Ens est quod est .

Now having found that ens is , it is requisite that we should know what it is ; and I say ens est quod est . If we shall look at the Grammatical notation of ens , it is a participle of the present tense , and therefore is as much as quod est , even as legens and qui , or quae legit are the same : or as in Greek 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 verberans , or qui verberat are all one , and that the very particle doth shew . For if it be of the present tense , it is the same with the verb of the present tense , so that ens and quod est are the same . Again , if there be ens , as we have already proved , then vel est quod est , vel non quod est , vel quod non est at neque , non quod est , nec quod non est , ergo quod est . For when I say non quod est , then I put ens fictum impossibile , ergo this can no way be ens , no not in our phantasie ; when I say quod non est , then I put ens fictum impossibile , and to that I give a quod but non est , so that in the end I say , ens est , quod est , that is , neither ens fictum possibile , or ens fictum impossibile ; and therefore if we will define ens fictum impossibile , it is non quod est , if we define ens fictum possibile , it is quod non est . Now if neither ens fictum possibile , nor ens fictum impossibile be entia , then ens est quod est . And again , when I deny non quod est , I deny est , and when I deny quod non est , I deny est , ergo , ens est quod est . Again , ens and bonum are all one , therefore non ens and malum are all gone , therefore siens non sit , then it is bonum and malum : ergoens est quod est .

Ens est primum vel a primo .

If ens be , it must be either first absolutely which is not from another , or it must be from a first ; that is from another , which is not from another : again , contradiction sheweth it , for it is as if I should say , ens is non aliunde or aliunde ; that is , it is of it self , or not of it self ; and this is contradiction .

But objection may be made , that in the continual generation of things , one thing is before another , as my father begot me , and another begot my father , and so in infinitum , ergo it is not necessary that ens should be absolutely first or from a first .

Answ. This is nothing , for am I from my father . This then he was before I was , and I am after him , ergo here is prius and posterius , therefore here cannot be eternity , ergo this ens is not eternal . Again , is not my fathers case as well as mine to be from another , and so all men till they come to ens primum ; Yes , ergo all men are from others , till we come to this first absolute being , which is not from any other : for then he should not be primum : ergo ens est primum , vel a primo .

Ens absolute primum est quod est seipso .

First , if there be ens primum or a primo , there must be ens primum of necessity , for if there be ens primum , ye grant it me , if there be ens a primo , ye must also grant ens primum , therefore ens primum 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 primum , and maxime intelligibile , therefore Atheists are here to be confuted , for they may sooner doubt whether they themselves be , then whether God be , for if they be entia a primo , they must first know him , that is primum , before they can know themselves , for the cause is before the effect , Quod est seipso , it must be being either seipso or aliunde , if aliunde , ne primum , for that from which it is , is prius unto it , ergo est seipso .

Object . Bellarmine saith that God is not seipso , neither any creature whatsoever , for then he saith , the same thing would be the cause of it self , and the effect .

Resp. It is a meer sophisme , or rather an Amphibolia of the phrase . For when we say God is seipso , we do not mean that he hath causes , but we mean privatively that he is not aliunde , and est seipso , and est 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 are the same , it is quod est , and so est seipso .

Ens primum est 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 .

