
be
mistaken
in
the
power
he
gives
them
?
)
or
else
the
King
is
no●e
,
&
indeed
can
be
none
of
the
three
Estates
,
qui
primarios
conventus
peragunt
,
who
usually
convene
in
Parliament
for
those
ends
and
purposes
before
remembred
.
But
not
to
trust
to
him
alone
,
though
questionlesse
he
be
ideoneus
testis
in
the
present
case
;
Let
us
behold
the
Assembly
of
the
three
Estates
or
Conventus
Ordinum
in
France
(
from
whence
it
is
conceived
that
all
Assemblies
of
this
kind
had
their
first
Original
)
and
we
shall
find
a
very
full
description
of
them
in
the
Assemblie
des
Estats
at
Bloys
under
Henry
3.
Anno
1577.
of
which
thus
Thuanus
.
[
f
](A86304-e61120-b)
f
Thuanus
in
histor.
sui
temp.
l.
63.
"
Rex
insublimi
loco
sub
uranisco
sedebat
,
&c.
The
King
,
saith
he
,
sate
on
an
high
erected
Throne
under
the
Canopy
of
State
,
the
Queen-mother
,
and
the
Queen
his
wife
,
and
all
the
Cardinals
,
Princes
,
Peers
upon
either
hand
.
And
then
it
followeth
,
Transtris
infra
dispositis
ad
dextram
suam
sacri
Ordinis
Delegati
,
ad
laevam
Nobilitas
,
&
infra
plebetus
ordo
sedebat
,
that
on
some
lower
forms
there
sate
the
Delegates
of
the
Clergy
towards
the
right
hand
of
the
King
,
the
Nobility
towards
the
left
,
and
the
Commissioners
for
the
Commons
in
the
space
below
.
"
We
may
conjecture
at
the
rest
by
the
view
of
this
:
Of
those
in
Spain
,
by
those
Conventions
of
the
States
which
before
we
spoke
of
,
at
Burgos
,
Monson
,
Toledo
,
and
in
other
places
,
in
which
the
King
is
alwaies
mentioned
as
a
different
person
,
who
called
them
,
and
dissolved
them
as
he
saw
occasion
.
For
Scotland
,
it
is
ordinary
in
the
stile
of
Parliaments
,
to
say
the
King
and
the
Estates
do
ordain
and
constitute
;
[
g
](A86304-e61270-b)
g
Statutes
of
Scotland
.
(
for
which
I
do
refer
you
to
the
Book
of
Statutes
)
which
clearly
makes
the
K.
to
be
a
different
person
from
the
Estates
of
that
Kingdome
.
And
as
for
England
,
besides
what
may
be
gathered
from
the
former
Chapter
,
we
read
in
the
History
of
Titus
Livius
,
touching
the
Reign
and
Acts
of
K.
Henry
the
5th
.
that
when
his
Funerals
were
ended
,
the
three
Estates
of
the
Realm
of
England
did
assemble
together
and
declared
his
Son
K.
Henry
the
6.
being
an
Infant
of
8
months
old
to
be
their
Soveraign
Lord
,
[
h
](A86304-e61360-b)
h
Tit.
Liv.
M.
S.
in
Bibl.
Bodl.
as
his
Heir
and
Successor
.
"
And
in
the
Parliament
Rolls
of
K.
Richard
the
3d.
there
is
mention
of
a
Bill
or
Parchment
presented
to
that
Prince
,
being
then
Duke
of
Glocester
,
on
the
behalf
and
in
the
name
of
the
three
Estates
of
this
Realm
of
England
,
that
is
to
wit
,
of
the
Lords
Spiritual
and
Temporal
,
and
of
the
Commons
by
name
:
which
forasmuch
as
neither
the
said
three
Estates
,
nor
the
persons
which
delivered
it
on
their
behalf
were
then
assembled
in
form
of
Parliament
,
was
afterwards
in
the
first
Parliament
of
that
King
by
the
same
three
Estates
assembled
in
this
present
Parliament
(
I
speak
the
very
words
of
the
Act
it self
)
and
by
authority
of
the
same
,
enrolled
,
recorded
,
and
approved
:
[
i
](A86304-e61480-b)
i
Ap
Speed
in
K.
Rich.
3●
And
at
the
request
,
and
by
the
assent
of
the
three
Estates
of
this
Realm
,
that
is
to
say
,
the
Lords
Spiritual
,
and
Temporal
,
and
Commons
of
this
Land
assembled
in
this
present
Parliament
,
and
by
authority
of
the
same
,
it
be
pronounced
,
decreed
,
and
declared
,
that
our
said
Soveraign
Lord
the
King
was
,
and
is
the
very
and
undoubted
heir
of
this
Realm
of
England
,
&c.
"
And
so
it
is
acknowledged
in
a
[
k
](A86304-e61540-b)
k
1
Eliz.
cap.
3.
Statute
of
1
Eliz.
ca.
3.
where
the
Lords
Spiritual
and
Temporal
,
and
the
Commons
in
that
Parliament
assembled
,
being
said
expresly
and
in
terminis
to
represent
the
three
Estates
of
the
Realm
of
England
,
did
recognize
the
Queens
Majesty
to
be
their
true
,
lawfull
,
and
undoubted
Soveraign
Liege
Lady
,
and
Queen
.
This
makes
it
evident
,
that
the
King
was
not
accounted
in
the
times
before
for
one
of
the
three
Estates
of
Parliament
,
nor
can
be
so
accounted
in
the
present
times
.
For
considering
that
the
Lords
and
Commons
do
most
confessedly
make
two
of
the
three
Estates
,
and
that
the
Clergy
in
an
other
Act
of
Parliament
of
the
said
Queens
time
,
are
confessed
to
be
one
of
the
greatest
States
of
the
Realm
,
[
l
](A86304-e61670-b)
l
Statut.
8
Eliz.
cap.
1.
which
Statute
being
still
in
force
,
doth
clearly
make
the
Clergy
to
be
the
third
;
either
there
must
be
more
than
three
Estates
in
this
Kingdome
,
which
is
against
the
Doctrine
of
the
present
times
,
or
else
the
King
is
none
of
the
Estates
,
as
indeed
he
is
not
,
which
was
the
matter
to
be
proved
.
But
I
spend
too
much
time
in
confuting
that
which
hath
so
little
ground
to
stand
on
,
more
than
the
dangerous
consequences
which
are
covered
under
it
:
For
if
the
King
be
granted
once
to
be
no
more
than
one
of
the
three
Estates
,
how
can
it
choose
but
follow
from
so
sad
a
Principle
,
that
he
is
of
no
more
power
and
consideration
in
the
time
of
Parliament
,
than
the
House
of
Peers
,
which
sometimes
hath
consisted
of
three
Lords
,
no
more
;
or
than
the
House
of
Commons
only
,
which
hath
many
times
consisted
of
no
more
than
80
or
an
hundred
Gentlemen
:
but
of
far
lesse
consideration
to
all
intents
and
purposes
in
the
Law
whatever
,
than
both
the
Houses
joyned
together
.
What
else
can
follow
hereupon
but
that
the
King
must
be
co-ordinate
with
his
two
Houses
of
Parliament
,
and
if
co-ordinate
,
then
to
be
over-ruled
by
their
Joynt
concurrence
,
bound
to
conform
unto
their
Acts
,
and
confirm
their
Ordinances
;
or
upon
case
of
inconformity
and
non-complyance
to
see
them
put
in
execution
against
his
liking
and
consents
,
to
his
foul
reproach
.
And
what
at
last
will
be
the
issue
of
this
dangerous
consequence
,
but
that
the
Lords
content
themselves
to
come
down
to
the
Commons
,
and
the
King
be
no
otherwise
esteemed
of
than
the
chief
of
the
Lords
,
the
Princeps
Senatus
if
you
will
,
or
the
Duke
of
Venice
,
at
the
best
no
more
,
which
if
Sir
Edward
Dering
may
be
credited
,
as
I
think
he
may
in
this
particular
,
seems
to
have
been
the
main
design
of
some
of
the
most
popular
and
powerfull
Members
then
sitting
with
him
,
for
which
I
do
refer
the
Reader
to
his
book
of
Speeches
.
Which
dangerous
consequents
whether
they
were
observed
at
first
by
these
who
first
ventured
on
the
expression
,
or
were
improvidently
looked
over
,
I
can
hardly
say
.
Certain
I
am
,
it
gave
too
manifest
an
advantage
to
the
Antimonarchical
party
in
this
Kingdome
,
and
hardned
them
in
their
proceeding
against
their
King
,
whom
they
were
taught
to
look
on
and
esteem
no
otherwise
than
as
a
Joynt-tenant
of
the
Soveraignty
with
the
Lords
and
Commons
.
And
if
Kings
have
partners
in
the
Soveraignty
,
they
are
then
no
King
;
such
being
the
nature
and
law
of
Monarchy
,
that
si
divisionem
capiat
interitum
capiat
necesse
est
,
[
m
](A86304-e61950-b)
m
Lactant
Institut.
Div.
l.
1.
c.
if
it
be
once
divided
,
and
the
authorities
thereof
imparted
,
it
is
soon
destroyed
.
Such
is
the
dangerous
consequence
of
this
new
Expression
,
that
it
seemeth
utterly
to
deprive
the
Bishops
,
and
in
them
the
Clergy
of
this
Land
,
of
all
future
hopes
of
being
restored
again
to
their
place
in
Parliament
.
For
being
the
Parliament
can
consist
but
of
three
Estates
,
if
the
King
fall
so
low
as
to
pass
for
one
,
either
the
Bishops
or
the
Commons
,
or
the
Temporal
Lords
must
desert
their
claim
,
the
better
to
make
way
for
this
new
pretension
:
and
in
all
probability
the
Commons
being
grown
so
potent
,
and
the
Nobility
so
numerous
and
united
in
blood
and
mariages
,
will
not
quit
their
interesse
;
and
therefore
the
poor
Clergy
must
be
no
Estate
,
because
lesse
able
,
as
the
world
now
goeth
with
them
,
to
maintain
their
title
.
I
have
often
read
that
Constantine
did
use
to
call
himself
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
[
n
](A86304-e62090-b)
n
Euseb.
de
vita
Constant
.
the
Bishop
or
Superintendent
of
his
Bishops
;
and
I
have
oft
heard
our
Lawyers
say
,
that
the
King
is
the
general
Ordinary
of
the
Kingdome
:
but
never
heard
nor
read
till
within
these
few
yearrs
,
that
ever
any
King
did
possess
himself
of
the
Bishops
place
or
vote
in
Parliament
,
or
sate
there
as
the
first
of
the
three
Estates
(
as
antiently
the
Bishops
did
)
to
supply
their
absence
.
By
which
device
,
whether
the
Clergy
or
the
King
be
the
greater
losers
(
though
it
be
partly
seen
already
)
future
times
will
shew
.
(
2.
)
This
rub
removed
,
we
next
proceed
to
the
examination
of
that
power
,
which
by
our
Author
is
conferred
on
the
three
Estates
:
which
we
shall
find
on
search
and
tryal
to
be
very
different
,
according
to
the
constitution
of
the
Kingdome
in
which
they
are
.
For
where
the
Kings
are
absolute
Monarchs
,
as
in
England
,
Scotland
,
France
,
and
Spain
,
[
l
](A86304-e62230-b)
l
Bodin
de
Repub.
l.
1.
c.
the
three
Estates
,
have
properly
and
legally
little
more
authority
,
than
to
advise
their
King
,
as
they
see
occasion
,
to
represent
unto
his
view
their
common
grievances
,
and
to
propose
such
remedies
,
for
redresse
therof
,
as
to
them
seem
meetest
,
to
canvass
and
review
such
erroneous
judgements
as
formerly
have
passed
in
inferiour
Courts
,
and
finally
to
consult
about
,
and
prepare
such
laws
as
are
expedient
for
the
publick
.
In
other
Countries
where
the
Kings
are
more
conditional
,
and
hold
their
Crowns
by
compact
and
agreement
betweeen
them
and
their
Subjects
;
the
reputation
and
authority
of
the
three
Estates
is
more
high
and
eminent
,
as
in
Polonia
,
Danemark
,
and
some
others
of
the
Northern
Kingdomes
,
where
the
Estates
lay
claim
to
more
than
a
directive
power
,
and
think
it
not
enough
to
advise
their
King
,
unless
they
may
dispose
of
the
Kingdome
also
,
or
at
least
make
their
King
no
better
than
a
Royal
Slave
.
Thus
and
no
otherwise
it
is
with
the
German
Emperors
,
who
are
obnoxious
to
the
Laws
,
[
m
](A86304-e62330-b)
m
Thuan.
hist.
sui
temp.
l.
2.
and
for
their
Government
accomptable
to
the
Estates
of
the
Empire
:
insomuch
that
if
the
Princes
of
the
Empire
be
perswaded
in
their
consciences
that
he
is
likely
by
his
mal-administration
to
destroy
the
Empire
,
and
that
he
will
not
hearken
to
advice
and
counsel
[
n
](A86304-e62360-b)
n
Anonym
.
Script
.
ap
Philip
.
Paraeu
in
Append.
●d
Rom.
13.
ab
Electorum
Collegio
Caesaria
potestate
privari
potest
,
he
may
be
deprived
by
the
Electors
,
and
a
more
fit
and
able
man
elected
to
supply
the
place
.
And
to
this
purpose
in
a
Constitution
made
by
the
Emperor
Jodocus
,
about
the
year
1410.
there
is
a
clause
,
that
if
he
or
any
one
of
his
Successors
do
any
thing
unto
the
contrary
thereof
,
the
Electors
and
other
States
of
the
Empire
sine
rebellionis
vel
infidelitatis
crimine
libertatem
habeant
,
[
o
](A86304-e62420-b)
o
Goldast
.
Constit
.
Imperial
.
Tom.
3.
p.
424.
should
be
at
liberty
without
incurring
the
crimes
of
Treason
or
Disloyalty
,
not
only
to
oppose
,
but
resist
them
in
it
.
The
like
to
which
occurs
for
the
Realm
of
Hungary
,
wherein
K.
Andrew
gives
authority
to
his
Bishops
,
Lords
,
and
other
Nobles
sine
nota
alicujus
infidelitatis
;
[
p
](A86304-e62460-b)
p
Bonfinius
de
Edict
.
publ
.
p.
37.
that
without
any
imputation
of
disloyalty
,
they
may
contradict
,
oppose
,
and
resist
their
Kings
,
if
they
do
any
thing
in
violation
of
some
Laws
and
sanctions
.
In
Poland
the
King
takes
a
solemn
oath
at
his
Coronation
,
to
confirm
all
the
Privileges
,
rights
and
liberties
which
have
been
granted
to
his
Subjects
of
all
ranks
and
orders
by
any
of
his
Predecessors
:
and
then
addes
this
clause
,
quod
si
Sacramentum
meum
violavero
,
incolae
Regni
nullam
nobis
obedientiam
praestare
tenebuntur
;
which
if
he
violates
,
his
Subjects
shall
no
longer
be
obliged
to
yield
him
obedience
.
[
q
](A86304-e62500-b)
q
Bodin
de
Rep.
lib.
1.
cap.
8.
Which
oath
as
Bodine
well
observeth
,
doth
savour
rather
of
the
condition
of
the
Prince
of
the
Senate
,
than
of
the
Majesty
of
a
King
.
The
like
may
be
affirmed
of
Frederick
the
first
King
of
Danemark
,
who
being
called
unto
that
Crown
on
the
ejection
of
K.
Christian
the
2d
.
An.
1523.
"
was
so
conditioned
with
by
the
the
Lords
of
the
Kingdome
,
that
at
his
coronation
,
or
before
,
he
was
fain
to
swear
,
that
he
would
put
none
of
the
Nobility
to
death
or
banishment
,
but
by
the
judgement
of
the
Senate
,
that
the
great
men
should
have
power
of
life
or
death
over
their
Tenants
and
Vassals
,
and
that
no
Appeal
should
lye
from
them
to
the
Kings
tribunal
,
nor
the
King
be
partaker
of
the
confiscations
;
nec
item
honores
aut
imperia
privatis
daturum
,
&c
[
r
](A86304-e62660-b)
r
Id.
ibid.
nor
advance
any
private
person
to
commands
or
honors
,
but
by
authority
of
his
great
Counsel
.
"
Which
oath
being
also
taken
by
Frederick
the
second
,
made
Bodinus
say
,
that
the
Kings
of
Danemark
,
non
tam
reipsa
quam
appellare
Reges
sunt
,
were
only
titular
Kings
,
but
not
Kings
indeed
:
Which
character
he
also
gives
of
the
Kings
of
Bohemia
.
[
s
](A86304-e62720-b)
s
Id.
ibid.
p.
88.
But
in
an
absolute
Monarchy
the
case
is
otherwise
,
all
the
prerogatives
and
rights
of
Soveraignty
being
so
vested
in
the
Kings
person
,
ut
nec
singulis
civibus
nec
universis
fac
est
,
&c.
that
it
is
neither
lawful
to
particular
men
,
nor
to
the
whole
body
of
the
Subjects
generally
to
call
the
Prince
in
question
for
life
,
fame
,
or
fortunes
:
[
t
](A86304-e62740-b)
t
Id.
ibid.
p.
210.
and
amongst
these
he
reckoneth
the
kingdoms
of
France
,
Spain
,
England
,
Scotland
,
the
Tartars
,
Muscovites
,
&
omnium
paene
Africae
&
Asiae
imperiorum
,
and
of
almost
all
the
Kingdomes
of
Africk
,
and
Asia
.
But
this
we
shall
the
better
see
by
looking
over
the
particulars
as
they
lye
before
us
.
(
3.
)
But
first
before
we
come
unto
those
particulars
we
will
look
backwards
on
the
condition
and
authority
of
the
Jewish
Sanhedrim
;
which
being
instituted
and
ordained
by
the
Lord
himself
,
may
serve
to
be
a
leading
case
in
the
present
business
.
For
being
that
the
Iews
were
the
Lords
own
people
,
and
their
Kings
honored
with
the
title
of
the
Lords
Anointed
:
it
will
be
thought
,
that
if
the
Sanhedrim
,
or
the
great
Councel
of
the
seventie
had
any
authority
and
power
over
the
Kings
of
Iudah
,
(
of
whose
jus
Regni
such
a
large
description
is
made
by
God
himself
in
the
first
of
Sam.
cap.
8.
)
the
three
Estates
may
reasonably
expect
the
like
in
these
parts
of
Christendom
.
Now
for
the
authority
of
the
Sanhedrim
,
it
is
said
by
Cardinal
Baronius
,
that
they
had
power
of
judicature
over
the
Law
,
the
Prophets
,
and
the
Kings
themselves
.
[
u
](A86304-e62950-b)
u
Baron
.
Annal.
Eccl.
An.
31.
§.
10.
Erat
horum
summa
autoritas
ut
qui
de
lege
cognoscerent
,
&
Prophetis
,
&
simul
de
Regnibus
judicarent
.
Which
false
position
he
confirms
by
as
false
an
instance
,
affirming
in
the
very
next
words
,
horum
judicio
Herodem
Regem
postulatum
esse
,
that
King
Herod
was
convented
and
convicted
by
them
;
for
which
he
cites
Iosephus
with
the
like
integrity
.
I
should
have
wondred
very
much
what
should
occasion
such
a
grosse
mistake
in
the
learned
Cardinal
,
had
I
not
shewn
before
,
that
as
he
makes
the
Sanhedrim
to
rule
the
King
,
so
he
hath
made
the
high
Priest
to
rule
the
Sanhedrim
:
which
to
what
purpose
it
was
done
every
man
can
tell
,
who
knoweth
the
Cardinal
endeavoureth
nothing
more
in
his
large
Collections
,
than
to
advance
the
dignity
and
supremacy
of
the
Popes
of
Rome
.
[
x
](A86304-e63060-b)
x
Id.
in
Epist
dedicator
.
But
for
the
power
pretended
to
be
in
the
Sanhedrim
,
and
their
proceedings
against
Herod
as
their
actual
King
;
Iosephus
when
he
cite's
is
so
far
from
saying
it
,
that
he
doth
expresly
say
the
contrary
.
