Peripateticall
INSTITUTIONS
.
First
Book
.
Containing
that
part
of
LOGICK
which
is
necessary
to
SCIENCES
.
LESSON
I.
Of
Propositions
as
they
are
the
parts
of
a
Syllogisme
.
1.
LOgick
is
the
Art
of
Discoursing
.
Discourse
is
the
Progresse
of
the
Vnderstanding
,
out
of
one
thought
or
judgement
into
another
:
but
in
a
more
speciall
acceptation
of
the
word
,
't
is
A
Motion
whereby
the
Understanding
,
out
of
a
fit
and
orderly
disposure
of
some
judgements
already
possessed
by
it
,
deduces
and
leads
it self
into
the
knowledge
of
something
it
was
ignorant
of
.
And
this
Discourse
,
when
't
is
close
and
exactly
perfect
,
is
,
by
a
Greek
term
,
called
a
Syllogism
.
2.
A
Syllogism
is
compos'd
of
three
Propositions
:
A
Proposition
is
a
speech
whereby
something
is
affirmed
or
denied
concerning
another
:
Whence
,
to
its
perfection
,
three
parts
are
necessary
;
That
which
is
affirm'd
,
That
of
which
't
is
affirm'd
,
and
That
which
expresses
the
affirmation
,
or
the
Term
which
connects
them
together
.
3.
These
three
are
called
Notions
,
or
apprehensions
,
or
things
as
they
are
in
the
Understanding
,
that
is
,
according
to
what
is
common
to
them
in
themselves
and
in
the
Understanding
:
For
,
as
the
Statue
of
Caesar
in
something
agrees
with
,
in
something
differs
from
Caesar
;
so
the
Understanding
actually
possessed
of
any
knowledge
,
has
something
wherein
it
resembles
and
agrees
with
the
Object
,
other
things
wherein
't
is
unlike
and
differs
from
it
.
4.
'T
is
already
said
that
Propositions
are
,
some
Affirmative
,
some
Negative
.
Now
,
sometimes
it
falls
out
,
that
an
Affirmation
is
applied
to
one
thing
alone
;
sometimes
to
divers
indifferently
,
as
many
agree
in
some
one
and
the
same
Notion
:
This
last
is
called
an
Vniversall
Proposition
;
as
when
we
say
,
Every
man
is
a
living
Creature
.
5.
When
the
affirmation
is
applied
to
one
thing
alone
,
that
is
taken
either
determinately
,
as
Socrates
,
Bucephalus
,
&c.
and
then
the
proposition
is
called
Singular
:
or
else
indeterminately
,
as
when
we
say
,
some
Man
,
or
Horse
,
&c.
and
then
't
is
call'd
a
Particular
proposition
.
6.
Again
:
since
a
proposition
is
either
affirmative
or
negative
;
and
the
same
thing
cannot
▪
at
once
,
both
be
&
not-be
:
if
,
at
any
time
,
one
proposition
affirms
what
another
denies
,
such
cannot
be
both
true
together
;
and
therefore
they
are
called
Opposites
or
Incompossibles
.
7.
When
the
affirmation
and
negation
falls
upon
the
same
thing
in
all
respects
,
such
propositions
are
called
Contradictories
;
as
,
Socrates
,
here
and
now
,
runs
;
Socrates
,
here
and
now
,
runs
not
:
But
when
the
proposition
is
universall
on
both
sides
,
they
are
called
Contraries
;
as
,
All
men
are
wise
,
None
are
wise
.
8.
Farther
:
as
't
is
evident
,
the
same
thing
cannot
both
be
and
not-be
,
at
once
;
so
't
is
as
clear
that
every
thing
is
,
whilst
it
is
:
whence
,
if
at
any
time
a
proposition
pronounces
the
same
thing
concerning
the
same
,
't
is
called
self-evident
;
as
when
we
say
,
The
whole
is
greater
then
a
part
of
it self
,
for
't
is
as
much
as
to
say
,
A
part
and
more
is
more
then
a
part
.
9.
Wherefore
,
if
it
be
once
known
,
that
the
same
Notion
is
identify'd
with
two
others
;
it
will
presently
be
evident
,
that
those
two
are
identify'd
betwixt
themselves
:
for
otherwise
,
that
Notion
which
is
the
same
with
them
would
not
be
the
same
with
it self
.
10.
Two
propositions
,
therefore
,
being
put
,
which
discover
the
identification
of
some
one
Notion
with
two
others
;
a
third
proposition
evidently
emerges
,
whereby
the
identification
of
those
two
Notions
betwixt
themselves
is
declared
:
And
these
three
compose
a
Syllogism
.
LESSON
II.
Of
a
Syllogism
and
its
Conclusion
.
1.
A
Proposition
being
a
speech
which
pronounces
one
thing
of
another
;
and
since
,
betwixt
three
,
there
can
be
but
three
Variations
,
viz.
that
one
be
pronounced
of
two
,
or
two
of
one
,
or
one
of
another
,
and
that
again
of
the
third
;
there
are
onely
three
sorts
or
Figures
of
Syllogisms
.
2.
And
,
a
Syllogism
consisting
of
such
speeches
as
connect
one
Term
to
another
;
since
,
this
third
way
,
the
Term
which
joyns
the
rest
falls
into
the
midst
between
them
,
becoming
under
or
Subject
to
one
,
and
above
or
Predicate
to
the
other
;
it
truly
and
properly
connects
them
:
whence
,
that
Figure
whose
Terms
are
thus
order'd
,
is
call'd
the
First
;
and
't
is
the
chief
of
all
others
,
for
all
the
Propositions
and
their
Terms
or
Notions
have
a
constant
and
determinate
place
and
order
in
the
Syllogism
:
3.
Whereas
,
in
the
other
Figures
it
imports
not
whether
of
the
two
Antecedents
be
preferr'd
;
and
,
in
the
Conclusion
,
either
of
the
Terms
may
,
indifferently
,
be
the
Subject
or
Predicate
,
And
,
if
we
look
more
narrowly
into
it
,
the
other
two
Figures
will
,
indeed
,
appear
but
distorsions
of
the
first
;
whereby
the
Notion
,
which
,
really
,
is
the
Middle
one
of
the
three
,
is
made
one
of
the
Extremes
,
because
all
the
three
are
identify'd
.
The
first
Figure
,
therefore
,
alone
is
according
to
Nature
,
and
Necessary
.
4.
And
in
this
first
,
because
the
middle
notion
is
once
affirm'd
or
made
the
Predicate
,
and
once
the
Subject
,
the
Conclusion
cannot
be
varied
,
except
it
be
in
respect
of
the
Universality
and
Particularity
,
or
Affirmation
and
Negation
;
whence
the
Conclusion
becomes
either
an
Universall
or
Particular
Affirmative
or
Negative
;
as
uses
to
be
cyphred
by
these
words
,
Barbara
,
Celarent
,
Darii
,
Ferio
:
in
which
the
Vowells
shew
the
Nature
of
the
Proposition
;
A
standing
for
an
Universall
Affirmative
,
E
,
an
Universall
Negative
,
I
,
a
Particular
Affirmative
,
O
,
a
Particular
Negative
.
5.
And
,
because
these
four
Differences
contein
all
manner
of
Propositions
,
in
which
Truth
may
be
look'd
for
;
there
are
onely
four
Moods
or
forms
of
Syllogisms
profitable
,
and
they
sufficient
to
deduce
it
:
the
rest
are
all
provided
rather
for
curiosity
and
abundance
then
benefit
.
6.
There
is
another
kind
of
Syllogism
which
some
call
Expository
,
consisting
purely
of
Singulars
:
And
because
a
singular
proposition
comprehends
its
Notion
as
well
as
an
universall
,
't
is
a
perfect
Syllogism
,
though
little
used
in
Sciences
,
and
therefore
little
treated
of
.
7.
Again
;
since
those
things
which
are
Circumstantiall
to
any
other
thing
either
belong
to
it
,
or
not
;
and
if
they
belong
to
it
,
then
either
to
it
alone
,
or
to
many
other
things
as
well
as
it
:
the
propositions
,
too
,
which
are
deduc'd
out
of
these
,
must
be
some
Proper
,
some
Common
,
some
wholly
Accidentall
and
Unconcerning
.
8.
Amongst
which
,
since
Proper
ones
alwayes
expresse
something
which
has
the
Nature
of
a
Cause
or
Effect
,
and
an
Effect
cannot
exist
without
an
actuall
Cause
,
nor
an
actuall
Cause
without
an
Effect
;
such
propositions
are
fit
to
conclude
upon
any
Subject
,
about
which
we
are
making
inquiry
,
that
It
is
,
and
cannot
possibly
but
be
;
to
do
which
we
call
framing
a
Science
,
and
the
Syllogism
whereby
we
work
thus
,
a
Demonstration
,
and
its
Conclusion
,
Science
:
which
,
if
we
know
why
a
thing
is
,
that
is
,
if
the
Demonstration
be
made
from
the
Cause
,
both
the
knowledge
and
Demonstration
are
call'd
à
Priori
,
or
from
something
going
before
;
if
otherwise
,
à
Posteriori
,
or
from
something
following
.
9.
Common
and
Vnconcerning
Propositions
are
both
of
this
Nature
,
Not
to
be
applied
to
the
Conclusion
but
by
the
Convoy
and
Mediation
of
some
other
closer
relations
;
which
yet
,
lying
hid
and
being
undiscernable
,
are
onely
capable
of
affording
an
apparent
knowledge
call'd
Opinion
.
10.
From
which
rule
,
such
propositions
are
to
be
excepted
which
assume
for
proof
the
knowledge
of
another
person
:
for
,
since
Knowledge
is
adequate
to
the
Thing
it self
;
't
is
,
as
it
were
,
a
proper
Accident
:
and
the
knowledge
of
a
thing
attain'd
by
these
propositions
is
call'd
Faith
.
Which
kind
of
knowledge
may
arrive
to
a
certainty
,
if
the
Authority
assum'd
be
out
of
all
question
:
yet
it
is
not
Science
,
because
not
evident
;
since
the
thing
appears
but
in
the
knowledge
of
another
,
and
is
undiscernable
in
it self
,
being
it
moves
not
the
Understanding
by
it self
and
things
naturally
connected
with
it
.
LESSON
III.
Of
the
Predicaments
in
Common
,
and
the
three
first
in
particular
.
1.
WE
have
said
that
Propositions
are
compos'd
of
Notions
;
and
that
a
Notion
is
the
thing
,
according
to
the
being
it
has
in
the
Vnderstanding
:
There
are
,
therefore
,
so
many
kinds
of
Notions
as
there
are
severall
common
habitudes
of
any
thing
without
or
within
the
Understanding
,
whereby
it
may
be
referr'd
to
any
other
thing
,
that
is
,
Predicated
of
a
Subject
.
2.
Now
any
thing
may
be
considered
both
according
to
what
it
has
in
it self
or
is
in
its
own
Nature
,
and
according
to
other
things
which
,
by
consideration
,
are
drawn
in
and
applied
to
it
.
And
,
as
to
its
intrinsecalls
,
a
thing
is
consider'd
either
absolutely
and
in
its
very
self
;
and
so
't
is
call'd
a
Substance
,
and
that
which
is
pronounced
of
it
a
Substantiall
Predicate
:
Or
,
as
't
is
compar'd
to
all
other
things
,
in
that
respect
wherein
all
things
agree
;
and
thus
we
ask
,
how
big
a
thing
is
?
and
what
we
answer
concerning
it
is
call'd
its
Quantity
:
Thirdly
,
't
is
compar'd
to
those
things
which
are
of
the
same
kind
with
it
▪
or
to
its
own
particular
nature
;
and
so
we
ask
,
what
manner
of
thing
is
it
,
that
is
,
how
perfect
is
it
in
its
own
nature
?
and
what
we
answer
is
call'd
its
Quality
:
Lastly
,
't
is
compar'd
to
other
particular
things
;
and
we
ask
,
what
't
is
in
respect
to
another
?
and
the
answer
is
call'd
Related
or
Relation
.
'T
is
plain
that
,
under
these
four
heads
,
are
comprehended
all
things
considerable
in
the
Nature
of
any
Subject
,
that
is
,
which
are
in
it self
.
3.
But
,
those
things
,
which
are
circumstantiall
to
another
and
may
be
referr'd
to
it
,
are
either
apply'd
with
Motion
or
in
Rest
.
If
in
Rest
,
the
Predicate
is
neither
constantly
fixt
to
the
Subject
,
nor
the
Subject
to
the
Predicate
;
and
then
we
ask
,
where
a
thing
is
?
and
the
answer
is
call'd
it's
Place
:
Or
else
the
Subject
is
fixt
to
the
Predicate
;
as
a
Statue
to
its
Basis
,
Liquour
to
a
Vessell
,
one
that
sits
to
his
Chair
,
&c.
and
,
as
before
,
we
ask
,
where
a
thing
is
?
whereto
the
Predicate
we
answer
is
call'd
its
Site
or
Situation
:
Or
lastly
,
the
Predicate
is
fixt
to
the
Subject
,
and
we
ask
,
what
it
has
?
to
which
that
we
answer
is
call'd
its
Habit
,
as
Garments
,
Arms
,
Instruments
.
4.
In
Motion
,
if
the
Subject
be
mov'd
,
the
Agent
alwaies
accompanies
it
;
if
it
move
,
the
Patient
:
and
,
in
both
cases
,
Time
or
the
Motion
of
the
Heavens
goes
along
with
them
,
from
which
no
Motion
can
be
exempt
.
Of
this
last
,
we
ask
,
When
was
the
Motion
?
and
what
we
answer
is
call'd
the
Time
of
the
Motion
.
5.
When
the
Subject
is
mov'd
,
we
ask
,
by
what
?
and
that
we
answer
is
said
to
Act
,
and
the
Subject
to
Suffer
from
it
:
when
the
Subject
moves
,
we
ask
,
what
it
moves
?
and
that
we
answer
is
said
to
Suffer
,
and
it self
to
Act.
Thus
,
the
reason
is
evident
,
why
there
are
just
ten
Orders
or
Classes
of
Predicates
,
or
Notions
,
or
Beings
in
the
Understanding
,
which
are
call'd
Predicaments
.
6.
Substance
is
immediately
distinguisht
into
Spirit
and
Body
.
The
differences
of
Spirits
are
unknown
.
Bodies
are
either
Living
,
that
is
,
moving
themselves
,
or
Dead
,
that
is
,
not
moving
,
but
mov'd
by
others
.
Living
bodies
are
either
Sensitive
,
or
without
Senses
.
Sensitive
are
either
Intellectuall
,
viz.
Man
,
or
Brutall
,
Beasts
.
Man
is
either
Socrates
,
or
Plato
,
or
Xenophon
,
&c.
and
these
are
no
farther
divisible
;
whence
they
are
call'd
Individualls
;
the
rest
Vniversalls
,
because
they
are
predicated
universally
of
all
that
are
under
them
,
that
is
,
of
every
one
.
7.
Quantity
is
either
Discrete
,
as
Number
;
or
Continu'd
:
and
this
,
either
Permanent
,
or
Successive
.
Permanent
is
twofold
;
Extensive
,
whose
perfection
consists
in
three
degrees
including
one
another
,
Longitude
,
Latitude
,
Profundity
;
and
Intensive
,
which
is
Weight
.
Successive
Quantity
is
contein'd
in
Action
,
Passion
,
Speaking
,
and
,
generally
,
in
Motion
.
8.
Concerning
the
proper
nature
of
Body
,
because
't
is
Finite
,
we
ask
,
of
what
Figure
'
t
is
?
because
't
is
Alterable
by
others
,
we
ask
,
how
't
is
,
in
respect
to
those
Qualities
according
to
which
't
is
variable
?
as
Heat
,
cold
,
colour
,
savour
,
&c.
and
this
either
constantly
or
in
Motion
;
and
we
answer
,
accordingly
,
either
by
the
Passible
Quality
or
by
the
Passion
:
as
,
in
a
Feaver
to
be
hot
,
or
to
blush
for
Bashfulnesse
,
is
a
Passion
;
but
to
be
of
a
hot
complexion
,
or
ruddy
countenance
,
is
a
Passible
quality
.
Again
,
because
a
Body
is
ordered
naturally
to
Act
and
to
Suffer
,
we
ask
,
what
it
can
or
cannot
do
?
and
that
which
is
answer'd
is
call'd
its
Power
or
Impotency
.
Lastly
,
because
every
nature
consists
in
a
kind
of
Temperature
,
we
ask
,
whether
it
be
well
or
ill
in
respect
to
that
;
that
is
,
whether
it
exactly
or
disproportionately
possesses
those
things
which
are
requisite
to
that
;
and
this
,
either
constantly
or
for
a
time
?
to
which
the
answer
is
call'd
,
respectively
,
a
Habit
or
Disposition
.
LESSON
IV.
Of
the
rest
of
the
Predicaments
.
1.
THose
things
which
relate
or
are
compar'd
to
another
,
are
either
compar'd
for
having
some
Notion
common
to
both
;
or
for
their
Acting
or
Suffering
;
or
else
,
by
a
certain
third
way
,
which
participates
of
both
these
:
as
,
when
a
Picture
is
made
like
the
Originall
,
that
neither
acts
upon
the
Picture
,
nor
is
the
Picture
(
being
wholy
of
another
kind
)
really
like
it
,
yet
in
a
manner
,
't
is
both
:
and
this
respect
is
call'd
of
the
thing
measured
to
the
Measure
.
2.
And
,
in
this
kind
,
there
is
one
onely
relation
,
and
that
on
the
side
of
the
Measured
:
For
a
Relation
being
the
Order
of
one
thing
to
another
,
and
since
,
between
two
things
,
one
may
be
so
ordered
to
the
other
,
that
the
other
may
either
have
or
not
have
a
coordination
to
it
;
it
comes
to
passe
that
those
things
which
are
in
the
same
order
(
such
as
are
those
two
first
kinds
)
have
a
relation
on
both
sides
,
but
those
that
are
of
different
orders
,
so
that
,
notwithstanding
,
the
one
be
ordered
to
the
other
,
have
a
relation
but
on
one
side
.
3.
Besides
,
it
often
happens
that
the
Understanding
,
through
Custome
or
an
imperfect
way
of
knowing
,
expresses
even
things
that
have
no
ordination
,
by
a
certain
relative
resemblance
;
and
then
't
is
a
mentall
relation
(
by
schoolmen
call'd
de
dici
)
not
a
reall
one
:
as
also
,
when
the
Understanding
has
express'd
the
nature
of
any
thing
by
a
Negation
,
saying
,
a
Man
does
not
see
,
or
has
no
hair
;
and
then
gives
a
positive
being
to
this
Notion
,
saying
,
a
Man
is
blind
or
bald
;
according
to
the
naturall
Aptitude
or
Ineptitude
of
the
Subject
to
the
denyed
Quality
,
't
is
call'd
a
Mentall
Negation
or
Privation
,
respectively
.
4.
Wherefore
,
since
,
by
these
only
ways
,
the
Understanding
can
so
vary
any
thing
which
it
knowes
,
that
a
change
may
remain
on
the
Objects
side
,
and
enter
into
the
consideration
of
it
,
as
belonging
to
the
thing
known
;
there
can
be
three
only
kinds
of
Mentall
Beings
:
For
,
the
disputes
of
the
Moderns
concerning
such
entities
,
are
but
gay
Trifles
,
and
the
contemplation
of
an
erroneous
definition
.
5.
There
is
a
kind
of
Relations
,
not
unjustly
,
call'd
Intellectuall
,
which
follows
a
thing
in
the
Vnderstanding
in
vertue
of
the
reall
quality
of
mere
Vnderstanding
;
and
these
relations
are
of
a
Logicall
Nature
,
as
those
Terms
of
Universall
,
Predicable
,
Subject
,
Antecedent
,
Consequent
,
&
the
like
:
And
these
Relations
as
much
follow
out
of
things
,
in
that
respect
,
as
they
are
in
the
Understanding
,
as
Likenesse
follow
's
a
thing
in
as
much
as
't
is
white
,
or
Equality
because
't
is
Quantitative
:
This
,
therefore
,
is
call'd
Intellectuall
,
because
the
Understanding
is
call'd
Intellect
,
and
in
no
other
respect
.
6.
An
Agent
and
a
Patient
clearly
expresse
two
causes
:
which
,
yet
,
the
Understanding
(
distinguishing
,
&
finding
parts
differently
respecting
the
effect
)
Logically
and
to
serve
its
turn
for
Demonstration
,
divides
into
four
.
7.
And
finding
,
in
the
Agent
,
that
it
can
and
that
it
does
Act
;
the
Understanding
call's
that
whereby
it
does
or
can
▪
act
the
Efficient
cause
,
and
that
which
moves
or
makes
it
to
act
,
the
End
:
Likewise
,
in
the
Patient
,
distinguishing
what
it
is
that
suffers
,
and
what
it
suffers
;
it
call's
that
the
Form
,
this
the
Matter
:
satisfying
,
thus
,
these
Interrogations
,
From
what
?
Why
?
By
what
or
How
?
In
what
?
8.
Plato
adds
an
Idea
or
Exemplar
:
but
,
't
is
clear
,
that
what
wants
an
Exemplar
cannot
work
without
it
;
and
consequently
,
there
is
not
yet
an
Efficient
cause
.
The
species
of
these
,
and
indeed
of
all
the
last
six
Predicaments
,
are
little
us'd
,
and
therefore
omitted
.
LESSON
V.
Of
the
five
Predicables
,
and
the
signification
of
Words
.
1.
HEnce
't
is
evident
,
there
are
two
kinds
or
differences
of
Predications
:
For
some
Predicates
of
the
same
line
or
Predicament
comprehend
others
,
and
are
predicated
of
them
as
an
Universall
of
a
Particular
:
But
Predicates
of
distinct
lines
are
predicated
of
one
another
,
as
a
thing
superadded
is
predicated
of
that
to
which
't
is
apply'd
.
2.
Predicates
of
the
first
kind
are
said
to
be
predicated
in
quid
or
as
the
what
;
being
such
as
answer
to
the
question
,
what
a
thing
is
?
And
,
if
the
predicate
comprehends
the
full
answer
to
that
question
,
't
is
call'd
a
Species
:
but
,
if
it
only
contains
a
part
,
so
that
other
common
considerations
are
comprehended
under
it
,
't
is
call'd
a
Genus
;
whose
compart
or
partner
,
equall
to
the
Species
,
answers
not
directly
to
the
question
What
?
but
,
with
the
addition
of
what
kind
or
what
in
particular
?
supposing
the
answer
to
the
question
What
already
made
by
the
Genus
:
and
this
is
call'd
a
Difference
.
3.
The
other
kind
of
Predication
is
apply'd
to
some
things
necessarily
connected
with
the
Subject
,
which
are
call'd
Properties
:
and
are
strictly
such
,
if
they
appertain
to
it
alone
and
alwaies
;
but
,
more
at
large
,
if
they
be
deficient
in
these
conditions
.
Sometimes
't
is
apply'd
to
things
,
which
may
be
both
joyn'd
to
and
separated
from
the
Subject
,
without
destroying
it
;
and
such
are
call'd
Accidents
.
Thus
are
there
five
,
commonly
call'd
,
Predicables
,
or
Porphyries
five
Terms
.
4.
But
,
since
Notions
are
not
communicated
,
but
by
the
means
of
Words
;
and
the
same
word
sometimes
is
apply'd
to
severall
Notions
,
sometimes
to
one
only
:
as
oft
as
the
same
word
,
in
the
same
signification
,
that
is
,
meaning
the
same
Notion
,
is
apply'd
to
more
,
't
is
said
to
signifie
or
be
spoken
Vnivocally
.
5.
A
word
which
serves
for
severall
Notions
has
this
property
either
by
chance
,
as
when
in
one
Language
it
signifies
one
thing
,
in
others
another
;
and
then
't
is
call'd
purely
Equivocall
:
or
else
,
of
set
purpose
,
't
is
transferr'd
from
one
Notion
to
another
;
and
then
't
is
Equivocall
by
design
.
6.
And
,
of
this
kind
are
those
words
which
,
by
necessity
or
upon
occasion
,
are
transferr'd
from
one
Notion
to
another
,
by
reason
of
the
Connection
of
the
two
Notions
or
things
,
or
in
consideration
of
their
being
Cause
and
Effect
to
one
another
:
As
,
when
healthfull
,
which
signifies
the
quality
of
that
temper
which
is
just
fit
and
convenient
to
a
sensitive
Creature
,
is
transferr'd
to
signifie
the
quality
of
Vrine
,
because
such
a
quality
in
it
is
the
effect
of
a
due
temper
in
the
Creature
;
or
to
Meat
,
because
it
preserves
and
produces
that
fit
temper
:
Or
else
for
Proportion
sake
:
so
the
expression
,
to
stand
at
the
Helm
,
is
transferr'd
from
a
Ship
to
the
Governour
of
a
City
;
because
,
according
to
proportion
,
he
does
that
in
the
City
which
a
Pilot
does
in
a
Ship
.
7.
And
,
in
such
kind
of
words
,
the
later
signification
includes
the
former
:
as
,
if
you
would
explicate
Urine
as
healthfull
,
you
must
say
,
't
is
such
an
Urine
as
is
the
sign
of
health
in
the
sensitive
Creature
;
if
,
the
Governour
of
a
City
as
standing
at
the
Helm
you
must
say
,
't
is
he
that
does
that
in
a
City
which
a
Pilot
does
in
a
Ship
.