If he be seipso , then he is without causes , that that is absolutely first must have no causes , for then it is not absolutely first , ergo there can be no scientia of him 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , for tunc scire dicimur cum causas scimus . Again , first if he have no causes , he hath no end , ergo he is not made for an end , ergo there can be no art of him to guide him to an end . So that we find in this respect that ens primum cannot be the subject of Art ; Every Art is to guide the thing whereof it is an Art to it 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Again , every Art doth lay forth the causes , effects , subjects and the proper adjuncts of a thing , for if it have no causes it can have no qualities , and God hath none of these , ergo he is not the subject of Art . Hence again , as this ens is beyond our reason , so he is beyond our speech , either Grammar or Rhetorick , so that concerning this ens primum , whatsoever we think or speak it is imperfect . Now bring it to our Logick after another sort , and we shall see this ens to be beyond Art . Our Logick bringeth us first to a first efficient , and in the resolution of any thing we go so far , as in the end we find a first efficient . Now this first efficient hath nothing before it , ergo that is beyond our reason , therefore what that is we cannot tell , and therefore if we shall make him an effect to look out his causes , we shall not make him first , ergo he is beyond all Art : Then again , there is no Art but is an eternal rule in the Idea of God , as a precept of that thing whereof it is an Art , to guide it to its Eupraxie , therefore if there should be an Art of him , there must be a former ens which must have the Idea of it , to shew how this ens primum was made , and whereby it must be governed : so that he is not the subject of our reason ; so that whereas I said before , that ens was the subject of our reason ; here I recal it , and say , that primum ens is beyond out Logick : and therefore he being beyond all art , we will go them over more briefly , till we come to ens a primo . First then , he is without efficient , for he is without causes , ergo he is uncreated : for the first matter , though it were without matter and form , yet it had an efficient , and an end , ergo was created : then again , he is seipso , ergo he must be uncreated , hence also he cannot be annihilated , neither generated , nor corrupted : again , hence he is independe aliunde , and therefore supremum : again , hence he is without matter : Now if he be without matter , therefore he is without genus , ergo is not a species either subalterna , or specialissima . Again if he be without form as without genus , then he cannot be defined , ergo he must be without limitation of essence , ergo without limitation of quantity , ergo without limitation of place , and because he is without beginning from any other thing , therefore he is without any duration , and because he is without any matter , ergo he is truly spiritual , for so we account things spiritual , according to the subtleness of their matter , but he hath no matter at all : Again he being without matter and form , ergo can be no membrum , because every member containeth a portion of matter and form , neither can he be an integrum , because that consisteth of members , which contain part of matter and form . Now in that he is absolutely first , therefore he can be but unum , for else there should be more : again if there should be more than one , then the one would say as well as the other , I am as forward as thee , and so none could be absolutely first . Again he is no genus , for that is an universal , or Synopsis of many together , whereas he is but one : so that now he is not properly an ens , but an 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , and above our Logick : again , in that he is absolutely first he must needs be without accidents ( to use their term ) without adjuncts , for they are second things arising from their substances , and in absolute primo ente there must be nothing , but that which is absolute primum : so that here we see his most simple being , and that he is beyond our Logick . Now if he be without all potentia , both essentialis , and accidentalis , he is pure act ; so that this act now of his must needs be his esse , because he is pure act , for if he be agere , then his esse and agere are the same : so that if any one doth any thing . as every ens a primo doth by potentia , it is not pure act : some say the Angels do agere per essentiam , but it is false , unless they mean that they act first by potentia : now indeed there is nothing , but it doth act per faoultatem essentiae . First the form , that is the beginner of act , and when it acts upon matter internal , that is habitual , or a faculty , when it acts by the matter upon some external object , that is an act ; for first there is the essence , the matter and the form , then the faculty , the forms act upon the matter internally ; lastly , the act , which is of the form , by the matter externally : now these are not in God , but are his very essence . Now we find then , that this primum ens must be actus , and purus actus , because there is no potentia in him at all , ergo it must needs be , that he is primus actus , ergo optimus actus . for primus actus , and optimus actus are all one : Again hence it must needs follow , that if there be any act of other things , it must needs be from him , and therefore if there be any thing actu it must be from him : so then thus we have found him absolute in every thing .

Ens a primo .

Now to return to the first Syllogism . If there be reason , there must be an adaequatum subjectum of it , ergo ens a primo , for we have heard , that ens primum is beyond our reason , so that there must be ens a primo , which is adequatum subjectum rationi , and that now is liable to all our Logick , for it hath causes , effects , subjects , adjuncts , &c. and thus we will go on , and see all the subjects of the Arts in the concretion of ens a primo , which the Philosophers say , cannot be demonstrated .

That we might dig deep , and lay our foundation of Arts sure , I have shewed that there is a being , and that it is double , the one from whom Art is , the other in whom it shines , now we heard that ens est quod est , which is nothing but the true notation of ens resolved by Grammer quod est . Now for the continual succession of things which some dream of , this it is , if all things be effects , there must be so many causes , ergo in the end we shall come to a first cause , that is not effectum : Further we heard that ens primum , was quod est seipso , that is without any other : so that in propriety be is neither essentia nor ens , but 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . Hence he neither hath causes , neither is any argument that doth arise from causes , ergo is an individuum , but not a species : he is without end , ergo he is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 : hence he therefore was never made , ergo he made all things : he is without definition , distribution , and properties , because he is without causes , ergo there can be no art of him , but he must be the Author of art , as we shall hear hereafter . He is merus Actus , because he is without all potentia , both substantialis , and accidentalis ; again , he is primus actus , ergo optimus actus , ergo whatsoever is well done of any thing is first from him : again , he is infinitus actus , ergo able to do any finite thing , yea , and infinite .