For
,
as
Josephus
tells
the
story
,
Hyrcanus
was
then
King
,
not
Herod
;
and
Herod
of
so
little
hopes
to
enjoy
the
Kingdom
,
that
he
could
not
possibly
pretend
any
Title
to
it
.
But
having
a
command
in
Galilee
procured
by
Antipater
his
Father
,
of
the
good
King
Hyrcanus
,
he
had
played
the
wanton
Governor
amongst
them
,
and
put
some
of
them
to
death
against
Law
and
Justice
.
For
which
the
Mothers
of
the
slain
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
,
did
often
call
upon
the
King
and
people
in
the
open
Temple
,
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
,
[
y
](A86304-e63190-b)
y
Joseph
.
Ant●q
Judic
.
l.
14.
cap.
17.
&c.
that
Herod
might
answer
for
the
murther
before
the
Sanhedrim
,
Which
being
granted
by
the
King
,
he
was
accordingly
convented
by
them
,
and
had
been
questionlesse
condemned
,
had
not
the
King
,
who
loved
him
dearly
,
given
him
notice
of
it
;
on
whose
advertisement
he
went
out
of
the
Town
,
and
so
escaped
the
danger
.
This
is
the
substance
of
that
story
:
and
this
gives
no
authority
to
the
Court
of
Sanhedrim
,
over
the
persons
or
the
actions
of
the
Kings
of
Iudah
.
Others
there
are
,
who
make
them
equal
to
the
Kings
,
though
not
superiour
,
(
Magnam
fuisse
Senatus
autoritatem
&
Regiae
velut
parem
,
[
z
](A86304-e63270-b)
z
Grotius
in
Matth.
cap.
5.
v.
22.
saith
the
learned
Grotius
:
)
And
for
the
proof
thereof
allege
those
words
of
Sedechias
in
the
Book
of
Ieremie
:
who
when
the
Princes
of
his
Realm
required
of
him
to
put
the
Prophet
to
death
,
returned
this
Answer
,
[
a
](A86304-e63320-b)
a
Jerem.
38.
5.
Behold
he
is
in
your
h●nd
,
Rex
enim
contra
vos
nihil
potest
,
for
the
King
is
not
he
that
can
do
any
thing
against
you
.
Which
words
are
also
cited
by
Mr.
Prynne
to
prove
that
the
King
of
England
hath
no
Negative
voyce
;
[
b
](A86304-e63380-b)
b
Prynne
of
Parl.
pt.
2.
p.
73.
but
by
neither
rightly
.
For
Calvin
(
who
,
as
one
observeth
,
composed
his
expositions
on
the
book
of
God
according
to
the
doctrine
of
his
Institutions
[
c
](A86304-e63410-b)
c
Hookers
preface
.
)
would
not
have
lost
so
fair
an
evidence
for
the
advancing
of
the
power
of
his
three
Estates
:
had
he
conceived
he
could
have
made
it
serviceable
to
his
end
and
purpose
.
But
he
upon
the
contrary
finds
fault
with
them
,
who
do
so
expound
it
,
or
think
the
King
did
speak
so
honorably
of
his
Princes
,
ac
si
nihil
iis
sit
nequandum
[
d
](A86304-e63440-b)
d
Calvin
.
in
Jerem.
c.
38.
v.
5.
as
if
it
were
not
to
deny
them
any
thing
.
Not
so
,
saith
he
,
it
rather
is
amerulenta
Regis
querimonia
,
a
sad
and
bitter
complaint
of
the
poor
captivated
King
against
his
Counsellors
;
by
whom
he
was
so
over-ruled
,
ut
velit
nolit
cedere
iis
cognitur
,
that
he
was
forced
to
yield
to
them
whether
he
would
or
not
:
which
he
expresly
calls
inexcusabilem
arrogantium
,
an
intollerable
piece
of
sawciness
in
those
Princes
,
and
an
exclusion
of
the
King
from
his
legal
rights
.
(4)
Let
us
next
take
a
view
of
such
Christian
Kingdomes
as
are
under
the
command
of
absolute
Monarchs
.
And
first
we
will
begin
with
the
Realm
of
France
,
the
government
whereof
is
meerly
Regal
,
if
not
despotical
,
such
as
that
of
a
Master
over
his
Servants
:
which
Aristotle
defineth
to
be
a
form
of
Government
,
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
,
[
c
](A86304-e63560-b)
c
Aristot
.
Politic.
l.
3.
wherein
the
King
may
do
whatsoever
he
list
,
according
to
the
counsel
of
his
own
mind
.
For
in
his
Arbitrary
Edicts
which
he
sendeth
abroad
,
he
never
mentioneth
the
consent
of
the
People
,
or
the
approbation
of
the
Counsel
,
or
the
advice
of
his
Judges
(
which
might
be
thought
to
derogate
too
much
from
his
absolute
power
)
but
concludes
all
of
them
in
this
Regal
form
,
Car
tel
est
nostre
plaisir
,
for
such
is
our
pleasure
.
And
though
the
Court
of
Parliament
in
Paris
do
use
to
take
upon
them
to
peruse
his
Edicts
,
before
they
passe
abroad
for
[
d
](A86304-e63640-b)
d
View
of
France
by
Dallington
.
Laws
,
and
sometime
to
demurr
on
his
grants
,
and
patents
,
and
to
petition
him
to
reverse
the
same
,
as
they
see
occasion
;
yet
their
perusal
is
a
matter
but
of
meer
formality
,
and
their
demurs
more
dilatory
than
effectual
.
It
is
the
Car
tel
est
nostre
plaisir
that
concludes
the
business
,
and
the
Kings
pleasure
is
the
Law
which
that
Court
is
ruled
by
.
As
for
the
Assemblie
des
Estats
,
or
Conventus
Ordinum
,
it
was
reputed
antiently
the
Supreme
Court
for
government
and
justice
of
all
the
Kingdome
;
and
had
the
cognizance
of
the
greatest
and
most
weighty
affairs
of
State
.
But
these
meetings
have
been
long
since
discontinued
,
and
almost
forgotten
:
there
being
no
such
Assembly
from
the
time
of
K.
Charles
the
eighth
,
to
the
beginning
of
the
reign
of
K.
Charles
the
ninth
,
[
e
](A86304-e63720-b)
e
Thuanus
hist.
sui
temp.
which
was
70
years
,
and
not
many
since
.
And
to
say
truth
,
they
could
be
but
of
little
use
,
as
the
world
now
goeth
,
were
the
meetings
oftner
.
For
whereas
there
are
three
Principal
,
if
not
sole
occasions
of
calling
this
Assemblie
,
or
Conventus
Ordinum
,
that
is
to
say
,
the
disposing
of
the
Regency
,
during
the
nonage
or
sickness
of
the
King
,
the
granting
aids
and
subsidies
,
and
the
redress
of
the
grievances
:
there
is
now
another
course
taken
to
dispatch
their
business
.
The
Parliament
of
Paris
,
which
speaks
most
commonly
as
it
is
prompted
by
power
and
greatness
,
appointeth
the
Regent
;
[
f
](A86304-e63790-b)
f
Contin
.
Thuani
.
An.
1610.
the
Kings
themselves
together
with
their
Treasurers
and
Under-officers
determine
of
the
taxes
,
[
g
](A86304-e63800-b)
g
View
of
France
.
and
they
that
do
complain
of
grievances
may
either
have
recourse
to
the
Courts
of
justice
,
or
else
petition
to
the
King
for
redress
thereof
.
And
for
the
making
new
Laws
or
repealing
the
old
,
the
naturalization
of
the
Alien
,
and
the
regulating
of
his
sales
or
grants
of
the
Crown-lands
,
the
publick
patrimony
of
the
Kingdome
,
which
were
wont
to
be
the
proper
subject
and
debates
of
these
grand
Assemblies
:
they
also
have
been
so
disposed
of
,
that
the
Conventus
Ordinum
is
neither
troubled
with
them
,
nor
called
about
them
.
The
Chamber
of
Accompts
in
Paris
(
which
hath
some
resemblance
to
our
Court
of
Exchequer
)
doth
absolutely
dispose
of
Naturalizations
,
and
superficially
surveyeth
the
Kings
grants
and
sales
,
[
*
](A86304-e63890-b)
*
Andr.
Du
Mesn
.
which
they
seldom
cross
.
The
Kings
Car
tel
est
nostre
plaisir
is
the
Subjects
law
,
and
is
as
binding
as
any
Act
or
Ordinance
of
the
three
Estates
:
and
for
repealing
of
such
Laws
as
upon
long
experience
are
conceived
to
be
unprofitable
,
the
Kings
sole
Edict
is
as
powerfull
as
any
Act
of
Parliament
.
Of
which
Bodinus
,
doth
not
only
say
in
these
general
terms
,
Saepe
vidimus
sine
Ordinum
convocatione
&
consensu
leges
à
Principe
abrogatas
[
k
](A86304-e63960-b)
k
Bodin
.
de
Rep.
lib.
1.
cap.
8.
.
that
many
times
these
Kings
did
abrogate
some
antient
laws
without
the
calling
and
consent
of
the
three
Estates
:
but
saith
,
that
it
was
neither
new
nor
strange
that
they
should
so
do
,
and
gives
us
some
particular
instances
,
not
only
of
the
later
times
but
the
former
ages
.
Nay
when
the
power
of
this
Assemblie
des
Estats
was
most
great
and
eminent
,
neither
so
curtailled
nor
neglected
as
it
hath
been
lately
;
yet
then
they
carried
themselves
with
the
greatest
reverence
and
respect
before
their
King
,
that
could
be
possibly
imagined
.
For
in
the
Assembly
held
at
Tours
under
Charles
the
8.
though
the
King
was
then
no
more
than
14
years
of
age
,
and
the
authority
of
that
Court
so
great
and
awfull
that
it
was
never
at
so
high
an
eminence
for
power
and
reputation
,
quanta
illis
temporibus
,
as
it
was
at
that
time
:
yet
when
they
came
before
the
King
,
Monseiur
de
Rell
being
then
Speaker
for
the
Commons
or
the
third
Estate
,
did
in
the
name
of
all
the
rest
,
and
with
as
much
humility
and
reverence
as
he
could
devise
,
promise
such
duty
and
obedience
,
such
a
conformity
of
his
will
and
pleasure
,
such
readiness
to
supply
his
wants
,
and
such
alacrity
in
hearking
unto
his
Commandements
,
that
as
Bodinus
well
observes
,
his
▪
whole
Oration
was
nothing
else
,
quam
perpetua
voluntatis
omnium
erga
Regem
testificatio
[
l
](A86304-e64090-b)
l
Id.
ibid.
,
but
a
constant
testimony
and
expression
of
the
good
affections
of
the
subject
to
their
Lord
and
Soveraign
.
But
whatsoever
power
they
had
in
former
times
is
not
now
material
,
King
Lewis
the
thirteenth
,
having
(
on
good
reason
of
State
)
discharged
those
Conventions
for
the
time
ensuing
,
Instead
whereof
he
instituted
an
Assembly
of
another
temper
,
and
such
as
should
be
more
obnoxious
to
his
will
and
pleasure
,
consisting
of
a
certain
number
of
persons
out
of
each
Estate
,
but
all
of
his
own
nomination
and
appointment
,
which
joyn'd
with
certain
of
his
Counsel
and
principal
Officers
,
he
caused
to
be
called
L'
Assembly
des
Notables
,
assigning
to
them
all
the
power
and
privileges
which
the
later
Conventions
of
the
three
Estates
did
pretend
unto
;
right
well
assured
that
men
so
nominated
and
intrusted
would
never
use
their
powers
to
his
detriment
,
and
disturbance
of
his
Heirs
and
Successors
.
5.
But
to
proceed
,
Bodinus
having
shewn
what
dutifull
respects
the
Convention
of
Estates
in
France
shewed
unto
their
King
,
addes
this
note
,
nec
aliter
Hispanorum
conventus
habentur
,
that
the
Assembly
of
the
three
Estates
in
the
Realms
of
Spain
carry
themselves
with
the
like
reverence
and
submission
to
their
Lord
the
King
:
Nay
major
etiam
obedientia
&
majus
obsequium
Regi
exhibetur
,
[
m
](A86304-e64220-b)
m
Id.
ibid.
the
King
of
Spain
hath
more
obedience
and
observance
from
his
three
Estates
,
than
that
which
is
afforded
to
the
Kings
of
France
.
Which
being
but
general
and
comparative
,
is
yet
enough
to
let
us
see
that
the
Assembly
of
Estates
in
the
Realms
of
Spain
,
which
they
call
the
Curia
,
is
very
observant
of
their
King
and
obsequious
to
him
,
and
have
but
little
of
that
power
which
is
supposed
by
our
Author
to
be
inherent
in
the
three
Estates
of
all
the
Christian
Kingdoms
,
But
this
Bodinus
proveth
more
particularly
,
ascribing
to
the
King
,
and
to
him
alone
,
the
power
of
calling
this
Assemblie
when
he
sees
occasion
,
and
of
dissolving
it
again
when
his
work
is
done
;
according
as
is
used
both
in
France
and
England
.
And
when
they
are
assembled
and
met
together
,
their
Acts
and
consultations
are
of
no
effect
,
further
than
as
they
are
confirmed
by
the
Kings
consent
.
Which
he
declareth
in
the
same
form
(
eadem
formulà
quâ
apud
nos
)
that
hath
accustomably
been
used
by
the
Kings
of
France
,
which
is
authoritative
enough
;
that
is
to
say
[
n
](A86304-e64370-b)
n
Id.
ibid.
p.
90.
decernimus
,
statuimus
,
volumus
,
We
will
,
and
we
appoint
,
and
we
have
decreed
.
The
Kings
of
Spain
,
though
not
so
despotical
in
their
Government
as
the
French
Kings
are
,
are
as
absolute
Monarchs
,
and
have
as
great
an
influence
on
the
three
Estates
,
to
make
them
pliant
to
their
will
,
and
to
work
out
their
own
ends
by
them
,
as
ever
had
the
French
Kings
on
their
Courts
of
Parliament
:
a
touch
whereof
we
had
before
in
the
former
Chapter
.
And
this
we
may
yet
further
see
by
their
observance
of
the
pleasure
of
King
Philip
the
2d
.
Who
having
maried
the
Lady
Elizabeth
Daughter
of
Henry
the
2d
.
of
France
,
Convocatos
Castellae
&
reliquarum
Hispaniae
Provinciarum
Ordines
,
[
o
](A86304-e64510-b)
o
Thuan.
●ist
.
sui
temp.
h
23.
l.
calling
together
the
Estates
of
Castile
and
his
other
Provinces
of
Spain
,
he
caused
them
to
swear
to
the
succession
of
his
Son
Prince
Charles
,
whom
he
had
by
the
Lady
Mary
of
Portugal
,
and
after
having
on
some
jealousies
of
State
put
that
Prince
to
death
,
caused
them
to
swear
to
the
succession
of
another
son
by
the
Lady
of
Austria
.
And
for
the
power
of
his
Edicts
,
which
they
call
Pragmaticas
,
they
are
as
binding
to
the
Subject
as
an
Act
of
Parliament
,
or
any
kind
of
Law
whatever
:
examples
of
the
which
are
very
obvious
and
familiar
in
the
Spanish
Histories
.
For
though
there
be
a
body
of
Laws
in
use
amongst
them
,
partly
made
up
of
some
old
Gothish
Laws
and
Constitutions
,
and
partly
of
some
parts
of
the
Law
imperial
:
yet
for
the
explanation
of
the
Laws
in
force
,
if
any
doubt
arise
about
them
,
or
for
supplying
such
defects
which
in
the
best
colllection
of
the
Laws
may
occur
sometimes
,
the
Magistrates
and
Judges
are
to
have
recourse
to
the
King
alone
,
and
to
conform
to
such
instructions
as
he
gives
them
in
it
.
And
this
is
it
which
was
ordained
by
Alfonso
the
tenth
,
qui
etiam
magistratus
ac
judices
Principem
adire
jussit
,
quoties
patrio
jure
nihil
de
proposita
causa
scriptum
esset
[
p
](A86304-e64660-b)
p
Bodin
.
de
Rep.
lib.
1.
cap.
8.
,
as
Bodinus
hath
it
.
'T
is
true
that
for
the
raising
of
supplies
of
mony
,
and
the
imposing
of
extraordinary
taxes
upon
the
subject
,
the
Kings
of
Spain
must
be
beholden
to
the
three
Estates
,
without
whose
consent
it
cannot
legally
be
done
.
But
then
it
is
as
true
withall
,
that
there
are
customary
tributes
called
Servitia
[
q
](A86304-e64710-b)
q
Id.
ibid.
p.
90.
which
the
King
raiseth
of
his
own
authority
without
such
consent
.
And
their
consenting
to
the
extraordinary
is
a
thing
of
course
:
the
Spanish
Nation
being
so
well
affected
naturally
to
the
power
and
greatness
of
their
Kings
,
whom
they
desire
to
make
considerable
if
not
formidable
in
the
opinion
of
their
Neighbours
,
that
the
Kings
seldome
fail
of
monies
if
the
Subjects
have
it
.
Finally
that
we
may
perceive
how
absolute
this
Monarch
is
over
all
the
Courts
or
Curias
of
his
whole
dominions
;
take
this
along
according
as
it
stands
verbatim
[
s
](A86304-e64750-b)
s
Spanish
hist.
67.
by
Tyrannell
.
in
the
Spanish
Historie
.
"
The
King
of
Spain
as
he
is
a
potent
Prince
and
Lord
of
many
Countries
,
so
hath
he
many
Counsels
for
the
managing
of
their
affairs
distinctly
and
apart
without
any
confusion
:
every
Counsel
treating
only
of
those
matters
which
concern
their
Jurisdiction
and
charges
:
with
which
Counsels
and
with
the
Presidents
thereof
,
being
men
of
chief
note
,
the
King
doth
usually
confer
touching
matters
belonging
to
the
good
Government
,
preservation
,
and
increase
of
his
Estates
,
and
having
heard
every
mans
opinion
,
he
commands
that
to
be
executed
which
he
holds
most
fit
and
convenient
..
"
6.
Next
let
us
take
a
view
of
Scotland
,
and
we
shall
find
it
there
no
otherwise
(
I
mean
in
reference
to
the
point
which
is
now
in
question
)
than
in
France
or
Spain
.
For
besides
that
Bodinus
makes
it
one
of
those
absolute
Monarchies
,
ubi
Reges
sine
controversia
omnia
jura
Majestatis
habent
per
sese
,
[
t
](A86304-e64880-b)
t
Bodin
.
de
Repub.
l.
2.
c.
7.
in
which
the
Kings
have
clearly
all
the
rights
of
Majesty
inherent
in
their
own
persons
only
:
it
is
declared
in
the
Records
of
that
very
Kingdome
,
that
the
King
is
directus
totius
dominus
,
[
u
](A86304-e64920-b)
u
Camden
n
Britan.
deicript
.
●
the
Soveraign
Lord
of
the
whole
State
,
and
hath
all
authority
and
jurisdiction
over
all
estates
and
degrees
,
aswel
Ecclesiastical
as
lay
or
temporal
.
And
as
for
those
Estates
and
Degrees
convened
in
Parliament
,
we
may
conjecture
at
their
power
,
by
that
which
is
delivered
of
the
form
or
order
which
they
held
it
in
;
which
is
briefly
this
.
[
x
](A86304-e64970-b)
x
Form
of
holding
the
Parl.
in
Scotl.
"
Assoon
as
the
Kings
writ
is
issued
out
for
summoning
the
Estates
to
meet
in
Parliament
,
he
maketh
choyse
of
eight
of
the
Spiritual
Lords
,
such
on
whose
wisdom
and
integrity
he
may
most
rely
;
which
eight
do
choose
as
many
of
the
Temporal
Lords
,
and
they
together
nominate
eight
more
out
of
the
Commissioners
for
the
Counties
,
and
as
many
out
of
the
Commissioners
for
the
Towns
or
Burroughs
.