These
words
are
said
Analogically
,
or
by
Analogy
,
to
signifie
more
things
.
8.
And
thus
the
word
Thing
or
Being
is
extended
to
those
ten
lines
or
Predicaments
before
explicated
:
For
,
since
a
Thing
is
that
which
has
a
being
,
the
first
Predicament
alone
justly
challenges
to
it self
the
title
of
a
Thing
in
this
signification
;
that
is
,
as
Thing
signifies
An
individual
substance
,
which
Aristotle
call's
the
first
Substance
,
Suppositum
or
Hypostasis
,
&
,
in
rationall
Substances
,
the
Person
;
for
these
names
signify
the
same
.
9.
Whereas
the
rest
have
no
being
,
but
are
only
Affections
and
certain
determinations
of
what
has
a
being
:
for
example
,
Socrates
or
Callias
to
be
Men
,
is
to
have
a
being
&
to
be
Substances
;
but
Callias
's
being
of
the
same
Nature
with
Socrates
,
which
we
call
a
relation
of
identity
,
is
not
at
all
distinct
from
them
,
&
consequently
can
have
no
being
but
in
them
,
and
that
their
being
;
yet
,
't
is
not
according
to
this
Notion
that
They
have
their
being
:
This
Identity
,
therefore
,
has
a
being
,
not
because
it
,
according
to
its
own
notion
,
gives
a
being
,
or
is
that
whereby
a
thing
has
a
being
;
but
,
because
't
is
a
Notion
which
explicates
a
thing
,
that
,
according
to
another
Notion
,
has
a
being
.
10.
Hence
it
appears
why
a
consequence
holds
negatively
,
from
a
Substance
to
all
other
things
;
but
positively
,
from
other
things
to
a
Substance
:
For
,
that
which
is
not
,
can
neither
be
the
whole
nor
part
of
a
Thing
;
and
,
if
it
be
a
part
or
a
whole
,
if
fitted
to
its
Own
Nature
,
if
apply'd
to
others
,
certainly
it
is
.
11.
T
is
as
evident
,
if
any
never
so
little
mutation
be
made
in
the
Substance
,
the
whole
is
chang'd
:
for
,
the
Substance
being
that
Notion
whereby
the
thing
is
what
it
is
;
and
every
mutation
in
Substance
changing
that
Notion
;
by
every
change
made
in
the
Substance
,
that
is
chang'd
whereby
this
thing
is
,
and
consequently
,
this
very
thing
.
LESSON
VI.
Of
Definition
,
Division
,
and
Disputation
.
1.
TO
know
whether
a
word
be
spoken
univocally
of
more
things
,
we
must
look
whether
it
be
predicated
,
still
,
according
to
the
same
Notion
:
now
,
a
Notion
is
evidenc'd
by
a
Definition
.
A
Definition
,
therefore
,
is
a
speech
compos'd
of
more
Notions
,
which
,
taken
together
,
make
up
that
one
Notion
which
before
was
not
known
.
2.
Since
,
therefore
,
a
Definition
is
the
very
Notion
defin'd
,
resolved
,
as
it
were
,
into
parts
:
't
is
clear
,
it
can
neither
be
more
ample
nor
narrower
then
that
which
is
defin'd
.
3.
Again
;
't
is
plain
,
that
,
to
ask
a
Definition
is
nothing
but
asking
what
they
mean
,
who
understandingly
use
a
word
:
wherefore
,
since
some
words
expresse
Notions
that
are
common
to
all
mankind
(
as
,
those
of
the
ten
Predicaments
)
't
is
evident
that
,
in
these
and
such
like
,
we
must
observe
,
what
the
common-People
,
who
make
up
mankind
,
mean
by
such
a
word
.
4.
But
,
of
Proper
Names
and
Terms
appropriated
to
any
Discipline
,
to
ask
the
Definition
is
to
ask
,
what
the
Masters
of
that
Discipline
mean
by
such
a
word
?
for
these
are
,
as
it
were
,
the
Creatours
and
Causes
of
the
words
.
5.
Again
,
't
is
evident
,
he
that
asks
a
Definition
ought
to
collect
the
usuall
sayings
of
the
intelligent
users
of
this
word
,
that
concern
the
thing
as
't
is
expressed
by
this
word
:
which
,
if
they
be
all
gather'd
,
't
is
as
demonstrable
the
Definition
is
made
right
,
as
any
cause
can
be
demonstrated
from
its
effects
;
since
,
't
is
plain
,
those
sayings
depend
from
the
notion
of
the
word
as
from
their
cause
,
and
consequently
,
the
Notion
of
necessity
appears
in
them
.
6.
But
,
if
it
happen
to
appear
out
of
such
sayings
,
that
the
word
has
more
significations
then
one
;
amongst
those
that
are
made
by
design
,
it
will
easily
be
seen
which
is
the
principall
,
because
that
signification
will
be
included
in
all
the
rest
:
as
,
the
soundnesse
of
Meat
or
Urine
include
the
soundnesse
of
an
Animal
.
7.
Again
,
since
those
things
which
are
demonstrated
concerning
another
are
,
either
in
the
thing
it self
,
or
else
are
effects
or
causes
of
it
;
both
which
appear
in
the
thing
it self
,
and
are
conformable
and
proper
to
it
:
now
,
a
Definition
explicates
the
thing
it self
:
't
is
clear
,
that
whatsoever
is
demonstrable
of
the
thing
is
rooted
in
the
very
Definition
:
Whence
,
a
Definition
is
a
certain
principall
Instrument
of
Science
;
and
all
the
solutions
of
difficulties
depend
chiefly
upon
Definitions
.
8.
To
make
a
Definition
right
,
the
Art
of
Distinguishing
must
be
learnt
.
For
,
a
Term
being
propos'd
to
be
defin'd
,
out
of
what
has
been
said
,
't
is
easie
to
find
in
what
Predicament
't
is
:
which
once
known
,
all
that
remains
is
,
by
dividing
the
Genus
,
to
descend
by
degrees
,
till
you
come
to
the
particular
in
question
;
when
,
presently
,
you
have
the
Definition
.
And
if
,
as
it
sometimes
happens
,
many
severall
Genus's
have
a
share
in
the
thing
to
be
defin'd
;
this
same
course
is
to
be
pursu'd
through
them
all
.
9.
But
care
must
be
taken
,
to
divide
by
proper
differences
,
that
is
,
such
as
include
in
them
the
thing
to
be
divided
;
seeing
they
are
nothing
else
but
more
or
lesse
of
the
very
Genericall
Notion
:
for
accidentall
differences
are
infinite
,
and
besides
the
intention
of
him
that
asks
for
a
Definition
.
10.
Have
a
care
,
also
,
the
Division
be
made
by
Contradiction
,
that
is
,
into
parts
contradictory
one
to
another
;
for
so
the
Divider
may
be
sure
he
comprehends
the
whole
Genus
.
Lastly
,
these
rules
being
observ'd
,
the
fewer
Members
there
are
,
that
is
,
parts
into
which
the
Genus
is
divided
,
the
more
exactly
you
proceed
.
That
Division
,
too
,
whereby
Accidents
are
distinguisht
from
their
Subject
,
is
very
usefull
to
Sciences
:
for
,
when
it
appears
that
a
Concrete
,
that
is
,
a
thing
which
comprehends
severall
parts
or
Notions
,
is
the
Cause
of
any
effect
,
by
this
Division
you
come
to
that
Notion
,
according
to
which
,
precisely
,
't
is
the
cause
;
which
must
necessarily
be
connected
with
the
effect
,
simply
speaking
,
and
consequently
,
the
effect
may
be
demonstrated
out
of
it
à
priori
:
For
example
,
if
it
be
known
that
Policletus
made
a
Statue
;
separating
the
Accidents
,
't
will
appear
that
he
made
it
,
not
as
White
,
nor
as
Musicall
,
nor
as
Policletus
,
but
as
one
skill'd
in
such
an
Art
;
and
hence
you
'l
collect
,
that
All
skilfull
in
that
Art
can
make
a
Statue
.
11.
Out
of
a
Division
and
Definition
made
aright
,
there
arise
two
sorts
or
Species
of
self-evident
propositions
:
For
,
as
oft
as
one
of
the
Terms
is
a
direct
part
of
the
definition
of
another
Term
,
the
Proposition
is
clear
;
as
,
if
a
Man
be
a
Reasonable
Creature
,
he
is
a
Creature
:
Again
,
in
a
Division
truly
made
,
't
is
plain
,
the
parts
may
divisively
be
pronounc'd
of
the
whole
;
as
,
when
we
say
,
a
Number
is
either
Even
or
Odd.
Whoever
aspires
to
Sciences
must
be
assiduous
in
these
;
but
,
above
all
,
in
the
practice
of
Defining
;
for
,
all
the
connection
of
Notions
is
found
in
Definitions
,
and
the
connection
of
Terms
is
that
which
makes
Science
.
12.
These
,
too
,
chiefly
detect
the
snares
of
Equivocall
terms
,
which
are
the
very
Bane
of
Science
;
especially
those
which
are
caus'd
by
Analogy
.
Now
,
Equivocation
is
display'd
,
by
looking
into
words
what
way
soever
connected
;
as
,
into
Causes
,
effects
,
contraries
,
superiours
,
inferiours
,
&c.
wherein
,
if
once
any
thing
be
found
,
which
agrees
to
one
and
not
to
the
other
,
the
Equivocation
is
discover'd
:
As
,
if
a
Voice
and
a
Saw
be
both
said
to
be
sharp
,
but
the
Contrary
to
the
Voice
is
flat
,
to
the
Saw
,
blunt
;
't
is
plain
that
sharp
is
not
predicated
of
them
both
in
the
same
signification
,
and
therefore
't
is
equivocall
.
13.
As
for
our
modern
Disputes
,
't
is
to
be
observ'd
,
that
the
Defendant
either
puts
a
false
Conclusion
;
or
,
if
it
be
true
,
he
holds
another
incoherent
with
it
;
or
,
at
least
,
if
there
be
no
opposition
among
his
Tenets
,
yet
he
is
ignorant
of
the
Antecedents
and
Consequents
to
his
Thesis
;
or
,
lastly
,
he
is
perfect
only
at
this
Thesis
.
In
the
two
first
cases
,
he
may
be
convinc'd
,
if
the
Disputant
behave
himself
well
:
in
the
third
,
too
,
if
the
Disputant
can
bring
him
about
to
yield
to
some
falsity
in
those
things
he
is
ignorant
of
,
he
may
easily
convince
him
.
14.
In
the
fourth
case
,
one
must
dispute
Critically
,
that
is
,
either
something
afarre
off
must
be
sought
for
,
and
forreign
to
the
Question
,
which
the
Defendant
is
not
oblig'd
to
be
skilfull
in
;
and
clapping
Authority
on
the
back
on
't
,
to
fright
him
into
the
admission
of
a
falsity
;
which
is
the
trick
of
most
of
those
that
dispute
out
of
Medium's
from
Theology
and
the
Divine
Omnipotence
:
or
else
,
one
must
argue
out
of
common
and
logicall
Notions
,
in
which
both
the
terms
are
ambiguous
,
and
Equivocation
easily
hides
it self
.
Peripateticall
INSTITUTIONS
.
Second
Book
.
Containing
those
things
which
concern
the
nature
of
BODIES
in
common
.
LESSON
I.
Of
the
Composition
of
Bulk
or
Bignesse
.
EVclide
having
demonstrated
,
2.
Whence
it
follows
,
that
one
indivisible
in
quantity
,
added
to
another
,
makes
it
not
bigger
:
For
,
if
it
did
,
a
finite
number
of
indivisibles
would
constitute
quantity
;
and
consequently
,
a
Body
would
not
be
divisible
without
end
.
3.
Again
:
since
any
Multitude
encreases
by
the
addition
of
one
to
those
already
suppos'd
,
ev'n
though
't
were
infinite
:
and
yet
the
addition
of
one
indivisible
,
to
whatever
presuppos'd
number
,
makes
it
not
greater
:
't
is
clear
,
that
neither
an
infinite
multiplication
of
indivisibles
is
sufficient
to
make
quantity
;
and
consequently
,
that
a
Body
or
bignesse
is
not
compos'd
of
infinite
Indivisibles
.
4.
Moreover
,
since
't
is
manifest
that
,
if
any
two
parts
actually
exist
in
a
Body
or
Magnitude
,
even
all
the
parts
into
which
a
Body
is
divisible
do
actually
preexist
in
it
,
too
;
and
since
't
is
plain
,
if
a
Magnitude
were
divided
into
all
it
were
divisible
into
,
the
remains
would
be
purely
infinite
Indivisibles
:
't
is
perfectly
manifest
that
no
two
parts
do
actually
exist
in
a
Body
or
Magnitude
.
5.
'T
is
urg'd
against
the
divisibility
of
a
Body
in
infinitum
,
that
there
would
be
infinite
parts
in
it
;
and
since
an
infinite
can
never
be
measur'd
,
no
part
of
a
body
can
be
pass'd
over
in
a
finite
time
;
and
consequently
,
there
can
be
no
Motion
▪
Aristotle
answers
,
that
an
actuall
infinite
can
never
,
indeed
,
be
pass'd
over
,
but
in
an
infinite
time
,
too
:
but
that
the
parts
of
a
Magnitude
are
only
,
potentially
,
infinite
;
and
,
therefore
,
nothing
hinders
but
they
may
be
pass'd
over
in
a
finite
time
.
Galilaeus
replies
,
As
any
two
halfs
do
not
,
therefore
,
require
lesse
time
to
pass
them
over
,
because
they
are
not
separated
:
so
neither
can
infinite
parts
(
supposing
them
in
a
Magnitude
)
be
pass'd
over
in
lesse
time
,
because
they
are
but
possible
,
then
if
they
were
actually
or
in
effect
.
6.
'T
is
answer'd
,
that
if
,
in
the
potentiality
of
a
Magnitude
,
there
were
,
really
,
infinite
parts
,
whereof
every
one
,
limited
in
themselves
and
distinct
from
one
another
,
had
a
determinate
bignesse
;
they
would
indeed
require
an
infinite
time
to
be
pass'd
over
:
But
there
's
no
such
matter
:
for
,
the
parts
of
a
Magnitude
have
so
undetermin'd
a
quantity
,
that
they
may
be
bigger
or
less
,
according
to
the
proportion
to
the
whole
wherein
they
are
taken
;
whence
,
since
,
the
more
are
put
,
the
lesse
they
are
,
it
comes
to
passe
that
they
never
exceed
a
certain
determinate
summe
,
which
is
the
Magnitude
of
the
whole
,
how
high
soever
they
encrease
in
Number
.
7.
Again
:
't
is
objected
against
this
assertion
of
no
parts
being
actually
in
a
Magnitude
:
First
,
that
't
is
against
the
credit
of
our
Senses
,
for
,
we
see
divers
and
severall
parts
of
a
Table
or
Stick
;
our
hands
,
too
,
and
fingers
are
many
.
8.
'T
is
answer'd
,
by
denying
that
we
see
many
parts
of
a
Table
or
Stick
:
for
,
if
we
saw
they
were
severall
,
our
sight
could
distinguish
one
from
another
,
and
we
could
just
tell
where
one
ends
and
another
begins
:
since
,
therefore
,
the
nearest
immediate
parts
are
separated
,
only
by
an
Indivisible
;
and
an
Indivisible
cannot
be
discerned
by
sense
;
't
is
evident
,
it
belongs
not
to
the
Senses
to
distinguish
one
part
from
another
.
9.
And
,
whereas
't
is
added
,
that
we
see
two
Hands
and
many
Fingers
of
the
same
Man's
:
't
is
true
,
indeed
;
but
a
Hand
or
a
Finger
signifies
not
a
part
actually
,
but
in
potentia
or
possibility
:
For
,
if
a
Hand
or
Finger
were
cut
off
from
the
rest
of
the
Body
,
it
were
,
now
,
no
longer
a
Hand
or
Finger
,
since
it
would
be
no
more
an
Instrument
of
taking
any
thing
,
which
is
of
the
very
definition
of
a
Hand
or
Finger
.
10.
'T
is
objected
,
thirdly
,
those
are
actually
distinct
,
of
which
Contradictories
can
be
verifi'd
:
But
,
't
is
truly
pronounced
of
divers
parts
of
a
Magnitude
,
that
this
is
seen
,
toucht
,
hot
,
cut
,
&c.
whilst
the
contradictories
to
these
are
as
truly
said
of
another
part
;
nay
,
't
is
really
true
,
that
this
part
is
not
that
,
as
the
Hand
is
not
the
Foot
,
an
Eye
is
not
an
Ear
:
Wherefore
,
these
parts
must
needs
be
actually
distinct
.
11.
'T
is
answer'd
,
that
Contradiction
is
only
in
respect
of
our
Understanding
;
wherefore
,
the
Contradictories
have
only
a
notionall
repugnance
in
the
Subject
,
as
it
is
in
our
Vnderstanding
.
Since
then
,
the
parts
have
a
distinct
being
in
our
Understanding
;
from
thence
't
is
that
they
are
capable
to
sustain
Contradictories
:
Which
to
make
plain
,
instead
of
this
Proposition
,
This
part
is
seen
,
toucht
,
warm
,
&c.
let
us
say
,
The
thing
,
according
to
this
part
,
is
seen
,
toucht
,
warm
,
&c.
and
not
according
to
that
;
is
it
not
clear
the
same
thing
sustains
Contradictories
as
't
is
diversly
apprehended
by
the
Understanding
,
because
the
Understanding
by
this
reflection
,
according
,
makes
the
same
thing
divers
Subjects
.
12.
The
like
't
is
when
we
say
,
a
hand
is
not
a
foot
:
for
it
signifies
that
a
Man
as
having
the
faculty
of
taking
any
thing
,
is
not
a
Man
as
having
the
faculty
of
walking
.
And
the
same
rule
,
we
see
,
holds
in
abstracted
Notions
;
for
,
though
we
say
,
an
Animall
is
rationall
,
yet
we
say
,
Animality
is
not
Rationality
.
LESSON
II.
Of
the
Nature
of
Quantity
and
Place
.
1.
PArts
,
then
,
not
being
actually
in
a
Magnitude
,
it
follows
,
that
Extension
or
Divisibility
is
not
accidentall
to
it
,
but
the
very
nature
of
Quantity
:
Whence
,
we
see
,
as
oft
as
one
asks
,
how
much
there
is
of
such
a
thing
;
for
example
,
a
way
,
a
piece
of
Cloath
,
Liquour
,
&c.
we
answer
,
so
many
furlongs
,
ells
,
ounces
,
&c.
that
is
,
by
the
parts
into
which
they
are
divisible
.
'T
is
plain
,
therefore
,
that
the
very
nature
of
Quantity
is
Divisibility
.
2.
Hence
,
again
,
't
is
clear
,
that
't
is
not
to
be
enquired
how
the
parts
of
a
Magnitude
come
to
be
united
:
for
,
since
more
cannot
be
made
of
any
thing
,
but
what
first
was
not
more
,
or
,
one
;
't
is
evident
,
that
what
is
divisible
is
,
in
that
very
respect
,
one
;
and
out
of
the
very
nature
of
Quantity
its
parts
derive
an
unity
.
3.
Nor
is
it
lesse
manifest
,
that
nothing
,
besides
Quantity
,
is
extended
and
divisible
:
for
,
't
is
not
intelligible
,
that
any
thing
can
be
divided
,
and
yet
have
no
Divisibility
:
Wherefore
,
that
they
call
Imaginary
space
is
nothing
at
all
,
nor
has
it
any
distinguishable
parts
;
much
lesse
can
it
be
a
means
of
distinguishing
other
things
,
by
its
own
distinction
.
4.
'T
is
objected
,
Before
the
Creation
of
the
World
,
there
was
a
certain
possibility
of
a
World
;
and
a
greater
of
the
whole
world
then
of
any
part
;
nay
,
even
now
,
without
or
about
this
world
,
't
is
possible
other
Bodies
should
be
created
,
bigger
then
this
world
:
Yet
,
such
a
Body
cannot
be
created
,
but
some
parts
of
it
must
be
more
distant
from
this
,
then
others
:
Therefore
,
a
greater
and
lesse
distance
from
the
world
is
imaginable
;
and
consequently
,
an
Imaginary
Space
.
5.
'T
is
answer'd
,
There
is
,
indeed
,
a
possibility
of
such
a
world
:
but
,
't
is
either
in
the
Power
of
God
,
and
so
is
nothing
else
but
his
very
Essence
;
or
,
in
the
Idea
of
some
understanding
Creature
(
and
is
only
the
mere
conformity
of
the
Predicate
with
the
Subject
,
or
of
one
part
with
another
)
which
saies
,
there
is
a
world
,
or
such
things
agree
well
together
.
But
,
without
the
world
there
is
no
distance
,
now
;
though
there
would
be
,
were
any
new
Body
created
:
for
,
since
Distance
signifies
extension
and
parts
;
and
a
Body
is
compos'd
of
parts
;
't
is
plain
,
that
,
a
Body
being
created
,
Distance
too
,
is
created
:
But
,
to
imagine
Distance
abstracted
from
a
Body
is
manifestly
against
this
first
principle
of
Reason
,
which
denies
that
the
same
can
be
a
Thing
and
no-Thing
.
6.
Again
,
't
is
evident
,
there
's
no
such
thing
as
a
kind
of
infinite
Magnitude
or
Vastness
,
wherein
all
Bodies
are
:
for
bodies
would
not
be
counter-extended
with
such
a
Magnitude
;
&
consequently
,
since
Bodies
are
Quantitative
things
,
that
would
not
be
such
.
7.
Out
of
what
has
been
said
,
't
is
plain
,
there
is
no
empty
place
in
the
world
;
that
is
,
there
is
no
hollow
body
,
wherein
there
is
not
another
Body
:
for
,
it
being
determin'd
,
that
Distance
is
a
Body
;
't
is
manifest
that
,
taking
away
Body
,
all
Distance
is
taken
away
:
Since
,
therefore
,
't
is
plain
,
that
distant
things
are
joyn'd
by
taking
away
the
distance
;
if
,
out
of
a
hollow
body
,
that
be
taken
away
which
keeps
the
sides
asunder
,
the
sides
remain
conjoin'd
,
&
the
Body
is
no
longer
hollow
.
8.
Whence
it
appears
,
the
wonder
of
those
that
ask
,
If
all
the
Air
should
be
taken
out
of
a
vast
hollow
sphear
,
and
nothing
else
should
be
done
,
what
would
follow
?
is
irrationall
;
and
signifies
just
as
if
they
should
say
,
If
the
sides
of
the
sphear
were
joyn'd
,
&
nothing
else
done
,
would
they
be
joyn'd
?
9.
If
,
then
,
all
quantitative
things
are
joyn'd
together
,
they
are
Continu'd
:
For
,
things
continu'd
are
no
otherwise
,
so
,
but
,
in
vertue
of
the
Quantity
,
which
is
in
either
part
:
since
,
therefore
,
in
these
,
there
's
Quantity
on
either
side
;
whatever
quantitative
things
are
conjoin'd
must
be
continu'd
.
10.
Out
of
what
has
been
said
,
the
Notion
of
Place
is
collected
:
For
,
it
appears
to
us
,
that
is
,
to
Mankind
,
that
Place
is
an
immovable
Vessell
,
which
some
bodies
go
out
of
and
others
enter
into
:
moreover
,
that
the
Earth
is
absolutely
immovable
,
and
that
Heaven
and
the
Starres
observe
a
constancy
in
their
Motion
,
&
so
give
a
ground
,
on
which
the
notion
of
immobility
may
be
founded
;
whence
,
a
Vessell
,
by
respects
to
a
determinate
part
of
the
Earth
&
of
the
motion
of
the
Heavens
,
will
gain
an
apprehension
of
immobility
.
To
say
,
therefore
,
a
Body
is
in
such
a
place
,
is
as
much
as
to
say
,
'T
is
in
a
Body
which
has
such
a
situation
to
the
Earth
and
to
the
Heavens
;
for
example
,
't
is
at
such
a
distance
from
such
a
Mountain
,
towards
the
beginning
of
Aries
,
or
the
Sun-rising
.
11.
And
,
that
this
is
true
,
appears
out
of
those
explications
of
Place
,
whereby
,
usually
,
answer
is
made
to
the
Question
,
Where
is
such
a
thing
?
For
,
we
answer
by
such
things
as
,
in
our
apprehensions
,
are
immoveable
:
in
the
last
resolution
,
by
the
parts
of
the
Heavens
;
next
,
by
Mountains
,
Rivers
,
Cities
,
Houses
,
Trees
,
&c.
and
more
immediately
by
Walls
and
things
fastned
to
Walls
,
or
rather
,
by
immoveable
things
within
the
House
,
as
Beds
,
Cupboards
,
&c.
'T
is
plain
,
therefore
,
that
Place
is
the
Body
which
next
encloses
the
thing
within
it
;
as
't
is
conceiv'd
to
be
in
a
certain
site
to
the
rest
of
the
world
,
or
its
fixt
parts
.
12.
You
'l
object
,
there
's
nothing
constant
in
the
world
,
able
to
make
a
Place
,
besides
Imaginary
Space
.