E●s a primo est , quod ut est a primo , sie est ex nihilo proter primum .

First we proved before , that there is ens a primo , for proprium , & adaequatum subjectum rationis est , at ens a primo est proprium & adaequatum objectum , rather than subjectum rationis , ergo , Est a primo , that we heard before , for it cannot be of it self , for then it should be absolutely first , ergo not the subject of our reason , ergo it is aliunde , ergo it is in the end for him that is not aliunde , Propter primum , every ens a primo is made , ergo for an end , ergo at last propter primum , as propter finem : Again , optimus actus must do nothing in vain . It is a rule of Nature in schools , that God and Nature nihil agunt frustra , which indeed is a general rule of Logick applied to two special Arts , natural Philosophy and Divinity . Now then at last we shall find every thing to be made , for that which was never made , ergo propter primus ens .

Object . But some things might be made for things that are made .

Answ. I suppose mediately , yet when all things are effects , ergo made for an end , at length we shall come to an end , that is not an effect , as all creatures are made for man , and man also being made , is therefore for an end , ergo for God : Hence therefore we see that ens a prima is propter primum , ergo every ens a primo hath his vigour , or impulsus from his first efficient , whereby it is set forth to his end , so that the Lord hath shot out every ens a primo , as it were an arrow out of his bow , to act his end : so that the vigour and impulsus of every ens a primo , which it receives from God , is that it may shoot at it end , ex nihilo , because there was onely a first efficient before it , for if it were ex aliquo , then there should be more firsts .

Object . But how can something be made of nothing ?

Answ. God is infinite , both a parte ante , and a parte post , ergo he can make things of nothing , which have an infinite distance a parte ante , though not a parte post , for so every creature is infinite .

Ens a primo est concretuns .

Ens a primo must be both like , and unlike primum : so the world is one , ergo like God , it is made of many simples , ergo unlike him : so every thing is one , ergo like God , but is concretum , ergo is unlike him : so that every creature must take a blow of God , as Jacob when he wrestled with the Angel took a blow on the hip , though he overcame , whereby he was made lame . Again , our Logick tels us first of simples , and then of the disposing of them , therefore ens a primo must be concretum of simples , because it must be liable to our reason ; so that as before there was ens , because there was reason , so here this ens , which is the subject of our reason must be concretum , because I must see it with my eye of Logick . This concretum is of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , the reason of it is this , this ens though it be for God , yet it is mediately for man , as we may see through all the creatures of God , ergo we thus conclude , that every thing was made for man , and man for God ; for we know that every thing consists of matter and form , and the end of the matter and form of a thing is to make up the effect , and thus we say , every thing is it own end . Now then in every ente a primo , there must be an actus to carry it to man , and an actum , that is , that that is carried , that that is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is actus , and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is the actum , or that which is carried . So we know that Logick carries from the thing to man , and speech from man to man , that which he hath seen with his Logick . By actus I mean that which doth make the thing actually to be carried to mine eye : so that it cannot come to me , but actu , by act , and it must bring the actum : now this actus is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ; for as colour acts the external thing to my external eye , and is about the thing , so this actus doth to my reason , and is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , that is , about every thing , and is an object of my eye of reason , though it ariseth from the thing , and flieth about it . Now this 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 doth concrescere both with it self , and with 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 : so that Logick is concrescus with Logick , and with Grammar , and Rhetorick , &c. And hence it is called commune , because it is concrescens with 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , and with every concretion 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , So that it is concrescens cum seipso , & cum omnibus aliis concrescentibus . Now that that is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , is the Logismos of the thing , or the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of it , and these are the actus of the thing : for I see every thing by my Logick , and that sees nothing but arguments , axioms , syllogismes and method ; ergo , I can see nothing but that that it doth thus dictate to my reason ; ergo , Logick doth act the actum , or that which is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to my reason . Now then there must be reason in every thing , because I am to see every thing by my Logick , which is the rule of reason , ergo all things must be liable to it , ergo it must apprehend the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in every thing . Again , there must be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in every thing , because though all things at the beginning were made for one man , yet by reason of sin since his fall , one cannot see all things , therefore there must be a carrier from one man to another , that which one man sees with his eye of Logick , he may utter it to another : so that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is actus rei ad hominem , and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is actu rei ab homine ad hominem .