These
32
thus
chosen
are
called
Domini
pro
Articulis
,
Lords
of
the
Articles
:
and
they
together
with
the
Chancellor
,
Treasurer
,
Keeper
of
the
Privy
Seal
,
and
Principal
Secretaries
of
state
,
and
the
Master
of
the
Rolls
(
whom
they
call
Clerk
Register
)
do
admit
or
reject
every
bill
;
[
but
not
before
they
have
been
shewn
unto
the
King
]
if
they
pass
there
they
are
presented
afterwards
to
the
whole
Assembly
,
where
being
thorowly
weighed
,
and
examined
,
&
put
unto
the
votes
of
the
house
;
such
of
them
as
are
carried
by
the
major
part
of
the
Voices
(
for
the
Lords
and
Commons
sit
together
in
the
same
house
there
)
are
on
the
last
day
of
the
Sessions
exhibited
to
the
King
:
who
by
touching
them
with
his
Scepter
pronounceth
that
he
either
ratifieth
and
approveth
them
,
or
that
he
doth
disable
them
and
make
them
void
.
But
if
the
business
be
disliked
by
the
Lords
of
the
Articles
it
proceeds
no
further
,
and
never
comes
unto
the
consideration
of
the
Parliament
,
or
if
the
King
dislikes
of
any
thing
in
it
when
they
shew
it
to
him
,
it
either
is
razed
out
or
mended
before
it
be
presented
to
the
publick
view
.
"
King
James
of
blessed
memory
,
who
very
well
understood
his
own
power
and
the
forms
of
that
Parliament
,
describes
it
much
to
the
same
purpose
,
in
his
Speech
made
at
Whitehall
,
March
31.
Anno
1607.
"
About
twenty
daies
(
saith
he
)
before
the
Parliament
,
Proclamation
is
made
throughout
the
Kingdom
to
deliver
unto
the
Kings
Clerk
of
Register
all
Bils
to
be
exhibited
that
Session
before
a
certain
day
.
Then
are
they
brought
unto
the
King
,
and
perused
and
considered
by
him
,
and
only
such
as
he
alloweth
of
are
put
into
the
Chancellors
hands
to
be
propounded
to
the
Parliament
,
and
none
others
.
And
if
any
other
man
in
Parliament
speak
of
any
other
matter
than
is
in
this
sort
first
allowed
by
the
King
,
the
Chancellor
telleth
him
that
the
King
hath
allowed
of
no
such
Bill
.
Besides
,
when
they
have
passed
them
for
Laws
they
are
presented
to
the
King
,
and
he
with
his
Scepter
put
into
his
hands
by
the
Chancellor
,
must
say
,
I
ratifie
and
approve
all
things
done
in
this
present
Parliament
.
And
if
there
be
any
thing
that
he
disliketh
it
is
razed
out
before
.
"
So
the
eldest
Parliament-man
as
he
said
himself
,
at
that
time
in
Scotland
.
This
was
the
form
of
holding
Parliaments
in
Scotland
,
which
,
whosoever
doth
consider
with
a
serious
eye
may
perceive
most
plainly
,
that
it
is
wholly
in
the
Kings
power
to
frame
the
Parliament
to
his
own
will
,
or
at
the
least
to
hinder
it
from
doing
any
thing
to
the
prejudice
of
his
Royal
Crown
and
Dignity
:
in
that
the
nominating
of
the
Lords
of
the
Articles
did
in
a
manner
totally
depend
on
him
.
Which
being
observed
by
the
Scots
,
they
took
the
opportunity
when
they
were
in
Arms
to
pass
an
Act
during
the
Presidency
of
the
Lord
Burley
,
Anno
1640.
[
y
](A86304-e65270-b)
y
Acts
of
Parliaments
,
16
Carol.
for
the
abolition
of
this
Order
,
and
for
reducing
of
that
Parliament
to
the
forms
of
England
;
as
being
thought
more
advantagious
to
their
purposes
,
than
the
former
was
.
So
that
the
violent
disloyalty
of
the
Scotish
Subjects
,
their
Insurrections
against
their
Kings
,
and
murdering
them
sometimes
when
their
heels
were
up
,
which
makes
that
Nation
so
ill
spoke
of
in
the
Stories
of
Christendom
,
are
not
to
be
imputed
to
the
three
Estates
convened
in
Parliament
,
or
to
any
power
or
Act
of
theirs
,
but
only
praefervido
Scotorum
ingenio
[
z
](A86304-e65330-b)
z
Rivet
cont
.
tenuit
.
as
one
pleads
it
for
them
,
unto
the
natural
disposition
of
that
fierce
and
head-strong
people
,
yet
easilier
made
subject
unto
rule
and
government
.
The
three
Estates
assembled
in
the
Court
of
Parliament
,
(
when
in
the
judgement
of
our
Author
they
are
most
fit
to
undertake
the
business
)
have
for
the
most
part
had
no
hand
in
those
desperate
courses
.
7.
And
now
at
last
we
ate
come
to
England
,
where
,
since
we
came
no
sooner
,
we
will
stay
the
longer
:
and
here
we
shall
behold
the
King
established
in
an
absolute
Monarchy
,
from
whom
the
meeting
of
the
three
Estates
in
Parliament
detracteth
nothing
of
his
power
and
authority
Royal.
Bodin
as
great
a
Politick
as
any
of
his
time
in
the
Realm
of
France
,
hath
ranked
our
Kings
amongst
the
absolute
Monarch
of
these
Western
parts
[
a
](A86304-e65450-b)
a
Bodin
de
Rep.
l.
1.
c.
8.
.
And
Camden
as
renowned
an
Antiquary
as
any
of
the
Age
he
lived
in
,
hath
told
us
of
the
King
of
England
,
supremam
potestatem
&
merum
imperium
habere
[
b
](A86304-e65480-b)
b
Camden
in
Britan.
descript.
,
"
that
he
hath
supreme
power
and
absolute
command
in
his
dominions
;
and
that
he
neither
holds
his
Crown
in
vassallage
,
nor
receiveth
his
investisture
of
any
other
,
nor
acknowledgeth
any
Superiour
,
but
God
alone
.
"
To
prove
this
last
,
he
cites
these
memorable
words
from
Bracton
an
old
English
Lawyer
,
omnis
quidem
sub
Rege
,
&
ipse
sub
nullo
sed
tantum
sub
deo
,
that
every
man
is
under
the
King
,
but
the
King
under
none
saving
only
God
.
But
Bracton
tells
us
more
than
this
,
and
affirms
expresly
,
that
the
King
hath
supreme
power
and
jurisdiction
over
all
causes
and
persons
in
this
his
Majesties
Realm
of
England
,
that
all
jurisdictions
are
vested
in
him
and
are
issued
from
him
,
and
that
he
hath
jus
gladii
,
or
the
right
of
the
sword
,
for
the
better
governance
of
his
people
.
This
is
the
substance
of
his
words
,
but
the
words
are
these
,
[
c
](A86304-e65570-b)
c
Bracton
de
leg
.
A●gl
.
l.
2.
c.
24.
Sciendum
est
(
saith
he
)
quod
ipse
dominus
Rex
ordinariam
habet
jurisdictionem
&
dignitatem
&
potestatem
super
omnes
qui
in
regno
suo
sunt
.
Habet
enim
omnia
jura
in
manu
sua
quae
ad
coronam
&
laicalem
pertinent
potestatem
,
&
materialem
gladium
qui
pertinet
ad
Regni
gubernandum
,
&c.
He
addes
yet
surther
.
Habet
item
in
potestate
sua
leges
&
constitutiones
[
d
](A86304-e65660-b)
d
Id.
l.
2.
c.
16.
,
that
the
Laws
and
constitutions
of
the
Realm
,
are
in
the
power
of
the
King
:
by
which
words
,
whether
he
meaneth
that
the
Legislative
power
is
in
the
King
,
and
whether
the
Legislative
power
be
in
him
,
and
in
him
alone
,
we
shall
see
anon
.
But
sure
I
am
,
that
he
ascribes
unto
the
King
the
power
of
interpreting
the
Law
in
all
doubtfull
cases
,
in
dubiis
&
obscuris
domini
Regis
expectanda
interpretatio
&
voluntas
,
which
is
plain
enough
.
For
though
he
speaketh
only
de
chartis
Regiis
&
factis
Regum
,
of
the
Kings
deeds
and
charters
only
,
as
the
words
seem
to
import
;
yet
considering
the
times
in
which
he
lived
(
being
Chief
Justice
in
the
time
of
King
Henry
the
3d.
)
wherein
there
was
but
little
written
Law
more
than
what
was
comprehended
in
the
Kings
Grants
and
Charters
,
he
may
be
understood
of
all
Laws
whatever
.
And
so
much
is
collected
out
of
Bractons
words
by
the
L.
Chancellor
Egerton
,
of
whom
it
may
be
said
without
envy
,
that
he
was
as
grave
and
learned
a
Lawyer
,
as
ever
sat
upon
that
Bench.
"
Who
gathereth
out
of
Bracton
,
that
all
cases
not
determined
for
want
of
foresight
are
in
the
King
,
to
whom
belongs
the
right
of
interpretation
,
not
in
plain
and
evident
cases
,
but
only
in
new
questions
and
emergent
doubts
;
and
that
the
King
hath
as
much
right
by
the
constitutions
of
this
Kingdom
,
as
the
Civil
law
gave
the
Roman
Emperors
,
where
it
is
said
,
Rex
solus
judicat
de
causa
a
jure
non
definita
[
e
](A86304-e65800-b)
e
Case
of
the
Post-nati
.
p.
107
,
108.
.
"
And
though
the
Kings
make
not
any
Laws
without
the
counsel
and
consent
of
his
Lords
and
Commons
,
whereof
we
shall
speak
more
in
the
following
Section
,
yet
in
such
cases
where
the
Laws
do
provide
no
remedy
,
and
in
such
matters
as
concern
the
politick
administration
of
his
Kingdoms
,
he
may
and
doth
take
order
by
his
Proclamations
.
He
also
hath
authority
by
his
Prerogative
Royal
to
dispense
with
the
rigour
of
the
Laws
,
and
sometimes
to
pass
by
a
Statute
with
a
non
obstante
,
as
in
the
Statute
1
Henr.
4.
cap.
6.
touching
the
value
to
be
specified
of
such
lands
,
offices
,
or
annuities
,
&c
,
as
by
the
King
are
granted
in
his
Letters
patents
.
But
these
will
better
come
within
the
compasse
of
those
jura
Majestatis
or
rights
of
Soveraignty
,
which
our
Lawyers
call
sacra
&
individua
[
f
](A86304-e65900-b)
f
Camden
in
B●it
.
:
sacred
,
by
reason
they
are
not
to
be
pryed
into
with
irreverent
eyes
;
and
individual
or
inseparable
,
because
they
cannot
be
communicated
unto
any
other
.
Of
which
kind
are
the
levying
of
Arms
[
g
](A86304-e65930-b)
g
Case
of
our
Affairs
.
p.
3.
,
suppressing
of
tumults
and
rebellions
,
providing
for
the
present
safety
of
his
Kingdom
against
sudden
dangers
,
convoking
of
Parliaments
,
and
dissolving
them
,
making
of
Peers
,
granting
liberty
of
sending
Burgesses
to
Towns
and
Cities
,
treating
with
forein
States
,
making
war
,
leagues
,
and
peace
,
granting
safe
conduct
and
protection
,
indenizing
,
giving
of
honor
,
rewarding
,
pardoning
,
coyning
,
printing
,
and
the
like
to
these
.
But
what
need
these
particulars
have
been
looked
into
,
to
prove
the
absoluteness
and
soveraignty
of
the
Kings
of
England
,
when
the
whole
body
of
the
Realm
hath
affirmed
the
same
,
and
solemnly
declared
it
in
their
Acts
of
Parliament
.
In
one
of
which
is
affirmed
,
[
h
](A86304-e65970-b)
h
16
Rich.
2.
c.
5.
that
the
Crown
of
England
hath
been
so
free
at
all
times
,
that
it
hath
been
in
no
earthly
subjection
,
but
immediatly
to
God
,
in
all
things
touching
the
regality
of
the
said
Crown
,
and
to
none
other
.
And
in
another
Act
,
that
the
Realm
of
England
is
an
Empire
governed
by
one
supreme
head
and
King
,
having
the
Dignity
and
Royal
Estate
of
the
Imperial
Crown
of
the
same
,
unto
whom
a
Body
politick
compact
of
all
sorts
and
degrees
of
people
,
divided
in
terms
and
by
names
of
Spiritualty
and
Temporalty
been
bounden
and
ought
to
bear
next
to
God
a
natural
and
humble
obedience
[
i
](A86304-e66130-b)
i
24
Henr.
8.
c.
12.
.
And
more
than
so
,
that
the
King
being
the
supreme
head
of
this
Body
Politick
is
instituted
and
furnished
by
the
goodness
and
sufferance
of
Almighty
God
with
plenary
whole
and
entire
power
,
preheminence
,
authority
,
prerogative
,
and
jurisdiction
to
render
and
yield
justice
and
final
determination
to
all
manner
of
Subjects
within
this
Realm
,
and
in
all
causes
whatsoever
.
Nor
was
this
any
new
Opinion
invented
only
to
comply
with
the
Princes
humour
,
but
such
as
is
declared
to
have
been
fortified
by
sundry
Laws
and
Ordinances
made
in
former
Parliaments
[
k
](A86304-e66200-b)
k
Ibid.
:
and
such
as
hath
been
since
confirmed
by
a
solemn
Oath
,
taken
and
to
be
taken
by
most
of
the
Subjects
of
this
Kingdom
,
Which
Oath
consisting
of
two
parts
,
the
one
Declaratory
,
and
the
other
Promissory
;
in
the
Declaratory
part
the
man
thus
taketh
it
doth
declare
and
testifie
in
his
conscience
,
that
the
Kings
Highness
is
the
only
supreme
Governor
of
this
Realm
and
of
all
other
his
Dominions
,
and
Countries
,
aswell
in
all
spiritual
or
ecclesiastical
things
or
causes
as
temporal
,
&c.
that
to
their
power
they
will
assist
and
defend
all
Jurisdictions
,
Privileges
,
Preheminences
,
and
Authorities
granted
or
belonging
to
the
Kings
Highness
,
his
Heirs
and
Succcesseors
,
or
united
and
annexed
to
the
Imperial
Crown
of
this
Realm
.
Put
all
which
hath
been
said
together
,
and
it
will
appear
,
that
if
to
have
merum
imperium
,
a
full
and
absolute
command
,
and
all
the
jura
majestatis
which
belong
to
Soveraignty
,
if
to
be
so
supreme
as
to
hold
immediatly
of
God
,
to
have
all
persons
under
him
,
none
but
God
above
him
;
if
to
have
all
authority
and
jurisdiction
to
be
vested
in
him
,
and
proceeding
from
him
,
and
the
material
sword
at
his
sole
disposal
for
the
correcting
of
offenders
and
the
well
ordering
of
his
people
;
if
to
have
whole
and
entire
power
of
rendring
justice
and
final
determination
of
all
causes
to
all
manner
of
Subjects
,
us
also
to
interpret
and
dispence
with
Laws
;
and
all
this
ratified
and
confirmed
unto
him
by
the
solemn
Oath
of
his
Subjects
in
the
Court
of
Parliament
,
be
enough
to
make
an
absolute
Monarch
:
the
Kings
of
England
are
more
absolute
Monarchs
than
either
of
their
Neighbours
of
France
or
Spain
.
8.
If
any
thing
may
be
said
to
detract
from
this
,
it
is
the
new
devise
so
much
pressed
of
late
,
of
placing
the
chief
Soveraignty
,
or
some
part
thereof
,
in
the
two
Houses
of
Parliament
:
concerning
which
Mr.
Prynne
published
a
discourse
entituled
The
supreme
power
of
Parliaments
and
Kingdoms
;
and
others
in
their
Pamphlets
upon
that
Argument
have
made
the
Parliament
so
absolute
,
and
the
King
so
limited
,
that
of
the
two
the
Members
of
the
Houses
are
the
greater
Monarchs
.
But
this
is
but
a
new
devise
,
not
heard
of
in
our
former
Monuments
&
Records
of
Law
:
nor
proved
,
or
to
be
proved
indeed
by
any
other
Medium
,
than
the
Rebellions
of
Cade
,
Tiler
,
Straw
,
Kett
,
Mackerell
,
and
the
rest
of
that
rascall
rabble
[
m
](A86304-e66540-b)
m
Prynnes
book
of
Parl.
&c.
p●
.
3.
;
or
the
seditious
Parliaments
in
the
time
of
K.
Henry
the
3d.
King
Edward
the
2d
.
and
King
Richard
the
2d
.
when
civil
war
and
faction
carried
all
before
it
.
For
neither
have
the
Houses
or
either
of
them
enjoyed
such
Soveraignty
de
facto
in
times
well
setled
,
and
Parliaments
lawfully
assembled
,
nor
ever
could
pretend
to
the
same
de
jure
.
Or
if
they
did
,
as
many
have
been
apt
enough
to
raise
false
pretences
,
it
would
much
trouble
them
to
determine
whether
this
Soveraignty
be
conferred
upon
them
by
the
King
or
the
people
,
whether
it
be
in
either
of
the
Houses
severally
,
or
in
both
united
.
If
they
can
challenge
this
pretended
Soveraignty
in
neither
of
these
capacities
,
nor
by
none
of
these
Titles
,
it
may
be
warrantably
concluded
that
there
is
no
such
Soveraignty
as
they
do
pretend
to
.
And
first
there
is
no
part
nor
branch
of
Soveraignty
conferred
upon
them
by
the
King
.
The
writs
of
Summons
which
the
Declaration
of
the
Lords
and
Commons
assembled
at
Oxon.
1643.
doth
most
truly
call
the
foundation
of
all
power
in
Parliament
[
n
](A86304-e66670-b)
n
Declaration
of
the
Treaty
.
p.
15.
,
tell
us
no
such
matter
.
The
writ
directed
to
the
Lords
doth
enable
them
only
to
confer
and
treat
with
one
another
,
&
consilium
vestrum
impendere
,
and
to
advise
the
King
in
such
weighty
matters
as
concern
the
safety
of
the
Kingdom
.
But
they
are
only
to
advise
,
not
compell
the
King
,
to
counsell
him
,
but
not
controll
him
;
and
to
advise
and
counsel
are
no
marks
of
Soveraignty
,
but
rather
works
of
service
and
subordination
.
Nor
can
they
come
to
give
this
Counsel
without
he
invite
them
,
and
being
invited
by
his
writ
cannot
choose
but
come
,
except
he
excuse
them
:
which
are
sure
notes
of
duty
and
subjection
,
but
very
sory
signs
of
power
and
soveraignty
.
'T
is
true
,
that
being
come
together
they
may
and
sometimes
do
,
on
a
writ
of
Error
,
examin
,
and
reverse
or
affirm
such
judgements
as
have
been
given
in
the
Kings
Bench
:
and
from
their
sentence
in
the
case
there
is
no
appeal
,
but
only
to
the
whole
body
of
that
Court
,
the
King
and
both
the
Houses
,
the
Head
and
Members
[
o
](A86304-e66730-b)
o
Case
of
our
Affairs
.
p.
7
,
8.
.
But
this
they
do
,
not
as
the
upper
house
of
Parliament
,
but
as
the
distinct
court
of
the
Kings
Barons
of
Parliament
of
a
particular
and
ministerial
jurisdiction
,
to
some
intents
and
purposes
,
and
to
some
alone
:
which
though
it
doth
invest
them
with
a
power
of
judicature
,
confers
not
any
thing
upon
them
which
belongs
to
Soveraignty
.
Then
for
the
Commons
,
all
which
the
writ
doth
call
them
to
is
facere
&
consentire
,
to
do
and
consent
unto
such
things
which
are
ordained
by
the
Lords
and
Common
Counsel
of
the
Kingdom
of
England
,
and
sure
conformity
and
consent
,
which
is
all
the
writ
requireth
from
them
)
are
no
marks
of
Soveraignty
,
nor
can
an
Argument
be
drawn
from
thence
by
the
subtillest
Sophister
,
to
shew
that
they
are
called
to
be
partakers
of
the
Soveraign
power
,
or
that
the
King
intends
to
denude
himself
of
any
branch
or
leaf
thereof
to
hide
their
nakednesse
.
And
being
met
together
in
a
body
collective
,
they
are
so
far
from
having
any
share
in
Soveraignty
,
that
they
cannot
properly
be
called
a
Court
of
Judicature
,
as
neither
having
any
power
to
minister
an
Oath
[
p
](A86304-e66890-b)
p
Id.
p.
