IT 's strange , that Man , who believes himself Natures masterpiece , and that it is his right to command all that is in the Universe , should not have informed himself of that Title which gives him these advantages ; and that he knows not wherein the excellency consists wherewith he flatters himself , not whereon the Soveraignty he claims , is founded . And what is the more wonderful , is . That he who hath given himself the liberty to assign to every thing the rank and order which they ought to hold in the world , and to prescribe them the function they are to exercise , should have forgot himself in this general distribution which he hath made , haveing reserved for himself no employment worthy of his ambition , or of the quality he hath taken . For although he boasts , that he hath Reason for his portion , and that he believes it belongs to him in propriety , and that it gives him the soveraign command over all creatures ; yet hath he so ill explain'd himself therein , and so weakly maintained the right which may be his , that in all Ages there hath lived very great Philosophers , who have assured that Beasts had Reason ; so that even there hath been Times wherein it was hardly permitted to doubt it : And that since the contrary hath crept into the Schools , the most cleer-sighted have held it as suspected , and the most moderate have rank'd it amongst those Questions which might be maintained on either side . And certainly if we consider the wonderful industry wherewith Beasts perform the most part of their works ; the ingenious foresight they use to shun evil , and seek what is useful for them ; the sleights and niceties they practise the one against the other ; the society and the communication they have together , and all those examples of prudence , of gratitude , and of generosity which they have given us , and which have convinced such Great persons : It 's impossible but we must believe , or at least suspect that Actions which appear so reasonable , cannot but be managed by Reason . For if we would refer them to Instinct , the nature thereof is so hidden , that there is no likelihood to destroy such clear and strong conjectures , by so obscure and ill establish'd a thing ; And which perhaps , if it were well known , would be found nothing different or estranged from Reason .

In effect , whatsoever may be said of the Instinct , it must either be an exterior cause which forceth Animals and works upon them , without their contributing any thing but obedience ; or else it must be a faculty natural unto them , by reason whereof they agitate themselves , and are truly the cause and principle of their actions : now , as a man cannot maintain that it is a stranger power , without falling into great inconveniences , and particularly in this , That we should give an assault to the Almightiness and infinite wisdom of God , for having left his works imperfect , and having deprived them of the greatest part of those vertues , which are most necessary for their preservation . We must conclude , it is a faculty born with them , which ought to be of an order as elevated , as its effects are excellent , and which consequently acts with a great knowledge . If it be so , who will not have cause to believe , that actions whose successes are so well ordered , which have so well regulated a progress and a concatenation , which so justly ties together the means with their ends , must needs be enlightned by Reason .

But , what renders these presumptions yet stronger , is the weakness of the proofs whereon the contrary opinion is grounded . For it is a thing which is hardly conceiveable , that Ratiocination should be taken from Beasts , without knowing the nature of Ratiocination . For certainly , hitherto no man hath exactly discovered wherein it consists , nor what the soul doth when it reasons , not what difference there is betwixt this operation of the mind , and the two others . We are well assured , that in the first the Understanding forms the images of things ; but when we come to examine the latter where Ratiocination consists , we fall short . And it is apparent , that Discourse , which like light makes known the most obscure things , remains it self unknown , and hides it self as that doth in darkness .

Yet herein is the foundation whereon the decision of this famous Controversie ought to be established . And there had been no more subject to doubt , if after having shewn how Ratiocination is formed , it had been remonstrated that that action surpassed the forces of all those faculties which are in Beasts . So that a man need not be astonished , if for default of having well observed that fundamental Truth , a man is not sure of the party he ought to take ; and if we doubt of those Conclusions , which are drawn from Principles which are without evidence and without proof .

Let them oppose as long as they please , That Reasoning requires Propositions and universal Notions ; and that it cannot be made without abstraction , and some reflection of the knowledge it hath of its self ; which are things whereto it 's certain the soul of Beasts can never attain : Yet some will still say , that it is not therein in which the reasoning of Beasts consists ; that all these conditions are strange unto it ; and that the Sillogism which is called expositive , is an evident sign thereof , since it cannot be formed of terms purely singular without any abstraction , and there being no need for the spirit to reflect on it self . Whence it follows , the difficulty is not taken away so , but that the conjecture which we have of the Reason of Beasts , remain in full force , and that nothing is objected which destroys or weakens it .