Now this 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is either loquentia or eloquentia : the reason of this distribution is this , we heard before that speech was a carrier from man to man : and because things that are reported , are not so easily received , as those which are seen by our eye of Logick , ergo it was requisite that there should not onely be an 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , whereby things might be uttered , but also a fine suggering of them with Rhetorick , for the more easie receiving of them .

Eloquentia is either more fine or more grave , that is , soluta , or ligata : the reason is this , argumentum is artificiale , or inartificiale : now because speech is an artificial argument , and so not easily received , the refore Rhetorick serves to deliver the matter more soberly and gravely ; and Poetry yet makes it more fine , where all things must be done by measure and sweet sounds .

So that now we see how these general Arts are 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 : and that they are not of so great necessity in respect of the thing , as in regard of us for our good : for , so as every thing is made for man , so he must see them for his good , by that rule that they are created .

These now though they be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 because they are circumstantial , yet they are ab ente primo , because there are causes , effects , subjects , adjuncts , &c. and speech in ente a primo .

Now the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is either quantity or quality , the reason is this , every ens a primo is finite , ergo must needs have limits of quantity , if he have limits of essence .

Quantity is either discreet , or continued , for if every thing be finite , then it must be discreet , or distinct from any other . Again , as it is discreet , so it is continued , so farre as the form extendeth the matter , whereby we may see how farre it reacheth , and where it reacheth not . Now as there is quantity , so also there must be quality in every thing , for there is no ens a primo that is pure act , ergo it hath a form acting upon a matter , and thence proceed all quantities . Again , it being made for an end , must there fore act unto its end .

Qualitas est natura , & bonitas , every thing hath nature , because it hath a matter and a form , ergo there is nature in every thing . And therefore Ramus saith , Forma est praecipua rerum natura : and the Philosophers call forma principium actionis , and materia principium passionis .

Now this ens being of this scantling for quantity , and of this nature for act , must be good for Gods glory : so that every thing hath a goodness in it . Again , were all things made for man , and must he see them with his reason ? Yes : ergo they are good for him : ergo he must have a will to imbrace them as bona , as well as an eye of reason to see them as vera , and so man also is made for God , as his will acts goodness .

Now for the order of these , actus is before actum , for the one is actio , the other is passio , and actio is before passio , and is more excellent then it . Again , actus doth concrescere with it self , and with the actum that is in the thing : ergo , actus is more general ; ergo is before actum .

Again , because we do not give names to things but with reason from some argument of Logick in the thing : and again , because there must be an actus from the thing to man , before there can be an actus from man to man , therefore the Logismos in the thing must be before the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in it ; ergo Logick is the most general , and first in order of all Arts.

Of those things that are acta , quantity is first , because it ariseth nexly from the matter and form of a thing : for first of all the matter and form limit the thing , when they are put together , before they act any thing , and afterward they act one upon the other . Now quality , that is the act of the form upon the matter ; ergo , it is after quantity , but before goodness , because that is the end of Natures act . For seeing quantity ariseth immediately from the matter and form of a thing , and Nature from the act of the form upon the matter : therefore goodness must be the last , as being the end of all the former : and thus did the Lord make all things , first making the causes effects of things , then imposing speech on them , then number , then measuring them by Geometry , how farre their magnitude should reach , and where it should not reach , before it should act . Now this act of Nature was to go no further upon external objects , but onely be acted by the form upon the matter ; whereas the moral act of goodness was to go further , for that is for God . Again , Nature is the next in most thing to quantity , and Goodness is last . And thus have we seen all that is in ente a primo , which is the ground of all Arts.

〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 est , qua omnes artes comprehenduntur pro subordinatione finium .