'T
is
answer'd
,
Place
is
a
word
,
signifying
according
to
the
will
of
the
first
imposers
,
and
therefore
signifies
a
thing
as
't
is
in
our
mind
,
or
under
Notion
;
wherefore
,
you
must
not
require
something
really
immoveable
,
but
which
may
appear
such
:
Now
,
even
Motion
it self
,
if
it
be
constantly
the
same
,
appears
to
have
a
kind
of
immobility
;
and
so
,
't
is
sufficient
that
the
Sun
constantly
rises
in
one
part
and
sets
in
another
,
to
determine
Place
,
without
any
need
of
Imaginary
Space
.
13.
You
'l
object
again
,
This
Definition
does
not
agree
with
all
things
that
are
in
Place
:
for
it
neither
agrees
with
Angels
or
separated
souls
,
which
yet
,
't
is
clear
,
are
in
a
Place
;
nor
with
the
World
it self
;
nor
with
Qualities
▪
or
parts
of
Substance
,
which
are
in
a
Place
,
too
.
We
answer
,
't
is
clear
indeed
that
spirituall
substances
are
in
a
Place
,
but
't
is
not
clear
what
signifies
,
to
be
in
a
Place
,
when
we
speak
of
them
:
but
certain
't
is
,
that
it
signifies
not
,
to
be
in
a
Place
after
the
manner
of
Bodies
,
which
alone
is
,
properly
,
to
be
in
a
Place
;
since
Mankind
,
to
whom
belongs
the
imposing
the
name
of
Place
,
never
saw
spirituall
substances
.
'T
is
as
certain
that
,
either
the
world
is
not
in
a
Place
,
or
,
if
it
be
,
(
as
some
endeavour
to
explicate
,
)
't
is
by
its
parts
;
that
is
,
because
every
part
is
in
a
Place
,
it
may
,
in
a
kind
of
forc'd
sense
,
be
said
to
be
in
a
Place
.
But
,
Forms
and
Qualities
to
be
in
a
Place
,
signifies
they
are
the
Forms
and
Qualities
of
Bodies
which
are
in
a
Place
:
Whence
,
all
these
are
said
to
be
in
a
Place
analogically
,
and
not
in
their
primary
signification
.
14.
Nor
imports
it
,
that
the
Vulgar
think
that
to
have
no
being
,
which
is
nowhere
:
for
the
Vulgar
are
not
the
composer
of
Sciences
,
as
they
are
the
imposer
of
Names
:
wherefore
,
we
receive
the
signification
of
Names
from
them
,
but
not
the
truth
of
Propositions
.
15.
Having
determin'd
then
,
that
Place
is
something
extrinsecall
to
the
thing
in
it
;
and
seeing
that
an
extrinsecall
change
cannot
be
made
without
some
intrinsecall
one
,
too
,
(
since
the
extrinsecall
denomination
is
not
another
thing
,
different
from
the
intrinsecall
quality
of
the
things
which
concurre
to
the
denomination
)
in
every
change
of
Place
,
some
intrinsecall
Mutation
must
of
necessity
intervene
:
But
,
the
change
of
Place
is
,
immediately
,
a
change
of
the
application
of
the
sides
of
the
thing
moved
,
from
the
sides
of
the
Place
whence
it
parts
,
to
the
sides
of
the
Place
whether
it
passes
:
wherefore
,
the
Place
and
the
Thing
in
it
being
,
really
,
the
same
quantitative
thing
,
we
must
say
that
Locall
Motion
materially
,
is
Division
,
that
is
,
the
first
and
,
principall
act
of
Quantity
or
Divisibilty
;
and
,
formally
,
the
denomination
of
a
new
site
of
the
Universe
,
as
has
been
declared
.
16.
It
follows
,
out
of
what
has
been
said
,
that
,
since
't
is
of
the
very
Nature
of
Quantity
,
to
have
its
parts
extended
and
one
out
of
or
beyond
another
,
't
is
impossible
two
Bodies
should
be
in
the
same
Place
;
for
so
,
one
,
in
respect
to
the
other
,
should
not
have
the
Nature
of
Quantity
:
As
also
,
if
the
same
Body
were
situated
in
two
Places
;
since
't
would
make
a
double
distance
,
it
would
have
the
force
and
effect
of
two
Quantities
,
that
is
,
be
double
it self
.
17.
The
objections
against
these
Positions
are
Theologicall
,
&
not
hard
in
Theology
;
&
therefore
,
are
to
be
referr'd
thither
.
LESSON
III.
Of
Time
and
Locall
Motion
.
1.
NOw
,
among
Locall-Motions
,
't
is
evident
,
the
Motion
of
the
Heavens
,
especially
of
the
Sun
and
Moon
,
is
most
notorious
and
common
to
Mankind
;
as
also
,
(
at
least
,
to
our
apprehensions
)
most
constant
&
equall
:
Wherefore
,
t
is
the
fittest
&
best
qualifi'd
for
the
measuring
of
other
Motions
:
&
so
,
experience
teaches
,
that
't
is
apply'd
to
this
use
;
for
the
Howers
,
Days
,
Years
,
&c.
are
certain
parts
of
the
Motion
of
the
Sun
.
2.
This
motion
therefore
,
as
't
is
made
use
of
for
the
measuring
other
motions
,
we
call
Time
:
and
,
comparing
motion
to
Time
,
we
say
,
one
is
swifter
or
slower
then
another
.
3.
You
'l
object
,
this
is
an
ill
Definition
of
Time
:
for
,
before
the
World
was
created
,
there
was
Time
;
and
yet
,
no
Motion
of
the
Heavens
.
If
the
Sun
,
too
,
should
stand
still
,
Time
would
not
,
therefore
,
cease
to
passe
on
:
Wherefore
,
Time
is
not
the
Motion
of
the
Heavens
.
'T
is
answer'd
,
Before
the
creation
of
the
World
,
there
was
no
time
;
however
we
may
imagine
Time
before
the
World
,
as
we
do
Place
out
of
the
World
:
but
these
Opinions
are
ill
grounded
in
the
Fancy
.
And
,
if
the
Sun
should
stand
still
,
't
is
plain
,
there
would
be
no
Daies
and
Years
,
&c.
that
is
,
if
it
should
stand
still
for
ever
;
for
,
if
it
stood
but
for
a
little
while
,
it
would
only
make
the
Day
longer
.
But
,
't
is
to
be
observ'd
,
that
the
Motion
of
the
Heavens
is
not
Time
,
as
it
is
in
it self
,
but
as
it
is
the
Object
of
our
apprehensions
;
whereby
we
form
a
certain
quantity
of
Motion
,
which
we
may
apply
to
all
other
Motions
,
and
even
to
the
Motion
of
the
Sun
it self
.
4.
To
the
question
,
therefore
,
Whether
time
would
passe
on
were
the
Sun
or
Heavens
immoveable
?
't
is
answer'd
that
,
abstracting
from
our
apprehensions
,
it
would
not
:
but
,
because
there
would
still
remain
in
us
a
power
of
measuring
other
Motions
,
by
the
Motion
of
the
Heavens
which
we
formerly
apprehended
;
we
should
measure
Motions
by
Time
passing
on
in
its
Essence
,
not
in
Existence
,
that
is
,
by
the
Notion
and
Nature
,
not
the
actuall
Presence
of
Time
.
Time
,
therefore
,
would
not
,
really
,
passe
on
;
yet
we
should
make
use
of
it
as
if
it
did
.
5.
You
'l
object
again
,
The
Motion
of
the
Heavens
is
divisible
,
as
the
space
wherein
they
are
mov'd
:
But
Time
consists
of
Indivisibles
;
for
,
It
has
no
true
being
but
the
present
,
which
is
alwaies
indivisible
.
'T
is
answer'd
,
Time
is
divisible
without
end
,
just
as
Motion
is
:
But
,
what
is
said
,
that
nothing
of
Time
is
present
but
an
instant
,
is
false
;
for
,
we
say
,
the
present
Day
,
Year
,
Age
,
&c.
for
,
Time
being
Motion
,
as
in
our
apprehensions
,
the
Understanding
can
make
as
much
of
it
present
as
it
pleases
,
by
taking
a
whole
part
after
the
manner
of
one
Entity
.
6.
But
an
indivisible
part
of
Time
is
never
present
;
for
,
there
is
no
such
thing
:
the
working
,
only
,
of
our
Understanding
makes
Instants
,
not
as
a
part
of
Time
,
but
as
the
end
of
one
part
and
the
beginning
of
another
:
Whence
,
we
never
conceit
an
instant
In
Time
or
Motion
,
but
when
we
mean
there
is
no
more
Time
or
Motion
,
An
Instant
,
therefore
,
is
a
kind
of
not-being
of
Time
:
Wherefore
,
what
's
said
,
that
nothing
of
Time
is
present
but
an
Instant
,
is
to
be
understood
,
that
Nothing
of
Time
is
present
together
and
at
once
,
because
its
nature
is
Successive
;
nor
can
it
have
any
existence
,
as
a
kind
of
Thing
or
Being
,
but
as
the
variation
of
a
divisible
Thing
as
't
is
divisible
.
7.
Again
;
it
being
apparent
,
that
some
things
are
more
easie
,
others
harder
to
be
divided
,
or
(
which
is
the
same
)
some
are
more
,
others
lesse
divisible
:
if
that
which
causes
the
Motion
forces
a
lesse
against
a
more
divisible
,
the
more
divisible
must
of
necessity
be
cut
asunder
,
and
admit
in
the
lesse
divisible
between
its
parts
:
wherefore
,
a
Division
will
be
made
,
and
consequently
,
if
the
other
requisites
concurre
,
a
Locall
Motion
;
for
,
the
lesse
divisible
will
change
its
place
.
If
,
therefore
,
the
same
lesse
divisible
be
impell'd
,
with
the
same
force
,
against
any
thing
more
divisible
then
the
former
;
't
will
separate
it
in
lesse
time
,
and
consequently
,
't
will
be
mov'd
faster
.
8.
Now
,
the
lesse
divisible
is
call'd
,
Dense
;
the
more
,
Rare
:
and
,
because
Divisibility
is
the
very
nature
of
Quantity
,
the
rare
will
have
more
,
the
dense
lesse
of
Quantity
:
and
these
are
the
first
differences
that
can
be
expected
in
a
Quantum
or
Magnitude
,
they
being
made
by
more
and
lesse
of
Quantity
in
a
quantitative
Thing
.
9.
But
,
because
,
out
of
what
has
been
said
,
it
appears
that
the
rare
,
in
respect
of
the
dense
,
is
that
which
is
divisible
,
and
contrarily
,
the
dense
is
the
divider
:
by
how
much
greater
the
proportion
of
density
is
in
the
divider
,
to
the
rarity
of
what
is
divided
;
by
so
much
the
division
must
needs
be
quicker
,
and
the
Motion
swifter
.
10.
In
like
manner
it
is
,
too
,
for
matter
of
the
Figure
or
shape
:
for
,
one
figure
being
apter
to
divide
then
another
,
(
since
,
we
see
Artificers
chuse
sharp
figures
to
cut
with
)
by
how
much
the
figure
is
more
apt
(
supposing
all
other
circumstances
proportionable
)
so
much
swifter
the
Motion
will
be
.
11.
Lastly
;
because
,
in
dense
things
of
the
same
figure
,
the
comparison
of
density
to
the
figure
is
greater
in
great
things
,
(
because
,
in
Bodies
,
the
Solid
is
multiply'd
in
a
triple
proportion
,
12.
It
follows
,
out
of
what
has
been
said
,
that
there
can
be
no
Motion
in
an
instant
,
by
an
Agent
of
a
finite
power
:
for
,
the
space
wherein
't
is
made
being
divisible
without
end
;
if
the
motion
were
in
an
instant
,
the
Agent
could
move
the
movable
through
a
space
assign'd
,
while
the
power
which
moves
the
Sun
could
not
move
that
never
so
little
a
space
:
since
,
therefore
,
space
may
diminish
without
end
,
't
is
necessary
the
power
be
encreas'd
without
end
,
and
consequently
,
be
infinite
.
13.
Again
;
since
a
greater
power
is
requir'd
to
move
the
same
movable
more
swiftly
through
the
same
Medium
;
a
movable
cannot
be
transferr'd
from
a
lesse
to
a
greater
degree
of
velocity
,
in
an
instant
,
by
a
finite
Agent
:
For
,
since
some
power
is
requisite
to
give
it
a
greater
velocity
,
even
in
the
same
time
;
and
the
proportion
of
time
to
an
instant
is
infinite
;
the
power
to
give
it
such
a
velocity
,
in
an
instant
,
must
be
infinite
.
14.
Whence
,
't
is
evident
,
that
every
Movable
which
is
rais'd
from
rest
to
motion
,
passes
through
infinite
degrees
of
slownesse
,
greater
then
that
degree
whereto
we
suppose
it
to
be
arrived
.
For
,
since
every
assign'd
degree
is
divisible
into
infinite
ones
which
are
between
it
and
rest
,
nor
can
a
finite
Agent
raise
the
Movable
from
any
of
those
to
an
assign'd
degree
,
in
an
instant
;
much
lesse
can
it
transferre
it
from
rest
to
an
assign'd
degree
in
an
instant
.
Consequentially
to
these
positions
,
Every
movable
that
is
reduc'd
from
rest
to
motion
,
at
the
beginning
,
increases
in
velocity
:
but
,
since
to
every
finite
Agent
,
there
corresponds
a
certain
determinate
degree
of
Effect
,
beyond
which
it
has
no
power
;
when
it
arrives
once
to
that
degree
of
velocity
,
it
will
stand
at
it
,
and
the
Motion
will
encrease
no
farther
.
15.
But
if
,
to
the
difficulty
of
the
Medium
,
there
be
added
an
Agent
moving
a
contrary
way
;
according
to
that
Agents
power
the
velocity
of
the
former
movable
will
be
diminisht
,
or
the
movable
be
even
forc'd
to
rest
,
or
to
an
opposite
Motion
.
And
thus
it
appears
how
Motions
begin
and
end
.
16.
Lastly
,
it
may
be
concluded
,
speculatively
speaking
,
that
any
weight
whatever
may
be
mov'd
an
assign'd
space
,
by
never
so
little
a
power
:
For
,
since
the
power
must
,
of
necessity
,
be
multiply'd
to
encrease
the
velocity
;
as
much
as
it
fails
in
velocity
,
so
much
may
be
abated
in
the
power
.
Assigning
therefore
a
Bulk
to
be
mov'd
and
a
power
to
move
it
;
suppose
another
power
which
may
be
able
,
in
a
certain
time
,
to
move
this
bulk
such
a
determin'd
space
;
and
,
by
how
much
this
later
power
is
greater
then
the
first
assign'd
,
somuch
encrease
the
time
in
which
the
movable
should
be
mov'd
through
the
propos'd
space
;
and
because
,
now
,
the
effect
is
so
much
lesse
,
it
will
not
exceed
the
power
assigned
.
17.
I
said
,
this
is
speculatively
true
:
because
,
when
one
should
go
about
to
reduce
it
to
practice
,
an
extremely
little
power
could
not
be
preserv'd
so
long
time
,
as
were
necessary
to
the
effect
.
LESSON
IV.
Of
the
four
First
Qualities
.
1.
OUt
of
what
has
been
said
,
it
being
concluded
that
Rare
and
Dense
are
the
first
Differences
,
and
that
they
by
consequence
,
like
Quantity
,
are
varied
with
endlesse
Differences
;
seeing
,
too
,
that
there
is
a
perpetuall
Tumult
as
it
were
,
in
the
world
,
of
heavy
things
descending
towards
the
Centre
of
the
Earth
:
there
must
,
of
necessity
,
be
some
degree
of
rare
Bodies
so
easily
divisible
,
that
it
needs
nothing
,
but
this
very
impulse
,
to
separate
their
parts
,
&
carry
them
,
the
nearest
way
to
the
Centre
.
2.
Such
bodies
,
therefore
,
will
spread
themselves
without
any
limits
about
the
Earth
,
unlesse
they
be
hindred
;
whence
,
they
'l
have
no
proper
figure
of
their
own
:
but
when
they
encounter
with
a
denser
body
,
upon
which
the
impulse
that
divides
them
,
has
not
the
like
power
;
there
they
'l
stop
their
division
,
and
receive
a
figure
from
that
.
3.
They
will
,
therefore
,
be
easily
terminable
by
others
bounds
,
hardly
by
their
own
:
But
,
on
the
contrary
,
Bodies
,
upon
which
the
motion
of
gravity
has
not
such
force
,
will
be
easily
terminable
by
their
own
bounds
,
hardly
by
others
.
Now
,
this
,
Nature
and
Aristotle
have
assign'd
for
the
notion
of
Drynesse
,
that
,
of
Moysture
;
wherefore
,
these
will
be
dry
bodies
,
those
moist
.
4.
It
appears
,
therefore
,
both
that
all
bodies
,
that
have
a
Consistency
,
are
dry
;
and
that
,
if
there
be
any
so
rare
,
that
,
by
all
others
,
it
will
be
repell'd
from
the
Centre
,
(
that
is
,
rare
in
the
highest
degree
)
that
,
too
,
is
dry
;
for
,
its
parts
take
not
easily
their
ply
,
that
is
,
are
not
spread
by
the
falling
of
heavy
bodies
,
but
are
carried
by
their
own
Motion
:
Yet
,
that
which
is
dense
in
the
highest
degree
will
be
more
dry
;
because
the
rarest
receiv's
a
figure
partly
from
those
without
it
,
partly
from
it self
.
5.
But
,
among
moist
bodies
,
that
which
is
rarer
is
moister
;
as
more
yielding
to
the
gravity
which
divides
it
.
6.
You
'l
object
,
that
Dust
and
Fire
accommodate
themselves
to
the
bounds
of
other
bodies
;
and
,
therefore
,
must
be
moist
.
'T
is
answer'd
,
Dust
is
not
one
body
,
but
many
:
besides
,
it
does
not
so
accommodate
it self
;
since
,
if
it
lye
free
,
a
heap
of
Dust
is
full
of
Aire
,
by
which
it
is
rendred
so
easily
plyable
.
Fire
,
too
,
has
a
proper
motion
,
and
is
reflected
,
when
forc'd
by
a
hard
body
;
nor
does
it
wholy
accommodate
it self
,
as
appears
in
light
and
the
flames
of
Furnaces
.
7.
Again
;
since
,
by
the
same
motion
of
heavy
bodies
,
rare
ones
must
necessarily
be
press'd
against
dense
,
and
dense
against
rare
:
if
a
very
rare
body
be
so
forc'd
against
a
dense
,
that
it
be
constrain'd
to
make
its
way
;
since
,
't
is
divisible
into
minutest
parts
,
and
't
is
easier
to
make
a
narrow
then
a
wide
way
;
't
is
plain
,
the
rare
body
will
bore
it self
a
world
of
little
passages
and
paths
,
and
consequently
,
will
dissect
the
dense
,
which
opposes
it
,
into
an
infinity
of
little
parts
.
8.
Whence
,
it
follows
,
that
,
if
there
were
many
heterogene
bodies
,
(
that
is
,
of
a
different
nature
)
shut
up
in
the
dense
body
;
all
,
now
being
set
at
liberty
,
by
such
dissection
,
will
,
by
their
proper
motions
,
gather
themselves
to
their
own
Parties
,
and
be
separated
,
every
one
,
from
those
of
another
kind
.
9.
But
if
a
dense
body
compresse
a
rare
one
,
't
will
let
nothing
scape
out
of
it
;
but
,
whatever
if
finds
,
it
condenses
and
crowds
into
a
narrower
room
.
10.
Dense
bodies
,
therefore
,
have
this
nature
,
to
gather
together
heterogene
bodies
;
that
is
,
they
are
cold
:
and
Rare
bodies
,
to
gather
together
homogene
(
or
bodies
of
the
same
kind
,
)
but
to
disperse
heterogene
;
that
is
,
they
are
hot
.
For
,
Nature
and
Aristotle
have
given
us
these
notions
of
hot
and
cold
.
11.
And
among
rare
bodies
,
't
is
apparent
,
the
rarest
will
be
the
best
dividers
,
that
is
,
the
hotest
:
but
,
among
dense
bodies
,
those
will
be
the
coldest
,
which
most
streightly
besiege
the
rare
bodies
,
and
those
are
such
as
are
most
plyant
to
their
parts
;
whence
,
they
which
are
,
in
some
measure
,
moist
,
too
,
will
be
the
coldest
.
LESSON
V.
Of
the
Elements
.
1.
WE
have
deduc'd
,
therefore
,
out
of
the
most
simple
notion
of
Quantity
,
dissected
by
the
only
differences
of
more
and
lesse
,
the
Rarest
body
,
hot
,
in
the
highest
degree
,
and
dry
,
but
not
in
the
highest
degree
;
the
Densest
,
dry
,
in
the
highest
degree
,
and
cold
,
but
not
in
the
highest
degree
;
a
Heavy
or
lesse
rare
body
,
moist
,
in
the
highest
degree
,
but
not
so
hot
;
lastly
,
a
Moderately
dense
body
,
cold
,
in
the
highest
degree
,
but
temperately
moist
.
2.
These
same
bodies
,
in
as
much
as
Motion
proceeds
from
them
to
others
,
are
active
;
but
,
in
as
much
as
they
sustain
the
action
of
others
,
they
are
passive
;
chang'd
,
thus
,
in
Name
,
not
Nature
.
3.
This
property
also
,
of
an
Element
,
they
have
,
that
they
cannot
be
compounded
of
other
things
,
and
all
things
else
are
compounded
of
them
:
they
being
establisht
out
of
the
first
Differences
which
,
of
necessity
,
are
found
in
others
.
There
are
,
therefore
,
four
ELEMENTS
.
4.
You
'l
object
;
Since
Rare
and
Dense
vary
the
Quantity
,
by
the
very
nature
of
Quantity
there
will
be
infinite
degrees
;
and
,
thence
the
number
of
the
Elements
will
neither
be
four
nor
,
indeed
,
finite
.
'T
is
answer'd
;
Men
do
not
determine
the
kinds
of
things
,
according
to
the
fruitfulnesse
of
Nature
;
but
,
by
grosse
and
sensible
differences
,
according
to
the
slownesse
of
our
Apprehension
.
5.
Thus
,
therefore
,
a
Rare
body
,
which
makes
it self
and
other
things
be
seen
,
we
call
Fire
:
One
that
has
not
this
vertue
,
and
yet
hinders
not
other
things
from
making
themselves
seen
,
we
call
Aire
:
A
Dense
body
,
which
absolutely
excludes
light
,
we
term
Earth
:
One
that
partly
admits
it
and
partly
repells
it
,
we
term
Water
.
6.
Not
,
that
wise
men
esteem
these
very
bodies
to
be
truly
Elements
,
which
we
are
conversant
with
round
about
us
:
But
that
,
these
mixt
bodies
obtain
that
name
,
out
of
the
predominancy
of
some
Element
in
them
,
which
they
would
deserve
,
if
,
drein'd
from
all
dregs
,
they
were
entirely
refin'd
into
the
nature
of
the
Predominant
.
7.
The
Elements
,
therefore
,
are
Bodies
distinguisht
,
purely
,
by
the
differences
of
rare
and
dense
:
and
they
are
collected
into
four
kinds
or
heads
,
under
the
terms
we
have
given
them
.
8.
Moreover
,
't
is
evident
,
that
no
bounds
or
figures
do
,
properly
,
belong
to
the
Elements
,
out
of
their
own
principles
,
that
is
,
precisely
by
their
own
nature
:
for
,
since
they
are
nothing
but
quantitative
bodies
,
affected
with
such
a
rarity
or
density
;
the
nature
of
Quantity
still
remains
,
which
is
every
where
divisible
and
terminable
,
and
consequently
,
figurable
as
one
pleases
.
9.
But
,
whether
there
be
not
some
greatest
possible
bulk
in
every
one
of
the
Elements
,
out
of
the
very
nature
of
density
,
depends
upon
Metaphysicall
principles
.
Neverthelesse
,
out
of
their
common
operation
,
a
Sphericall
figure
is
most
agreeable
to
Earth
and
Fire
.
To
Fire
,
because
its
nature
being
to
diffuse
it self
,
with
the
greatest
celerity
,
out
of
a
little
matter
into
a
great
breadth
,
it
must
of
necessity
spread
it self
on
all
sides
,
that
is
,
into
a
Sphear
.
10.
To
Earth
,
as
being
the
Basis
&
foundation
,
about
which
moist
bodies
diffuse
themselves
;
and
,
by
so
doing
,
mold
it
into
a
Globe
.
11.
But
,
that
Fire
flames
up
like
a
Pyramid
,
proceeds
from
the
resistance
of
the
Aire
incompassing
it
,
which
't
is
forc'd
to
penetrate
with
a
sharp
point
.
12.
Again
;
since
the
Elements
are
oppos'd
to
one
another
,
only
by
the
differences
of
rare
and
dense
:
't
is
evident
,
their
transmutation
into
one
another
is
nothing
else
but
rarefaction
and
condensation
.
13.
'T
is
plain
,
too
,
that
dense
things
,
being
forc'd
against
rare
,
do
compresse
them
,
and
,
if
there
be
no
way
to
escape
,
do
necessarily
condense
them
:
which
condensation
,
if
it
be
enough
both
in
time
and
degree
,
will
,
of
necessity
,
change
that
which
is
condens'd
,
into
that
Element
to
which
such
a
density
is
proper
.