After which , who dares affirm that it is Reason which raiseth Men above Beasts , without rendring that Right doubtful which cannot be contested against him , and without putting a Soveraigncie in competition , to which all Nature hath subjected it self ? No , no ; There must be a more solid foundation which must maintain his dignity , he must draw his perfection and excellency from a higher source : In a word , he must have some vertue which must be so eminent , which must be above all those which are in Nature , and whereto the most perfect Animals can never attain . But we must yet confess , that he who should have discovered so important a matter , hath done no small service to all the society of Mankind ; and that perhaps he hath little less obliged them , then those who invented the most profitable Arts and Sciences . Besides that he would have taught them the greatest and most precious things it hath , that it would have put the advantages and prerogatives it hath out of contest , and it would have justified the Empire it pretends , shewing that it is not a Tyranny as it 's reproached withall , but a just and legitimate dominion . It would without doubt withdraw them from the danger they are in at every moment , not only to commit an injustice against Beasts and against it self , but even also some kind of impiety towards God . For , in the doubt wherein we are , that Beasts have reason ; if it be found that in effect they have any , as it is not perhaps impossible , would not the Man then be unjust to ravish a good from them , which belongs to them as well as to him ? Would he not do himself wrong , to ground his excellency and his superiority on a thing which he hath only in common with them ? And will he not thereby sensibly offend the Author , in seeking to suppress so glorious a badg of his power and of his wisdom ?

All these considerations had sometimes perswaded me , that every Man ought to contribute with all his power to the finding out of a thing , in which every Man had an interest , and since Truth is like those unknown Lands which from time to time are discovered , and often rather by hazard then by address , that it might happen , that the less intelligent might advance the discovery of those noble functions of the Soul which have hitherto been unknown , at least whereof the past Ages have left us but some imperfect relations . Upon this confidence I had , as they say , set sail ; and neither the fear of shipwrack , nor an unprofitable voyage , could ever hinder me from hazarding my self in so high an enterprise .

After having therefore carefully enquired the Nature of these Faculties , and having made ( as I thought ) some considerable Observations , and which had not been made before , I thought I was obliged to divulge them , and that I could not suppress them without betraying the common cause . So that the Treatise of the Characters of the Passions , wherein I have engaged my self , having given me way to acquit my self of that duty , I had added to the Second Volume of that Work , a particular Treatise of the Knowledge of Beasts ; where all these Questions are examined , and wherein I pretended to shew by new and very probable proofs , That Beasts reason , and their reasoning is formed only of particular notions and propositions , wherein it is different from that of Men , who have the faculty of reasoning universally ; and that this faculty is the true difference of Man , which marks the spirituality and immortality of his soul . This Discourse having appeared in the World with a very happy fate , and if I may so speak , with more approbation then I ever hoped ; To that height , that some men perswaded themselves , that the Propositions I had therein established ought hereafter to be received for Truths which were not to be doubted ; and that no body would venture to write against so plausible and so solidly proved a Doctrine . For mine own part , who could never have had so advantagious a sense of mine own work , and who believe besides , that it is impossible for the Mind of Man to penetrate these profound depths , and to take off those thick vails which hide the Nature of every thing ; which withheld me from falling into that vanity . And I always thought , that an Opinion so far estranged from common belief , would never fail of Enemies , which would assault it as soon as it should appear in publick .