9.
,
or
to
imprison
any
body
(
except
it
be
some
of
their
own
Members
if
they
see
occasion
)
which
are
things
incident
to
all
Courts
of
Justice
,
and
to
every
Steward
of
a
Leet
,
insomuch
that
the
House
of
Co●mons
is
compared
by
some
(
●and
not
incongruosly
)
unto
the
Grand
Inquest
at
a
general
Sessions
[
q
](A86304-e66930-b)
q
Review
of
the
Observat
.
p.
22.
,
whose
principal
work
it
is
to
receive
bils
,
and
prepare
businesses
,
and
make
them
fit
and
ready
for
my
Lords
the
Judges
.
Nay
so
far
were
they
heretofore
from
the
thoughts
of
Soveraignty
,
that
they
were
lyable
to
sutes
and
punishments
for
things
done
in
Parliament
,
though
only
to
the
prejudice
of
a
private
Subject
,
untill
King
Henry
8.
most
graciously
passed
a
Law
for
their
indemnity
.
For
whereas
Richard
Strode
one
of
the
company
of
Tinners
in
the
County
of
Cornwall
,
being
a
Member
of
the
Commons
House
,
had
spoken
somwhat
to
the
prejudice
of
that
Society
,
and
contrary
to
the
Ordinances
of
the
Stanneries
;
at
his
return
into
the
Country
,
●e
was
arested
,
fined
,
imprisoned
.
Complaint
whereof
being
made
in
Parliament
,
the
King
passed
a
Law
to
this
effect
,
viz.
[
r
](A86304-e67030-b)
r
4
H●n.
8.
c.
8.
That
ull
sutes
,
condemnations
,
executions
,
charges
and
impositions
put
or
hereafter
to
be
put
upon
Richard
Strode
,
and
every
of
his
Complices
that
be
of
this
Parliament
,
or
a●y
other
hereafter
,
for
any
Bill
,
speaking
,
or
reasoning
of
any
thing
concerning
the
Parliament
to
be
communed
and
treated
of
,
shall
be
void
and
null
:
but
neither
any
reparation
was
allowed
to
Strode
,
nor
any
punishment
inflicted
upon
those
that
sued
him
,
for
ought
appears
upon
Record
.
And
for
the
Houses
joyned
together
(
which
is
the
last
capacity
they
can
claim
it
in
)
they
are
so
far
from
having
the
supreme
authority
,
that
(
as
it
is
observed
by
a
learned
Gentleman
)
"
they
cannot
so
unite
or
conjoyn
as
to
be
an
entire
Court
either
of
Soveraign
or
Ministerial
jurisdiction
;
no
otherwise
co-operating
than
by
concurrence
of
Votes
in
their
several
Houses
,
for
preparing
matters
in
order
to
an
Act
of
Parliament
[
s
](A86304-e67140-b)
s
Case
of
our
Affairs
.
p.
9.
:
Which
when
they
have
done
,
they
are
so
far
from
having
any
legal
authority
in
the
State
,
as
that
in
Law
there
is
no
stile
nor
form
of
their
joynt
Acts
;
nor
doth
the
Law
so
much
as
take
notice
of
them
until
they
have
the
Royal
Assent
.
So
that
considering
that
the
two
Houses
alone
do
no
way
make
an
entire
Body
or
Court
,
and
that
there
is
no
known
stile
nor
form
of
any
Law
or
Edict
,
by
the
Votes
of
the
two
Houses
only
,
nor
any
notice
taken
of
them
by
the
Law
;
it
is
apparent
that
there
is
no
Soveraignty
in
their
two
Votes
alone
.
"
How
far
the
practise
of
the
Lords
&
Commons
which
remaind
at
Westminster
,
after
so
many
of
both
Houses
had
tepaired
to
the
King
,
&c.
may
create
Precedents
unto
posterity
,
I
am
not
able
to
determine
:
but
sure
I
am
,
they
have
no
Precedent
to
shew
from
the
former
Ages
.
But
let
us
go
a
little
further
and
suppose
for
granted
,
that
the
Houses
either
joynt
or
separate
be
capable
of
the
Soveraignty
,
were
it
given
unto
them
:
I
would
fain
know
whether
they
claim
it
from
the
King
,
or
the
people
only
.
Not
from
the
King
,
for
he
confers
upon
them
no
further
power
than
to
debate
and
treat
of
his
great
Affairs
,
to
have
access
unto
his
person
,
freedome
of
Speech
(
as
long
as
they
contein
themselves
within
the
bounds
of
Loyalty
)
authority
over
their
own
Members
:
which
being
custumarily
desired
[
t
](A86304-e67280-b)
t
Hakewell
of
passing
bils
in
Parliament
,
and
of
course
obtained
(
as
it
relates
into
the
Commons
)
shews
plainly
,
that
these
vulgar
privileges
are
nothing
more
the
rights
of
Parliament
,
than
the
favours
of
Princes
,
but
yet
such
favours
as
impart
not
the
least
power
of
Soveraignty
.
Nor
doth
the
calling
of
a
Parliament
ex
opere
operato
as
you
know
who
phrase
it
,
either
denude
the
King
of
the
poorest
robe
of
all
his
Royalty
,
or
confer
the
same
upon
the
Houses
,
or
on
either
of
them
;
whether
the
King
intend
so
by
his
call
,
or
otherwise
.
For
Bodin
(
whom
Mr.
Prynne
hath
honored
with
the
title
of
a
grand
Politician
[
u
](A86304-e67400-b)
u
Pryn
of
Parliam
.
par.
2.
p.
45.
)
doth
affirm
expresly
,
Principis
majestatem
nec
Comitorum
convocatione
,
nec
Senatus
populique
praesentia
minui
[
x
](A86304-e67420-b)
x
Bodin
.
de
Repub.
,
that
the
majesty
or
Soveraignty
of
the
King
is
not
a
jot
diminished
either
by
the
calling
of
a
Parliament
or
Conventus
Ordinum
,
or
by
the
frequency
and
presence
of
his
Lords
and
Commons
.
Nay
to
say
truth
,
the
Majesty
of
Soveraign
Princes
is
never
so
transcendent
and
conspicuous
as
when
they
sit
in
Parliament
,
with
their
States
about
them
,
the
King
then
standing
in
his
highest
Estate
,
as
was
once
said
by
Henry
8.
who
knew
(
as
well
as
any
of
the
Kings
of
England
)
how
to
keep
up
the
majesty
of
the
Crown
Imperial
.
Nor
can
they
claim
it
from
the
people
,
who
have
none
to
give
;
for
nemo
dat
quod
non
habet
,
as
the
saying
is
.
The
King
(
as
hath
been
proved
before
)
doth
hold
his
Royal
Crown
immediately
from
God
himself
,
not
from
the
contract
of
the
people
.
He
writes
not
populi
clementia
,
but
Dei
gratia
,
not
by
the
favour
of
the
people
,
but
by
the
grace
of
God
.
The
consent
and
approbation
of
the
people
(
used
and
not
used
before
the
day
of
coronation
)
is
reckoned
only
as
a
part
of
the
solemn
pomps
which
are
then
accustomably
used
.
The
King
is
actually
King
to
all
intents
and
purposes
in
the
Law
whatever
,
immediately
on
the
death
of
his
Predecessor
.
Nor
ever
was
it
otherwise
objected
in
the
Realm
of
England
,
till
Clark
and
Watson
pleaded
it
at
their
arraignment
in
the
first
year
of
King
James
[
y
](A86304-e67610-b)
y
Speeds
History
in
K.
James
.
.
Or
grant
we
that
the
Majesty
of
this
Kingdom
was
first
originally
in
the
people
,
and
by
them
devolved
upon
the
King
by
their
joynt
consent
:
yet
having
given
away
that
power
by
their
said
consent
,
and
setled
it
upon
the
King
by
an
Act
of
State
,
confirmed
by
Oaths
and
all
solemnities
which
that
Act
requires
;
they
cannot
so
retract
that
grant
,
or
make
void
that
gift
,
as
to
pass
a
new
conveyance
of
it
,
and
settle
it
upon
their
Representees
in
the
House
of
Commons
.
Or
if
they
could
,
yet
this
would
utterly
exclude
all
the
Lords
from
having
the
least
share
or
portion
in
this
new
found
Soveraignty
;
in
that
they
represent
not
the
common
people
,
but
sit
there
only
in
their
own
personal
capacities
,
and
therefore
must
submit
at
last
to
these
new
made
Soveraigns
,
who
carry
both
the
Purse
&
Sword
at
their
own
girdles
.
So
then
the
people
cannot
give
the
Soveraignty
,
and
if
they
have
no
power
to
give
it
,
the
Lords
and
Commons
have
no
claim
thereunto
de
jure
.
See
we
next
therefore
how
much
of
this
Soveraignty
they
or
their
Predecessors
rather
have
enjoyed
de
facto
,
in
peaceable
and
regular
times
,
fit
to
be
drawn
into
example
in
the
Ages
following
.
The
chief
particulars
in
which
the
Soveraignty
consists
we
have
seen
before
;
and
will
now
see
whether
that
any
of
them
been
exercised
and
injoyed
in
peaceable
and
regular
times
by
both
or
either
of
the
two
Houses
of
Parliament
.
And
first
for
calling
and
dissolving
Parliaments
,
making
of
Peers
,
granting
of
liberty
to
Towns
and
Cities
,
to
make
choyse
of
Burgesses
,
which
antiently
had
no
such
liberty
,
treating
with
forein
States
,
denouncing
war
,
or
making
Leagues
or
Peace
after
war
commenced
,
granting
safe
conduct
and
protection
,
indenizing
of
Aliens
,
giving
of
honors
unto
eminent
and
deserving
persons
,
rewarding
,
pardoning
,
coyning
,
printing
,
making
of
corporations
,
and
dispensing
with
the
Laws
in
force
;
they
are
such
points
which
never
Parliament
did
pretend
to
till
these
later
times
,
wherein
every
thing
almost
is
lawfull
(
I
am
sure
more
law●ull
)
than
to
fear
God
and
honor
the
King
.
Nor
do
I
find
that
Mr.
Prynne
hath
laboured
to
entitle
them
to
these
particulars
.
For
levying
of
Arms
and
the
command
of
the
Militia
,
besides
that
the
Kings
of
England
have
ever
been
in
possession
of
it
,
and
that
possession
never
disturbed
or
interrupted
by
any
claim
of
right
made
in
the
behalf
of
the
two
Houses
,
(
which
is
as
sure
a
title
as
the
Law
can
make
)
:
the
Houses
have
declared
by
a
Act
of
Parliament
[
a
](A86304-e68030-b)
a
S●at
.
7
Ed.
1.
cap.
1.
,
that
of
right
it
belongs
unto
the
King
streightly
to
defend
(
that
is
prohibit
)
all
force
of
Arms
,
and
that
the
Parliament
is
bound
to
aid
him
in
that
prohibition
.
Touching
the
Royal
navy
and
the
ports
and
forts
,
the
Kings
prescription
to
them
is
so
strong
and
binding
,
that
in
the
3d.
of
Edward
3.
the
guarding
of
the
Seas
,
and
marches
of
the
Kingdome
:
which
certainly
they
had
not
done
had
they
pretended
any
title
to
the
ports
and
navy
.
As
for
suppressing
tumults
,
and
providing
for
the
safety
of
the
Kingdom
against
sudden
danger
,
the
Law
commits
it
solely
to
the
care
of
the
King
:
obliging
every
Subject
by
the
duty
of
his
allegeance
to
aid
and
assist
him
at
all
seasons
when
need
shall
require
[
b
](A86304-e68200-b)
b
11
Henr.
7.
c.
18.
.
And
for
their
power
of
declaring
law
in
the
House
of
Peers
,
wherein
they
deliver
their
opinion
in
the
point
before
them
,
in
true
propriety
of
speech
they
have
none
at
all
[
c
](A86304-e68220-b)
c
Case
of
our
Affairs
,
p.
4.
.
And
this
is
that
which
was
affirmed
by
his
Majesty
at
the
end
of
the
Parliament
,
Anno
1628.
saying
,
that
it
belonged
only
to
the
Iudges
under
him
to
interpret
laws
,
and
that
none
of
the
Houses
of
Parliament
joynt
or
separate
(
what
new
Doctrine
soever
might
be
raised
)
had
any
power
either
to
make
or
declare
law
without
his
consent
[
d
](A86304-e68280-b)
d
3
Car.
.
And
if
it
be
done
with
his
consent
,
it
is
not
so
properly
the
declaring
and
interpreting
of
an
old
law
,
as
the
making
rather
of
a
new
,
saith
a
learned
Gentleman
[
e
](A86304-e68340-b)
e
Case
of
our
affairs
,
P.
5.
.
9.
Others
have
found
out
a
new
way
to
invest
the
Parliament
with
the
robes
of
Soveraignty
,
not
as
superiour
to
the
King
,
but
co-ordinate
with
him
:
and
this
say
they
appears
sufficiently
in
that
the
two
Houses
of
Parliament
have
not
only
a
power
of
consulting
but
of
consenting
,
and
that
too
in
the
highest
office
of
the
Monarchy
,
(
whereof
they
are
a
Coordinative
part
)
the
making
of
Laws
[
f
](A86304-e68460-b)
f
Fuller
Answer
to
D.
F.
p.
2.
.
Which
dangerous
doctrin
as
it
was
built
at
first
on
that
former
error
which
makes
the
King
to
be
one
of
the
three
Estates
in
Parliament
,
so
it
is
super-structed
with
some
necessary
consequents
;
whether
more
treasonable
or
ridiculous
,
it
is
hard
to
say
.
For
on
these
grounds
the
Author
of
the
Fuller
Answers
hath
presented
us
with
these
trim
devises
[
g
](A86304-e68500-b)
g
Id.
pag.
1.
,
viz.
that
England
is
not
a
simple
subordinate
and
absolute
,
but
a
coordinative
and
mixt
Monarchy
;
that
this
mixt
Monarchy
is
compounded
of
three
coordinate
Estates
,
a
King
and
two
Houses
of
Parliament
;
that
these
three
make
but
one
supreme
,
but
that
one
is
a
mixt
one
,
or
else
the
Monarchy
were
not
mizt
;
and
finally
,
which
needs
must
follow
from
the
premises
,
that
although
every
Member
of
the
Houses
s●orsim
,
taken
severally
,
may
be
called
a
Subject
,
yet
all
collective
in
their
houses
are
no
Subjects
.
Auditum
admissi
risum
teneatis
?
Can
any
man
hear
these
serious
follies
and
abstain
from
laughter
?
or
think
a
fellow
who
pretends
both
to
wit
and
learning
should
talk
thus
of
a
Monarchy
(
which
every
one
that
knoweth
any
thing
in
Greek
,
know
to
imply
the
supreme
government
of
one
)
compounded
of
three
coordinate
Estates
,
and
those
coordinate
Estates
consisting
of
no
fewer
than
600
persons
?
Or
that
a
man
who
can
pretend
but
to
so
much
use
of
reason
as
to
distinguish
him
from
a
beast
,
could
fall
on
such
a
senselest
Dotage
,
as
to
make
the
same
man
at
the
same
time
to
be
a
Subject
and
no
Subject
;
a
Subject
in
the
Streets
and
in
his
private
House
,
no
Subject
when
he
sits
in
Haberdashers
Hall
for
advance
of
moneys
,
or
in
either
of
the
two
Houses
of
Parliament
?
And
yet
this
senseless
Doctrine
is
become
so
dangerous
,
because
so
universally
admired
and
hearkned
to
,
that
the
beginning
and
continuance
of
our
long
Disturbances
may
chiefly
be
ascribed
unto
this
opinion
,
to
which
they
have
seduced
the
poor
ignorant
people
.
The
rather
in
regard
that
some
who
have
undertook
the
confutation
of
these
brainless
solies
,
have
most
improvidently
granted
not
only
[
h
](A86304-e68810-b)
h
As
in
the
book
called
Conscience
satisfied
.
that
the
two
Houses
of
Parliament
are
in
a
sort
coordinate
with
the
King
ad
aliquid
,
to
some
Act
or
exercising
of
the
supreme
power
,
that
is
to
the
making
of
Laws
;
but
that
this
coordination
of
the
three
Estates
(
of
which
the
King
is
yielded
every
where
for
one
)
is
fundamental
,
and
held
by
the
two
Houses
on
no
worse
a
title
than
a
fundamental
Constitution
;
which
is
as
much
as
any
reasonable
Parliamentarian
need
desire
to
have
.
Therefore
in
Answer
to
the
Fuller
,
(
not
taking
notice
of
his
foolish
and
seditious
inferences
)
we
will
clear
those
points
.
1.
That
the
two
Houses
of
Parliament
are
not
coordinate
with
the
King
,
but
subordinate
to
him
;
And
2.
that
the
power
of
making
laws
is
properly
and
legally
in
the
King
alone
.
As
for
the
first
we
had
before
a
Recognition
made
by
Act
of
Parliament
,
by
which
the
Kingdom
of
England
is
acknowledged
to
be
an
Empire
governed
by
one
supreme
head
and
King
,
to
whom
all
sorts
and
degrees
of
people
ought
to
bear
next
to
God
a
natural
and
humble
obedience
[
i
](A86304-e69000-b)
i
24
H.
8.
c.
12.
:
which
certainly
the
Lords
and
Commons
had
not
made
to
the
dethroning
of
themselves
,
their
heirs
and
successors
from
this
coordinative
part
of
Soveraignty
,
if
any
such
coordination
had
been
then
believed
.
Or
if
it
be
supposed
,
to
excuse
the
matter
,
that
K.
Henry
the
8th
.
being
a
severe
and
terrible
Prince
did
wrest
this
Recognition
from
them
(
which
yet
will
hardly
serve
for
a
good
defence
:
)
what
shall
we
say
to
the
like
recognition
made
in
the
beginning
of
Queen
Elizabeths
reign
[
k
](A86304-e69100-b)
k
1
Eliz.
c.
1.
,
when
she
was
green
in
State
,
and
her
power
unsetled
,
and
so
less
apt
to
work
upon
her
people
by
threats
and
terrors
?
Assuredly
had
the
Houses
dream't
in
those
broken
times
of
that
coordinative
Soveraignty
,
which
is
now
pretended
,
they
might
have
easily
regained
it
,
and
made
up
that
breach
which
by
the
violent
assaults
of
King
Henry
the
8th
.
had
been
made
upon
them
:
which
was
a
point
they
never
aimed
at
.
Besides
,
if
this
coordinative
m●jesty
might
be
once
admitted
,
it
musts
needs
follow
,
that
though
the
King
hath
no
Superiour
,
he
hath
many
Equalls
;
and
where
there
is
Equality
there
is
no
Subjection
.
But
Bracton
tells
us
in
plain
terms
,
not
only
that
the
King
hath
no
Superiour
in
his
Realm
,
except
God
almighty
,
but
no
Equal
neither
:
and
the
reason
which
he
gives
is
exceeding
strong
,
Quia
sic
amitteret
praeceptum
,
cum
par
in
Parem
non
habeat
potestatem
[
l
](A86304-e69220-b)
l
Bracton
de
leg
.
A●gl
.
l.
1.
c.
8
▪
,
because
he
could
not
have
an
Equal
,
but
with
the
losse
of
his
Authority
and
Regal
Dignity
,
considering
that
one
Equal
hath
no
power
to
command
an
other
.
Now
lest
the
Fuller
should
object
(
as
perhaps
he
may
)
that
this
is
spoken
of
the
King
out
of
times
of
Parliament
,
and
of
the
Members
of
the
Houses
seorsim
,
taken
severally
as
particular
persons
;
but
when
they
are
convened
in
Parliament
,
then
they
are
Soveraigns
and
no
Subjects
:
first
he
must
know
,
that
by
the
Statute
of
Queen
Elizabeth
all
of
the
House
of
Commons
are
to
take
the
oath
before
remembred
for
the
defending
of
all
preheminences
,
and
authorities
united
and
annexed
to
the
Imperial
Crown
of
this
Realm
,
and
for
bearing
faith
and
true
allegiance
to
the
King
,
his
Heirs
,
and
lawfull
Successours
,
and
that
if
any
of
them
do
refuse
this
Oath
,
he
is
to
have
no
voice
in
Parliament
[
m
](A86304-e69410-b)
m
Stat.