14.
But
,
a
rare
body
compress'd
,
if
it
get
out
,
diffuses
it self
a
main
out
of
those
straights
:
whence
,
if
any
dense
body
,
that
is
rarifiable
,
stick
to
it
,
it
carries
it
away
with
it
,
and
rarifies
it
:
'T
is
plain
,
therefore
,
that
't
will
turn
it
into
the
nature
of
the
rarer
Element
;
if
the
other
circumstances
concurre
which
are
necessary
to
Action
.
15.
Out
of
all
which
,
we
may
collect
,
that
one
Element
cannot
be
chang'd
into
another
,
without
being
transferr'd
through
all
the
intermediate
degrees
:
as
if
you
should
endeavour
to
rarifie
Earth
into
Fire
;
first
you
must
raise
it
into
Water
,
then
into
Aire
,
and
at
length
into
Fire
.
16.
LESSON
VI.
Of
Mixtion
,
and
the
second
Qualities
,
or
those
which
most
immediately
follow
Mixtion
.
1.
SInce
that
part
of
the
world
,
which
is
expos'd
to
our
knowledge
,
is
finite
;
and
any
never-so-little
bulk
infinitely
repeated
,
exceeds
the
greatest
possible
:
it
follows
,
that
the
singular
bodies
of
this
part
are
finite
,
and
some
actually
the
least
:
nay
,
that
,
according
to
the
order
of
the
World
,
bodies
cannot
be
divided
beyond
a
certain
term
.
2.
There
will
be
,
therefore
,
in
each
of
the
Elements
certain
minutest
parts
,
which
are
,
either
not
at
all
,
or
very
seldome
,
farther
divisible
.
When
,
therefore
,
the
Elements
are
forc'd
one
against
another
,
the
sides
of
the
rare
ones
must
,
of
necessity
,
become
united
with
the
sides
of
the
dense
:
but
,
when
they
come
to
be
divided
again
,
't
is
impossible
they
should
not
leave
some
of
those
minutest
parts
sticking
to
the
dense
bodies
.
3.
For
,
since
,
in
the
same
Quantity
,
the
dense
part
is
lesse
divisible
then
the
rare
;
that
,
too
,
which
is
compounded
of
rare
and
dense
,
in
the
same
bulk
,
is
lesse
divisible
then
the
rare
part
of
the
same
quantity
:
It
must
needs
be
,
therefore
,
that
the
rare
Elements
must
stick
,
by
their
minutest
parts
,
to
the
dense
which
they
have
once
touch't
.
4.
Hence
,
't
is
evident
,
that
the
minutest
parts
being
rub'd
off
on
every
side
,
by
the
ouching
together
of
divers
Elements
,
mixt
bodies
must
necessarily
be
made
.
For
,
if
two
dense
parts
touch
one
minutest
rare
;
since
the
minutest
is
indivisible
,
there
naturally
emerges
a
Compound
of
the
three
,
as
hardly
divisible
as
are
the
dense
ones
themselves
.
5.
Whence
,
we
have
the
first
Distinction
of
bodies
:
For
,
since
the
Elements
are
four
,
and
may
be
joyn'd
together
by
bigger
or
lesse
parts
;
as
oft
as
great
parts
of
one
Element
redound
,
the
body
is
call'd
by
the
name
of
that
Element
.
6.
Thus
have
we
severall
kinds
of
Earth
:
and
,
in
this
sense
,
all
consistent
things
have
the
notion
of
Earth
;
all
visible
fluid
things
are
call'd
Waters
;
and
there
are
many
kinds
of
Airs
and
Fires
.
7.
But
,
when
a
body
,
that
has
the
consistency
of
one
Element
,
is
full
of
minute
parts
of
another
;
the
substance
of
one
Element
gets
the
denomination
of
the
other's
quality
:
Thence
proceed
the
degrees
of
temperaments
,
hot
,
cold
,
&c.
and
in
one
and
the
same
kind
,
too
,
reduplicated
differences
of
the
Elements
;
viz.
of
Earths
,
some
are
Earthy
,
some
Watry
,
some
Aeriall
,
some
Fiery
;
and
so
in
the
rest
,
ev'n
to
the
lowest
species
.
8.
It
appears
,
again
,
wherein
consist
those
qualities
,
which
distinguish
bodies
,
as
to
their
consistency
.
First
,
the
notion
of
liquid
&
consistent
plainly
follows
the
nature
of
rare
and
dense
:
and
soft
is
a
middle
between
liquid
and
hard
;
but
hard
,
being
that
which
resists
division
,
clearly
refers
to
density
.
9.
But
grosse
and
Massive
appertain
to
the
quantity
of
parts
:
for
grosse
is
not
,
so
,
divided
into
minutest
parts
,
as
to
be
able
,
by
its
subtilty
,
to
enter
into
the
least
pores
or
crannies
;
and
Massive
has
no
pores
or
passages
in
its
body
,
but
speaks
parts
constipated
and
thrust
close
together
:
Both
of
them
plainly
expresse
a
certain
notion
of
Density
.
10.
As
for
Fat
,
and
tough
,
and
viscous
or
slimy
,
they
have
this
common
to
them
all
,
To
stick
where
they
touch
:
but
fat
,
in
lesser
parts
;
viscous
,
in
greater
;
tough
,
properly
,
holds
its
own
parts
together
,
and
cleaves
not
so
much
to
others
.
11.
They
,
therefore
,
consist
of
moist
and
dense
well
mixt
:
from
moist
they
derive
the
facility
to
unite
;
from
dense
,
the
difficulty
to
be
separated
.
LESSON
VII
.
Of
the
manner
of
Mixtion
,
and
the
Passion
of
mixt
things
.
1.
THese
things
being
suppos'd
;
because
there
are
two
Active
qualities
,
heat
and
cold
,
which
are
most
eminent
in
Fire
and
Water
:
let
there
,
first
,
be
a
mixt
body
of
Earth
,
Water
,
and
Aire
,
upon
which
Fire
be
suppos'd
to
act
:
and
,
since
there
is
no
mixt
thing
so
compacted
,
but
,
at
least
,
some
parts
of
Fire
may
be
forc'd
and
fly
away
through
it
;
and
they
,
in
their
passage
,
are
joyn'd
to
the
parts
of
Aire
or
Water
:
't
is
apparent
that
the
Fire
will
carry
away
some
of
them
with
it
;
whence
the
Compound
will
become
more
compacted
and
solid
.
2.
Again
;
because
the
parts
of
Fire
are
extremely
subtile
;
whereever
they
find
a
resistance
in
the
solid
parts
,
weaker
then
their
power
of
dividing
,
that
way
they
'l
escape
,
and
that
,
not
alone
,
but
laden
with
watry
or
airy
parts
:
so
that
they
will
leave
the
Water
and
Aire
to
be
united
with
Earth
and
between
themselves
,
by
the
smallest
parts
that
are
possible
.
3.
Whence
,
two
things
come
to
passe
:
One
,
that
the
Whole
becomes
a
like
and
equall
throughout
,
all
the
Elements
being
mixt
by
most
minute
particles
in
every
part
:
The
other
,
that
the
Elements
become
lesse
divisible
from
one
another
in
this
whole
;
which
is
,
to
be
rendred
constant
and
permanent
body
.
4.
Let
therebe
,
therefore
,
in
another
body
,
the
natures
of
Fire
,
Aire
and
Earth
blended
together
;
to
which
let
Water
be
added
from
without
:
and
,
first
,
you
'l
see
all
the
sallies
block'd
up
,
and
the
Pores
coagulated
by
vertue
of
the
cold
,
so
that
the
Aire
or
Fire
cannot
easily
steal
out
.
5.
See
,
again
,
the
Water
with
all
its
weight
and
force
,
pressing
the
nearest
parts
of
the
Compound
on
every
side
:
whence
,
they
are
forc'd
to
compresse
and
streighten
themselves
,
and
shrink
into
a
lesse
and
lesse
place
,
to
make
room
for
the
water
;
and
this
,
not
in
the
surface
alone
,
but
even
in
the
minutest
parts
,
as
far
as
the
water
can
pierce
;
which
so
much
the
farther
it
can
,
as
its
parts
are
rendred
more
subtile
,
by
the
re-active
power
of
the
Aire
and
Fire
.
6.
Behold
,
therefore
,
its
parts
being
,
even
thus
,
condens'd
,
a
consistent
and
hardly-divisible
body
made
;
which
is
,
to
be
a
certain
naturall
species
of
Physicall
mixt
body
.
7.
Hence
,
again
,
the
causes
of
passions
are
apparent
:
for
,
we
see
some
compounds
suffer
from
Fire
a
liquefaction
and
dissolution
into
minute
particles
;
as
,
into
Ashes
and
powder
:
others
,
on
the
contrary
,
grow
hard
:
others
,
again
,
converted
into
Flame
.
8.
The
reason
whereof
is
clear
:
for
,
if
the
power
of
the
Fire
extends
it self
only
so
far
as
to
dilate
the
humid
parts
which
hold
together
the
dry
;
it
comes
to
passe
that
the
humid
parts
become
larger
and
more
rare
,
and
consequently
,
the
whole
it self
is
rendred
more
divisible
and
subject
to
be
diffus'd
,
by
its
own
gravity
,
into
the
best
ply
towards
the
Centre
;
which
is
,
to
be
liquid
.
9.
But
,
if
the
power
of
the
Fire
be
so
great
,
as
to
carry
away
with
it
the
humid
parts
;
then
the
dense
ones
remain
resolv'd
into
minute
particles
,
without
a
medium
to
unite
them
.
And
these
operations
are
effected
,
sometimes
by
the
mere
force
of
the
fire
it self
;
sometimes
by
means
of
some
instruments
,
whereby
the
humid
parts
are
either
increas'd
or
decreas'd
,
according
as
the
Artificer
has
occasion
.
10.
But
,
farther
,
if
humid
parts
were
redundant
in
the
Compound
,
and
Fire
were
so
far
apply'd
,
as
only
to
restrain
the
excesse
,
by
exhaling
those
parts
which
were
superfluous
;
the
connection
of
the
humid
with
the
Earthy
parts
will
be
lesse
dissolvable
,
and
the
proportion
of
the
Earthy
to
the
humid
,
greater
;
whence
,
the
Compound
grows
hard
.
11.
Water
,
too
,
by
pressing
upon
it
,
pierces
and
enters
into
the
Compound
it
encompasses
,
sheir's
off
its
lighter
and
dryer
parts
,
which
it
mingles
with
the
whole
dry
body
,
and
amplifies
the
humid
parts
:
whence
,
it
makes
the
body
flaccid
and
loose
,
and
next
door
to
dissolution
.
12.
Some
it
utterly
dissolv's
;
as
salts
:
for
,
they
are
compos'd
of
certain
minute
parts
,
betwixt
which
Water
easily
enters
;
and
,
so
little
they
are
,
that
they
swim
in
the
water
.
There
becomes
,
therefore
,
a
kind
of
fluid
body
,
thickned
with
little
heterogeniall
bodies
swimming
in
it
;
to
which
if
Fire
be
apply'd
,
by
exhaling
the
superfluous
humid
parts
,
it
remains
salt
,
as
at
first
.
13.
But
,
sometimes
it
happens
,
that
something
is
mix'd
with
the
salt
&
water
,
which
has
a
power
of
separating
the
watry
parts
from
those
little
swimming
bodies
,
and
of
pressing
down
&
precipitating
them
to
the
bottome
:
for
,
when
the
supervener
has
aggregated
to
it self
the
parts
of
that
humid
body
wherein
the
dissolution
was
made
,
that
which
was
mixt
with
them
(
if
it
be
heavier
then
water
)
descends
;
for
,
before
,
it
was
sustain'd
by
its
conjunction
to
the
water
which
was
lighter
.
14.
There
are
bodies
,
too
,
which
grow
harder
and
are
petrify'd
by
the
mixture
of
water
;
either
because
there
wanted
moisture
to
make
them
coagulate
,
as
it
happens
in
dry
or
sandy
bodies
;
or
because
,
by
the
addition
of
the
extrinsecall
moisture
,
the
superfluous
humour
is
suck'd
out
,
in
which
their
inward
parts
were
dissolv'd
and
rendred
flaccid
;
or
,
lastly
,
because
the
pores
of
the
Compound
being
constipated
without
,
the
internall
heat
better
dries
the
inward
parts
.
15.
But
,
when
the
redundant
parts
are
so
very
minute
in
themselves
that
they
are
easily
rarifyable
,
they
are
diffus'd
into
Flame
.
And
these
parts
are
such
as
we
call
fat
or
aiery
,
which
consist
of
a
thin
moisture
compacted
with
minutest
dense
parts
.
16.
It
falls
out
,
too
,
that
,
when
the
fiery
parts
within
are
many
and
happen
upon
a
convenient
moisture
,
they
multiply
and
encrease
themselves
without
any
apparent
extrinsecall
cause
,
and
open
themixt
body
it self
,
so
that
the
Vessell
cannot
contain
it
,
but
it
boyls
and
runs
over
;
as
we
see
in
the
Must
of
wine
and
of
other
fruits
:
and
this
kind
of
action
is
call'd
Fermentation
.
17.
Sometimes
,
too
,
it
blazes
out
in
Fire
and
Flame
;
as
appears
in
Hay
,
and
other
dry
bodies
moistned
and
crowded
together
:
which
comes
to
passe
,
by
the
fiery
parts
of
the
dry'd
bodies
turning
the
humid
parts
into
fire
,
and
,
at
length
,
by
their
multitude
and
compressure
,
raising
a
flame
.
18.
Passion
or
suffering
from
Earth
is
when
,
either
by
its
weight
or
some
other
pressure
and
hardnesse
,
a
change
is
made
;
which
,
even
by
this
,
is
understood
to
be
a
division
,
and
,
commonly
,
is
wrought
two
ways
:
For
,
either
the
parts
of
one
body
are
intirely
separated
,
by
the
interposition
of
another
body
of
another
nature
;
or
else
,
only
some
are
joyn'd
to
others
of
the
same
nature
,
as
it
happens
in
liquids
when
they
are
swash'd
up
and
down
.
19.
The
first
of
these
divisions
is
made
severall
ways
;
by
breaking
,
cutting
,
cleaving
,
pounding
,
and
the
like
;
the
other
,
by
hammering
,
drawing
,
impression
,
bending
,
compression
,
and
the
like
:
all
which
appear
in
themselves
to
be
made
,
by
the
motion
of
hard
and
dense
against
soft
and
rare
bodies
.
LESSON
VIII
.
Of
Impassibility
,
Destruction
,
and
the
Accidents
of
Mixt
bodies
.
1
THose
bodies
which
are
esteem'd
not
to
suffer
at
all
,
that
is
,
no
losse
;
as
Gold
,
though
it
melt
,
yet
consumes
not
;
the
Asbestus
stone
is
purifi'd
by
flames
and
not
endamag'd
;
Hair
grows
not
more
flaccid
,
that
is
,
its
parts
are
not
more
loos'ned
,
with
water
;
the
Adamant
is
so
call'd
,
because
neither
the
hammer
nor
fire
can
master
it
:
These
have
got
a
name
,
through
the
unskilfulnesse
of
Artificers
.
2.
For
,
the
Moderns
have
found
out
how
a
Diamant
may
be
resolv'd
to
dust
,
nay
,
even
melted
:
as
also
,
how
to
make
Gold
volatile
:
the
Asbestus
,
in
the
very
stone
,
both
suffers
from
a
very
violent
fire
,
and
,
when
divided
into
hairs
,
is
able
to
resist
only
a
moderate
one
.
3.
It
appears
,
consequentially
,
what
must
necessarily
follow
,
if
fire
be
apply'd
to
a
confirm'd
and
establisht
body
:
For
,
since
some
parts
of
a
Compound
are
moister
then
the
rest
,
the
first
efficacy
of
the
fire
will
be
exercis'd
upon
them
;
with
which
,
if
there
be
any
fiery
parts
mix'd
,
those
first
fly
out
with
the
fire
,
and
are
call'd
Spirits
.
4.
The
next
are
the
moist
and
more
insipid
parts
,
and
they
are
call'd
Flegme
:
Then
,
the
more
concocted
parts
,
in
which
Earth
,
Fire
and
Water
are
well
mix'd
;
and
they
are
call'd
Oyls
or
Sulphurs
,
and
need
a
strong
fire
to
extract
them
.
5.
That
which
remains
uses
,
by
the
Chymists
,
to
be
washt
in
water
:
wherein
they
find
a
more
solid
part
,
which
sinks
down
,
and
this
they
call
Salt
;
and
a
lighter
part
that
swimms
a
top
,
which
they
throw
away
as
unusefull
;
notwithstanding
,
't
is
dry
in
the
highest
degree
,
and
very
efficacious
to
fix
fluid
bodies
.
6.
But
,
if
a
Compound
of
these
two
be
throughly
bak'd
in
a
very
strong
fire
,
the
moisture
of
the
Salt
is
liquifi'd
,
and
the
other
being
clasp'd
into
it
,
and
,
as
it
were
,
swimming
in
it
,
so
condenses
it
into
a
porous
body
,
that
it
remains
alwaies
pervious
to
fire
:
and
such
a
body
is
call'd
Glasse
or
vitrify'd
.
7.
Whence
,
't
is
clear
,
that
these
bodies
are
in
part
,
made
,
and
,
in
part
,
resolved
or
extracted
by
the
operation
of
Fire
:
and
that
they
are
not
Elements
,
but
Compounds
,
containing
the
nature
of
the
whole
,
as
appears
by
Experience
.
8.
Out
of
what
has
been
said
,
it
may
be
understood
,
what
a
mixt
body
is
,
viz.
A
body
coagulated
of
rare
and
dense
parts
,
in
a
determinate
number
,
bignesse
,
and
weight
.
9.
And
,
when
many
such
unite
into
one
,
a
certain
homogeneous
sensible
body
emerges
,
serviceable
for
mans
use
;
though
it
be
seldome
so
pure
,
as
to
be
unmixt
with
others
.
10.
Hence
,
again
,
it
appears
,
that
it
concerns
not
a
mixt
body
,
of
what
Figure
it
be
:
since
,
with
the
same
proportion
of
parts
,
it
may
be
of
any
;
especially
,
when
one
body
is
compos'd
of
many
little
ones
.
All
things
,
therefore
,
receive
their
figure
from
the
circumstances
of
their
Origination
.
11.
For
,
since
the
same
things
must
be
produc'd
after
the
same
manner
;
and
those
that
are
divers
,
different
ways
:
the
variety
of
manners
occasions
the
variety
of
figures
.
12.
For
,
that
which
equally
dilates
every
way
,
becomes
spherical
;
that
which
dilates
irregularly
,
becomes
like
a
Bowl
;
that
which
faints
in
growing
longer
,
becomes
like
a
Top.
13.
That
which
cannot
extend
it self
in
length
,
becomes
parallelly
flat
;
that
which
is
,
in
some
part
,
defective
in
breadth
,
becomes
a
hexagon
,
a
quadrate
,
&c.
that
which
cannot
dilate
it self
in
breadth
,
becomes
oblong
.
And
thus
,
at
large
,
and
in
generall
,
't
is
evident
,
whence
proceed
the
figures
of
mixt
bodies
.
LESSON
IX
.
Of
the
Motion
of
heavy
and
light
bodies
,
and
the
Conditions
of
Acting
.
1.
FRom
what
has
been
said
we
collect
,
that
,
since
the
Sun
either
is
Fire
,
or
,
at
least
,
operates
like
fire
,
beating
upon
Earth
,
Water
,
and
all
other
bodies
,
with
its
Rayes
;
it
summons
out
little
bodies
,
which
,
sticking
to
its
Rayes
,
are
reflected
with
them
and
mov'd
from
the
Centre
towards
the
Circumference
.
2.
By
whose
motion
,
all
the
rest
must
,
of
necessity
,
presse
towards
the
Earth
:
and
because
the
Motion
of
dense
bodies
is
so
much
the
stronger
,
the
denser
they
are
;
and
descending
bodies
,
the
more
they
descend
,
the
more
they
repell
lesse
descending
ones
;
there
must
be
,
wheree're
the
Sun
has
any
power
,
a
Motion
of
dense
bodies
towards
the
Centre
and
of
rare
towards
the
Circumference
;
as
experience
teaches
us
there
is
.
3.
Whence
,
first
,
we
see
,
there
can
no
where
be
any
pure
Elements
:
since
,
at
least
,
the
Rayes
of
the
Sun
and
the
bodies
carry'd
about
with
them
are
mingled
every
where
.
4.
We
see
,
too
,
that
dense
bodies
are
heavy
,
and
contrarily
,
rare
are
light
:
and
that
there
is
not
any
inclination
requisite
in
bodies
,
towards
the
Centre
;
as
is
evident
by
the
experience
of
Pumps
,
by
which
,
with
an
easie
motion
,
a
great
weight
of
water
is
rais'd
;
or
,
as
when
we
suck
a
Bullet
out
of
the
barrell
of
a
long
Gun
.
5.
We
see
,
moreover
,
that
,
since
this
tumult
,
of
little
bodies
ascending
and
descending
,
swarm's
every
where
:
place
any
body
in
it
,
it
must
needs
be
press'd
upon
by
others
every
where
about
it
;
and
the
bodies
,
which
are
aside
on
't
,
must
perpetually
pierce
and
enter
into
it
,
if
they
find
in
it
lighter
bodies
which
they
can
repell
from
the
Centre
:
Whence
,
this
tumult
is
even
within
all
bodies
,
and
,
by
vertue
of
it
,
all
bodies
are
mingled
.
6.
Whence
,
again
,
it
must
needs
be
,
that
the
thin
parts
of
every
body
consist
in
a
kind
of
perpetuall
expiration
;
and
consequently
,
that
every
body
,
more
or
lesse
,
operates
upon
and
affects
other
bodies
which
approach
it
round
about
,
or
acts
in
a
Sphear
;
as
we
see
by
experience
,
in
hot
,
cold
,
odoriferous
,
poys'nous
bodies
,
and
in
Animals
,
&c.
Every
body
,
therefore
,
has
a
certain
Sphear
of
activity
,
by
this
motion
;
and
its
action
depends
upon
this
action
.
7.
Again
,
therefore
,
since
its
action
is
not
effected
but
by
an
emission
of
its
own
parts
;
't
is
plain
,
it
cannot
act
upon
a
distant
thing
,
but
by
a
Medium
;
as
also
,
that
it
suffers
from
that
upon
which
it
acts
,
if
it
be
within
that
's
Sphear
of
activity
:
the
emanations
of
the
one
running
,
by
lines
different
,
from
the
emanations
of
the
other
.
8.
Again
,
't
is
evident
,
that
,
since
these
emanations
are
certain
minutest
particles
;
in
a
denser
body
more
will
stick
to
its
parts
,
because
its
pores
are
narrow
and
hard
to
passe
through
:
wherefore
,
with
greater
labour
and
time
,
and
at
the
cost
of
more
little
particles
,
a
dense
body
receiv's
the
nature
and
similitude
of
the
body
acting
upon
it
,
retains
more
strongly
,
and
works
more
vigorously
then
if
it
were
rarer
.
9.
And
,
hence
,
the
nature
of
intension
and
remission
is
evident
;
viz.
because
there
are
,
within
the
same
space
,
more
or
fewer
of
these
particles
:
as
also
,
why
,
in
a
denser
body
,
a
quality
is
more
intended
.
LESSON
X.
Of
the
Motions
of
Vndulation
,
Projection
,
Reflection
,
and
Refraction
.
1.
'T
Is
consequentiall
to
what
has
been
said
,
that
Water
,
stir'd
and
alter'd
,
by
any
violence
,
from
its
planesse
and
equidistance
from
the
Centre
,
will
not
suddenly
cease
its
motion
and
return
to
rest
,
though
that
extrinsecall
force
be
withdrawn
:
For
,
since
,
by
that
violence
,
some
of
its
parts
are
rais'd
higher
then
they
should
be
;
't
is
manifest
,
that
those
higher
parts
,
by
the
course
of
common
causes
,
must
presse
towards
the
Centre
,
and
,
consequently
,
thrust
others
out
of
their
place
:
wherefore
,
the
motion
will
continue
,
'till
every
one
be
restor'd
to
its
own
proper
place
.
2.
And
,
because
ther
's
no
motion
without
a
concitation
and
a
certain
degree
of
velocity
;
therefore
,
by
the
very
stop
of
the
motion
,
a
new
motion
will
be
occasion'd
,
but
weaker
and
weaker
still
,
till
it
quite
faint
away
.
3.
'T
is
plain
,
too
,
that
the
very
same
must
,
of
necessity
,
happen
in
Aire
,
if
its
parts
be
either
condens'd
,
or
stir'd
out
of
their
right
place
.
4.
Again
,
it
appears
that
,
if
it
be
thus
with
the
Aire
,
the
same
must
be
expected
,
too
,
of
any
weighty
moveable
that
's
carri'd
in
the
Aire
:
For
,
since
the
reason
,
why
such
descend
not
perpendicularly
,
is
,
because
the
progressive
motion
or
the
causes
of
it
are
stronger
then
the
causes
of
descent
,
at
least
in
part
;
and
,
since
the
moveable
has
,
of
it self
,
no
inclination
this
or
that
way
;
it
must
needs
follow
the
motion
of
the
Aire
that
's
next
it
.