Indeed , a little while after , Monsieur Chanet published his Book of the Instinct and Knowledge of Beasts : The Title of which promiseth an Examen of all what I had written on that Subject ; the main design whereof was to shew , That Beasts cannot reason . As soon as his Discourse came to my hands , I fancied him to be some Hero of the Schools , and some new Hercules , whose Commission was to damn Paradoxes , and to maintain Vulgar opinions . And I ingenuously confess , that at that time fear and hope equally divided my mind : I was afraid to find such strong Reasons , that they would have obliged me to abandon those Opinions which had been so well received , and which had afforded me so much reputation . On the other side , the ardent love I have for the Truth , made me hope that I should therein learn divers things which were unknown unto me , and that my losses would be repaired by those fair instructions I should gather from thence . But in once reading of it , all those vain thoughts were taken away ; and , far from making me change my opinion , it fortified me in my first sentiment , and made me believe , that those things which before I esteemed but probable , might now pass for demonstrative , since they had been disputed against with all the endeavours of a man of metal , who hath meditated and written so much on these things . For , this is worthy consideration , that M.C. hath deduced no proofs to destroy my Reasons , in which he hath not used some Sophism or Paralogism , as I shall make it appear in this Discourse : And that necessarily his cause must be ill , since that with all the Memory and all the Reading which they say he hath , they could furnish him with no lawful defence , he having made use of sleights and artifices only , which such men use who mistrust the soundness of their own right .

Assuredly , if this manner of acting were to be permitted any man , it were to be allowed me , who have stragled out of the ordinary road , who have brought to light new Paradoxes , and whose proofs at worst may pass for the disports of the mind , as well as those of those men who have made Elogies of Nero , and of the Quartan Ague . But that M.C. should make use of them to maintain an Opinion which is so generally approved by all the World , and which is held as an undoubted Maxim in Philosophy , is an unexcuseable abuse , and which must charge him with so reproachful a shame amongst those of his own party , that he could not defend a good cause but by ill means , or that he should have prevaricated in his own cause : I fear even lest I should be entangled in his disgrace , and that those of the most judicious seeing my Writings , may not suspect an intelligence betwixt us two , and that he is an Adversary I have appointed to suffer himself to be overcome , and by his weakness to give credit to my party . But to justifie my self from this suspition , I have nothing to say , but that I had never heard any speak of M.C. till the Book he had written against me came to light : And that there is no likelihood , that under colour to give some lustre to my opinions by this artifice , I should engage a man of honor in so base a design , without the fear lest he should have doubly made against me , and lest he might quit himself of the faint , that in good earnest he might handle me the worse .

IN considering the order which God hath established through the whole Universe where the lesse noble thing ; serve for the degrees whereby we rise to the most excellent , and all of them have some beginings of that perfection which is more full and perfect in these ; A man might easily perswade himself , that since the Sensitive Soul is subordinate to the Reasonable , such a progresse ought to be made in their knowledge , that the first may be addresses to the latter , and that the actions of the understanding may have their beginning to be as it were roughcast in those of the Imagination . And to speak it in one word , since the understanding knows thing , that it judgeth of them and draweth consequences from them , there must needs be somthing done in the Sensitive Soul , which serves for the first draught of those actions , and in which some image , and some vestiges may be observed . In effect it conceives things , it judgeth whether they are good or ill , and concludes either to follow or to fly them : And to perform these actions , it useth the same way as the Understanding doth . For as it judgeth and reasoneth by uniting things which are divided , and by dividing those which are united , it doth nothing but unite and separate the images of objects , to judge of what is good or ill for the Animal . It is true , that she doth it very imperfectly , both because her power is of no great extent , and because her knowledges are as the first sights wherewith the Soul views things , and the first Essays she makes to discern them .

But to understand this , it 's necessary to see how the Imagination knows , That Knowledge is an Action . and how far its knowledge may arrive . Having therefore presupposed that Knowledge is the onely function of the Reasonable and Sensitive Soul , forasmuch as to be sensible , to conceive , to judge , and to reason , is nothing else but to know , I have from thence inferred , That since all things which are below them have the vertue of operating , they also must needs have it ; and consequently that Knowledge which is their onely function is an Action . So that those who say that the Senses know not their objects but by receiving their images ; and that sensation is a pure passion , place the sensitive Soul below all corporal things , and destroy ever the Nature of Knowledge which was even placed in the rank of vital actions .

This action is a production of the Image . Now because Knowledg cannot be otherwise conceived but as a representation of the objects which are made in the mind ; If the Sensitive Soul knows , and if to know is to operate ; it of necessity must present it self with the objects ; And because it cannot otherwise represent a thing but by forming its picture , it follows that in knowing things , it forms pictures and images of them , and that there is no other action which may be attributed unto it proportionable to the perfection and excellency of its Nature .