5
E●iz
.
1.
.
2.
He
cannot
choose
but
know
,
that
even
sedente
Parliamento
,
both
the
Lords
and
Commons
use
to
address
themselves
to
his
sacred
Majesty
in
the
way
of
supplication
and
petition
,
(
and
certainly
it
is
not
the
course
for
men
of
equal
rank
to
send
Petitions
unto
one
another
)
;
and
that
in
those
Petitions
they
do
stile
themselves
his
Majesties
most
humble
and
obedient
Subjects
.
Which
is
not
only
used
as
the
common
Complement
which
the
hypocrisie
of
these
times
hath
taken
up
,
(
though
possibly
it
might
be
no
otherwise
meant
in
some
late
addresses
)
but
is
the
very
phrase
in
some
Acts
of
Parliament
[
n
](A86304-e69470-b)
n
●25
Hen.
8.
c.
22.
&c.
,
as
in
the
Acts
at
large
doth
at
full
appear
.
3.
They
may
be
pleased
to
know
,
how
happy
a
thing
it
was
for
the
Realm
of
England
that
this
Fuller
did
not
live
in
former
times
:
For
had
he
broached
this
Doctrine
some
Ages
since
,
he
would
have
made
an
end
of
Parliaments
.
Princes
are
very
jealous
of
the
smallest
points
of
Soveraignty
,
and
love
to
reign
alone
without
any
Rivals
:
their
Souls
being
equally
made
up
of
Pompeys
and
Caesars
,
and
can
as
little
broke
an
Equul
,
as
endure
a
Superiour
.
And
lastly
,
I
must
let
him
know
what
Bodinus
saith
,
who
telleth
us
this
,
Legum
ac
edictorum
probatio
aut
publicatio
quae
in
Curia
vel
Senatu
fieri
solet
,
non
arguit
imperii
majestatem
in
Senatu
vel
Curia
inesse
[
o
](A86304-e69610-b)
o
Bodin
de
Rep.
l.
1.
c.
8.
,
viz.
That
the
publishing
and
approbation
of
Laws
and
Edicts
which
is
made
ordinarily
in
the
Court
or
Parliament
,
proves
not
the
Majesty
of
the
State
to
be
in
the
said
Court
or
Parliament
.
And
therefore
if
the
power
of
confirmation
or
rejecting
be
of
a
greater
trust
and
more
high
concernment
,
than
that
of
consulting
and
consenting
,
as
no
doubt
it
is
,
the
power
of
consulting
and
consenting
,
which
the
Fuller
doth
ascribe
to
the
two
Houses
of
Parliament
,
will
give
them
but
a
sory
Title
to
Co-ordinative
soveraignty
.
10.
This
leads
me
on
unto
the
power
of
making
Laws
,
which
as
before
I
said
,
is
properly
and
legally
in
the
King
alone
,
tanquam
in
proprio
Subjecto
,
as
in
the
true
and
adequate
subject
of
that
power
.
And
for
the
proof
thereof
,
I
shall
thus
proceed
.
When
the
Norman
Conqueror
first
came
in
,
as
he
wonne
the
Kingdom
by
the
sword
,
so
did
he
govern
it
by
his
power
:
His
Sword
was
then
the
Scepter
,
and
his
will
the
Law
.
There
was
no
need
on
his
part
,
of
an
Act
of
Parliament
;
much
less
of
calling
all
the
Estates
together
,
to
know
of
them
after
what
form
,
and
by
what
Laws
they
would
be
governed
.
It
might
as
well
be
said
of
him
,
as
in
the
flourish
and
best
times
of
the
Roman
Emperors
[
p
](A86304-e69840-b)
p
Justin
.
Institut.
l.
1.
c.
,
Quod
Principi
placuerit
legis
habet
vigorem
,
that
whatsoever
the
King
willed
it
did
pass
for
▪
Law
.
This
King
and
some
of
his
Successours
being
then
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
,
and
having
a
despotical
power
on
the
lives
and
fortunes
of
their
Subjects
,
which
they
disposed
of
for
the
benefit
of
their
friends
and
followers
,
Normans
,
French
,
and
Flemangs
,
as
to
them
seemed
best
.
But
as
the
Subjects
found
the
yoke
to
be
too
heavy
and
insupportable
;
so
they
addressed
themselves
in
their
Petitions
to
the
Kings
their
Soveraigns
,
to
have
that
yoke
made
easier
,
and
the
burden
lighter
,
especially
in
such
particulars
,
of
which
they
were
most
sensible
at
the
present
time
.
By
this
means
they
obtained
first
to
have
the
Laws
of
Edward
the
Confessor
,
contain'd
for
the
most
part
in
the
great
Charter
afterwards
:
and
by
this
means
,
that
is
to
say
,
by
powring
out
their
prayers
and
desires
unto
them
,
did
they
obtain
most
of
the
Laws
and
Statutes
,
which
are
now
remaining
of
the
time
of
King
Henry
the
3d.
and
King
Edward
the
first
.
Many
of
which
as
they
were
issued
at
the
first
either
in
form
of
Charters
under
the
Great
Seal
,
or
else
as
Proclamations
of
Grace
and
favour
;
so
do
they
carry
still
this
mark
of
their
first
procuring
,
the
King
willeth
,
the
King
commandeth
,
the
King
ordaineth
,
the
King
provideth
,
the
King
grants
,
&c.
And
when
the
Kings
were
pleased
to
call
their
Estates
together
,
it
was
not
out
of
an
opinion
that
they
could
not
give
away
their
power
,
or
dispence
their
favours
,
or
abate
any
thing
of
the
severity
of
their
former
government
,
without
the
approbation
and
consent
of
their
people
:
but
out
of
just
fear
lest
any
one
of
the
three
Estates
(
I
mean
the
Clergy
,
the
Nobility
,
and
the
Commons
)
should
insist
on
any
thing
,
which
might
be
prejudicial
to
the
other
two
.
The
Commons
being
alwaies
on
the
craving
part
,
and
suffering
as
much
perhaps
from
their
immediate
Lords
,
as
from
their
King
,
might
possibly
have
asked
some
things
which
were
as
much
derogatory
to
the
Lords
(
under
whom
they
held
)
as
of
their
Soveraign
Liege
the
King
,
the
chief
Lord
of
all
.
In
this
respect
,
the
Counsel
and
consent
as
well
of
the
Prelates
as
the
Temporal
Lords
,
was
accounted
necessary
,
in
passing
of
all
Acts
of
Grace
and
Favour
to
the
people
:
because
that
having
many
Royalties
and
large
immunities
of
their
own
,
a
more
near
relation
to
the
person
,
and
a
greater
interesse
in
the
honour
of
their
Lord
the
King
;
nothing
should
passe
unto
the
prejudice
and
diminution
of
their
own
Estates
,
or
the
disabling
of
the
King
to
support
his
Soveraignty
.
And
this
for
long
time
was
the
Stile
of
the
following
Parliaments
,
viz.
[
q
](A86304-e70240-b)
q
Preface
,
an.
1
Ed.
3.
"
To
the
honour
of
God
and
of
holy
Church
,
and
to
the
redresse
of
the
oppressions
of
the
people
,
our
Soveraign
Lord
the
King
,
&c.
at
the
request
of
the
Commonalty
of
his
Realm
,
by
their
Petition
made
before
him
and
his
Counsel
in
the
Parliament
,
by
the
Assent
of
the
Prelates
,
Earls
,
Barons
,
and
other
great
men
assembled
in
the
said
Parliament
,
hath
granted
for
him
and
his
Heirs
.
&c.
"
To
this
effect
,
but
with
some
little
(
and
but
a
very
little
)
variation
of
the
words
,
was
the
usual
Stile
in
all
the
Prefaces
or
Preambles
of
the
Acts
of
Parliament
,
from
the
beginning
of
the
Reign
of
King
Edward
the
third
,
till
the
beginning
of
the
reign
of
King
Henry
the
7th
.
save
that
sometimes
we
find
the
Lords
complaining
[
r
](A86304-e70320-b)
r
10
Ed.
3.
&c.
,
or
petitioning
[
s
](A86304-e70340-b)
s
21
Ed.
3.
&c.
,
and
the
Commons
assenting
[
t
](A86304-e70360-b)
t
28
Ed.
3.
&c.
,
as
their
occasions
did
require
:
and
sometime
also
no
other
motive
represented
,
but
the
Kings
great
desire
to
provide
for
the
ease
and
safety
of
his
people
,
upon
deliberation
had
with
the
Prelates
and
Nobles
,
and
learned
men
assisting
with
their
mutual
Counsell
[
u
](A86304-e70400-b)
u
23
Ed.
3.
.
And
all
this
while
there
is
no
question
to
be
made
,
but
that
the
power
of
making
Laws
was
conceived
to
be
the
chiefest
flower
of
the
Royal
Diademe
,
to
which
the
Lords
and
Commons
neither
joynt
nor
separate
,
did
not
pretend
the
smallest
Title
more
than
petitioning
for
them
,
or
assenting
to
them
:
it
being
wholly
left
to
the
Kings
grace
and
goodness
,
whether
he
would
give
ear
or
not
unto
their
petitions
,
or
hearken
unto
such
advise
as
the
Lords
or
other
great
men
gave
him
in
behalf
of
his
people
.
And
this
is
that
which
was
declared
in
the
Parliament
by
the
Lords
and
Commons
(
and
still
holds
good
as
well
in
point
of
Law
as
Reason
)
that
it
belonged
unto
the
regality
of
the
King
to
grant
or
deny
what
Petitions
[
x
](A86304-e70530-b)
x
2
Her.
5.
in
Parliament
he
pleaseth
.
But
as
the
Kings
came
in
upon
doubtfull
Titles
,
or
otherwise
were
necessitated
to
comply
with
the
peoples
humours
,
(
as
sometimes
they
were
)
so
did
the
Parliaments
make
use
of
the
opportunities
for
the
increase
of
their
authoritie
,
at
least
in
the
formalities
of
Law
,
and
other
advantages
of
expression
.
So
that
in
the
minority
of
King
Henry
the
sixth
,
unto
those
usual
words
by
the
advise
and
assent
of
the
Lords
Spiritual
and
Temporal
,
and
at
the
special
instance
and
request
of
the
Commons
(
which
were
inserted
ordinarily
into
the
body
of
the
Acts
from
the
beginning
of
the
reign
of
King
Henry
the
6th
.
)
was
added
this
,
By
the
authority
of
the
said
Parliament
[
y
](A86304-e70630-b)
y
3
Hen.
6.
c.
2.
&
8
H.
6.
3.
&c.
.
But
still
it
is
to
be
observed
,
that
though
those
words
were
added
to
the
former
clause
,
yet
the
power
of
granting
or
ordaining
was
acknowledged
to
belong
to
the
King
alone
;
as
in
the
places
in
the
Margin
,
where
it
is
said
,
Our
Lord
the
King
considering
the
premises
,
by
the
advise
and
assent
,
and
at
the
request
aforesaid
,
hath
ordained
and
granted
by
the
authority
of
the
said
Parliament
,
3
H.
6.
2.
and
our
Lord
the
King
considering
,
&c.
hath
ordained
and
established
by
authority
of
this
Parliament
,
8
H.
6.
3.
And
thus
it
generally
stood
,
(
but
every
general
rule
may
have
some
exceptions
)
till
the
beginning
of
the
reign
of
King
Henry
the
7th
.
about
which
time
that
usual
clause
,
the
special
instance
or
request
of
the
Commons
,
began
by
little
and
little
to
be
laid
aside
,
and
that
of
their
advise
or
assent
to
be
inserted
in
the
place
thereof
:
for
which
I
do
refer
you
to
the
book
at
large
.
Which
though
it
were
some
alteration
of
the
former
stile
,
and
that
those
words
By
the
authority
of
this
present
Parliament
,
may
make
men
think
that
the
Lords
and
Commons
did
then
pretend
some
title
unto
the
power
of
making
laws
:
yet
neither
advising
or
assenting
are
so
operative
in
the
present
case
as
to
transfer
the
power
of
making
laws
to
such
as
do
advise
about
them
,
or
assent
unto
them
;
not
can
the
al●eration
of
the
forms
and
stiles
used
in
antient
times
,
import
an
alteration
of
the
form
of
Government
,
unless
it
can
be
shewed
,
(
as
I
think
it
cannot
)
that
any
of
our
Kings
did
renounce
that
power
,
which
properly
and
solely
did
belong
unto
them
,
or
did
by
any
solemn
Act
of
Communication
,
confer
the
same
upon
the
Lords
and
Commons
convened
in
Parliament
.
And
this
is
that
which
is
resolved
and
declared
in
our
Common
law
,
where
it
is
said
[
z
](A86304-e70910-b)
z
Cited
in
the
unlawfulness
of
resist
.
p
▪
107.
,
Le
Roy
fait
les
loix
avec
le
consent
du
Seigneurs
et
communs
,
et
non
pas
les
Seigneurs
et
communs
avec
le
consent
du
Roy
,
that
is
to
say
,
that
the
King
makes
Laws
in
Parliament
by
the
assent
of
the
Lords
and
Commoni
,
and
not
the
Lords
and
Commons
by
the
assent
of
the
King
.
And
for
a
further
proof
of
this
,
and
for
the
clearing
of
this
point
that
the
Lords
and
Commons
pretend
to
no
more
power
in
the
making
of
laws
,
than
opportunity
to
propound
and
advise
about
them
,
and
on
mature
advise
to
give
their
several
Assents
unto
them
,
we
need
but
look
into
the
first
Act
of
the
Parliament
in
the
third
year
of
King
Charles
,
being
a
Recognition
of
some
antient
Rights
belonging
to
the
English
subject
.
An
Act
conceived
according
to
the
primitive
form
,
in
way
of
a
Petition
to
the
Kings
most
excellent
Majesty
[
a
](A86304-e71080-b)
a
Statut.
3
Carol.
,
in
which
the
Lords
and
Commons
do
most
humbly
pray
as
their
Rights
and
Liberties
,
that
no
such
things
as
they
complained
of
,
might
be
done
hereafter
;
that
his
Majesty
would
vouchsafe
to
declare
that
the
Awards
,
doings
,
and
proceedings
to
the
prejudice
of
his
people
in
any
of
the
premises
,
shall
not
be
drawn
hereafter
into
consequence
or
example
,
and
that
he
would
be
pleased
to
declare
his
Royal
pleasure
,
that
in
the
point
aforesaid
all
his
Officers
and
Ministers
should
serve
him
according
to
the
Laws
and
Statutes
of
this
Realm
.
To
which
although
the
King
returned
a
fair
general
Answer
,
assuring
them
that
his
Subjects
should
have
no
cause
for
the
time
to
come
to
complain
of
any
wrong
or
oppressions
contrary
to
their
just
Righ●s
and
Liberties
;
yet
this
gave
little
satisfaction
till
he
came
in
person
,
and
causing
the
Petition
to
be
distinctly
read
by
the
Clerk
of
the
Crown
[
b
](A86304-e71190-b)
b
Ibid.
,
returned
his
Answer
in
these
words
,
Soit
droit
fait
come
est
desire
,
that
is
to
say
,
let
right
be
done
as
is
desired
.
Which
being
the
very
formal
words
by
which
the
said
Petition
and
every
clause
and
Article
therein
contained
,
became
to
be
a
law
and
to
have
the
force
of
an
Act
of
Parliament
,
and
being
there
is
nothing
spoken
of
the
concurrent
authority
of
the
Lords
and
Commons
for
the
enacting
of
the
same
,
may
serve
instead
of
many
Arguments
for
the
proof
of
this
,
that
the
Legislative
power
as
we
phrase
it
now
,
is
wholly
and
solely
in
the
King
;
although
restrained
in
the
exercise
and
use
thereof
by
constant
custome
,
unto
the
counsel
and
consent
of
the
Lords
and
Commons
.
Le
Roy
veult
[
c
](A86304-e71310-b)
c
Smith
de
Rep.
Angl.
,
or
the
King
will
have
it
so
,
is
the
imperative
phrase
by
which
the
Propositions
of
the
Lords
and
Commons
are
made
Acts
of
Parliament
.
And
let
the
Lords
and
Commons
agitate
and
propound
what
Laws
they
please
for
their
ease
and
benefit
(
as
generally
all
Laws
and
Statutes
are
more
for
the
ease
and
benefit
of
the
Subject
,
than
the
advantage
of
the
King
)
:
yet
aswell
now
,
as
formerly
in
the
times
of
the
Roman
Emperors
,
Quod
Principi
placuerit
legis
habet
vigorem
,
nothing
but
that
which
the
King
pleaseth
to
allow
of
,
is
to
pass
for
Law
:
the
laws
not
taking
their
coercive
force
(
as
judicious
Hooker
well
observeth
)
from
the
quality
of
such
as
devise
them
,
but
from
the
power
which
giveth
them
the
strength
of
laws
[
d
](A86304-e71430-b)
d
Hooker
Ecclesiast.
Pol
▪
.
I
shut
up
this
Discourse
with
this
expression
and
comparison
of
a
late
leatned
Gentleman
,
viz.
"
That
as
in
a
Copyhold
Estate
,
the
Copybolder
of
a
meer
Tenant
at
will
comes
by
custom
to
gain
an
Inheritance
,
and
so
to
limit
and
restrain
the
will
and
power
of
the
Lord
,
that
he
cannot
make
any
determination
of
the
Copyholders
Estate
otherwise
than
according
to
the
custome
of
the
Mannour
;
and
yet
doth
not
deprive
the
Lord
of
his
Lordship
in
the
Copyhold
,
nor
participate
with
him
in
it
,
neither
yet
devest
the
Fee
and
Franktenement
out
of
the
Lord
,
but
that
they
still
remain
in
him
,
and
are
ever
parcel
of
his
Demesn
[
e
](A86304-e71560-b)
e
Case
of
our
Affairs
.
p.
6.
:
so
in
the
restraining
of
the
Kings
Legislative
power
to
the
concurrence
of
the
Peers
and
Commons
,
though
the
custome
of
the
Kingdom
hath
so
fixed
and
setled
the
restraint
,
as
that
the
King
cannot
in
that
point
use
his
Soveraign
power
without
the
concurrence
of
the
Peers
and
Commons
according
to
the
custom
of
the
Kingdom
;
yet
still
the
Soveraignty
(
and
with
it
the
inseparable
Legislative
power
)
doth
reside
soly
in
the
King
.
"
11.
If
any
hereupon
demand
to
what
end
serve
Parliaments
,
and
what
benefit
can
redound
to
the
Subject
by
them
;
I
say
in
the
Apostles
words
,
much
every
way
[
f
](A86304-e71670-b)
f
Rom.
3.
2.
.
Many
vexations
often
times
do
befall
the
Subjects
without
the
knowledge
of
the
King
,
and
against
his
will
;
to
which
his
ears
are
open
in
a
time
of
Parliament
.
The
King
at
other
times
useth
the
eyes
and
ears
of
such
as
have
place
about
him
,
who
may
perhaps
be
guilty
of
the
wrongs
which
are
done
the
people
:
but
in
a
Parliament
he
seeth
with
his
own
eyes
,
and
heareth
with
his
own
ears
,
and
so
is
in
a
better
way
to
redresse
the
mischief
than
he
could
be
otherwise
.
Nor
do
the
people
by
the
opportunity
of
these
Parliamentary
meetings
,
obtain
upon
their
Prayers
and
petitions
a
redress
of
grievances
only
,
but
many
times
the
King
is
overcome
by
their
importunity
to
abate
so
much
of
his
power
,
to
grant
such
points
,
and
pass
such
Laws
and
Statutes
for
their
ease
and
benefit
,
as
otherwise
he
would
not
yield
to
.
For
certainly
it
is
as
true
in
making
our
approaches
and
petitions
to
our
Lord
the
King
,
as
in
the
pouring
out
of
our
prayers
and
supplications
to
the
Lord
our
God
:
the
more
multitudinous
and
united
the
Petitioners
are
,
the
more
like
to
speed
.