But
,
since
a
dense
thing
mov'd
is
carri'd
more
forceably
,
then
a
rare
body
in
which
it
is
;
the
rare
body
it self
,
as
it
gives
a
beginning
to
that
's
motion
,
so
,
again
,
it
receiv's
an
advance
from
that
:
whence
it
comes
to
passe
,
that
both
the
Aire
and
the
moveable
continue
their
motion
longer
then
the
Aire
alone
would
.
5.
Hence
,
again
,
it
appears
,
that
Moveables
(
in
all
other
respects
alike
)
the
denser
they
are
,
the
longer
they
retain
their
Motion
.
6.
'T
is
plain
,
therefore
,
why
Pendents
by
a
thrid
fastned
above
wave
up
and
down
,
if
they
be
rais'd
from
the
perpendicular
and
then
let
drop
:
for
,
with
their
first
descent
,
they
move
the
Aire
,
following
it
when
it
ascends
and
returning
with
it
when
it
returns
,
but
with
a
new
and
a
weaker
impulse
:
and
so
proceed
still
,
till
they
can
stir
it
no
longer
.
7.
It
appears
likewise
,
that
,
if
a
Moveable
be
violently
struck
against
a
hard
resister
:
because
the
Aire
before
it
must
,
of
necessity
,
yield
,
and
that
which
follows
it
pushes
it
on
;
it
will
follow
the
Aire
before
it
,
that
is
,
't
will
be
reflected
from
the
hard
Resister
.
8.
And
this
,
making
equall
Angles
,
at
least
without
any
sensible
difference
:
for
since
an
oblique
motion
is
resolv'd
into
two
perpendiculars
,
which
are
in
a
certain
proportion
,
by
vertue
of
the
moving
causes
,
and
the
Angle
is
caus'd
and
emerges
out
of
this
proportion
;
it
must
needs
be
that
,
this
proportion
remaining
,
the
Angle
of
the
result
or
reflection
must
needs
be
the
same
with
that
of
the
impulse
or
incidence
:
as
in
light
,
where
the
reflection
diminishes
not
sensibly
the
force
;
but
,
where
the
reflection
notably
weakens
the
force
,
the
angle
of
reflection
will
be
proportionably
lessen'd
.
9.
But
,
if
the
Resister
do
but
partly
resist
and
partly
admit
,
that
which
is
obliquely
mov'd
will
be
refracted
(
as
they
call
it
)
from
the
resistance
towards
the
contrary
part
;
that
is
,
at
the
entring
,
towards
the
Perpendicular
falling
from
the
mover
upon
the
Superficies
;
at
the
going
out
,
from
the
Perpendicular
;
as
experience
,
conformable
to
reason
,
witnesses
.
10.
You
'l
object
,
that
Refraction
of
light
and
dense
bodies
is
very
different
.
I
answer
,
all
the
Experiments
I
have
ever
heard
of
,
conclude
no
such
thing
.
11.
The
cause
of
Restitution
is
,
that
those
bodies
which
recover
themselves
again
are
chang'd
from
length
to
breadth
:
but
,
't
is
known
,
an
extrinsecall
superficies
,
the
more
equall
dimensions
it
has
,
the
greater
Quantity
't
is
capable
of
;
whence
,
the
more
the
longitude
exceeds
the
latitude
,
so
much
the
more
the
parts
of
the
imprison'd
body
are
compress'd
,
whose
motion
is
so
much
the
swifter
as
they
are
the
more
spirituous
,
and
so
much
the
easilyer
,
too
,
they
are
dilated
and
rarifi'd
after
they
have
been
compress'd
and
condens'd
by
the
circumstant
causes
:
and
this
is
that
we
call
Restitution
.
12.
But
,
it
ordinarily
happens
that
,
if
they
stand
too
long
in
bent
,
they
recover
not
themselves
again
afterwards
:
because
,
either
the
condens'd
parts
are
rarifi'd
,
by
the
expulsion
of
some
of
them
;
or
else
time
has
begot
some
stiffnesse
,
by
the
concretion
of
the
parts
press'd
together
,
so
that
now
't
is
not
so
easy
for
them
to
return
to
their
former
habit
.
13.
This
doctrine
is
evident
,
to
the
very
sight
in
Flesh
;
which
,
being
press'd
,
becomes
white
,
the
Bloud
retiring
;
but
when
that
returnes
,
it
comes
to
it self
again
and
recovers
its
colour
.
But
Steel
,
above
all
things
,
most
swiftly
restores
it self
,
because
it
has
a
many
extremely
spirited
particles
imprison'd
in
it
.
LESSON
XI
.
Of
the
Electricall
and
Magneticall
Attractions
of
hot
bodies
.
1.
OUt
of
what
has
been
said
,
't
is
again
deduc'd
,
that
,
since
there
's
a
perpetuall
issue
and
sally
of
some
parts
,
out
of
bodies
abounding
with
intense
heat
;
and
,
thereupon
,
a
certain
Orbe
of
Steams
:
other
little
bodies
must
,
of
necessity
,
flow
in
,
after
the
same
manner
,
to
the
body
it self
;
and
consequently
,
there
must
be
the
same
tumult
about
every
such
body
;
Les.
9.
2.
as
we
spake
of
about
the
Earth
.
2.
Hence
,
we
see
that
hot
bodies
naturally
attract
those
things
which
are
in
the
Aire
about
them
:
Thus
,
we
believe
hot
Loafs
,
Onions
,
Apples
,
Dogs
and
Cats
&c.
draw
infection
to
them
,
that
is
,
the
pestilent
vapours
which
fly
in
the
Aire
.
3.
But
,
seeing
that
Emanations
strike
the
Aire
with
a
certain
kind
of
agitation
;
those
things
will
be
easilyest
mov'd
with
this
agitation
and
brought
to
the
body
,
which
are
most
sollicited
by
this
stroak
,
that
is
,
those
which
are
most
conformable
to
the
particles
that
sally
out
.
4.
To
which
may
be
added
,
that
such
parts
,
too
,
will
stick
faster
and
easier
;
and
,
when
they
are
united
,
foment
the
naturall
heat
of
the
body
;
which
causes
this
motion
:
Thence
,
we
see
that
Poysons
are
more
easily
suck'd
out
of
infected
bodies
,
by
other
dry'd
poys'nous
things
;
but
,
best
of
all
,
by
those
very
bodies
to
whom
the
Poyson
to
be
suck'd
out
is
proper
.
5.
But
,
when
the
parts
returning
are
any
way
viscous
,
little
light
heterogeniall
bodies
stick
to
them
,
too
,
by
reason
of
their
gluyness
,
and
return
with
them
;
as
may
be
seen
in
Electricall
bodies
,
which
little
straws
and
dust
fly
to
:
And
sometimes
they
rebound
again
,
with
a
kind
of
Impetus
or
vehemency
;
whence
appears
,
that
the
Steams
of
such
like
bodies
are
very
spirited
,
and
start
out
with
certain
impetuosities
.
6.
Out
of
these
things
,
it
appears
,
that
there
is
,
in
a
manner
,
a
double
nature
of
every
mix'd
body
;
one
,
as
it
were
,
perfect
and
fit
to
be
evaporated
;
another
,
as
it
were
,
imperfect
and
wanting
more
concoction
;
which
two
must
,
of
necessity
,
be
oppos'd
to
one
another
,
by
the
differences
of
more
and
lesse
.
7.
Now
,
if
we
suppose
a
body
so
compos'd
in
its
own
Nature
,
as
to
be
plac'd
between
two
fountains
,
as
it
were
,
of
such
Steams
;
it
must
,
of
necessity
,
attain
such
a
disposition
,
that
,
on
one
side
,
't
will
be
apt
to
receive
the
one's
Emanations
,
on
the
other
,
the
other
's
,
and
to
eject
them
,
again
,
by
the
contrary
sides
.
8.
It
will
,
therefore
,
have
contrary
vertues
in
its
extremities
;
but
,
in
the
middle
,
an
indifferency
,
at
least
,
in
comparison
to
the
Ends.
9.
Again
,
its
Emanations
will
be
carry'd
(
against
the
course
of
other
bodies
,
which
return
to
their
own
fountains
)
still
directly
on
towards
their
opposite
fountain
:
and
the
body
,
too
,
if
it
hang
so
freely
that
it
may
more
easily
follow
its
Emanations
then
leave
them
,
will
it self
be
carry'd
along
with
its
Emanations
.
10.
But
,
if
it
cannot
bear
them
company
,
and
yet
be
plac'd
obliquely
to
the
fountain
,
and
at
liberty
to
turn
it self
;
with
the
same
force
't
will
turn
it self
to
the
fountain
.
11.
Moreover
,
as
the
fountain
acts
upon
it
,
so
this
body
it self
will
act
upon
another
body
of
the
same
kind
;
but
more
faintly
.
12.
Wherefore
,
since
we
find
by
experience
,
that
a
Loadstone
receives
vertue
from
the
Earth
,
as
we
have
explicated
it
;
and
suffers
and
acts
thus
from
the
Earth
and
upon
Iron
,
respectively
;
and
besides
,
the
searchers
into
its
nature
declare
,
that
all
the
rest
of
its
wonderfull
motions
depend
on
these
:
the
reason
of
Magneticall
Attraction
is
evident
,
out
of
what
has
been
said
.
LESSON
XII
.
Of
the
generation
of
more
compounded
Bodies
,
and
Plants
.
1.
2.
This
Water
if
it
rest
in
any
cavity
of
the
Earth
,
those
little
bodies
sink
down
in
it
;
and
,
whether
by
heat
evaporating
the
humid
parts
of
the
water
,
or
by
cold
binding
them
together
,
they
coagulate
,
by
their
clamminesse
,
into
one
body
appearing
homogeneous
through
the
littlenesse
of
its
parts
:
which
,
being
imperceptible
,
are
so
equally
mix'd
in
every
the
least
sensible
bulk
,
that
they
shew
every
where
throughout
the
same
uniforme
nature
.
And
,
this
is
the
most
simple
generation
of
demix'd
bodies
.
3.
And
these
bodies
,
by
the
fresh
accesse
of
more
water
,
are
increas'd
;
more
of
the
like
matter
being
added
to
them
by
approximation
or
juxtaposition
,
as
they
term
it
in
the
Schools
.
4.
But
,
if
some
such
thing
happen
to
coagulate
,
after
the
fore-said
manner
,
in
some
concavity
not
far
from
the
superficies
of
the
Earth
;
of
so
tender
a
substance
and
with
so
much
heat
,
that
it
should
ferment
within
it self
:
it
must
,
of
necessity
,
suck
into
its
very
body
any
moisture
about
it
,
and
dilate
and
concoct
it
.
5.
Wherefore
,
such
a
body
must
needs
be
increas'd
,
out
of
a
certain
intrinsecall
vertue
,
and
with
a
kind
of
equality
in
all
its
parts
,
after
that
manner
as
they
call
by
intrasumption
or
receiving
in
:
and
so
Tartufoli
,
Potatoes
,
&c.
grow
under
ground
,
without
shooting
any
part
of
themselves
above
the
Earth
.
6.
But
,
if
the
heat
overcome
,
and
be
able
,
by
increasing
it
,
to
thrust
out
into
the
Aire
,
too
,
some
little
particles
of
this
body
;
which
must
be
of
the
more
subtile
ones
,
that
is
,
the
best
mix'd
of
hot
and
moist
:
this
body
will
have
heterogeniall
parts
,
growing
together
and
subservient
to
one
another
;
and
becomes
a
manifest
Plant
,
having
a
root
within
the
Earth
,
and
a
blade
or
a
stalk
above
ground
.
LESSON
XIII
.
Of
the
more
universall
parts
of
Plants
.
1.
'T
Is
evident
,
again
,
that
a
Plant
,
being
expos'd
to
the
Sun
and
wind
,
becomes
harder
and
dryer
,
at
least
,
as
to
its
exteriour
parts
:
whence
,
it
comes
to
passe
,
that
the
Moisture
drawn
up
out
of
the
root
,
either
by
the
power
of
the
Sun
or
its
own
naturall
heat
,
more
and
gentlyer
irrigates
and
waters
its
inward
parts
.
2.
Whence
proceeds
,
commonly
,
a
threefold
difference
in
the
substance
of
a
Plant
:
for
,
the
outermost
part
is
hard
and
call'd
the
Bark
;
the
innermost
is
soft
,
as
being
that
which
is
last
dry'd
,
and
is
call'd
the
Marrow
or
Pith
;
lastly
,
the
middle
is
the
very
substance
of
the
Plant.
3.
But
,
when
Moisture
flows
in
greater
abundance
out
of
the
root
,
then
can
be
rais'd
up
perpendicularly
,
which
is
the
hardest
course
of
all
;
it
breaks
out
at
the
sides
,
splitting
the
bark
of
the
Plant
,
and
makes
it self
a
kind
of
new
trunk
of
the
same
nature
with
the
former
,
which
we
call
a
Bough
,
or
Branch
.
4.
But
,
since
the
Plant
receiv's
a
heat'
variously
temper'd
with
moisture
,
by
the
Sun
:
't
is
plain
,
when
the
moisture
is
best
digested
,
it
must
necessarily
break
out
into
certain
Buttons
or
Nuts
;
which
are
concocted
by
degrees
and
,
from
their
originall
hardnesse
,
grow
softer
by
the
flowing
in
of
more
subtile
moisture
,
and
participate
in
another
degree
,
the
same
differences
which
are
in
the
Stock
,
to
wit
,
a
Skin
,
Flesh
,
as
it
were
,
and
Marrow
.
5.
Only
,
because
some
parts
of
the
juyce
are
too
earthy
and
,
therefore
,
grow
hard
;
these
commonly
coagulate
between
the
Flesh
and
the
Marrow
,
the
Sun
drawing
out
their
moisture
to
the
exteriour
parts
.
6.
These
Buttons
,
being
found
in
the
more
perfect
Plants
,
use
to
be
call'd
Fruits
;
and
that
which
has
the
place
of
the
Marrow
in
them
is
the
Seed
of
the
Tree
.
7.
It
appears
,
again
,
that
,
since
the
temperaments
of
heat
and
moisture
are
varied
without
end
;
there
must
be
,
too
,
infinite
other
things
,
as
it
were
,
accidentall
to
Plants
,
besides
what
we
have
mentioned
.
8.
Whence
,
we
see
upon
some
Berries
,
upon
others
Thorns
,
upon
some
Ioynts
,
upon
others
other
things
growing
;
according
to
the
divers
natures
of
the
particulars
that
concurre
to
the
breeding
them
.
9.
Leafs
are
,
universally
,
common
to
almost
all
;
and
are
nothing
but
little
distinct
sprigs
,
the
distances
between
which
are
fill'd
up
&
distended
with
the
same-natur'd
moisture
:
for
,
't
is
evident
,
the
substance
of
wood
and
almost
of
every
Plant
consists
of
certain
thrids
,
as
it
were
,
compacted
together
;
as
appears
plainly
,
in
the
rending
them
asunder
.
Moreover
,
if
,
before
they
stick
well
together
,
a
more
abundant
moisture
flows
in
;
it
distends
these
fibres
,
and
,
while
the
leafs
are
yet
streightned
and
shut
up
,
makes
them
enwrap
one
another
as
it
were
,
cylindrically
,
like
a
bark
.
10.
When
they
peep
into
the
Aire
,
by
little
and
little
,
the
fibres
grow
stiffe
and
streight
and
stretched
farther
out
,
and
the
leaf
unfolds
it self
;
becoming
,
according
to
the
order
of
the
fibres
,
broader
one
way
,
longer
in
the
middle
,
and
,
as
it
declines
from
the
middle
,
the
figure
still
abates
in
longitude
:
they
are
split
,
where
the
fibres
do
not
joyn
together
:
to
conclude
,
from
them
and
the
moisture
which
connects
them
,
the
leafs
receive
their
figure
.
11.
It
appears
,
again
,
that
Flowers
are
a
kind
of
leafs
;
but
of
the
more
spirited
and
oyly
parts
:
therefore
,
they
are
light
,
odoriferous
,
and
short-liv'd
,
and
,
in
Trees
,
they
are
the
forewarners
of
the
Fruit.
LESSON
XIV
.
Of
the
Accidents
of
Plants
.
1.
OUt
of
the
figure
of
the
parts
,
the
figure
of
the
whole
Plant
is
fitted
and
proportion'd
.
The
Trunk
,
which
is
the
principall
part
,
most
commonly
grows
up
like
a
Cylinder
,
or
rather
like
a
Cone
,
because
upwards
still
it
grows
smaller
,
and
abates
in
latitude
.
2.
When
it
deviates
from
this
figure
,
the
reason
may
be
easily
collected
out
of
the
figure
of
the
root
or
seed
.
Those
which
have
a
weak
stock
or
Trunk
do
not
grow
erect
,
but
either
run
upon
the
ground
,
or
else
are
rais'd
up
and
sustain'd
by
others
,
and
get
a
spirall
figure
,
like
the
winding
about
a
Cylinder
.
3.
For
,
the
naturall
motion
of
Plants
being
upwards
,
by
force
of
the
heat
and
sting
out
of
the
Earth
;
and
the
Trunk
,
by
reason
of
its
weaknesse
,
not
being
able
to
bear
much
:
it
bows
towards
the
Earth
,
and
strives
to
rise
again
as
much
as
't
is
able
;
&
so
imitates
the
figure
of
a
serpent
creeping
.
But
,
if
the
stemme
cling
to
some
prop
that
may
help
it
upwards
;
it
elevates
it self
,
not
directly
,
or
in
a
straight
line
,
but
,
as
well
as
it
can
,
winding
round
about
the
sides
on
't
.
4.
Again
;
because
we
see
ther
's
both
a
kind
of
annuall
and
diurnall
,
as
it
were
,
flux
and
reflux
of
heat
from
the
Sun
:
some
Plants
are
but
of
a
day's
life
;
as
certain
Flowers
,
which
,
the
same
day
,
blow
and
wither
.
5.
Very
many
last
not
above
a
year
;
and
then
are
repair'd
again
,
either
by
shedding
their
seed
,
or
by
the
reviving
of
their
fountain
,
the
root
;
or
else
by
the
very
temperature
of
the
soil
.
Others
of
a
more
constant
substance
,
do
not
only
sustain
themselves
,
but
increase
for
many
years
.
Others
,
again
,
even
out-last
Ages
.
6.
All
have
the
same
reason
of
their
life
and
death
:
their
life
and
increase
consists
in
a
due
proportion
of
moisture
with
heat
;
where
this
fails
,
they
faint
and
consume
away
.
7.
A
Plant
dies
,
either
because
the
Sun
,
sucking
the
moisture
out
of
the
upper
parts
of
the
Earth
,
has
not
left
wherewith
to
moisten
the
root
:
or
,
because
too
much
moisture
overflowing
the
root
without
a
proportionable
heat
,
has
too
much
dissolv'd
and
diffus'd
the
vertue
of
it
;
so
that
the
Sun
supervening
has
extracted
its
very
radicall
heat
,
before
it
could
increase
and
supply
it self
:
8.
Or
else
,
because
,
by
little
and
little
,
earthy
and
feculent
parts
,
cleaving
to
the
root
,
have
obstructed
the
passage
of
the
moysture
to
the
inward
parts
of
it
:
And
this
way
of
death
,
because
it
follows
out
of
the
very
action
of
life
,
seems
more
properly
to
bear
the
denomination
of
old
Age
and
a
naturall
way
to
death
.
9.
Out
of
the
same
principles
,
't
is
apparent
,
why
severall
parts
of
the
same
Plant
produce
such
contrary
effects
:
For
,
since
,
in
the
nourishing
of
the
Plant
there
is
a
kind
of
perpetuall
streining
and
separating
of
the
parts
of
the
Aliment
,
most
of
the
parts
of
the
same
nature
must
,
of
necessity
,
run
together
to
one
and
the
same
place
and
part
:
Whence
,
the
severall
parts
of
the
plant
are
compos'd
of
heterogeniall
particles
of
the
nutritive
moisture
;
yet
,
more
or
lesse
sated
,
too
,
with
the
temper
and
seasoning
imbib'd
in
the
root
:
Thus
,
therefore
,
't
is
consonant
to
reason
,
that
a
Plant
should
be
compos'd
of
contraries
and
things
that
have
contrary
vertues
.
10.
The
same
way
we
come
to
understand
the
Sympathy
and
Antipathy
which
is
found
in
divers
Plants
:
for
,
since
't
is
certain
that
every
Plant
,
to
its
measure
,
has
a
certain
Orbe
of
vapours
always
encompassing
it
,
(
as
is
evident
,
in
some
,
by
the
fmell
issuing
from
them
,
)
and
some
Plants
must
needs
consist
of
contrary
natures
;
if
the
weaker
happen
to
be
planted
within
the
Sphear
of
the
stronger
,
that
corrupts
and
kills
it
with
the
stroaks
of
its
vapours
which
besiege
it
;
but
,
if
the
stronger
be
of
a
nature
that
is
a
friend
to
it
,
by
the
same
stroaks
it
grows
more
lively
and
fruitfuller
.
LESSON
XV.
Of
the
generation
and
augmentation
of
Animals
.
1.
ANd
because
,
the
more
fervent
the
heat
is
and
the
moisture
more
figurable
,
(
that
is
,
in
a
certain
proportion
,
neither
resisting
division
,
and
yet
easily
consistent
)
the
Plant
is
divided
into
so
many
the
more
members
and
joynts
:
't
is
evident
,
if
there
be
so
much
heat
as
to
exhale
fumes
out
of
the
moisture
,
and
make
it
actually
fluid
,
the
little
branches
,
through
which
it
flows
and
wherein
't
is
contain'd
,
will
of
necessity
become
hollow
.
And
since
,
by
force
of
the
heat
,
the
Moisture
is
refin'd
into
watry
and
oyly
parts
,
the
earthy
remaining
still
below
:
it
comes
to
passe
that
there
are
found
three
,
as
it
were
,
severall
,
but
subordinate
,
fountains
of
Moisture
in
the
same
Plant
;
and
,
from
every
one
of
these
their
branches
,
and
,
in
them
,
their
own
proper
Moistures
are
deriv'd
.
2.
Among
which
,
those
that
savour
of
Water
are
the
more
remote
,
and
more
fit
to
form
the
exteriour
parts
of
the
Plant
;
and
the
enclosed
humour
is
more
apt
for
those
effects
which
are
perform'd
by
rarefaction
and
condensation
.
3.
Those
which
savour
of
Oyle
are
fitter
for
Augmentation
;
as
being
of
a
kind
of
middle
nature
,
and
conformable
to
all
the
parts
.
Lastly
,
the
Earthy
,
for
the
Conservation
of
the
whole
Plant
in
a
due
temperament
,
by
the
mixture
of
heat
;
which
the
more
solid
parts
are
more
susceptible
of
and
longer
hold
.
4.
Again
,
because
the
watry
parts
are
very
thin
and
,
as
it
were
,
in
a
middle
between
Water
and
Aire
,
in
those
long
and
narrow
channells
;
't
is
clear
that
they
are
both
extremely
passive
of
every
impression
from
without
,
and
transmit
it
to
their
fountain
or
head
.
5.
And
,
because
their
head
has
a
connection
with
the
principall
fountain
;
for
the
most
part
,
the
same
passion
will
passe
on
even
to
that
:
in
which
,
the
heat
being
very
acute
and
spritely
,
and
,
consequently
,
capable
of
sudden
motion
;
a
change
in
the
Plant
,
proportionable
to
its
nature
,
will
necessarily
follow
the
impression
made
upon
it
.
6.
This
Plant
,
therefore
,
will
have
these
two
qualities
:
to
be
stir'd
up
,
as
it
were
,
and
irritated
with
all
occurrences
from
without
;
and
this
very
principle
or
head
thus
irritated
,
will
have
power
to
move
any
part
of
the
Plant
out
of
its
present
site
into
another
,
according
to
the
manner
and
measure
of
the
irritation
.
7.
Which
two
,
making
up
that
whereby
we
distinguish
living
Creatures
from
such
as
have
no
life
,
namely
this
,
that
,
upon
all
occurrences
from
without
,
they
can
move
themselves
;
't
is
evident
,
that
the
name
of
an
Animal
or
living
Creature
agrees
to
this
Plant
:
We
have
,
therefore
,
an
Animal
,
consisting
of
three
principles
,
a
Heart
,
a
Liver
and
Brain
;
watred
with
three
rivers
,
of
the
Vitall
and
Animal
spirits
and
the
Bloud
;
by
the
three
various
Channels
of
the
Arteries
,
Veins
and
Nerves
.
8.
But
,
because
all
things
are
increas'd
by
the
same
things
whereof
they
are
made
;
and
all
mix'd
bodies
are
compos'd
of
the
Elements
;
't
is
clear
,
that
Animals
may
be
increas'd
by
all
bodies
,
so
that
they
be
furnisht
with
fit
instruments
to
make
the
necessary
transmutations
.
9.
But
,
some
bodies
are
of
a
harder
transmutation
,
others
of
an
easier
:
wherefore
,
bodies
ought
to
be
chosen
fit
for
the
food
of
the
Animal
;
and
those
that
are
chosen
should
again
be
resolv'd
into
parts
,
that
the
best
may
be
taken
and
the
worse
rejected
;
and
this
,
as
oft
as
is
necessary
,
that
is
,
till
such
are
chosen
as
,
by
mere
concoction
and
mixing
with
the
humours
of
the
Animal
,
may
be
reduc'd
into
a
substance
like
it
.