Now we are come to Arts , and first we are to begin with Encuclopaidia , and the definition of it . First for the name , it is Orbis ille , & Circulus Artium . The reason of it indeed is as much as Arts quite through , as we use to say when there are many poor folk to be served , though they stand in a long row , Have you served them round ? But there is a further reason of it , A circle we know is a round line , whose beginning and end meet together in a common point ; therefore this learning in a Circle must be shewed to have a common point , and that we shall easily find . The proper subject of Art is Ens a primo , because we heard , that was made for an end . Now then from whence Ens a primo had his beginning , from thence must Ars have his beginning : But from Ens primum it had his beginning , ergo . Again , as Ens a primo hath for his beginning Ens primum , so it must have Ens primum for his last end , because Ens primum is not made for any end , but is the last end of all things it self , ergo he must also be the last end of Art : Then here we find , as Ens primum is the beginning of Art , so also he is the end of Art ; because he is the beginning and end of those things that are the subjects of Arts ; therefore there is one common point wherein they begin and end : ergo having the same beginning and end , here is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . Now howsoever the phrase may seem otherwise , as we heard before , yet here we see the wisdom of God in this name , though the Graecians did not know the reason of it when they gave it . Now the Scripture seemeth to witness this truth . For the Lord saith , I am the beginning and the end : that is , of things , and again , I am Alpha and Omega : these belong to Grammar , ergo to Art , ergo he is both the beginning and end of things , and the Alpha and Omega of the Arts.

That this wisdom is round , we may also see in regard of the subject ; for the World is round , and that is the subject of Art : ergo Art is so , for Art is an adjunct to it , and every adjunct takes figure of his subject . Again , if we will take Art for Knowledge , Knowledge is in a mans head , and that is round , so Encuclopaidia is every way in circulo : and thus we see the reason , why this name should be given to a Chain , whose links are the Arts. Now if Ens primum be the cause of entia a primo , then he hath the Idea of them in him : for he made them by counsel , and not by necessity ; for then he should have needed them , and they have a parelion of that wisdom that is in his Idea . Again , it must needs be that this wisdom is his , because he governs them by the rules of Art , for so every rule of Art is a Statute-law of God , by which he made the things , and whereby he governs the things , whose Art it is . Now seeing it is so , therefore this Law hath God for the Author , and look what Idea was in the making of the thing , the same Idea is in the governing of it : for if the Lord should make it by one rule , and govern it by another , it would not serve the turn to guide the thing to the eupraxie , whereunto it was made . So that hence it follows , that every rule of Art is eternal . Again , our rule of Logick tels us , that every rule of Art is most true , and therefore is from God . For so every rule is true , as it answers to that Idea that is in him : and is most just , most wise ; ergo is from God , who is most true , most just , and most wise . Now it is in God as in the fountain , and it is in the creature too , but there it is by a refraction : for this wisdom coming to the creature , according as the creature is , such is the Arts order and course . So that if ens a primo be divided into parts , this wisdom also will be divided into parts : and as in a Looking-glass that is broken , look how many peices it is broken into , so many images shall you see : So for the Arts , look into how many parts the thing is divided , into so many parts will the Art be distributed .

Q. What is the next subject of Ars in the thing ?

Answ. The Frame , as the tearm shews : for so 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in Greek signifieth fabrica of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , because it is seen in the frame of the thing : so that the frame of the thing is taught in the Art . So when I say , Dial●ctica est ars bene disserendi , I do not define Logick , but I define the frame of reason : so that the parelion is the frame of the thing , and thence are the Arts written , and by the Art we see the frame : so then Encuclopaidia is the wisdom of God in the thing , ergo the subject of Encuclopaidia is Ars , that is the Frame of things ,

Qua comprehenduntur , or , continentur .

The Chain Encuclopaidia is not a genus to Ars , no more than a Chain is a genus to the Links , but an integrum : for as a Chain is an integrum , and the Links membra ; so Encuclopaidia is an integrum , and the Arts are the members that make up the whole . Now as the links must be linked together , before there be a Chain : so the Arts must be holden together , before there be Encuclopaidia : so that every Art is a link , and they must be linked together to make up the whole . Therefore I say , qua continentur , as parts , continentur a toto .

For Arts may be holden together ; for there is that community among the Arts , for Ars in genere is genus to them all : Therefore as Tully saith , they have a certain commonkinred , as being species of one genus : but this holding together is after another manner then links in a Chain : namely , pro subordinatione finium : Therefore they are not holden together confusedly , and as they come to hand , but every one must have his rank according to the generality of the end thereof . So that if we link Grammar on the Chain before Logick , we do not right : and so in like sort for the other Arts.

I say , qua omnes artes , because as a Chain that hath not all his links , is not perfect , because it wants some parts : so the Chain of Arts will not be perfect , if there be any wanting ; the rule of Logick teacheth us so much : for Encuclopaidia is a totum , ergo if any member be wanting , there will not be a totum made up . And thus we have heard the definition of Encuclopaidia , Now the subject of it is Ars , as the notation of it 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 sheweth : and this wisdom of God is one in him , but is made various in the thing .