And
therefore
said
Bodinus
truly
,
Principem
plaeraque
universis
concedere
quae
singulis
denegarentur
[
g
](A86304-e71760-b)
g
Bodin
.
de
Rep.
l.
1.
c.
8.
,
that
Kings
do
many
times
grant
those
favours
to
the
whole
body
of
their
people
,
which
would
be
absolutely
denied
or
not
so
readily
yielded
to
particular
persons
.
There
are
moreover
many
things
of
greater
concernment
,
(
besides
the
abrogating
of
old
Laws
and
making
new
)
which
having
been
formerly
recommended
by
the
Kings
of
England
,
to
the
care
and
counsel
of
their
people
convened
in
Parliament
,
are
not
now
regularly
dispatched
but
in
such
conventions
:
as
are
altering
the
tenure
of
Lands
,
confirming
the
rights
,
titles
,
and
possessions
of
private
men
,
naturalizing
Aliens
,
legitimating
Bastards
,
adding
sometimes
the
secular
authority
to
such
points
of
Doctrin
and
forms
of
worship
as
the
Clergy
have
agreed
upon
in
their
Comvocations
,
if
it
be
required
,
changing
the
publick
weights
and
measures
thorowout
the
Kingdom
,
defining
of
such
doubtfull
cases
as
are
not
easily
resolved
in
the
Courts
of
Law
,
raising
of
Subsidies
and
Taxes
,
attainting
such
as
either
are
too
potent
to
be
caught
,
or
too
hard
to
be
found
,
and
so
not
tryable
in
the
ordinary
Courts
of
Justice
;
restoring
to
their
blood
and
honours
such
,
or
the
Heirs
of
such
,
as
have
been
formerly
attainted
;
granting
of
free
and
general
pardons
[
h
](A86304-e71830-b)
h
Sir
Tho.
Smith
,
de
Rep.
Angl.
Camden
in
Brit.
Crompt
.
of
Courts
,
&c.
,
with
divers
others
of
this
nature
.
In
all
and
each
of
these
the
Lords
and
Commons
do
co-operate
to
the
publick
good
,
in
the
way
of
means
and
preparation
,
but
their
co-operation
would
be
lost
and
fruitless
,
did
not
the
King
by
his
concomitant
or
subsequent
grace
produce
their
good
intentions
into
perfect
Acts
,
and
being
Acts
either
of
special
grace
and
favour
,
or
else
of
ordinary
right
and
justice
,
no
way
derogatory
to
the
Prerogative
Royal●
,
are
usually
confirmed
by
the
Royal
assent
,
without
stop
or
hesitancy
.
But
then
,
some
other
things
there
are
of
great
importance
and
advantage
to
the
Common
wealth
,
in
which
the
Houses
usually
do
proceed
even
to
final
sentence
(
the
Commons
in
the
way
of
imquisition
or
impeachment
,
the
Lords
in
that
of
judicature
and
determination
)
with
the
consent
and
approbation
of
the
King
,
though
many
times
without
his
personal
assent
and
presence
.
The
King
may
be
abused
in
his
Grants
and
Patents
,
to
the
oppression
of
the
people
,
or
the
dilapidation
and
destruction
of
the
Royal
Patrimony
;
Judges
,
and
other
the
great
Officers
of
Law
and
Equity
are
subject
to
corruptions
,
and
may
smell
of
gifts
,
whereby
the
passages
of
Justice
do
become
obstructed
;
The
Ministers
of
inferiour
Courts
as
well
Ecclesiastical
as
Civil
,
either
exhaust
the
miserable
subject
by
extortions
,
or
else
consume
him
by
delayes
;
Erroneous
judgements
may
be
given
through
fear
or
favour
to
the
undoing
of
a
man
and
his
whole
posterity
,
in
which
his
Majesties
Justices
of
either
Bench
can
afford
no
remedy
;
The
great
ones
of
the
State
may
become
too
insolent
,
and
the
poor
too
miserable
;
and
many
other
waies
there
are
by
which
the
Fabrick
of
the
State
may
be
out
of
Order
:
for
the
removing
of
which
mischiefs
,
the
rectifying
of
which
abuses
,
the
Lords
and
Commons
in
their
several
waies
before
remembred
,
are
of
special
use
;
yet
so
,
that
if
the
Kings
Grants
do
come
in
question
,
or
any
of
his
Officers
are
called
to
a
reckoning
,
they
used
heretofore
to
signifie
unto
his
Majesty
what
they
found
therein
,
and
he
accordingly
either
revoked
his
Grants
,
or
displaced
his
Servants
,
or
by
some
other
means
gave
way
unto
their
contentment
:
the
Kings
consent
being
alwaies
necessary
,
and
received
as
a
part
of
the
final
sentence
,
if
they
went
so
far
.
So
that
we
may
conclude
this
point
with
these
words
of
Bodin
,
who
being
well
acquainted
with
the
Government
of
this
State
and
Nation
,
partly
by
way
of
conference
with
Dr.
Dale
the
Queens
Ambassadour
in
France
,
and
partly
in
the
way
of
observation
when
he
was
in
England
,
doth
give
this
resolution
of
the
point
in
controversie
[
i
](A86304-e72110-b)
i
Bodin
.
de
Repub.
l.
1.
c.
8.
,
Habere
quidem
Ordines
Anglorum
authoritatem
quandam
,
jura
vero
majestatis
,
&
imperii
summam
in
unius
Principis
arbitrio
versari
.
The
States
saith
he
of
England
have
a
kind
of
authority
,
but
all
the
rights
of
Soveraignty
and
command
in
chief
,
are
at
the
will
and
pleasure
of
the
Prince
alone
.
12.
And
to
say
truth
,
although
the
Lords
&
Commons
met
in
Parliament
are
of
great
authority
,
especially
as
they
have
improved
it
in
these
later
times
;
yet
were
they
never
of
such
power
,
but
that
the
Kings
have
for
the
most
part
over-ruled
them
,
&
made
them
pliant
&
conformable
to
their
own
desires
:
and
this
not
only
by
themselves
,
but
sometimes
also
by
their
Judges
,
by
their
counsel
often
.
For
such
was
the
great
care
and
wisdom
of
our
former
Kings
,
as
not
to
venture
single
on
that
numerous
body
of
the
two
Houses
of
Parliament
,
whereby
the
Soveraignty
might
be
so
easily
overmatched
;
but
to
take
with
them
for
Assistants
as
well
the
Lords
of
their
Privy
Counsel
with
whom
they
might
advise
in
matters
which
concerned
them
in
their
Soveraign
rights
,
as
their
learned
Counsel
(
as
they
call
them
)
consisting
of
the
Judges
and
most
eminent
Lawyers
,
from
whom
they
might
receive
instruction
as
the
case
required
,
and
neither
do
,
nor
suffer
wrong
in
point
of
Law
:
and
by
both
these
,
as
well
as
by
the
power
and
awe
of
their
personal
presence
,
have
they
not
only
regulated
but
restrained
their
Parliaments
.
And
this
is
easily
demonstrable
by
continual
practice
.
For
in
the
Statute
of
Bigamie
made
in
the
fourth
[
k
](A86304-e72310-b)
k
4
Ed.
1.
year
of
King
Edward
1.
it
is
said
expre●ly
,
"
that
in
the
presence
of
certain
reverend
Fathers
,
Bishops
of
England
,
and
others
of
the
Kings
Counsel
,
the
Constitutions
under-written
were
recited
,
and
after
published
before
the
King
his
Couusel
,
forasmuch
as
all
the
Kings
Counsel
,
as
well
Justices
as
others
did
agree
,
that
they
should
be
put
in
writing
and
observed
.
"
In
the
Articuli
super
Chartas
,
when
the
Great
Charter
was
confirmed
at
the
request
of
the
Prelates
,
Earls
,
and
Barons
,
[
l
](A86304-e72420-b)
l
28
Ed.
1.
c.
2.
we
find
these
two
clauses
:
the
one
in
the
beginning
thus
,
Nevertheless
the
King
and
his
Counsel
do
not
intend
,
by
reason
of
this
Stat●te
,
to
diminish
the
Kings
right
[
m
](A86304-e72450-b)
m
Ibid.
c.
20.
,
&c.
The
other
in
the
close
of
all
in
these
following
words
,
And
notwithstanding
all
these
things
mentioned
,
or
any
part
of
them
,
both
the
King
and
his
Counsel
,
and
all
they
which
were
present
at
the
making
of
this
Ordinance
,
do
will
and
intend
that
the
right
and
prerogative
of
his
Crown
shall
be
saved
in
all
things
.
In
the
27th
.
of
King
Edward
the
3d.
[
n
](A86304-e72530-b)
n
27
Ed.
3.
The
Commons
presenting
a
Petition
to
the
King
,
which
the
Kings
Counsel
did
mislike
,
were
content
thereupon
to
mend
and
explain
their
Petition
,
the
form
of
which
Petition
is
in
these
words
following
.
"
To
their
most
redoubted
Soveraign
Lord
the
King
,
praying
the
Commons
,
that
whereas
they
have
prayed
him
to
be
discharged
of
all
manner
of
Articles
of
the
Lyre
,
&c.
which
Petition
seemeth
to
his
Counsel
to
be
prejudicial
unto
him
,
and
in
disherison
of
his
Crown
▪
if
it
were
so
generally
granted
:
his
said
Commons
not
willing
nor
desiring
to
demand
things
of
him
,
which
should
fall
in
disherison
of
him
or
of
his
Crown
perpetually
,
as
of
Escheats
,
&c.
but
of
trespasses
,
misprisions
,
negligences
,
and
ignorances
,
&c.
"
In
the
13
of
the
reign
of
King
Richard
the
2d
.
when
the
Commons
did
pray
that
upon
pain
of
forfeiture
,
the
Chancellor
,
or
Counsel
of
the
King
should
not
after
the
end
of
the
Parliament
make
any
Ordinance
against
the
Common
law
[
o
](A86304-e72720-b)
o
13
Rich.
2.
,
the
King
(
by
the
advise
of
his
Counsel
)
answered
,
Let
it
be
used
as
it
hath
been
used
before
this
time
,
so
as
the
Regality
of
the
King
be
saved
,
for
the
King
will
save
his
Regalities
,
as
his
Predecessors
have
done
.
In
the
4th
.
year
of
King
Henry
4.
[
p
](A86304-e72780-b)
p
4
Hen.
4.
when
the
Commons
complained
against
Sub-poenae's
and
other
writs
grounded
upon
false
suggestions
,
the
King
(
upon
the
same
advise
)
returned
this
answer
,
that
he
would
give
in
charge
to
his
Officers
,
that
they
should
abstain
more
than
before
time
they
had
to
send
for
his
Subjects
in
that
manner
.
But
yet
(
saith
he
)
it
is
not
our
intention
that
our
Officers
shall
so
abstain
,
that
they
may
not
send
for
our
Subjects
in
matters
and
causes
necessary
,
as
it
hath
been
used
in
the
time
of
our
good
Progenitors
.
Finally
,
not
to
bring
forth
more
particulars
in
a
case
so
clear
,
it
was
the
constant
custome
in
all
Parliaments
,
till
the
Reign
of
King
Henry
5.
[
q
](A86304-e72860-b)
q
Henr.
5
▪
that
when
any
Bill
had
passed
both
houses
,
and
was
presented
to
the
King
for
his
Royal
Assent
,
the
King
by
the
advise
of
his
Privy
Counsel
,
or
his
Counsel
learned
in
the
Laws
,
or
sometimes
of
both
,
did
use
to
crosse
ou●
and
obliterate
as
much
or
as
little
of
it
as
he
pleased
,
to
leave
out
what
he
liked
not
,
and
confirmed
the
rest
;
that
only
which
the
King
confirmed
being
held
for
Law
.
And
though
in
the
succeeding
times
the
Kings
did
graciously
vouchsafe
to
pass
the
whole
Bill
in
that
form
which
the
Houses
gave
it
,
or
to
reject
it
wholly
as
they
saw
occasion
:
yet
still
the
Privy
Counsel
,
and
the
Judges
,
and
the
Counsel
learned
in
the
Laws
,
have
and
enjoy
their
place
in
the
House
of
Peers
,
aswell
for
preservation
of
the
Kings
rights
and
Royalties
,
as
for
direction
to
the
Lords
in
a
point
of
Law
,
if
any
case
of
difficulty
be
brought
before
them
;
on
which
occasions
the
Lords
are
to
demand
the
opinion
of
the
Judges
,
and
upon
their
opinions
to
ground
their
Iudgement
.
As
for
example
,
In
the
Parliament
28
of
Hen.
6.
The
Commons
made
sure
that
William
de
la
Pole
Duke
of
Suffolk
,
should
be
committed
to
Prison
for
many
treasons
and
other
crimes
[
r
](A86304-e73010-b)
r
28
Hen.
6
▪
,
and
thereupon
the
Lords
demanded
the
opinion
of
the
Judges
,
whether
he
should
be
committed
to
Prison
or
not
;
whose
Answer
was
,
that
he
ought
not
to
be
committed
in
regard
the
Commons
had
not
charged
him
with
any
particular
offence
,
but
with
generals
only
;
which
opinion
was
allowed
and
followed
.
In
another
Parliament
of
the
said
King
,
held
by
Prorogation
,
one
Thomas
Thorpe
the
Speaker
of
the
House
of
Commons
,
was
in
the
Prorogation-time
condemned
in
1000
l.
dammages
,
upon
an
Action
of
Trespass
at
the
sute
of
Richard
Duke
of
York
,
and
was
committed
to
Prison
for
execution
of
the
same
.
The
parliament
being
reassembled
,
the
Commons
made
su●e
to
the
King
and
Lords
to
have
their
Speaker
delivered
to
them
,
according
to
the
privilege
of
Parliaments
[
t
](A86304-e73140-b)
t
The
privilege
of
the
Barons
,
p.
15.
:
the
Lords
demanded
the
opinion
of
the
Judges
in
it
,
and
upon
their
Answer
,
did
conclude
,
that
the
Speaker
should
still
remain
in
Prison
according
to
Law
,
notwithstanding
the
privilege
of
Parliament
;
and
according
to
this
resolution
the
Commons
were
commanded
in
the
Kings
name
to
choose
one
Tho
▪
Carleton
for
their
Speaker
,
which
was
done
accordingly
.
Other
examples
of
this
kind
are
exceeding
obvious
,
and
for
numbers
infinite
;
yet
neither
more
in
number
,
nor
more
obvious
than
those
of
our
Kings
serving
their
turns
by
and
upon
their
Parliaments
,
as
their
occasions
did
require
.
For
not
to
look
on
higher
and
more
Regal
times
,
we
find
that
Richard
the
2d
.
a
Prince
not
very
acceptable
to
the
Common
people
,
could
get
an
Act
of
Parliament
[
t
](A86304-e73250-b)
t
21
Ric.
2.
,
to
confirm
the
extrajudicial
opinion
of
the
Iudges
,
given
before
at
Notingham
;
that
King
Henry
4th
.
could
by
an
other
Act
reverse
all
that
Parliament
,
[
u
](A86304-e73300-b)
u
1
Hen
▪
4.
entayl
the
Crown
to
his
posterity
,
and
keep
his
Dutchy
of
Lancaster
and
all
the
Lands
and
Seigneuries
of
it
,
from
being
united
to
the
Crown
;
that
King
Edward
the
4th
.
could
have
a
Parliament
to
declare
all
the
Kings
of
the
House
of
Lancaster
,
to
be
Kings
in
fact
but
not
in
right
[
x
](A86304-e73360-b)
x
1
Ed.
c.
1.
,
and
for
uniting
of
that
Dutchy
to
the
Crown
Imperial
,
notwithstanding
the
former
Act
of
separation
;
that
King
Richard
the
3d.
could
have
a
Parliament
to
bastardize
all
his
Brothers
Children
,
to
set
the
Crown
on
his
own
head
,
though
a
most
bloody
Tyrant
,
and
a
plain
Usurper
[
y
](A86304-e73390-b)
y
Speeds
hist.
in
K.
Richard
.
3.
;
that
King
Henry
7.
could
have
the
Crown
entayled
by
an
Act
of
Parliament
,
to
the
issue
of
his
own
body
[
z
](A86304-e73410-b)
z
Verulam
.
hist.
of
K.
Hen
7.
without
relation
to
his
Queen
of
the
house
of
York
,
which
was
conceived
by
many
at
that
time
to
have
the
better
Title
to
it
;
another
,
for
paying
a
Benevolence
which
he
had
required
of
the
subject
[
a
](A86304-e73440-b)
a
11
Hen.
7.
c.
10.
,
though
all
Benevolences
had
been
damned
by
a
former
Statute
made
in
the
short
,
but
bloody
reign
of
King
Richard
the
3d.
that
King
Henry
8.
[
b
](A86304-e73480-b)
b
65
Hen.
8.
c.
22
,
&
28.
c.
7.
&
35
H.
8.
c.
1.
could
have
one
Act
of
Parliament
to
bastardry
his
Daughter
Mary
,
in
favour
of
the
Lady
Elizabeth
;
another
to
declare
the
Lady
Elizabeth
to
be
illegitimate
,
in
expectation
of
the
issue
by
Queen
Jane
Seymour
;
a
third
for
setling
the
succession
by
his
Will
and
Testament
,
and
what
else
he
pleased
;
that
Queen
Mary
could
not
only
obtain
several
Acts
in
favour
of
her self
and
the
S●e
of
Rome
[
c
](A86304-e73550-b)
c
1
Mar.
s●s
.
2.
c.
1
,
2.
&
1.
&
2
Ph.
&
M.
c.
8.
10.
,
but
for
the
setling
of
the
Regency
on
the
King
of
Spain
,
in
case
the
Children
of
that
Bed
should
be
left
in
nonage
.
And
finally
that
Queen
Elizabeth
did
not
only
gain
many
several
Acts
for
the
security
of
her
own
Person
,
which
were
determinable
with
her
life
,
but
could
procure
an
Act
to
be
passed
in
Parliament
for
making
it
high
treason
to
affirm
and
say
,
That
the
Queen
could
not
by
Act
of
Parliament
,
bind
and
dispose
the
Rights
a●d
Titles
which
any
person
whatsoever
might
have
to
the
Crown
.
[
d
](A86304-e73610-b)
d
13
Eliz.
c.
1.
And
as
for
raising
monies
,
and
amassing
treasures
by
help
of
Parliaments
,
he
that
desires
to
know
how
well
our
Kings
have
served
themselves
that
way
by
the
help
of
Parliaments
,
let
him
peruse
a
book
intituled
,
the
Privilege
of
Parliaments
,
writ
in
the
manner
of
Dialogue
between
a
Privy
Counsellor
,
and
a
Iustice
of
Peace
,
and
he
shall
be
satisfied
to
the
full
.
Put
all
that
hath
been
said
together
,
and
sure
the
kingdom
of
England
must
not
be
the
place
,
in
which
the
three
Estates
convened
in
Parliament
have
power
to
regulate
the
King
,
or
restrain
his
actions
,
or
moderate
his
extravagances
,
or
where
they
can
be
taxed
for
per●idious
treachery
,
if
they
connive
at
Kings
when
they
play
the
Tyrants
,
or
wantonly
insult
on
the
Common-people
,
or
otherwise
abuse
that
power
which
the
Lord
hath
given
them
.
Calvin
was
much
mistaken
if
he
thought
the
contrary
;
or
if
he
dreamt
that
he
should
be
believ'd
on
his
ipse
dixit
,
without
a
punctual
enquiry
into
the
grounds
and
probability
of
such
a
dangerous
intimation
as
he
lays
before
us
.
13.
But
against
this
it
is
objected
,
that
Parliaments
have
disposed
of
the
Militia
of
the
Kingdom
,
of
the
Forts
,
Castles
,
Ports
,
and
the
Navie
Royal
,
not
only
without
the
Kings
leave
,
but
against
his
liking
:
that
they
have
deposed
some
Kings
,
and
advanced
others
to
the
top
of
the
Regal
Throne
:
And
for
the
proof
of
this
they
produce
examples
out
of
the
reign
of
K.
Henry
3.
K.
Edw.
2.
and
K.
Richard
the
2.
[
e
](A86304-e73800-b)
e
Prynnes
Book
of
Parl.
part.