Now
,
whilst
the
fibres
are
distended
with
this
moisture
,
both
they
are
strengthned
by
it
and
the
spaces
between
them
are
fill'd
up
:
and
,
thus
,
the
Animal
becomes
bigger
.
10.
And
,
because
this
is
brought
about
by
concoction
;
those
bodies
which
have
not
yet
arriv'd
to
the
degree
of
the
Animal
,
must
needs
be
the
most
connaturall
Aliment
.
LESSON
XVI
.
Of
the
Motion
of
the
Heart
,
and
some
consequents
of
it
.
1.
AGain
,
because
the
Heart
has
heat
and
moisture
in
it
,
and
moisture
boyls
with
heat
,
and
is
turn'd
into
fumes
;
't
is
manifest
,
the
same
moisture
does
not
remain
constantly
in
the
heart
,
but
,
being
resolv'd
by
the
heat
,
is
cast
out
by
the
motion
of
the
Heart
,
swagging
down
and
shutting
it self
with
its
own
weight
,
till
't
is
open'd
again
and
swell'd
with
other
moisture
flowing
into
it
.
2.
There
is
,
therefore
,
a
continuall
flux
of
moisture
through
the
heart
;
which
,
heated
in
it
and
then
cast
out
to
be
dispers'd
through
the
Animal
,
conserv's
it
in
a
due
temperament
of
heat
.
3.
Out
of
what
has
been
said
,
may
be
understood
,
what
a
Disease
and
the
Cure
of
it
is
:
for
,
when
any
part
is
indispos'd
,
so
that
unwholesome
vapours
fume
out
of
it
,
they
,
mix'd
with
the
bloud
,
overrun
and
discompose
,
as
much
as
they
can
,
the
whole
body
and
the
very
Heart
it self
.
4.
And
,
according
as
these
vapours
do
more
frequently
rise
to
such
a
bulk
,
that
they
are
able
vehemently
to
assail
the
whole
Animal
;
so
much
the
frequenter
are
the
Fits
of
the
Disease
.
And
thus
,
some
are
continuall
,
and
others
have
intermissions
;
some
every
other
day
,
some
tertians
,
some
quotidians
,
&c.
5.
And
the
true
nature
and
Method
of
Curing
is
,
To
seek
out
the
part
originally
ill-affected
,
and
apply
remedies
to
that
.
6.
Thus
,
too
,
it
appears
,
how
Physick
expells
one
certain
determinate
humour
out
of
the
whole
body
:
for
a
Drug
,
&c.
being
concocted
in
the
Ventricle
,
which
has
a
power
of
dissolving
and
rendring
fluid
a
certain
humour
of
the
body
,
its
vertue
is
diffus'd
through
all
the
Veins
by
the
fore-explicated
Motion
of
the
Heart
;
whence
,
it
comes
to
passe
that
,
being
provok'd
to
stool
,
that
humour
rather
and
more
then
any
others
follows
out
of
all
the
members
;
or
,
if
the
Physick
be
diaphoreticall
,
that
will
sweat
out
more
then
any
of
the
rest
.
7.
Lastly
,
't
is
clear
,
since
an
Animal
is
a
Plant
;
by
the
highest
concoction
,
a
Seed
or
compendium
of
its
nature
may
be
framed
in
it
as
well
as
in
Plants
:
which
,
duly
ejected
into
a
congruous
ambient
body
,
may
spring
up
into
a
new
Animal
.
8.
Now
,
this
seed
coagulates
first
into
a
Heart
,
then
into
a
Brain
,
and
at
length
into
a
Liver
:
out
of
every
one
of
which
their
own
proper
little
Channels
spring
;
as
is
observ'd
by
those
that
pry
artificially
into
these
things
.
LESSON
XVII
.
Of
the
progressive
Motion
of
Animals
.
1.
OUt
of
what
has
been
said
,
it
may
evidently
be
concluded
that
,
since
the
Heart
is
mov'd
naturally
and
,
by
its
motion
,
presses
out
a
fumy
humour
,
which
they
use
to
call
the
Spirit
,
into
the
Channels
connected
with
it self
and
into
the
bodies
joyn'd
to
it
:
and
the
Flesh
is
fibrous
,
viz.
certain
parts
constipated
together
of
a
world
of
minutest
fibres
sticking
to
one
another
:
and
since
,
if
a
connaturall
moisture
,
especially
being
warm
,
get
into
such
a
body
,
it
makes
it
swell
and
,
of
thin
,
become
thicker
,
of
long
,
shorter
:
It
comes
to
passe
that
the
Members
,
whether
consisting
of
such
fibres
or
knit
together
by
them
,
attain
some
kind
of
locall
Motion
,
by
that
irrigation
from
the
Heart
.
2.
Again
,
the
Channels
,
especially
if
they
are
extremely
little
,
will
swell
,
too
,
and
become
shorter
.
3.
Since
,
therefore
,
't
is
apparent
,
that
there
flow
abundance
of
Spirits
from
the
Heart
to
the
Brain
;
and
again
,
that
,
from
the
Brain
through
the
whole
body
,
mostsubtilly-hollow
nerves
are
extended
to
all
the
members
,
and
lose
themselves
by
their
dispersion
,
as
it
were
,
in
the
Muscles
:
'T
is
plain
,
the
Muscles
will
swell
with
these
spirits
,
as
oft
as
the
Heart
overflows
;
and
consequently
,
become
shorter
,
and
the
parts
adhering
to
them
be
drawn
backwards
to
the
head
of
the
Muscles
;
and
,
which
clearly
follows
,
all
the
extremities
of
the
body
be
mov'd
,
from
the
motion
of
the
Heart
,
according
to
what
is
convenient
to
its
nature
.
4.
It
follows
,
too
,
how
certain
other
members
,
which
have
no
Nerves
but
only
fibres
,
have
motions
of
their
own
;
which
consist
almost
in
nothing
else
but
in
contraction
and
dilatation
:
For
,
the
fibres
being
made
shorter
by
their
irrigation
,
they
draw
the
body
with
them
into
that
figure
which
follows
out
of
their
contraction
;
which
,
when
the
fibres
are
transvers'd
,
is
dilatation
,
when
other
ways
set
,
contraction
.
5.
Again
,
hence
appears
how
the
progressive
motion
of
an
Animal
is
effected
:
For
,
an
Animal
which
is
mov'd
by
walking
,
whilst
it
stands
still
,
has
the
Centre
of
its
gravity
set
directly
to
the
Centre
;
but
,
when
it
sets
a
foot
any
way
,
it
inclines
the
centre
of
its
gravity
,
and
consequently
its
whole
body
,
that
way
;
till
,
transferring
the
other
foot
,
it
sets
it
down
too
:
and
this
often
repeated
is
walking
.
6.
But
,
one
that
leaps
,
when
he
has
contracted
the
superiour
or
fore-parts
to
the
inferiour
or
hinder-parts
;
suddenly
pouring
out
spirits
through
convenient
Nerves
,
he
thrusts
the
fore-parts
forwards
,
with
such
a
force
that
the
hinder-parts
follow
them
.
7.
Something
like
this
is
the
creeping
of
feetlesse
Creatures
:
for
,
fixing
their
breast
or
some
other
part
,
they
bow
their
back-bone
or
that
which
serv's
in
stead
of
it
,
and
so
draw
the
hinder
to
the
fore-parts
;
then
,
fixing
some
of
their
hinder-parts
to
the
Earth
,
they
advance
their
fore-parts
,
by
straightning
again
their
back
.
8.
Swimming
is
made
out
of
leaping
:
for
,
it
being
effected
by
the
Instrument's
first
being
crook'ned
and
then
straightned
again
;
by
the
resisting
Water
the
body
is
pusht
forward
:
and
,
the
same
happens
in
flying
.
9.
Now
,
the
body
being
heavier
then
the
Medium
in
a
certain
proportion
,
and
consequently
,
obliged
to
spend
a
certain
time
in
descending
;
and
the
adventitious
Motion
making
the
Medium
strain
with
more
vehemence
against
that
motion
of
the
body
downwards
,
or
according
to
the
centre
of
its
gravity
:
't
is
plain
,
such
a
body
will
not
sink
.
LESSON
XVIII
.
Of
the
five
senses
of
Animals
.
1.
OUt
of
what
has
been
said
,
it
appears
,
that
there
are
certain
Channels
spread
through
the
whole
body
of
an
Animal
,
full
of
a
kind
of
aiery
humour
;
and
that
they
are
long
and
narrow
:
whence
,
the
least
impression
made
in
any
extremity
of
the
body
must
needs
,
in
a
moment
,
run
to
their
fountain
,
the
Brain
;
and
,
thence
descend
to
the
Heart
.
These
channels
,
therefore
,
being
any
way
obstructed
,
the
Animal
is
sensible
of
nothing
without
.
2.
And
,
since
bodies
that
make
impression
,
either
do
it
by
their
immediate
selves
,
or
else
by
the
mediation
of
some
other
body
;
and
,
those
that
act
by
their
immediate
selves
,
either
do
it
in
their
proper
bulk
,
or
broken
into
parts
,
or
by
naturall
emissions
;
and
those
bodies
,
by
the
mediation
whereof
universally
one
body
acts
upon
another
,
are
either
Aire
,
or
Fire
,
or
light
which
we
see
every
body
bandies
against
another
:
It
follows
,
that
an
Animal
,
if
it
be
perfect
,
may
be
affected
these
five
ways
by
the
things
about
it
.
3.
And
,
because
't
is
evident
that
these
five
ways
are
distinct
;
the
Animal
,
too
,
it self
will
have
five
distinct
dispositions
,
by
which
it
will
be
apt
to
receive
these
five
impressions
;
to
chuse
the
things
that
are
congruous
and
refuse
those
that
are
noxious
,
both
in
its
food
and
other
things
belonging
to
its
conservation
.
4.
Again
,
because
these
impressions
are
different
;
't
is
fit
the
Organs
that
are
to
receive
them
be
plac'd
in
severall
parts
of
the
Animal
:
Animals
,
therefore
,
have
five
Senses
.
5.
'T
is
apparent
,
too
,
that
the
Senses
are
nothing
but
certain
different
degrees
of
Touches
:
For
,
the
parts
of
the
same
body
must
needs
make
only
a
more
subtile
stroak
,
of
the
same
nature
with
the
stroak
of
the
whole
.
6.
And
,
hence
,
we
distinguish
the
differences
of
Tasts
;
so
,
as
,
that
one
pricks
,
another
cutt's
,
another
brushes
,
another
smooth's
:
the
differences
of
Smels
,
too
,
are
a-kin
to
Tasts
.
7.
But
,
the
differences
of
Sounds
are
the
same
with
those
of
Motions
;
distinguisht
by
swiftnesse
and
slownesse
,
by
bignesse
and
smalnesse
,
Lastly
,
't
is
evident
,
that
Fire
or
Light
make
stroaks
too
,
by
its
Activity
upon
other
bodies
.
8.
It
appears
,
farther
,
of
what
nature
the
Senses
must
be
,
and
where
situated
.
For
,
the
Touch
,
being
to
receive
the
excesse
of
those
qualities
whereof
the
body
of
the
Animal
consists
,
requires
nothing
but
a
middling
kind
of
Moisture
,
or
the
naturall
quality
of
that
vapour
which
fills
the
Channels
;
and
therefore
,
like
them
,
't
is
diffus'd
through
the
whole
body
.
9.
The
Tast
,
because
it
requires
a
Moistnesse
which
may
dissolve
the
minutest
parts
,
needs
an
abundance
of
Moisture
,
and
a
site
where
the
food
may
be
dissected
.
The
Smell
,
by
which
Aire
chiefly
enters
into
the
body
,
requires
a
site
and
Organ
where
the
vapours
may
stick
,
that
,
being
constipated
together
,
they
may
act
the
more
powerfully
.
10.
The
Hearing
and
Sight
require
a
situation
near
the
Brain
;
in
an
eminent
place
,
where
Motion
and
Light
may
come
to
them
more
pure
;
and
Organs
,
which
may
multiply
Light
by
refraction
and
Motion
by
reflection
.
11.
Nor
is
it
lesse
evident
,
that
the
Sensation
is
perfected
in
that
part
of
the
Organ
,
where
chiefly
resides
that
vertue
for
which
the
Sense
was
made
;
that
is
,
to
transferre
to
the
Brain
the
action
of
a
body
without
:
If
the
black
of
the
Eye
,
the
hammer
of
the
Eare
,
the
pulp
of
the
Nose
doe
this
;
the
Sensation
also
must
be
plac'd
in
them
.
12.
It
appears
,
too
,
why
the
Senses
are
believ'd
to
consist
in
a
kind
of
Spirituality
and
abstraction
from
matter
:
For
,
since
they
are
ordain'd
by
nature
,
only
that
the
Animal
may
be
mov'd
;
the
stroak
of
sensible
things
is
so
thin
and
subtile
,
that
it
changes
not
the
quality
of
the
Organ
sensibly
,
and
,
therefore
,
't
is
not
believ'd
to
be
materiall
.
13.
And
,
hence
,
too
,
the
Sensible
object
is
commonly
believ'd
to
be
in
the
Sense
,
not
as
something
of
the
same
nature
or
contrary
to
it
,
but
purely
as
another
thing
;
by
which
mistake
,
Sensation
is
thought
to
be
a
kind
of
knowledge
.
LESSON
XIX
.
Of
the
Objects
of
the
Senses
.
1.
LAstly
,
it
appears
,
wherein
consists
the
being
Objects
of
Sense
:
for
,
Touchable
things
,
't
is
plain
,
are
the
first
Qualities
,
or
those
which
are
immediately
deriv'd
from
them
:
Tastable
things
,
conformable
to
nature
,
are
Sweets
;
and
must
necessarily
consist
,
as
the
nature
it self
does
,
in
a
moderate
heat
and
moisture
,
or
,
of
the
degree
proper
to
the
Animal
.
2.
From
this
temper
,
other
Savours
incline
,
too
much
,
towards
cold
and
heat
,
or
moisture
and
drynesse
:
as
salt
,
sharp
and
bitter
things
tast
too
much
of
heat
;
restringent
,
crabbed
,
of
cold
;
sour
,
bitter
and
sharp
,
of
drynesse
;
insipid
,
of
moisture
.
Proportion'd
to
this
is
the
account
of
Smells
.
3.
Sounding
things
are
dry
and
trembling
,
which
are
easily
wav'd
up
and
down
:
but
,
soft
things
hinder
Sound
.
4.
Since
Colours
strike
the
Eye
,
their
nature
must
consist
in
a
vertue
to
reflect
Light
;
that
is
,
in
a
density
&
constipation
of
parts
,
and
in
having
a
many-corner'd
figure
:
And
these
commonly
favour
of
cold
and
drynesse
;
and
their
opposites
,
of
moisture
and
heat
.
5.
Lastly
,
Light
it self
(
and
dilated
flame
,
if
wee
'l
suppose
it
repell'd
from
the
Object
to
the
Eyes
,
must
necessarily
doe
the
same
as
Light
)
will
represent
the
figure
of
a
thing
by
intershadow'd
stroaks
upon
the
Organ
,
and
strike
,
more
or
lesse
,
according
to
the
nature
of
that
which
reflects
it
:
if
it
passe
through
a
triangular
glasse
,
it
will
receive
and
carry
to
the
Eye
the
same
varieties
,
that
is
,
differences
of
Colours
.
6.
But
,
that
light
,
too
,
does
those
things
which
are
proper
to
fire
,
(
viz.
to
dry
,
to
burn
,
to
be
reflected
,
refracted
,
collected
,
dispers'd
,
produced
and
extinguisht
,
)
is
so
clear
,
that
it
cannot
be
doubted
but
light
is
fire
.
7.
Nor
imports
it
against
this
,
That
it
seems
to
be
mov'd
in
an
instant
,
That
it
fills
the
whole
Aire
,
That
it
penetrates
solid
bodies
,
as
glasse
,
&c.
for
,
these
things
seem
so
only
,
through
the
defect
of
our
Senses
;
which
perceive
not
its
motion
,
nor
those
little
spaces
by
which
the
Aire
is
separated
from
the
light
,
nor
the
pores
of
those
bodies
through
which
it
passes
.
LESSON
XX.
Of
Knowledge
and
Memory
.
1.
FArther
,
it
appears
,
that
these
Motions
,
when
they
strike
against
the
destin'd
part
of
the
Brain
,
in
which
knowledge
is
produc'd
;
though
it
be
fatty
and
clammy
,
according
to
the
nature
of
the
Brain
,
yet
are
they
repell'd
from
it
,
because
frequent
new
impulses
charge
upon
the
same
point
.
2.
Those
little
bodies
,
therefore
,
retreat
thence
,
carrying
away
with
them
some
little
particle
of
the
Brain
which
sticks
to
them
;
and
wander
up
and
down
in
the
ventricles
of
the
brain
,
till
they
rest
upon
the
bottome
or
stick
to
the
sides
.
3.
Whence
,
being
rub'd
off
,
as
it
were
with
a
brush
,
by
the
motion
of
the
Spirits
,
when
there
's
occasion
;
they
swimme
again
,
and
are
brought
back
to
that
part
which
is
the
fountain
of
knowledge
.
4.
The
first
stroak
produces
Knowledge
;
the
later
,
actuall
Memory
;
which
,
if
it
be
made
by
design
,
is
call'd
Remembrance
.
5.
Again
;
since
Motion
requires
that
the
Nerves
be
well
fill'd
with
Spirits
,
and
that
the
extrinsecall
parts
be
strong
;
but
Sensation
needs
only
a
clam
and
clear
disposition
of
the
Humour
contain'd
in
those
Nerves
:
't
is
plain
,
both
that
there
may
be
Sensation
without
Motion
,
and
Motion
without
Sensation
.
6.
It
appears
,
too
,
why
the
Memory
is
set
a
work
by
the
Similitude
,
as
also
by
the
connection
of
Objects
:
For
,
since
,
in
a
liquid
body
,
things
that
are
alike
naturally
gather
together
,
and
are
apt
to
stick
to
one
another
;
and
,
since
those
things
which
enter
together
and
at
once
must
necessarily
attain
a
kind
of
connection
,
which
is
easily
preserv'd
in
the
clammy
nature
of
the
Brain
;
when
,
by
any
means
,
they
are
brought
again
to
the
fountain
of
sensation
,
they
must
needs
meet
there
together
,
and
in
a
kind
of
Order
.
7.
But
,
since
contraries
use
to
enter
together
into
the
internall
sense
,
and
make
one
another
more
taken
notice
of
;
't
is
plain
,
if
Hunger
provokes
the
Animal
,
't
will
remember
Meat
,
if
Thirst
,
Drink
,
if
Seed
,
the
Female
.
Whence
,
it
appears
,
that
Passion
and
Will
stir
up
the
Memory
:
as
also
other
causes
,
too
,
which
,
by
pouring
in
spirits
,
sweep
or
brush
,
as
it
were
,
the
Brain
;
and
for
that
these
causes
do
this
by
accident
,
they
are
all
comprehended
under
the
name
of
Chance
.
8.
It
appears
,
again
,
that
they
,
whose
brain
is
of
a
thin
and
hot
constitution
,
easily
apprehend
,
conjecture
happily
,
opine
rashly
and
changeably
:
they
,
whose
disposition
is
more
dry
and
thin
,
have
a
good
Memory
and
rememberance
too
,
but
opine
lightly
and
changeably
.
9.
They
that
have
a
temperate
Brain
,
have
the
best
judgement
:
since
,
they
look
upon
many
things
,
before
they
establish
their
Opinion
;
and
,
for
the
same
reason
,
they
are
not
changeable
.
10.
Lastly
,
since
,
by
the
stroaks
of
Objects
,
some
litle
particle
is
still
taken
off
and
carry'd
away
from
the
brain
:
when
the
same
returns
again
,
it
must
needs
appear
that
we
have
been
sensible
of
that
before
.
LESSON
XXI
.
Of
Sleep
and
Dreams
.
1.
IT
appears
farther
,
that
,
since
the
Nerves
must
needs
be
distant
from
that
part
of
the
brain
wherein
Sensation
is
produc'd
;
it
may
fall
out
,
that
,
the
motion
by
the
Nerves
being
obstructed
,
there
may
yet
a
Motion
proceed
,
from
some
part
of
the
brain
to
the
knowing
part
:
and
then
,
some
things
will
appear
to
the
Animal
to
be
,
as
if
it
had
receiv'd
them
by
its
Senses
,
when
yet
it
did
not
receive
them
.
2.
This
stopping
of
the
Senses
is
called
Sleep
;
and
such
apparitions
,
Dreams
:
An
Animal
,
therefore
,
will
sleep
and
dream
sometimes
.
3.
But
,
because
there
's
no
necessity
,
that
all
the
Senses
or
Nerves
must
be
stop'd
at
once
;
't
will
happen
,
that
an
Animal
may
partly
sleep
and
partly
wake
:
Whence
,
it
comes
to
passe
that
,
the
Nerves
of
the
Tongue
being
left
unstop'd
,
some
talk
in
their
Dreams
;
and
,
if
the
Nerves
for
hearing
,
too
,
be
unstop'd
,
that
they
answer
to
those
that
speak
to
them
;
or
,
if
there
be
no
obstruction
towards
the
Marrow
in
the
Back-bone
,
they
walk
,
too
,
and
use
their
hands
.
4.
When
,
therefore
,
some
of
the
Senses
are
at
liberty
,
Dreams
may
be
provok'd
by
them
:
another
way
,
by
some
naturall
disposition
,
which
affects
the
heart
,
and
makes
a
motion
in
the
brain
conformable
to
that
impression
:
or
,
lastly
,
by
much
precedent
thinking
,
objects
may
be
stirr'd
up
and
down
,
too
,
in
ones
Sleep
.
5.
But
,
a
Man
being
in
a
manner
quiet
in
his
Sleep
,
he
happens
sometimes
to
judge
more
truly
of
things
he
sees
,
in
his
sleep
,
then
when
awake
:
For
the
Soul
undisturb'd
,
of
its
own
nature
,
more
clearly
perceiv's
the
force
of
the
Objects
playing
up
and
down
before
it
,
to
discover
Truth
;
and
unperceiv'dly
orders
them
:
Hence
,
it
comes
to
passe
,
that
,
sometimes
,
we
discern
,
in
our
Sleep
,
future
or
absent
things
,
which
we
could
not
find
out
nor
pierce
into
,
by
consideration
,
or
discourse
,
when
we
were
awake
.
6.
And
,
the
same
may
be
the
case
of
Fools
,
Mad
and
Melancholy
persons
;
though
't
is
very
rare
and
to
be
esteem'd
prodigious
,
and
they
have
a
great
many
falsities
mixt
withall
:
whence
,
neither
are
these
apparitions
to
be
confided
in
;
nor
is
it
possible
there
should
be
any
Art
of
Divination
by
Dreams
.
LESSON
XXII
.
Of
Passions
and
the
expression
of
them
.
1.
FArther
,
't
is
deducible
,
that
,
since
impressions
made
in
the
Brain
are
convey'd
,
by
a
short
and
open
way
,
to
the
Heart
;
they
must
,
necessarily
have
an
effect
,
too
,
in
the
Heart
,
conformable
to
the
natures
of
both
.
2.
Since
,
therefore
,
the
heart
redounds
with
hot
spirits
:
as
we
see
a
little
drop
of
red
wine
,
dropd
into
water
,
diffuses
it self
into
the
water
and
changes
it
,
according
to
its
nature
;
so
,
the
impression
of
these
little
bodies
will
have
the
like
effect
upon
the
fumes
of
the
heart
.
3.
Hence
,
again
,
it
proceeds
,
that
the
motion
of
the
heart
,
through
these
,
becomes
sometimes
freer
and
better
,
sometimes
worse
;
and
that
these
very
qualities
passe
into
the
Pulse
,
whence
,
according
to
the
variety
of
Passions
,
the
Pulse
varies
.
4.
Again
,
Passions
must
needs
differ
by
dilatation
and
constriction
:
for
,
by
a
conformable
Object
,
the
Spirits
of
the
heart
are
made
more
rare
,
whence
,
the
heart
more
freely
enjoys
its
motion
;
by
things
disagreeable
to
Nature
,
the
Spirits
become
more
crasse
and
heavy
,
and
the
heart
is
,
as
it
were
,
oppress'd
.
5.
Again
;
since
an
absent
Object
does
not
equally
affect
,
with
a
present
one
;
these
motions
will
be
more
remisse
in
its
absence
then
in
its
presence
:
whence
,
we
deduce
four
differences
of
Passions
;
Ioy
and
Grief
,
for
a
present
good
or
evil
;
Hope
and
Fear
,
for
them
absent
.
6.
Anger
is
,
in
a
manner
,
mixt
of
a
present
evil
and
future
good
:
and
,
't
is
the
most
violent
of
all
the
Passions
;
because
,
so
mething
that
's
contrary
to
it
falling
into
an
abundance
of
hot
bloud
,
produces
a
most
swift
effect
;
just
as
when
something
moist
and
cold
falls
into
molten
Metall
.
7.