2.
Examples
,
which
if
rightly
pondered
,
doe
not
so
much
prove
the
power
,
as
the
weakness
of
Parliaments
,
in
being
carried
up
and
down
by
the
privat
conduct
of
every
popular
pretender
.
For
't
is
well
known
that
the
Parliaments
did
not
take
upon
them
to
rule
,
or
rather
to
over-look
K.
Henry
3.
but
as
they
were
directed
by
Simon
Montfort
Earl
of
Leicester
,
who
having
raised
a
potent
faction
in
the
State
,
by
the
assistance
of
the
Earls
of
Glocester
,
Hereford
,
Derby
,
[
f
](A86304-e73870-b)
f
Ma●
.
Paris
,
Henr.
3.
and
some
others
of
the
great
Lords
of
the
kingdom
,
compelled
the
King
to
yeeld
unto
what
terms
he
pleased
,
and
made
the
Parliaments
no
other
than
a
means
and
instrument
to
put
a
popular
gloss
on
his
wretched
purposes
.
And
't
is
well
known
that
the
ensuing
Parliaments
which
they
instance
in
,
moved
not
of
their
own
accord
to
the
deposing
of
King
Edward
the
2.
or
King
Richard
the
2.
but
sailed
as
they
were
steered
by
those
powerfull
Counsels
,
which
Queen
Isabel
in
the
one
,
and
Henry
Duke
of
Lancaster
in
the
other
,
did
propose
unto
them
.
[
g
](A86304-e73930-b)
g
Walsingham
in
Hist.
Angl.
&
Hypodig
.
Neustriae
.
It
was
no
safe
resisting
those
(
as
their
cold
wisdoms
and
forgotten
loyalties
did
suggest
unto
them
)
qui
tot
legionibus
imperarent
,
who
had
so
manany
thousand
men
in
arms
to
make
good
their
project
,
and
they
might
think
as
the
poor-spirited
Citizens
of
Samaria
did
in
another
case
(
but
a
case
very
like
the
present
)
Behold
two
Kings
stood
not
before
him
,
how
then
can
we
stand
[
h
](A86304-e73970-b)
h
2
Kings
10.
4.
?
For
had
it
been
an
argument
of
the
power
of
Parliaments
,
that
they
deposed
one
King
to
set
up
another
,
dethroned
King
Richard
to
advance
the
Duke
of
Lancaster
to
the
Regal
diadem
,
they
would
have
kept
the
house
of
Lancaster
in
possession
of
it
,
(
for
the
full
demonstration
of
a
power
indeed
)
and
not
have
cast
them
off
,
at
the
first
attempt
of
a
new
plausible
pretender
,
declared
them
to
be
kings
in
fact
,
but
not
in
right
,
whose
lawfull
right
they
had
before
preferred
above
all
other
titles
,
and
set
the
Crown
upon
the
heads
of
their
deadly
Enemies
.
In
the
next
place
it
is
objected
that
Parliaments
are
a
great
restraint
of
the
Soveraign
power
(
according
to
the
Doctrine
here
laid
down
by
Calvin
)
in
that
the
King
can
make
no
laws
,
nor
levy
any
money
upon
the
Subject
,
but
by
the
counsel
and
assent
of
the
Lords
and
Commons
assembled
in
Parliament
.
But
this
objection
hurts
as
little
as
the
former
did
.
For
Kings
,
to
say
the
truth
,
need
no
laws
at
all
.
In
all
such
points
wherein
they
have
not
bound
themselves
by
some
former
laws
made
for
the
common
use
and
benefit
of
the
Subject
,
they
are
left
at
liberty
,
and
may
proceed
in
governing
the
people
,
given
by
God
unto
them
,
according
to
their
own
discretion
,
and
the
advice
of
their
Counsel
.
New
Laws
are
chiefly
made
for
the
Subjects
benefit
,
at
their
desire
,
on
their
importunate
requests
,
for
their
special
profit
;
not
one
in
twenty
,
nay
,
I
dare
boldly
say
not
one
in
an
hundred
,
made
for
the
advantage
of
the
King
,
either
in
the
improvement
of
his
power
,
or
the
increase
of
his
Revenue
.
Look
over
all
the
Acts
of
Parliament
,
from
the
beginning
of
the
reign
of
King
Henry
3.
to
the
present
time
,
and
tell
me
he
that
can
,
if
he
finds
it
otherwise
:
Kings
would
have
little
use
of
Parliaments
,
and
less
mind
to
call
them
,
if
nothing
but
the
making
of
new
Laws
were
the
matter
aimed
at
.
And
as
for
raising
monies
and
imposing
taxes
,
it
either
must
suppose
the
Kings
to
be
always
unthrifts
,
that
they
be
always
indigent
and
necessitous
,
and
behind-hand
with
the
world
(
which
are
the
ordinary
effects
of
ill
husbandry
)
or
else
this
argument
is
lost
,
and
of
little
use
:
For
if
our
Kings
should
husband
their
estates
to
the
best
advantage
,
and
make
the
best
benefit
of
such
escheats
and
forfeitures
&
con●iscations
as
day
by
day
do
fall
unto
them
;
If
they
should
follow
the
example
of
K.
Henry
7.
and
execute
the
penal
Laws
according
to
the
power
which
those
Laws
have
given
them
,
and
the
trust
reposed
in
them
by
their
People
;
if
they
should
please
to
examine
their
revenue
,
and
proportion
their
expence
to
their
comings
in
,
there
would
be
litle
need
of
subsidies
and
supplies
of
money
,
more
than
the
ordinary
aids
and
impositions
upon
Merchandize
,
which
the
Law
alloweth
of
,
and
the
known
rights
of
Sovereignty
backed
by
prescription
,
and
long
custom
have
asserted
to
them
:
So
that
it
is
by
Accident
,
not
by
right
and
nature
,
that
the
Parliament
hath
any
power
or
opportunity
to
restrain
their
King
in
this
particular
;
for
where
there
is
no
need
of
asking
,
there
is
no
occasion
of
denying
;
by
consequence
no
restraint
upon
,
no
baffle
or
affronting
offered
to
the
Regal
power
.
And
yet
the
Soveraign
need
not
fear
(
if
he
be
tollerably
carefull
of
his
own
estate
)
that
any
reasonable
demand
of
his
in
these
mony
matters
,
will
meet
with
opposition
or
denial
in
his
Houses
of
Parliament
.
For
whilest
there
are
so
many
Acts
of
Grace
and
favour
to
be
done
in
Parliament
(
as
what
almost
in
every
Parliament
but
an
enlargement
of
the
Kings
favours
to
his
people
)
and
that
none
can
be
done
in
Parliament
but
with
the
Kings
fiat
and
consent
:
there
is
no
question
to
be
made
,
but
that
the
two
Houses
of
Parliament
will
far
sooner
choose
to
supply
the
King
(
as
allwise
Parliaments
have
done
)
than
rob
the
Subject
of
the
benefit
of
his
grace
and
favours
,
which
is
the
best
fruit
they
reap
from
Parliaments
.
Finally
,
whereas
it
is
objected
(
but
I
think
it
in
sport
)
that
the
old
Lord
Burleigh
used
to
say
,
that
he
knew
not
what
a
Parliament
in
England
could
not
do
;
and
that
King
Iames
once
said
in
a
Parliament
,
that
then
there
were
500
Kings
,
which
words
were
took
for
a
Concession
that
all
were
Kings
as
well
as
he
in
a
time
of
Parliament
;
they
who
have
given
us
these
Objections
do
either
mis-understand
their
Authors
,
or
abuse
themselves
.
For
what
the
Lord
Burleigh
said
of
Parliaments
(
though
it
be
more
than
the
wisest
man
alive
can
justifie
)
he
spake
of
Parliaments
,
according
as
the
word
is
used
in
its
proper
sense
;
not
for
the
two
Houses
,
or
for
either
of
them
exclusive
of
the
Kings
presence
and
consent
;
but
for
the
supreme
Court
,
for
the
highest
Judicatory
,
consisting
of
the
Kings
most
excellent
Majesty
,
the
Lords
Spiritual
and
Temporal
,
and
the
Representees
of
the
Commons
;
and
then
it
will
not
serve
for
the
turn
intended
.
And
what
King
James
said
once
in
jest
(
though
I
have
often
heard
it
used
in
earnest
upon
this
occasion
)
was
spoke
only
in
derision
of
some
daring
Spirits
,
who
laying
by
the
modesty
of
their
Predecessors
,
would
needs
be
looking
into
the
Prerogative
,
or
finding
errors
and
mistakes
in
the
present
Government
,
or
medling
with
those
Arcana
imperii
which
former
Parliaments
beheld
at
distance
,
with
the
eye
of
reverence
.
But
certainly
King
James
intended
nothing
lesse
than
to
acknowledg
a
co-ordinative
Soveraignty
in
the
two
Houses
of
Parliament
,
or
to
make
them
his
Co-partners
in
the
Regal
power
.
His
carriage
and
behaviour
towards
them
in
the
whole
course
of
his
Government
,
clearly
shews
the
contrary
:
there
never
being
prince
more
jealous
in
the
points
of
Soveraignty
,
nor
more
uncapable
of
a
Rival
in
those
points
than
he
.
14.
But
yet
the
main
objection
(
which
we
may
call
the
Objection
paramount
)
doth
remain
unanswered
.
For
if
the
three
Estates
convened
in
Parliament
,
or
any
other
popular
Magistrate
,
whom
Calvin
dreams
of
,
be
ordaned
by
the
Word
of
God
,
as
Guardians
of
the
peoples
Liberties
;
and
therefore
authorised
to
moderate
and
restrain
the
power
of
Kings
as
often
as
they
shall
invade
or
infringe
those
liberties
,
as
Calvin
plainly
saies
they
were
;
or
that
they
know
themselves
to
be
ordained
by
Gods
word
to
that
end
and
purpose
(
cujus
se
lege
Dei
Tutores
positos
esse
norunt
)
as
he
saies
they
do
:
then
neither
any
discontinuance
or
non-usage
on
their
parts
,
nor
any
prescription
to
the
contrary
alledged
by
Kings
and
supreme
Princes
,
can
hinder
them
from
resuming
and
exercising
that
Authority
which
God
hath
given
them
,
whensoever
they
shall
finde
a
fit
time
for
it
.
But
first
I
would
fain
learn
of
Calvin
in
what
part
of
the
Word
of
God
we
shall
finde
any
such
Authority
given
to
those
popular
Magistrates
(
by
what
name
soever
they
are
called
in
their
several
Countreys
)
as
he
tels
us
of
.
Not
in
the
old
Testament
I
am
sure
,
though
in
the
institution
of
the
seventy
Elders
there
be
some
hopes
of
it
.
For
when
Moses
first
ordained
those
Elders
,
it
was
not
to
diminish
any
part
of
that
power
which
was
vosted
in
him
,
but
to
ease
himself
of
some
part
of
the
burthen
which
did
lie
upon
him
.
And
this
appears
plainly
by
the
18.
Chapter
of
the
Book
of
Exodus
.
For
when
it
was
observed
by
Jethro
his
Father
in
Law
,
that
he
attended
the
businesses
of
the
people
from
morning
till
night
,
he
told
him
plainly
ultra
v●res
s●as
negotium
esse
,
that
the
burthen
was
too
heavy
for
him
,
vers.
18.
and
therefore
that
he
should
choose
some
Under-officers
,
and
place
them
over
Thousands
,
over
Hundreds
,
and
ever
Fifties
,
and
over
Tens
,
Vers.
21.
Leviusque
sit
tibi
partito
in
alios
onere
:
that
so
it
might
be
the
easier
for
him
,
those
officers
bearing
some
part
of
the
burthen
with
him
.
Yet
so
that
these
inferior
Officers
should
only
judge
in
matters
of
inferior
nature
,
the
greater
matters
being
still
reserved
to
his
own
Tribunal
.
Which
counsel
,
as
it
was
very
well
approved
by
Moses
,
so
was
it
given
by
Jethro
and
approved
by
Moses
,
with
reference
to
the
will
and
pleasure
of
All-mighty
God
,
vers.
23.
And
what
the
Lord
God
did
in
it
we
shall
finde
in
the
Book
of
Numbers
chap.
11.
For
when
Moses
made
complaint
to
God
,
that
the
Burthen
of
all
the
people
was
laid
on
him
,
vers.
11.
(
where
note
it
is
the
burden
still
which
he
makes
complaint
of
)
and
that
he
was
not
able
to
hear
all
the
people
alone
,
because
it
was
too
heavie
for
him
,
vers.
14.
God
willed
him
to
make
choice
of
seventy
of
those
Officers
,
which
before
he
had
placed
over
the
people
,
and
to
present
them
to
him
in
the
Tabernacle
of
the
Congregation
,
where
he
would
give
unto
them
the
Spirit
of
Government
,
ut
sustentent
tecum
o●us
populi
,
to
the
end
that
they
might
bear
the
burthen
of
the
people
with
him
,
vers.
17.
Nothing
in
all
this
,
but
the
easing
of
the
Supreme
Magistrate
of
some
part
of
the
Burthen
,
which
was
before
too
heavie
for
him
,
without
any
diminution
of
his
power
in
the
least
respect
.
Nor
doth
it
make
for
Calvins
purpose
,
that
God
said
to
Moses
,
that
he
would
take
of
the
Spirit
which
was
upon
him
,
and
put
it
on
the
seventy
Elders
,
vers.
17.
the
Spirit
resting
upon
Moses
in
as
full
a
measure
as
at
first
it
did
,
not
lessened
by
the
communication
of
it
to
those
Under-officers
.
And
so
the
point
is
stated
by
two
learned
writers
,
though
otherwise
of
different
perswasions
in
the
things
of
God
.
By
Estius
for
the
Pontificians
it
is
so
determined
,
Not
that
the
gift
of
the
Spirit
(
saith
he
)
should
be
in
any
manner
truly
(
or
really
)
diminished
in
Moses
,
but
because
that
infallible
conduct
of
the
Spirit
of
God
,
which
untill
then
had
been
peculiar
to
Moses
,
should
be
made
common
to
all
the
seventy
in
the
publick
government
.
And
much
lesse
did
it
derogate
from
the
spirit
and
power
of
Moses
,
that
the
seventy
were
indued
by
God
with
the
gift
of
prophesie
,
vers.
25.
that
being
but
a
personal
grace
,
and
perhaps
but
temporary
to
those
persons
neither
,
to
gain
them
at
the
first
the
greater
estimation
amongst
the
people
,
whom
they
were
to
govern
;
never
pretended
to
by
any
of
their
Successors
in
that
Magistracy
for
the
times
insuing
.
And
therefore
when
Moses
was
told
of
it
,
he
made
light
of
the
matter
,
and
was
so
far
from
envying
at
it
,
that
he
seemed
to
wish
that
all
Gods
people
might
be
able
to
prophesie
to
one
another
,
nihil
abesse
dignitati
suae
personae
,
as
my
Author
hath
it
,
that
it
did
nothing
derogate
from
his
power
and
dignity
;
though
J●shua
out
of
an
honest
zeal
to
his
Masters
greatnesse
might
fear
it
tended
,
or
might
tend
unto
the
diminution
of
his
Masters
dignity
and
credit
,
as
is
observed
by
Deodate
.
What
power
these
seventy
Elders
had
in
succeeding
times
,
when
they
were
drawn
into
a
body
,
and
made
up
that
great
Court
which
was
called
the
Sanhedrim
;
and
how
far
they
were
then
from
curbing
and
restraining
the
power
of
those
several
Kings
under
which
they
lived
,
hath
been
shewn
already
.
Now
if
the
old
Testament
do
give
so
little
countenance
to
that
great
Authority
which
Calvin
hath
assigned
so
peremptorily
to
his
three
Estates
,
or
any
other
popular
Magistates
in
their
several
Countreys
,
I
am
sure
the
New
Testament
doth
afford
them
lesse
;
in
which
obedience
to
the
Supreme
Magistrate
,
is
punctually
and
frequently
required
of
all
sorts
of
persons
.
Let
every
soul
be
subject
to
the
higher
powers
,
saith
the
Apostle
of
the
Gentiles
,
Rom.
13.
1.
If
every
soul
,
then
neither
any
Papal
,
Presbyterian
or
popular
pretender
can
challenge
any
exemption
from
that
obedience
and
subjection
to
the
higher
powers
,
which
is
required
of
them
in
this
Text
;
and
much
lesse
exercise
any
jurisdiction
or
Authority
over
them
,
whereby
they
may
be
brought
in
subjection
to
him
.
"
St.
Jerome
tels
us
that
this
rule
is
given
by
the
Apostle
,
for
fear
lest
some
presuming
on
that
Christian
Liberty
unto
which
they
were
called
,
might
possibly
refuse
to
yeeld
obedience
and
pay
their
just
Tributes
to
those
higher
powers
to
which
the
Lord
had
made
them
subject
.
"
And
therefore
he
desires
to
humble
them
and
bring
them
unto
a
better
understanding
of
their
Christian
duty
,
ne
forte
propter
superbiam
,
magis
quam
propter
Deum
contumeliam
patiantur
.
Lest
the
reproach
or
punishment
which
they
suffered
for
it
,
should
be
imputed
rather
to
their
pride
and
arrogancy
,
then
their
zeal
to
God
.
Now
what
St.
Jerome
tels
us
in
the
general
only
,
is
by
St.
Chrysostome
prest
particularly
,
with
reference
almost
to
all
degrees
and
estates
of
men
:
Here
the
Apostle
sheweth
(
saith
he
)
that
these
things
are
commanded
to
all
men
,
both
Priests
and
Monks
,
and
not
to
temporal
men
only
,
which
he
declareth
in
the
beginning
,
when
he
said
,
Let
every
soul
be
subject
to
the
highest
powers
:
although
thou
be
an
Apostle
,
although
thou
be
an
Evangelist
,
although
thou
be
a
Prophet
,
although
thou
be
whatsoever
thou
art
.
Which
said
he
gives
this
reason
for
it
,
that
Religion
is
not
overthrown
by
this
subjection
.
If
no
Apostle
could
pretend
to
an
exemption
from
those
common
duties
which
Subjects
owe
unto
their
Princes
;
then
certainly
the
Pope
who
pretends
to
sit
in
Peters
Chair
,
and
to
challenge
all
the
priviledges
which
belonged
unto
him
,
must
needs
be
in
as
great
subjection
to
a
Christian
Emperor
,
as
the
Apostles
were
(
in
their
times
)
to
any
Heathen
King
.
If
those
things
were
required
of
Priests
and
Monks
,
as
he
saies
they
were
,
then
must
the
Papal
Clergie
,
(
whether
they
be
Monasticks
or
secular
Priests
)
perform
those
duties
,
and
yeeld
that
due
obedience
unto
those
Kings
and
Princes
under
whom
they
live
,
which
are
here
required
.
But
so
it
is
,
that
partly
by
strong
hand
,
and
partly
by
taking
their
opportunities
in
the
darker
Ages
of
the
Church
,
the
Pope
hath
not
only
freed
his
Clergie
from
the
power
of
Princes
,
in
matters
even
of
Civill
nature
and
concernment
;
but
challengeth
for
himself
a
power
above
them
,
and
exercised
it
for
a
long
time
with
great
pride
and
Tyranny
,
contrary
to
the
Apostles
Rule
and
the
Fathers
Commentary
.
If
no
Evangelist
or
Prophet
could
challenge
any
such
exemption
as
the
Father
plainly
saith
they
could
not
;
then
much
lesse
can
the
Presbyterian
Minister
pretend
unto
it
,
though
he
be
both
a
Prophet
and
an
Evangelist
also
in
his
own
conceit
.
Which
notwithstanding
,
the
Scottish
Presbyterians
had
got
unto
so
great
a
head
in
the
minority
of
King
James
,
in
all
matters
,
which
related
to
Ecclesiastical
cognizance
(
and
to
that
cognizance
they
reduced
all
matters
)
they
commonly
declin'd
the
Kings
judgement
,
and
his
Courts
of
Judicature
as
altogether
incompetent
;
appealing
from
them
either
to
their
own
Presbyteries
,
or
to
the
next
general
Assembly
of
their
own
appointing
:
and
standing
so
wilfully
to
those
Appeals
,
that
some
of
them
had
like
to
have
paid
dear
for
it
,
(
after
that
Kings
coming
into
England
)
if
the
King
had
not
been
more
mercifull
to
them
,
then
they
deserved
at
his
hands
.