Again
,
because
the
Spirits
,
flowing
at
that
time
out
of
the
heart
to
the
brain
,
retain
that
nature
they
had
receiv'd
in
the
heart
;
in
the
brain
it self
they
gather
to
them
those
Phantasms
that
are
conformable
to
them
:
whence
,
the
Animal
must
,
of
necessity
,
be
much
fixt
upon
that
thought
,
and
not
easily
admit
any
other
then
such
as
are
conformable
to
its
Passion
.
8.
And
,
because
the
heart
is
joyn'd
to
the
Pericardium
,
and
the
Pericardium
to
the
Diaphragm
;
and
the
Diaphragm
is
furnisht
with
an
eminent
Nerve
,
and
is
moveable
within
it self
:
it
comes
to
passe
,
that
every
motion
of
the
heart
flow's
,
by
the
Diaphragm
,
into
the
neighbouring
parts
of
the
body
,
and
all
the
motions
of
them
all
return
again
,
by
its
Nerve
,
to
the
brain
;
and
,
so
,
beget
a
sense
of
that
grief
or
pleasure
which
the
heart
is
affected
with
.
Whence
,
too
,
without
any
externall
Sensation
,
but
by
thinking
only
,
an
Animal
may
be
delighted
and
incourag'd
to
action
.
9.
Again
,
because
,
by
repeating
either
the
stroaks
of
Objects
or
very
Thoughts
,
there
grows
a
great
multitude
of
Phantasms
of
the
same
thing
,
in
the
brain
;
and
,
in
like
manner
,
the
heart
often
agitated
by
such
like
causes
in
a
certain
motion
,
gets
an
aptitude
to
be
easily
mov'd
so
:
there
grows
,
both
in
the
brain
and
in
the
heart
,
a
certain
constancy
and
facility
of
knowing
and
doing
;
in
which
consists
the
notion
of
Intellectuall
and
Morall
habits
,
as
far
as
they
are
grounded
in
the
body
.
10.
Lastly
,
since
,
by
the
motion
of
the
Diaphragm
,
the
breathing
is
alter'd
;
and
breathing
,
express'd
out
of
a
hollow
place
through
a
narrow
passage
,
is
apt
to
yield
a
Voice
,
by
reason
of
the
multiplication
of
its
processions
,
occasion'd
by
the
reflection
of
the
cavity
:
it
comes
to
passe
,
that
the
Voice
of
Animals
is
altered
by
the
variety
of
their
Passions
;
and
so
,
in
grief
,
they
expresse
one
Voice
,
another
in
hope
,
another
in
joy
.
LESSON
XXIII
.
Of
the
communicating
Affections
to
others
.
1.
FArther
,
it
appears
,
that
,
since
,
all
Sensations
(
whether
of
those
things
which
affect
the
body
from
without
,
or
those
we
are
sensible
of
because
one
part
of
the
body
affects
another
,
)
are
produc'd
in
a
certain
site
to
the
Organ
of
Sensation
,
that
is
,
in
a
right
or
the
naturall
line
of
Motion
,
from
the
Entries
of
the
Nerves
to
the
place
of
Sensation
:
It
follows
,
that
,
when
we
think
of
the
same
things
,
they
must
be
in
the
very
same
site
and
posture
;
whence
,
it
comes
to
passe
,
that
,
in
Dreams
,
and
in
Distraction
of
mind
we
seem
to
see
the
very
things
themselves
before
us
.
2.
'T
is
apparent
,
therefore
,
they
are
in
a
fit
situation
for
this
,
viz.
to
be
press'd
,
by
the
motion
made
by
the
heart
,
into
the
same
Nerves
:
whence
it
follows
,
that
,
by
the
thinking
on
any
Object
,
the
nerves
are
just
so
mov'd
as
when
the
Senses
convey
it
;
and
consequently
,
the
same
action
is
apt
to
follow
.
3.
And
,
thus
we
see
,
Laughing
and
Gaping
,
&c.
proceed
from
seeing
others
doe
so
;
as
love
and
hatred
from
hear-say
.
4.
Hence
,
it
comes
to
passe
,
that
blearey'dnesse
and
other
distorsions
of
the
Members
are
often
deriv'd
from
beholding
others
:
that
contagious
Diseases
,
too
,
(
for
which
some
disposition
in
the
body
prepares
the
way
)
are
attracted
and
,
as
it
were
,
suck'd
in
,
by
fear
:
and
,
that
other
Diseases
,
which
the
retraction
of
a
humour
to
some
certain
parts
produces
,
are
introduc'd
by
mere
sight
or
imagination
only
.
5.
Again
,
because
the
members
of
the
body
are
connected
,
and
the
exteriour
depend
upon
the
interiour
;
these
operations
cannot
be
produc'd
,
but
that
,
byconnection
,
the
exteriour
members
must
some
way
be
chang'd
:
and
thus
,
we
see
,
all
the
Passions
shew
themselves
in
the
countenance
and
actions
of
Animals
;
upon
which
depends
the
principles
of
Physiognomy
.
6.
Again
;
because
usuall
Motions
render
the
Organs
apt
for
such
motions
:
it
comes
to
passe
,
that
,
in
generation
,
the
like
dispositions
are
oft
transfer'd
to
the
issue
,
and
the
Off-spring
becomes
like
the
Parent
,
both
in
its
naturall
operations
and
those
which
depend
upon
Sensation
;
nay
,
even
in
some
triviall
things
,
too
,
as
in
Warts
,
in
hookednesse
of
nose
,
and
the
like
.
7.
Moreover
,
since
the
issue
in
the
womb
derives
its
nourishment
from
the
Mother
,
't
is
no
wonder
if
the
desires
of
the
Mother
,
at
that
time
,
passe
into
the
issue
:
as
,
if
they
long
for
wine
or
whatever
other
food
or
pleasure
,
that
the
issue
should
suck
in
such
a
disposition
as
to
be
obnoxious
to
the
same
things
all
their
lives
.
8.
Again
,
since
such
longings
fix
a
vehement
resemblance
of
the
things
in
the
Fancy
;
and
terrour
,
too
,
or
any
violent
passion
does
the
same
;
and
that
image
is
made
by
Motion
:
't
is
no
wonder
that
the
Spirits
of
the
Mother
tremble
with
the
same
motion
,
even
as
far
as
to
the
Issue
it self
;
and
that
,
as
light
with
its
stroak
,
paints
in
a
glasse
the
reflected
Image
of
a
body
,
so
this
Image
should
,
in
the
little
tender
body
of
an
Infant
,
and
where-ever
it
finds
matter
apt
to
preserve
it
,
leave
an
image
fixt
in
the
flesh
,
as
it
were
a
Mark
of
that
desire
.
9.
And
,
because
,
too
,
the
Infant
is
never
more
tender
then
at
the
first
commixtion
of
the
Father
and
Mother's
Seeds
,
and
women
,
in
the
conjugall
act
,
especially
some
,
are
very
passive
:
't
is
no
wonder
,
if
a
violent
apprehension
of
their's
,
in
that
conjuncture
,
often
changes
the
complexion
of
the
Issue
;
the
Female
Seed
receiving
a
kind
of
proper
stamp
,
from
the
image
which
possesses
the
Mother's
fancy
.
LESSON
XXIV
.
Of
the
seeming-rationall
Actions
of
Animals
.
1.
'T
Is
plain
,
again
,
that
Animals
must
,
of
necessity
,
operate
seeming-reasonably
,
or
like
Reason
:
For
,
since
the
work
of
nature
is
the
work
of
THAT
REASON
which
fram'd
nature
;
the
effects
of
Nature
must
needs
be
the
works
of
the
same
Reason
,
and
resemble
the
manner
of
Reason's
working
.
2.
Again
;
some
of
their
operations
must
needs
exceed
those
which
Reason
works
in
us
:
For
,
since
they
spring
from
a
REASON
which
transcends
ours
,
't
is
but
consequentiall
,
that
they
should
transcend
the
effects
of
our
Reason
;
as
appears
in
Generation
,
which
we
understand
not
how
't
is
done
,
even
when
we
doe
it
;
as
neither
could
a
Man
tell
the
houres
of
the
day
as
a
Clock
does
,
which
yet
is
it self
but
a
work
of
our
Reason
.
3.
It
appears
,
too
,
whence
proceed
the
Antipathies
and
Sympathies
of
Animals
:
viz.
partly
,
out
of
the
naturall
disposition
of
contrary
qualities
,
4.
Farther
,
the
vertuous
Actions
of
Animals
,
as
those
of
ove
of
Glory
,
Gratitude
,
Generosity
,
&c.
are
nothing
but
such
materiall
impetuosities
;
which
,
because
we
feel
in
our selves
joyn'd
with
vertue
,
we
,
therefore
,
believe
to
be
just
so
,
too
,
in
Animals
.
5.
Lastly
,
their
concatenated
and
orderly-proceeding
actions
are
the
effects
,
partly
,
of
fore-going
actions
,
partly
,
of
the
disposition
of
the
circumstant
bodies
;
as
they
may
find
by
experience
,
whoever
have
the
leisure
to
observe
a
Dunghill
Hen:
The
admiration
of
which
actions
ought
not
to
stop
at
the
Animals
,
but
at
their
Maker
;
who
has
fram'd
such
a
concatenation
,
out
of
which
the
Effect
follows
after
so
many
Causes
.
6.
And
,
thus
much
may
suffice
about
Animals
,
in
common
.
MAN
three
things
raise
above
the
Crowd
:
in
his
Internall
Sense
,
That
he
can
order
,
and
rummige
for
,
and
own
,
&
use
the
Instruments
of
Knowledge
:
in
his
Tongue
and
Voice
,
That
they
do
not
purely
expresse
his
Passion
,
but
even
his
Mind
,
too
:
in
his
Body
,
That
he
has
Hands
,
an
Instrument
not
fitted
to
any
one
determinate
operation
,
but
destin'd
to
a
kind
of
universality
of
Acting
.
But
,
in
these
three
,
there
's
nothing
requires
a
Comment.
Peripateticall
INSTITUTIONS
.
Third
Book
.
Containing
those
things
,
which
concern
the
WORLD
and
its
greater
Parts
.
LESSON
I.
Of
the
limitation
,
unity
,
and
composition
of
the
World
.
1.
THe
WORLD
we
call
,
the
Collection
of
all
existent
Bodies
.
That
this
is
not
infinite
,
't
is
evident
:
For
,
if
any
longitude
be
infinite
,
that
very
notion
imports
that
it
has
infinite
parts
equall
to
one
another
,
(
paces
,
suppose
,
or
feet
)
;
and
consequently
,
from
an
assigned
point
in
that
line
,
some
one
foot
will
be
,
by
infinite
others
,
distant
;
and
so
a
term
assign'd
,
and
limits
fix'd
at
both
ends
,
to
a
line
which
is
call'd
infinite
.
2.
If
you
answer
,
some
one
foot
is
infinite
intermediate
ones
distant
from
an
assign'd
point
,
but
that
foot
cannot
be
assign'd
;
as
some
one
horse
is
necessary
to
ride
on
,
yet
no
determinate
one
:
'T
is
reply'd
,
indetermination
and
infinity
are
qualifications
or
manners
of
a
thing
in
potentiâ
or
possibilitie
:
and
so
a
horse
is
undetermin'd
whilst
he
is
yet
but
necessary
,
that
is
,
in
possibility
,
not
in
act
.
3.
Nor
makes
it
against
this
,
that
there
are
infinite
objects
in
the
understanding
of
the
Intelligences
:
for
,
admit
there
were
,
we
are
not
sure
they
are
there
actually
distinct
,
and
not
after
the
manner
of
one
.
4.
You
'l
say
,
Suppose
Quantity
to
exist
as
great
as
't
is
possible
,
and
't
will
be
infinite
:
't
is
no
contradiction
,
therefore
,
to
suppose
it
infinite
.
'T
is
answer'd
,
that
,
since
,
supposing
any
Quantity
,
how
big
soever
,
yet
one
may
alwaies
suppose
a
bigger
;
there
is
no
Quantity
so
big
as
may
exist
:
whence
,
this
is
an
implicatory
proposition
,
that
is
,
such
as
couches
contradiction
in
it self
;
as
taking
the
manner
of
possibility
to
be
the
manner
of
act
.
5.
Again
,
't
is
evident
,
there
's
but
one
World
:
For
,
since
there
's
no
space
,
by
which
two
worlds
could
be
separated
one
from
the
other
;
and
quantitative
bodies
joyn'd
together
,
even
by
that
very
conjunction
,
are
one
;
all
quantity
whatever
must
,
of
necessity
,
by
continuednesse
,
conspire
into
one
bulk
.
6.
Again
,
't
is
collected
,
that
the
World
is
not
compos'd
only
of
minute
bodies
,
by
nature
indivisible
:
for
,
since
an
extrinsecall
denomination
is
nothing
,
but
the
intrinsecall
natures
of
the
things
out
of
which
it
rises
;
and
,
if
there
were
only
indivisibles
in
the
world
,
all
the
intrinsecalls
would
remain
the
same
;
since
the
same
things
alwaies
afford
the
same
denomination
,
't
would
be
impossible
any
thing
should
be
chang'd
.
7.
And
,
hence
it
follows
,
that
there
is
still
some
liquid
substance
,
where-ever
there
's
any
locall
mutation
:
and
therefore
in
Heaven
it self
,
the
Sphears
cannot
be
so
contiguous
that
there
intervenes
not
some
liquid
and
divisible
substance
between
them
.
8.
Since
,
therefore
,
a
whole
,
after
't
is
divided
,
is
no
longer
what
it
was
;
every
divisible
substance
,
in
that
very
respect
,
is
mortall
.
Wherefore
,
every
moveable
body
must
needs
be
either
corruptible
it self
,
or
joyn'd
to
something
that
is
corruptible
.
LESSON
II.
Of
the
Mortality
and
kinds
of
those
things
that
are
in
the
World
.
1.
T
Is
infer'd
,
that
all
Corporeall
nature
whereever
is
corruptible
;
since
all
participate
the
same
nature
of
Quantity
:
whose
differences
being
rare
and
dense
,
and
,
out
of
their
permixtion
,
the
Elements
and
all
mixt
things
being
deriv'd
,
the
differences
of
all
quantitative
things
,
that
is
,
bodies
,
must
needs
be
proportion'd
to
these
we
see
amongst
us
;
that
is
,
there
may
be
Elements
or
mixt
things
differing
,
indeed
,
in
temperament
,
but
the
same
and
entirely
agreeing
in
the
common
notions
.
2.
Again
,
since
the
differences
of
mixt
things
,
Vegetables
and
Animals
,
both
from
one
another
and
among
themselves
,
are
condivided
by
the
opposition
of
contradiction
;
that
is
,
by
this
not
being
so
much
as
that
;
as
,
mixt
bodies
are
either
vegetable
or
not
vegetable
,
and
vegetables
are
sensible
or
not
sensible
,
&c.
though
we
cannot
tell
whether
all
our
kinds
may
be
found
in
the
other
parts
of
the
world
;
yet
,
certain
it
is
,
that
no
other
kinds
can
be
found
,
which
may
not
be
reduc'd
to
these
amongst
us
.
3.
'T
is
objected
,
Since
the
Notion
of
a
body
is
,
to
be
moveable
;
bodies
,
to
which
a
simple
Motion
is
naturall
,
must
be
simple
:
now
,
we
find
three
simple
motions
in
nature
,
upwards
,
downwards
and
circular
:
the
former
two
of
these
oppose
one
another
,
and
consequently
,
both
they
and
the
bodies
,
whose
they
are
,
destroy
one
another
and
are
corruptible
;
circular
motion
,
therefore
,
because
it
has
no
opposite
,
must
be
incorruptible
,
and
so
the
Heavens
,
too
,
to
which
this
motion
is
proper
.
'T
is
answer'd
,
since
a
body
is
a
mover
mov'd
;
and
to
be
a
Mover
is
a
nobler
Notion
then
to
be
mov'd
;
the
differences
of
bodies
are
rather
to
be
deduc'd
from
that
of
being
Movers
,
then
from
this
,
that
they
are
moveable
.
4.
Again
,
't
is
false
,
that
the
subjects
of
simple
Motions
must
be
simple
bodies
:
for
,
both
all
mix'd
things
are
carry'd
upwards
and
downwards
,
and
two
Elements
are
assign'd
to
either
of
these
motions
;
and
,
which
is
most
considerable
,
these
motions
agree
to
these
bodies
,
by
accident
,
not
out
of
their
naturall
disposition
.
'T
is
false
,
too
,
that
the
third
,
viz.
circular
,
is
a
simple
Motion
:
for
,
Aristotle
himself
acknowledges
it
to
be
compounded
of
thrusting
and
drawing
;
and
't
is
manifestly
carry'd
on
according
to
two
perpendiculars
at
once
,
and
at
least
four
times
reflected
,
and
has
a
great
difformity
in
the
proportion
of
its
carriage
:
Whence
,
it
appears
,
if
we
were
to
judge
from
the
nature
of
their
Motions
,
the
Heavens
must
needs
be
no
simple
but
a
most
compounded
body
.
5.
'T
is
objected
,
again
,
there
would
have
appear'd
,
in
so
long
time
,
some
change
in
the
Heavens
,
if
they
were
corruptible
.
'T
is
answer'd
,
there
's
no
necessity
of
that
;
as
't
is
not
credible
that
,
if
one
were
in
Heaven
,
he
would
discern
the
Changes
we
suffer
:
But
,
again
,
many
things
have
appear'd
,
as
more
at
large
shall
be
shew'd
hereafter
.
Moreover
,
Light
is
concluded
to
be
the
same
with
Fire
;
and
that
our
very
Eyes
witnesse
to
be
spread
every
where
over
the
visible
world
:
but
,
where
there
is
any
one
Element
,
there
,
Aristotle
acknowledges
the
rest
,
too
;
and
indeed
,
with
the
same
Eyes
,
we
discern
an
opake
body
reflecting
the
light
.
6.
'T
is
objected
,
Animals
cannot
live
in
the
Moon
;
not
Men
,
particularly
,
because
,
in
it
,
there
is
not
a
variety
of
Earth
and
Waters
,
nor
rains
,
nor
clouds
:
Adde
to
this
,
a
most
vehement
heat
;
the
Sun
shining
continually
upon
the
same
part
for
fifteen
whole
days
together
,
and
never
receding
,
in
latitude
,
above
ten
degrees
from
the
part
illuminated
.
7.
'T
is
answer'd
,
If
there
be
a
kind
of
grosser
Aire
,
as
't
is
observ'd
,
there
will
,
of
necessity
,
be
Water
:
for
these
grosse
vapours
are
made
out
of
Earth
,
and
have
the
nature
of
water
before
,
though
perhaps
the
Clouds
are
not
so
big
as
to
be
taken
notice
of
.
Besides
,
the
Almains
have
observ'd
something
like
a
vast
cloud
in
the
Moon
.
The
extreme
heat
is
moderated
,
by
the
height
of
the
Mountains
,
the
lownesse
of
the
Vallies
,
the
abundance
of
water
and
woods
:
as
we
see
by
experience
under
the
Aequator
,
from
which
the
Sun
is
at
farthest
about
twenty
three
degrees
distant
;
and
,
but
about
ten
only
for
half
the
year
,
from
the
middle
between
the
Aequator
and
the
Tropick
;
yet
this
hinders
not
but
those
are
most
happy
regions
.
LESSON
III.
Of
the
parts
of
the
Planetary
World
,
and
especially
those
of
the
Earth
.
1.
THe
greatest
part
of
the
world
,
which
we
have
some
kind
of
knowledge
of
,
consists
of
the
Sun
and
six
great
bodies
illuminated
by
it
;
and
some
lesser
ones
,
which
are
,
in
a
manner
,
members
cut
off
from
the
greater
.
2.
The
bigger
bodies
are
counted
by
Astronomers
,
Saturn
,
Iupiter
,
Mars
,
the
Earth
,
Mercury
,
Venus
:
which
,
't
is
certain
,
(
of
the
rest
by
evident
experiments
,
of
Mars
and
Saturn
by
their
parity
to
the
rest
)
are
opake
bodies
,
illuminated
by
the
Sun
.
3.
Mercury
is
believ'd
to
have
appear'd
like
a
spot
under
the
Sun
.
Venus
appears
horned
like
the
Moon
.
Iupiter
;
suffers
from
the
Stars
accompanying
him
and
they
,
reciprocally
,
from
him
.
The
Sun
alone
shines
of
it self
.
4.
Moreover
,
since
light
is
Fire
,
the
fountain
of
light
is
the
fountain
of
Fire
,
too
.
The
SUN
,
therefore
,
is
a
vast
body
,
consisting
of
Mountains
and
Plains
which
belch
out
fire
;
and
,
as
Aetna
,
Lipara
and
Hecla
are
never
without
flames
,
and
especially
the
Vulcanian
Mountains
of
the
new
world
,
so
,
much
lesse
is
the
Sun
.
5.
Both
the
clouds
of
ashes
(
vapour'd
out
in
vast
abundance
)
and
other
bodies
mix'd
with
them
,
which
make
the
Spots
in
the
Sun
;
and
the
fountains
of
flames
,
observ'd
,
sometimes
more
fiercely
sometimes
more
remissely
,
to
blaze
out
,
witnesse
this
to
be
the
nature
of
the
Sun
.
6.
The
whole
body
,
therefore
,
of
the
Sun
,
or
,
at
least
,
as
deep
as
is
necessary
,
must
needs
consist
of
some
matter
resembling
to
bitumen
or
Sulphur
;
and
be
intended
by
nature
for
nothing
but
an
Esca
and
food
of
flames
,
serviceable
to
other
bodies
.
7.
And
,
since
we
have
the
same
Actour
upon
the
other
six
Bodies
,
the
effects
,
too
,
must
needs
be
analogous
upon
an
analogous
matter
,
as
we
have
already
prov'd
that
of
all
other
bodies
must
be
:
amongst
these
,
the
Earth
,
by
which
we
are
nourisht
,
is
the
best
known
to
us
.
8.
This
,
our
very
senses
tell
us
,
is
divided
into
three
parts
:
A
solid
Substance
,
which
we
call
Earth
;
a
liquid
but
crasse
one
,
which
we
call
Water
;
and
aninvisible
one
,
which
we
call
Aire
.
9.
The
Earth
is
not
a
Loadstone
:
first
,
because
it
hangs
not
on
any
other
;
for
,
the
Stars
of
the
Eighth
Sphear
are
at
too
great
a
distance
,
to
look
for
any
Magneticall
action
from
them
:
secondly
,
because
that
vertue
in
it
which
attracts
the
loadstone
,
is
not
diffus'd
through
the
whole
body
of
the
Earth
,
but
rests
only
in
the
bark
of
it
,
as
it
were
:
thirdly
,
because
,
if
it
were
a
loadstone
,
it
would
joyn
to
some
other
body
,
as
the
loadstone
does
to
Iron
;
nor
would
it
be
carry'd
about
in
any
place
or
with
any
Motion
of
its
own
,
but
proceed
to
joyn
it self
with
that
other
.
The
parts
of
the
Earth
are
Mountains
,
Valleys
,
Caverns
,
Plains
.
10.
And
,
since
,
we
know
,
Fire
will
make
water
boil
and
swell
,
and
dilate
whatever
other
bodies
are
mixt
with
the
water
;
we
see
,
too
,
that
the
Earth
,
both
within
in
its
bowells
,
and
in
its
superficies
,
is
furnisht
with
heat
to
concoct
Metals
and
juyces
:
as
,
in
our
bodies
,
when
the
heat
abounds
with
moisture
above
the
just
proportion
in
any
part
,
it
breeds
warts
and
wens
and
blisters
;
so
,
hills
and
mountains
must
,
of
necessity
,
rise
out
of
the
body
of
this
great
Mother
.
11.
This
is
evidenc'd
both
by
ancient
and
modern
Experiments
,
which
tell
us
of
Islands
cast
up
in
the
Sea
:
we
hear
of
cinders
belcht
out
of
Aetna
and
Vesuvius
;
for
the
most
part
,
falling
upon
and
encreasing
the
Mountains
,
but
sometimes
,
too
,
raising
fields
into
Mountains
:
and
,
hence
it
is
,
that
Mountains
,
for
the
most
part
,
ingender
Metalls
and
are
full
of
wholesome
hearbs
,
as
is
generally
observ'd
.
12.
Hollow
places
,
whether
upon
the
Superficies
of
the
Earth
,
which
we
call
Vallies
,
or
Caverns
within
its
bowells
,
proceed
from
two
proper
causes
:
the
sinking
and
settling
of
the
Earth
into
those
places
,
which
the
matter
for
the
Mountains
left
vacant
;
and
the
washing
away
of
that
matter
which
,
by
rains
and
torrents
,
is
carry'd
otherwhere
,
especially
into
the
Sea
.
Thus
,
the
Channells
of
Rivers
are
made
;
thus
,
between
vast
and
very
high
Mountains
,
the
Channells
of
the
Valleys
are
deeper
:
Hence
,
in
one
place
,
the
Earth
is
hollow'd
away
,
in
another
rais'd
.
LESSON
IV.
Of
the
Sea
,
and
its
Accidents
.
1.
THe
parts
of
water
are
Sea
,
Lakes
,
Pools
,
Rivers
,
Fountains
.