If
no
man
whatsoever
he
be
,
can
lawfully
acquit
himself
from
this
subjection
as
is
said
by
Chrysostome
;
what
will
become
of
Calvins
popular
Magistrates
,
and
of
the
great
authority
which
he
gives
them
over
Kings
and
Princes
;
those
popular
Officers
being
included
equally
with
the
rest
of
the
people
,
in
St.
Pauls
injunction
?
It
's
true
that
Calvins
popular
Officers
may
seem
to
have
some
colour
for
it
,
both
from
our
English
Translation
and
the
vulgar
Latine
;
by
which
obedience
is
required
sublimioribus
potestatibus
,
to
the
higher
powers
;
and
all
such
popular
Officers
,
whatsoever
they
be
,
may
warrantably
be
lookt
upon
as
higher
powers
,
in
respect
of
the
residue
of
the
people
.
But
first
the
words
in
the
original
,
viz.
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
,
do
not
so
properly
signifie
,
the
higher
,
as
the
supreme
powers
:
and
so
the
word
is
rendred
in
the
first
of
St.
Peter
cap.
2.
vers.
13.
in
which
submission
is
required
to
every
ordinance
of
man
for
the
Lords
sake
,
whether
it
be
unto
the
King
,
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
,
as
to
the
Supreme
,
or
unto
such
as
are
sent
by
him
,
&c.
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
,
saith
St.
Peter
in
the
singular
,
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
,
saith
St.
Paul
in
the
plural
number
;
both
words
proceeding
from
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
,
in
the
Nominative
Case
,
and
consequently
being
of
the
same
sense
and
signification
.
But
secondly
permitting
them
the
benefit
of
these
translations
,
yet
will
they
finde
but
little
colour
for
that
coercive
power
,
that
soveraign
Authority
and
Jurisdiction
,
which
Calvin
hath
assigned
to
the
three
Estates
or
any
other
popular
Officers
over
Kings
and
Princes
.
For
though
such
popular
Officers
may
warrantably
be
lookt
upon
as
higher
powers
in
respect
of
the
residue
of
the
people
,
as
before
was
said
,
yet
are
they
lower
powers
in
respect
of
the
King
,
from
whom
as
they
receive
all
the
Authority
which
they
have
,
whatsoever
it
be
,
so
unto
him
they
are
to
render
an
accompt
of
their
actings
in
it
,
whensoever
he
pleaseth
.
So
that
these
popular
Officers
may
be
compar'd
not
unfitly
unto
the
Genera
subalterna
in
the
Schools
of
Logick
;
each
of
them
being
subordinate
to
one
another
(
the
Constable
to
the
Maior
or
Bayliff
in
a
corporate
Town
,
or
to
the
Justices
of
the
Peace
in
the
County
at
large
,
the
Maiors
and
Justices
to
the
Judges
in
their
several
Circuits
,
the
Judges
in
their
several
Circuits
and
their
Courts
of
Judicature
to
the
Lord
Chancellor
for
the
time
being
,
and
he
unto
the
three
Estates
when
convened
in
Parliament
)
till
they
end
all
in
genus
summum
,
in
that
supreme
power
which
is
subordinate
to
none
,
and
unto
which
the
rest
are
Species
subalternae
(
as
the
Logicians
phrase
it
)
in
their
several
orders
,
till
they
end
all
in
Specie
infimâ
,
even
in
the
lowest
of
the
People
.
Less
comfort
can
I
give
them
from
the
Apostle
of
the
Jewes
from
the
words
of
St.
Peter
,
in
which
submission
is
required
(
as
before
was
said
)
to
every
ordinance
of
man
,
whether
it
be
unto
the
King
as
unto
the
Supreme
,
or
unto
Governors
,
as
unto
them
that
are
sent
by
him
for
the
punishment
of
evill
doers
,
and
for
the
praise
of
them
that
do
well
.
Now
those
which
are
thus
authorised
,
and
sent
by
Kings
to
the
ends
and
purposes
before
mentioned
,
may
very
properly
be
resembled
unto
Jehosophats
Commissioners
in
the
Kingdome
of
Judah
,
inferior
Magistrates
,
may
challenge
any
power
above
him
,
or
exercise
any
jurisdiction
or
Authority
over
him
.
If
any
thing
in
this
Text
may
be
thought
to
favour
Calvin
in
this
strange
opinion
,
it
is
that
Kings
are
said
to
be
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
,
humana
creatura
,
saith
the
vulgar
Latin
,
an
ordinance
of
man
,
as
the
English
reads
it
;
and
being
but
a
Creature
of
the
peoples
making
,
the
rest
may
think
themselves
as
good
men
as
he
.
"
The
Rhemists
will
have
Kings
to
be
called
humane
creatures
,
because
elected
by
the
people
,
or
holding
their
Soveraignty
by
birth
and
carnall
propagation
,
ordained
for
the
wealth
,
peace
and
prosperity
of
the
Subjects
;
to
put
a
difference
betwixt
that
humane
Superiority
,
and
the
spiritual
Rulers
and
Regiment
,
guiding
and
governing
the
people
to
an
higher
end
,
and
instituted
by
God
himself
immediately
,
Christ
having
expresly
constituted
the
form
of
Regiment
,
used
ever
since
in
the
Church
.
"
Whereunto
Dr.
Fulk
for
want
of
a
better
doth
return
this
Answer
,
viz.
That
though
there
be
great
difference
between
the
government
of
Princes
,
and
Ecclesiastical
Governors
,
yet
the
Apostle
calleth
not
Princes
an
humane
creation
,
as
though
they
were
not
also
of
Gods
Creation
(
for
there
is
no
power
but
of
God
)
but
that
the
form
of
their
Creation
is
in
mans
appointment
.
All
the
Genevians
generally
do
so
expound
it
,
and
it
concerns
them
so
to
do
in
point
of
interesse
.
The
Bishop
of
that
City
was
their
Soveraign
Prince
,
and
had
jus
utriusque
gladini
,
as
Calvin
signified
in
a
Letter
to
Cardinal
Sadolet
,
till
he
and
all
his
Clergy
were
expelled
the
City
in
a
popular
Tumult
,
Anno
1528.
and
a
new
form
of
Government
established
both
in
Church
and
State
.
So
that
having
laid
the
foundation
of
their
Common-wealth
in
the
expulsion
of
their
Prince
,
and
the
new
model
of
their
Discipline
in
refusing
to
have
any
more
Bishop
;
they
found
it
best
for
justifying
their
proceedings
at
home
,
and
increasing
their
Partizans
abroad
,
to
maintain
a
parity
of
Ministers
in
the
Church
of
Christ
,
and
to
invest
the
people
and
their
popular
Officers
with
a
chief
power
in
the
concernments
and
affairs
of
State
,
even
to
the
deposing
of
Kings
,
and
disposing
of
Kingdoms
.
But
for
this
last
they
finde
no
warrant
in
the
Text
which
we
have
before
us
,
For
first
admitting
the
Translation
to
be
true
and
genuine
(
as
indeed
it
is
not
)
the
Roman
Emperor
,
and
consequently
other
Kings
and
Princes
,
may
be
said
to
be
an
humane
Ordinance
,
because
their
power
is
most
visibly
conversant
,
circa
humanas
Actiones
,
about
ordering
of
humane
Actions
,
and
other
civill
affairs
of
men
,
as
they
were
subjects
of
the
Empire
,
and
Members
of
that
Body
politick
,
whereof
that
Emperor
was
head
.
Secondly
,
to
make
soveraign
Princes
by
what
name
and
Title
soever
called
,
to
be
no
other
then
an
humane
Ordinance
,
because
they
are
ordained
by
the
people
and
of
their
appointment
;
must
needs
create
an
irreconcileable
difference
between
St.
Peter
and
St.
Paul
,
by
which
last
the
Supreme
Powers
,
whatsoever
they
be
,
are
called
the
Ordinance
of
God
.
The
Powers
(
saith
that
Apostle
)
are
ordained
of
God
,
and
therefore
he
that
resisteth
the
Powers
resisteth
the
Ordinance
of
God
.
Upon
which
words
Deodate
gives
this
Glosse
or
Comment.
"
That
the
supreme
Powers
are
called
the
Ordinance
of
God
,
because
God
is
the
Author
of
this
Order
in
the
world
:
and
all
those
who
attain
to
these
Dignities
,
do
so
,
either
by
his
manifest
will
and
approbation
,
when
the
means
are
lawfull
:
or
by
his
secret
Providence
by
meer
permission
or
toleration
,
when
they
are
unlawfull
.
Now
it
is
fitting
that
man
should
approve
and
tolerate
that
which
God
approves
and
tolerates
.
"
But
thirdly
,
I
conceive
that
those
words
in
the
Greek
Text
of
St.
Peter
,
viz.
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
,
are
not
so
properly
translated
as
they
might
have
been
;
and
as
the
same
words
,
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
,
are
rendred
by
the
same
Translators
(
somewhat
more
neer
to
the
Original
)
in
another
place
.
For
in
the
8.
chapt
.
to
the
Romans
vers.
22.
we
finde
them
rendring
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
,
by
the
whole
Creation
(
and
why
not
rather
every
Creature
,
as
both
our
old
Translation
and
the
Rhemists
read
it
,
conform
to
omnis
Creatura
in
the
vulgar
Latine
?
)
which
had
they
done
and
kept
themselves
more
near
to
the
Greek
Original
in
St.
Peters
Text
,
they
either
would
have
rendred
it
by
every
humane
Creature
,
as
the
Rhemists
do
;
or
rather
by
all
Men
,
or
by
all
Man-kinde
,
as
the
words
import
.
And
then
the
meaning
will
be
this
,
that
the
Jewes
living
scattered
and
disperst
in
Pontus
,
Galatia
,
Cappadocia
,
and
other
Provinces
of
the
Empire
,
were
to
have
their
conversation
so
meek
and
lowly
(
for
fear
of
giving
scandal
to
the
Gentiles
amongst
whom
they
lived
)
as
to
submit
themselves
to
all
Man-kinde
,
or
rather
to
every
Man
(
unto
every
humane
Creature
,
as
the
Rhemists
read
it
)
that
was
in
Authority
above
,
whether
it
were
unto
the
Emperor
himself
,
as
their
supreme
Lord
,
or
to
such
Legats
,
Prefects
,
and
Procurators
,
as
were
appointed
by
him
for
the
government
of
those
several
Provinces
,
to
the
end
that
they
may
punish
the
evil-doers
,
and
incourage
such
as
did
well
,
living
comformably
to
the
Lawes
by
which
they
were
governed
.
Small
comfort
in
this
Text
,
as
in
any
of
the
rest
before
,
for
those
popular
Officers
which
Calvin
makes
the
Overseers
of
the
soveraign
Prince
,
and
Guardians
of
the
Liberties
of
the
common
people
.
If
then
there
be
no
Text
of
Scripture
,
no
warrant
from
the
word
of
God
by
which
the
popular
Officers
,
which
Calvin
dreams
of
,
are
made
the
Keepers
of
the
Liberties
of
the
Common
people
,
or
vested
with
the
power
of
opposing
Kings
and
soveraign
Princes
as
often
as
they
wantonly
insult
upon
the
people
,
or
wilfully
infringe
their
Priviledges
:
I
would
fain
learn
how
they
should
come
to
know
that
they
are
vested
with
such
power
,
or
trusted
with
the
defence
of
the
Subjects
Liberties
(
cujus
se
Dei
ordinatione
Tutores
positos
esse
norunt
)
as
Calvin
plainly
saies
they
do
.
If
they
pretend
to
know
it
by
inspiration
,
such
inspiration
cannot
be
known
to
any
but
themselves
alone
;
neither
the
Prince
or
people
,
whom
it
most
concerneth
,
can
take
notice
of
it
.
Nor
can
they
well
assure
themselves
whether
such
inspirations
come
from
God
or
the
Devil
;
the
Devil
many
times
insnaring
proud
ambitious
and
vain-glorious
Men
by
such
strange
Delusions
.
If
they
pretend
to
know
it
by
the
Dictate
of
their
private
Spirit
(
the
great
Diana
of
Calvin
and
his
followers
in
expounding
Scripture
)
we
are
but
in
the
same
uncertainties
,
as
we
were
before
.
And
who
can
tell
whether
the
private
Spirit
they
pretend
unto
,
and
do
so
much
brag
of
,
lying
Spirit
as
was
put
into
the
mouthes
of
the
Prophets
,
when
Ahab
was
to
be
seduced
to
his
own
destruction
?
Adeo
Argumenta
ex
absurdo
petita
ineptos
habent
exitus
,
as
Lactantius
notes
it
.
All
I
have
now
to
add
,
is
to
shew
the
difference
between
Calvin
and
his
followers
,
in
the
propounding
of
this
Doctrine
;
delivered
by
Calvin
in
few
words
,
but
Magisterially
enough
,
and
with
no
other
Authority
then
his
ipse
dixit
;
enlarged
by
David
Paraeus
in
his
Comment
on
the
13.
chapter
to
the
Romans
into
divers
branches
,
and
many
endevours
used
by
him
(
as
by
the
rest
of
Calvins
followers
,
)
to
finde
out
Arguments
and
instances
out
of
several
Authors
to
make
good
the
cause
.
For
which
though
Calvin
scap'd
the
fire
,
yet
Paraeus
could
not
.
Ille
Crucem
pretium
sceleris
tulit
,
hic
Diadema
.
For
so
it
hapned
,
that
one
Mr.
Knight
of
Brodegates
(
now
Pembroke
Colledge
)
in
Oxford
,
had
preach'd
up
the
Authority
of
these
popular
officers
in
a
Sermon
before
the
University
,
about
the
beginning
of
the
year
1622.
for
which
being
presently
transmitted
to
the
King
and
Councel
,
he
there
ingenuously
confessed
,
that
he
had
borrowed
both
his
Doctrine
,
and
his
proofs
and
instances
from
the
Book
of
Paraeus
above
mentioned
.
Notice
whereof
being
given
to
the
University
,
the
whole
Doctrine
of
Paraeus
as
to
that
particular
,
was
drawn
into
several
Propositions
;
which
in
a
full
and
frequent
Convocation
held
on
the
25.
of
June
,
1622.
were
severally
condemned
to
be
erroneous
,
scandalous
,
and
destructive
of
Monarchical
Government
.
Upon
which
Sentence
or
determination
,
the
King
gave
order
that
as
many
of
those
books
as
could
be
gotten
,
should
solemnly
and
publickly
be
burnt
in
each
of
the
Universities
,
and
St.
Pauls
Church-yard
,
which
was
done
accordingly
.
An
accident
much
complained
of
by
the
Puritan
party
for
a
long
time
after
,
who
looked
upon
it
as
the
funeral
pile
of
their
Hopes
and
Projects
;
till
by
degrees
they
got
fresh
courage
,
carrying
on
their
designs
more
secretly
,
by
consequence
more
dangerously
then
before
they
did
.
The
terrible
effects
whereof
we
have
seen
and
felt
in
our
late
Civil
Wars
and
present
confusions
.
But
it
is
time
to
close
this
point
,
and
come
to
a
conclusion
of
the
whole
Discourse
;
there
be
no
other
Objections
that
I
know
of
,
but
what
are
easily
reduced
unto
those
before
,
or
not
worth
the
Answering
.
15.
Thus
have
we
took
a
brief
Survey
of
those
insinuations
,
grounds
or
Principles
(
call
them
what
you
will
)
which
CALVIN
hath
laid
down
in
his
Book
of
Institutions
,
for
the
incouragement
of
the
Subjects
to
rebellious
courses
,
and
putting
them
in
Arms
against
their
Soveraign
,
either
in
case
of
Tyrannie
,
Licentiousness
,
or
Mal-administration
,
of
what
sort
soever
;
by
which
the
Subjects
may
pretend
that
they
are
oppressed
either
in
point
of
liberty
,
or
in
point
of
property
.
And
we
have
shewn
upon
what
false
and
weak
foundations
he
hath
raised
his
building
;
how
much
he
hath
mistook
or
abused
his
Authors
;
but
how
much
more
he
hath
betrayed
and
abused
his
Readers
.
For
we
have
clearly
proved
,
and
directly
manifested
,
out
of
the
best
Records
and
Monuments
of
the
former
times
,
that
the
Ephori
were
not
instituted
in
the
State
of
Sparta
to
oppose
the
Kings
;
nor
the
Tribunes
in
the
State
of
Rome
to
oppose
the
Consuls
;
nor
the
Demarchi
in
the
Common-wealth
of
Athens
to
oppose
the
Senate
:
or
if
they
were
,
that
this
could
no
way
serve
to
advance
his
purpose
of
setting
up
such
popular
Officers
in
the
Kingdoms
of
Christendom
;
those
Officers
being
only
found
in
Aristocraties
,
or
Democraties
,
but
never
heard
or
dreampt
of
in
a
Monarchical
Government
.
And
we
have
shewn
both
who
they
are
which
constitute
the
three
Estates
in
all
Christian
Kingdoms
;
and
that
there
is
no
Christian
Kingdom
in
which
the
three
Estates
convened
in
Parliament
(
or
by
what
other
name
soever
they
do
call
them
)
have
any
authority
either
to
regulate
the
person
of
the
Soveraign
Prince
,
or
restrain
his
power
,
in
case
he
be
a
Soveraign
Prince
,
and
not
meerly
titular
and
conditional
;
and
that
it
is
not
to
be
found
in
Holy
Scripture
,
that
they
are
or
were
ordained
by
God
to
be
the
Patrons
and
Protectors
of
the
Common
people
,
and
therefore
chargeable
with
no
lesse
a
crime
than
a
most
perfidious
Dissimulation
,
should
they
connive
at
Kings
when
they
play
the
Tyrants
,
or
want
only
abuse
that
power
which
the
Lord
hath
given
them
,
to
the
oppression
of
their
Subjects
.
In
which
last
points
,
touching
the
designation
of
the
three
Estates
,
and
the
authority
pretended
to
be
vested
in
them
,
I
have
carried
a
more
particular
eye
on
this
Kingdom
of
England
where
those
pernicious
Principles
and
insinuations
which
our
Author
gives
us
,
have
been
too
readily
imbraced
,
and
too
eagerly
pursued
by
those
of
his
party
and
opinion
.
If
herein
I
have
done
any
service
to
Supreme
Authority
,
my
Countrey
and
some
misguided
Zelots
of
it
,
I
shall
have
reason
to
rejoyce
in
my
undertaking
.
If
not
,
posterity
shall
not
say
that
Calvins
memory
was
so
sacred
with
me
,
and
his
name
so
venerable
,
as
rather
to
suffer
such
a
Stumbling-block
to
be
laid
in
the
Subjects
way
without
being
censured
and
removed
,
than
either
his
authority
should
be
brought
in
question
,
or
any
of
his
Dictates
to
a
legal
tryal
.
Having
been
purchased
by
the
Lord
at
so
dear
a
price
,
we
are
to
be
no
longer
the
Servants
of
men
,
or
to
have
the
truth
of
God
with
respect
of
persons
.
I
have
God
to
be
my
Father
,
and
the
Church
my
Mother
,
and
therefore
have
not
only
pleaded
the
Cause
of
Kings
and
Supreme
Magistrates
who
are
the
Deputies
of
God
,
but
added
somewhat
in
behalf
of
the
Church
of
England
,
whose
Rights
and
priviledges
I
have
pleaded
to
my
best
abilities
.
The
issue
and
success
I
refer
to
him
by
whom
Kings
do
reign
,
and
who
appointed
Kings
,
and
other
Supreme
Magistrates
to
be
nursing
Fathers
to
his
Church
;
that
as
they
do
receive
authority
and
power
from
the
hands
of
God
,
so
they
may
use
the
same
in
the
protection
and
defence
of
the
Church
of
God
:
and
God
,
even
their
own
God
will
give
them
his
Blessing
,
and
save
them
from
the
striving
of
unruly
people
,
whose
mouth
speaketh
proud
words
,
and
their
right
hand
is
a
right
hand
of
iniquity
.
FINIS
.