The
Sea
is
but
one
;
since
,
all
those
parts
,
whereof
every
one
is
call'd
a
Sea
,
communicate
among
themselves
,
either
openly
,
or
by
hidden
Channells
:
as
,
the
Caspian
discharges
it self
into
the
Euxine
;
for
,
otherwise
,
t
would
overflow
with
the
constant
tribute
of
such
great
Rivers
.
2.
That
the
Main
does
not
overflow
,
is
because
of
the
amplitude
and
vastnesse
of
its
surface
:
whence
,
it
comes
to
passe
,
that
as
much
is
lick'd
up
by
the
Sun
into
clouds
and
winds
,
as
is
pour'd
in
by
so
many
Rivers
;
as
will
be
evident
to
one
that
shall
observe
how
much
the
Sun
,
in
one
day
,
draws
up
out
of
a
little
Plash
.
3.
Hence
proceeds
its
saltnesse
:
for
,
since
the
salt
which
flows
in
out
of
the
Rivers
makes
not
them
so
much
as
brackish
;
neither
could
they
infect
the
sea
,
were
it
not
that
,
the
sun
sucking
up
the
lighter
parts
,
the
salt
remains
in
the
rest
.
4.
Moreover
,
the
salt
,
which
the
sun
must
necessarily
make
upon
the
top
,
out
of
the
concoction
of
the
land-floods
which
fatten
the
River-water
,
does
not
sink
down
to
the
bottom
;
both
by
reason
of
the
motion
of
the
sea
continually
mingling
it
together
;
as
also
because
,
the
deeper
the
water
,
the
salter
and
heavier
it
is
,
unlesse
some
speciall
cause
interpose
,
as
perhaps
in
the
mouths
of
Rivers
.
5.
From
the
abundance
of
salt
,
the
sea
gets
both
density
and
gravity
;
moreover
,
that
it
will
not
extinguish
flames
very
readily
;
as
also
,
by
a
multiply'd
reflection
of
light
,
to
sparkle
and
flame
,
as
it
were
,
when
't
is
stirr'd
.
6.
The
same
,
too
,
is
no
little
cause
of
Sea-sicknesse
,
(
besides
the
very
tossing
,
which
,
of
it self
,
is
a
cause
;
as
appears
in
those
who
are
sick
with
riding
in
a
Coach
)
;
for
,
the
stomack
,
being
offended
with
the
saltnesse
,
strives
to
cast
it
up
;
as
appears
by
that
salt
humour
we
oft
are
sensible
of
in
colds
.
7.
Hence
,
too
,
comes
it
,
that
the
sea
is
not
frozen
;
the
mixture
of
salt
hindring
the
freezing
wind
's
entrance
:
For
,
where
the
sea
is
congeal'd
,
't
is
not
the
sea-water
,
but
the
snow
falling
on
it
,
which
makes
the
sea
seem
frozen
;
as
our
Countrey-men
,
that
go
Northern
voyages
,
witnesse
.
Yet
,
others
report
that
,
near
the
shoars
,
a
sharp
wind
will
freez
the
sea
in
some
,
ev'n
hotter
,
Countreys
.
8.
But
,
when
vast
Rivers
flow
into
narrow
Bayes
,
they
must
needs
overflow
into
larger
seas
:
whence
,
of
necessity
,
there
must
needs
be
a
kind
of
perpetuall
flux
of
some
seas
into
others
;
as
,
of
the
Euxine
into
the
Propontis
,
of
this
into
the
Mediterranean
,
of
the
Mediterranean
into
the
Ocean
.
The
reason
is
,
because
the
lesser
sea
,
with
the
same
quantity
of
water
,
is
more
swell'd
and
,
consequently
,
has
a
higher
levell
of
water
:
Again
,
the
power
of
the
sun
drinks
more
out
of
a
larger
sea
then
out
of
a
narrower
;
whence
,
't
is
more
easily
sunk
low
to
receive
the
adventitious
waters
.
9.
Out
of
the
sea
,
the
sun
,
like
fire
out
of
a
boyling
pot
,
extracts
continuall
vapours
;
which
,
either
in
Rains
or
Winds
,
it
disperses
over
all
the
Earth
:
for
,
all
those
Winds
,
which
we
feel
cool
from
the
Ocean
in
the
Summer
,
though
we
perceive
it
not
,
yet
,
both
their
extraction
makes
us
confesse
they
are
moist
,
and
their
density
and
softnesse
,
savouring
a
similitude
of
and
derivation
from
Water
.
10.
The
Earth
,
therefore
,
heated
by
the
Sun
,
being
sprinkled
with
these
,
whether
in
Rain
or
Wind
,
(
for
the
Earth
,
being
once
hot
,
a
great
while
retains
it
)
dissolves
it self
into
Vapours
:
and
so
,
by
little
and
little
,
they
are
rais'd
to
the
higher
parts
of
the
Earth
;
where
if
they
feel
the
cold
of
the
Aire
without
,
or
,
by
any
other
cause
,
are
coagulated
into
bigger
parts
,
they
become
Water
,
and
by
degrees
,
break
themselves
a
passage
through
and
flow
down
upon
the
lower
grounds
.
LESSON
V.
Of
Fountains
,
Rivers
,
and
Lakes
.
1.
ANd
,
because
the
causes
of
evaporations
are
continuall
,
Fountains
,
too
,
continually
flow
;
which
,
joyning
together
,
make
Brooks
and
Rivers
,
and
,
when
they
have
watered
the
whole
surface
of
the
Earth
,
restore
to
the
Sea
the
superfluous
moisture
,
to
repair
again
the
Earth
with
a
new
distillation
.
2.
Let
him
,
that
thinks
not
the
Rain-water
sufficient
for
this
,
imagine
the
Mountains
,
out
of
their
innate
heat
,
are
more
pory
then
the
rest
of
the
Earth
,
and
hollow
,
as
we
have
said
;
wherein
there
may
be
receptacles
of
water
:
out
of
which
the
heat
,
that
is
every
where
mingled
,
often
draws
vapours
,
which
it
transmits
to
the
top
of
Mountains
covered
with
Rocks
;
whence
,
afterwards
,
water
starts
,
as
it
were
,
out
of
bare
Rocks
.
3.
That
this
is
the
generation
of
Fountains
,
the
stones
and
earth
at
a
Fountain-head
,
all
deaw'd
like
the
cover
of
a
boiling
pot
,
are
an
argument
:
also
,
the
thinnesse
&
subtilty
of
the
vapours
so
rais'd
through
the
Earth
;
&
certain
herbs
,
too
,
nourisht
by
such
like
vapours
:
by
observing
all
which
,
the
Water-finders
search
for
Well-springs
.
4.
Of
Fountains
,
the
famousest
are
Baths
,
that
is
,
hot
ones
.
The
Authour
of
the
Demonstrative
Physick
,
ripping
up
some
fountains
,
both
learnt
himself
and
convinc'd
others
,
by
the
very
course
of
nature
and
by
experiments
Masterly
made
,
that
cold
Water
,
full
of
a
salt
(
which
he
calls
hermeticall
)
with
a
mixture
of
Sulphur
,
will
grow
hot
.
5.
The
same
may
be
seen
in
watred
lime
;
and
in
Tartar
,
with
the
spirit
of
Vitriol
infus'd
in
it
:
The
cause
of
all
these
is
the
same
,
viz.
The
fiery
parts
,
fetter'd
,
as
it
were
,
in
dry
bodies
,
being
set
at
liberty
by
the
mixture
of
a
liquid
body
,
dissipate
into
vapours
that
liquour
,
it
consisting
of
parts
easily
dissolvable
.
6.
Hence
,
it
appears
,
why
cold
fountains
,
sometimes
of
the
same
favour
,
are
next
neighbours
to
hot
ones
,
viz.
because
they
passe
not
through
the
same
salt
.
7.
Why
some
are
more
,
some
lesse
hot
,
viz.
either
through
the
abundance
of
this
salt
,
or
through
its
nearnesse
to
the
mouth
of
the
Fountain
.
8.
The
same
Authour
evidenc'd
the
constant
lastingnesse
of
the
heat
to
proceed
,
from
the
naturall
reparation
and
recruit
of
the
same
salt
;
when
,
extracting
the
salt
,
he
found
the
remaining
mud
season'd
again
within
three
dayes
:
not
by
the
raining
of
salt
down
out
of
the
Aire
(
as
that
Authour
thinks
)
but
by
the
nature
of
the
Earth's
being
such
that
,
mixt
with
Aire
,
it
turn'd
into
salt
,
or
,
salt
was
made
of
the
moist
Aire
and
that
Mud.
9.
It
appears
,
again
,
why
some
Fountains
have
wonderful
vertues
,
either
in
benefit
or
prejudice
of
our
bodies
:
why
others
convert
Iron
into
Copper
:
others
petrifie
sticks
and
whatever
is
thrown
into
them
:
why
some
yield
gold
,
others
silver
.
10.
Namely
,
because
,
flowing
through
severall
sorts
of
Earth
,
they
rub
off
along
with
them
little
particles
and
dust
;
so
minute
,
sometimes
,
that
they
are
not
discernable
from
the
very
body
of
the
water
,
and
then
the
water
is
reputed
to
have
such
a
vertue
;
sometimes
they
are
visible
,
and
then
the
water
is
said
to
carry
some
such
thing
in
it
.
11.
Of
Fountains
flowing
out
,
Brooks
and
Rivers
are
made
;
whose
running
,
they
say
,
requires
the
declivity
of
one
foot
in
a
Mile
:
Their
reason
is
,
because
a
line
touching
the
Earth
,
at
a
Miles
end
,
is
rais'd
nine
inches
;
Artificers
,
therefore
,
adde
three
inches
more
,
that
it
may
conveniently
run
;
(
whence
,
the
fountains
of
Nilus
should
be
almost
a
mile
and
half
higher
then
the
Port
of
Alexandria
)
;
but
erroneously
:
for
,
when
ever
the
water
running
behind
is
so
encreased
,
that
it
be
able
to
raise
it self
above
the
water
before
,
this
rule
of
declivity
changes
.
12.
Among
Rivers
,
't
is
strange
one
should
swim
upon
and
,
as
it
were
,
run
over
another
;
as
,
Titaresus
upon
Peneus
,
Boristhenes
upon
Hypanis
:
The
reason
is
,
the
gravity
of
the
one
and
the
lightnesse
of
the
other
;
or
,
they
will
not
mix
out
of
some
other
cause
,
as
,
if
one
of
them
be
oily
.
13.
The
overflowing
of
Rivers
in
Summer
proceeds
,
either
from
the
melting
of
Snow
shut
up
in
Vallies
,
or
from
an
abundance
of
Rain
,
falling
in
a
far-distant
Climate
,
and
therefore
not
suspected
by
us
;
as
is
evident
,
in
Nilus
,
Niger
,
and
some
others
of
no
name
and
scarce
any
better
then
Brooks
.
14.
Fountains
,
if
they
emerge
into
a
hollow
place
of
the
Earth
,
beget
a
Lake
:
and
,
if
this
cavity
happen
in
any
elevated
Superficies
of
the
Earth
,
whether
in
a
Mountain
or
a
high
Plain
;
it
comes
to
passe
,
that
sometimes
great
Rivers
flow
out
of
Lakes
:
And
sometimes
vast
eruptions
of
waters
,
without
any
appearing
cause
;
when
a
Lake
emprison'd
in
the
bowells
of
a
Mountain
,
suddenly
overflows
and
opens
it self
a
way
.
LESSON
VI.
Of
the
Aire
,
&
those
things
which
are
done
in
it
near
the
Earth
.
1.
THe
Aire
is
evidently
divided
into
two
parts
;
that
which
is
habitable
by
Animals
,
and
that
above
:
this
last
has
no
limits
we
can
know
of
;
that
first
is
contain'd
in
the
Sphear
of
Vapours
which
ascend
with
a
sensible
heat
out
of
the
Earth
,
that
is
,
as
much
as
the
Sun
cherishes
with
its
heat
and
renders
fit
for
the
life
of
Animals
:
This
,
therefore
,
is
comparatively
hot
;
the
rest
comparatively
cold
,
which
the
Snows
and
cold
winds
about
the
highest
Mountains
testifie
.
A
third
,
which
they
use
to
call
the
Middle
Region
,
there
's
none
;
since
the
place
of
Meteors
is
very
uncertain
,
some
residing
near
the
Earth
,
others
above
the
Moon
.
2.
Out
of
the
Globe
of
Earth
and
Sea
,
by
the
power
of
the
Sun
,
little
bodies
are
rais'd
up
,
of
the
minutest
bulk
;
which
,
the
Sun
deserting
them
,
sometimes
fall
down
upon
the
Earth
like
drops
,
and
are
call'd
Deaw
;
some
drop
from
hard
by
,
others
from
a
great
height
;
for
,
all
night
long
vapours
descend
,
and
the
higher
more
slowly
,
both
because
they
are
higher
and
because
every
drop
is
lesse
:
Hence
't
is
that
Chymists
rather
chuse
the
Deaw
that
falls
last
,
as
also
the
summer
Deaw
,
these
being
the
purest
and
subtilest
.
3.
From
this
Deaw
't
is
,
that
the
night
grows
cooler
towards
day-break
;
though
the
first
Drops
breaking
and
diffusing
themselves
,
intends
the
same
cold
by
the
expiration
of
their
cold
parts
.
4.
The
drops
of
Deaw
,
especially
the
least
,
are
perfectly
round
:
the
cause
whereof
is
,
because
the
water
of
Deaw
is
very
tender
,
and
encompass'd
in
and
bound
together
with
a
skin
,
as
it
were
,
by
the
more
viscous
Aire
about
it
.
5.
As
we
see
,
therefore
,
Bladders
blown-up
become
round
,
because
in
that
figure
they
are
capable
of
most
Aire
:
so
,
every
fluid
body
,
when
't
is
straightned
,
must
of
necessity
mould
it self
into
a
round
form
.
And
,
this
seems
the
cause
why
Quicksilver
so
easily
runs
into
little
sphears
:
for
,
since
the
least
fire
will
vapour
it
away
,
the
least
cold
,
too
,
must
needs
compresse
it
.
6.
Some
Deaws
are
sweeter
then
the
rest
,
especially
in
the
hotter
Regions
;
whence
,
a
kind
of
Hony
may
be
lick'd
from
the
leafs
of
Trees
,
and
the
Bees
are
believ'd
to
make
their
hony
out
of
Deaw
;
also
,
the
Manna
,
in
Calabria
and
Arabia
and
other
hot
Regions
,
is
a
kind
of
Deaw
;
Cloves
,
too
,
and
Nutmeggs
are
thought
to
derive
their
sweetnesse
from
a
kind
of
Deaw
which
falls
in
the
Molucco
Islands
:
Now
sweetnesse
proceeds
from
a
concocting
and
digestion
of
Moysture
,
into
a
certain
oily
softnesse
and
equability
of
parts
.
7.
Frost
is
congealed
Deaw
.
A
Fogg
or
Mist
,
properly
,
is
the
expiration
of
the
Earth
or
Water
out
of
a
certain
Vent
made
by
their
native
heat
:
For
,
we
sensibly
perceive
Foggs
rising
out
of
moist
Valleys
,
Lakes
,
Rivers
and
the
Sea
:
they
presently
fill
all
our
Horizon
:
then
,
for
the
most
part
,
they
rise
either
in
the
Morning
or
Evening
,
seldome
when
the
Sun
shines
hot
:
they
rise
,
too
,
in
great
abundance
,
out
of
some
certain
place
.
All
which
agree
not
to
Vapours
extracted
by
the
Sun
.
8.
And
,
because
they
expire
out
of
putrid
water
,
they
stink
and
beget
a
Cough
.
But
,
that
which
uses
to
rest
upon
Mountains
and
in
Woods
,
especially
when
it
rains
,
is
another
thing
:
for
those
are
really
Clouds
,
not
Fogs
,
which
either
fall
or
are
sustain'd
by
the
leafs
of
Trees
;
whence
,
in
certain
Islands
,
we
read
there
's
no
other
water
,
then
what
is
so
gather'd
and
distill'd
from
Trees
.
Some
Mists
are
purely
watry
;
others
have
a
kind
of
slimy
muddynesse
withall
,
deriv'd
out
of
the
quality
of
that
body
whence
they
are
sublimated
.
9.
The
Nets
we
see
in
trees
&
hedges
,
as
also
those
thrids
that
fly
up
&
down
sometimes
,
are
made
by
the
parts
of
the
Fog
growing
together
;
or
,
of
little
bodies
,
too
,
rais'd
up
by
the
Sun
:
minutest
humid
bodies
gluing
together
other
minutest
dry
ones
;
that
we
may
learn
,
out
of
these
rude
principles
,
how
Silk-worms
and
Spiders
Webs
and
even
Flesh
it self
is
woven
.
LESSON
VII
.
Of
Clouds
,
Rain
,
Snow
and
Hail
.
1.
HItherto
,
we
have
kept
near
the
Earth
.
But
,
if
the
Sun
drives
the
vapours
higher
,
they
are
gather'd
into
Clouds
:
Now
,
a
Cloud
is
a
swarm
or
heap
of
minutest
bodies
elevated
by
the
Sun
;
of
such
a
crassitude
&
thickness
,
that
,
like
a
solid
body
,
it
either
reflects
or
deads
the
Light
.
2.
That
't
is
no
solid
body
,
is
plain
;
both
from
the
tops
of
high
Mountains
,
upon
which
it
appears
like
a
Mist
,
and
does
not
much
wet
those
that
goe
into
it
;
as
also
,
from
its
generation
,
and
rising
up
in
minutest
bodies
.
3.
And
the
reason
is
plain
,
why
they
hang
above
;
namely
,
because
of
the
littlenesse
of
their
parts
,
as
,
we
see
,
Dust
thrown
up
staies
a
great
while
in
the
Aire
:
Besides
,
the
motion
of
the
Aire
hinders
their
descending
;
wherefore
,
in
a
high
wind
,
we
fear
not
the
Rain
,
which
,
as
soon
as
the
wind
is
down
,
presently
falls
.
4.
Now
,
that
which
makes
it
fall
is
the
forcing
those
little
bodies
into
a
straight
place
;
and
,
therefore
wind
brings
Rain
,
because
it
thrusts
the
little
drops
one
against
another
and
makes
them
bigger
.
5.
Besides
,
the
wind
it self
is
often
incorporated
with
the
Vapour
and
,
by
sticking
to
them
,
makes
those
particles
,
which
before
were
too
little
,
now
to
be
big
enough
and
fit
for
descending
:
as
,
when
a
warm
wind
rushes
against
a
cold
vapour
,
or
contrariwise
:
and
therefore
,
cold
winds
in
the
Summer
and
warm
ones
in
the
Winter
chiefly
bring
Rain
.
6.
But
,
because
those
things
that
are
rais'd
out
of
the
Earth
ascend
,
not
onely
from
the
Superficies
,
but
out
of
its
very
Bowells
,
too
,
through
the
pores
:
nay
,
they
are
expell'd
and
thrust
out
from
the
bottome
of
the
Sea
,
and
the
Earth
under
it
;
the
Sea-water
forcing
whatever
is
dissolved
in
the
bottome
,
lighter
then
it self
,
to
ascend
:
And
,
because
there
is
a
perpetuall
vicissitude
of
Vapours
,
bandy'd
from
the
Poles
to
the
Aequator
,
and
from
the
Aequator
back
again
to
the
Poles
;
these
Consequents
follow
:
7.
That
little
particles
are
drawn
up
into
the
Aire
and
Clouds
,
of
all
kinds
of
Earth
,
clayey
,
stony
,
nitrous
,
bituminous
,
metallick
,
&
whatever
other
sorts
there
are
:
again
,
of
all
sorts
of
Plants
,
Trees
,
Roots
,
Animals
:
all
which
being
hurry'd
up
and
down
in
the
Clouds
from
one
part
to
another
,
are
scattered
;
and
,
if
any
where
they
come
to
find
a
convenient
receptacle
and
nourishment
,
there
such
things
or
creatures
are
produc'd
.
8.
But
,
because
some
are
apt
to
be
form'd
suddenly
;
(
as
,
Froggs
easily
grow
out
of
Mud
;
and
,
't
is
told
by
a
man
of
credit
,
that
a
certain
Chymist
,
in
a
quarter
of
an
hour
,
brought
certain
seeds
to
grow
)
:
it
happens
sometimes
,
such
as
these
,
too
,
rain
out
of
the
Clouds
.
9.
So
,
it
rain'd
Wheat
,
some
yeares
since
,
in
the
West
of
England
,
or
rather
,
something
like
Wheat
;
and
the
same
,
I
believe
,
those
other
miraculous
rains
are
to
be
accounted
,
viz.
that
it
rain'd
not
bloud
,
but
a
red
water
,
something
crasse
it
may
be
;
and
not
Iron
,
but
a
kind
of
ironish
stone
;
so
,
too
,
not
Flesh
,
but
something
like
Flesh
may
have
rain'd
other
where
:
For
,
we
are
wont
to
call
things
by
the
names
of
others
which
they
resemble
,
especially
when
something
of
miracle
is
joyn'd
with
it
;
so
greedy
we
are
of
seeming
to
know
or
have
seen
something
more
then
others
.
10.
Snow
and
Hail
seem
to
be
accidents
of
Rain
;
with
this
difference
,
that
snow
is
rain
whilst
't
is
yet
in
such
little
parts
that
it
cannot
descend
;
but
Hail
is
it
congeal'd
,
when
't
is
in
such
drops
as
are
apt
for
descending
:
For
,
that
the
generation
of
Snow
is
higher
then
that
of
Rain
,
the
tops
of
Mountains
witnesse
,
cover'd
all
the
yeare
with
Snow
;
which
they
could
not
be
,
were
they
ever
drench'd
with
Rain
.
11.
And
,
that
't
is
congeal'd
in
minutest
particles
,
is
evident
,
to
one
that
considers
it
,
both
from
the
height
of
its
place
and
the
very
nature
of
Snow
;
for
,
the
flakes
are
not
of
one
continu'd
body
,
but
,
as
it
were
,
ashes
or
little
dusts
made
up
together
:
Its
whitenesse
,
too
,
proves
it
,
that
is
,
its
eminent
virtue
of
reflecting
light
:
for
,
suppose
a
world
of
little
sphears
,
smooth
and
extreamly
minute
,
made
up
together
into
one
body
as
little
as
can
be
visible
;
and
,
because
every
one
of
those
convex
Superficies
are
apt
to
scatter
light
;
in
its
proportion
,
from
every
point
,
that
quantity
must
needs
appear
extreamly
white
.
12.
The
Rine
,
too
,
witnesses
it
,
and
a
kind
of
snowy-hail
we
sometimes
see
like
Coriander
Confits
:
for
,
certain
minute
particles
of
snow
are
easily
discernable
;
and
,
if
one
look
very
curiously
upon
a
flake
of
snow
,
one
shall
discern
a
composition
without
end
,
as
it
were
,
of
distinct
bodies
coagulated
.
Lastly
,
the
whitenesse
of
Froth
proceeds
clearly
from
the
same
cause
.
13.
Hence
,
the
doubts
about
snow
are
easily
resolv'd
:
as
,
why
the
vapours
should
not
rather
immediately
fall
down
in
Rain
,
then
turn
into
Snow
;
since
there
needs
a
lesse
intense
cold
for
Rain
?
For
,
either
they
are
admitted
to
be
first
in
the
degree
of
Rain
,
before
they
become
Snow
;
but
descend
not
,
because
the
parts
are
too
little
yet
:
or
it
must
be
said
that
Rain
does
not
signifie
every
moisture
,
but
a
dropping
one
,
such
as
is
not
in
so
minute
particles
.
The
cause
,
too
,
of
its
softnesse
is
plain
;
for
,
even
Diamant
dust
,
if
it
be
small
enough
,
will
be
soft
.
14.
Again
;
why
't
is
often
sexangular
,
or
rather
like
a
Star
with
six
rayes
?
For
,
since
six
other
equall
circles
just
encompasse
and
inclose
a
Circle
;
if
Snow
be
compos'd
of
little
Sphears
,
the
first
composition
will
have
six
jettings
out
,
to
which
those
things
may
stick
which
,
in
motion
,
are
apt
to
touch
and
stop
against
what
they
encounter
:
Such
a
compound
,
therefore
,
is
apt
to
be
form'd
into
a
star-like
figure
.
15.
The
cold
,
if
it
has
been
very
intense
and
dry
,
slacken's
before
Snow
,
because
of
the
Snow's
moisture
;
especially
,
if
it
come
with
a
gentle
,
a
South
,
or
West-wind
:
as
also
,
because
a
snowy
cloud
more
compresses
and
straightens
the
Aire
near
the
Earth
;
whence
,
the
Vapours
which
rise
out
of
the
Earth
,
being
thrust
and
crouded
close
together
,
grow
warmer
;
and
thus
,
too
,
Snow
,
lying
upon
houses
,
makes
the
upper
rooms
warmer
,
by
hindring
both
the
entrance
of
the
wind
and
the
issuing
of
the
vapours
.
In
the
same
manner
,
also
,
it
protects
the
Earth
and
Roots
from
the
cold
.
16.
But
,
the
warmnesse
,
which
is
felt
after
the
fall
of
Snow
,
proceeds
from
the
free
action
of
the
Sun
,
which
before
was
restrain'd
by
a
grosse
cloud
interpos'd
against
it
:
as
also
,
because
the
cold
wherewith
we
were
infested
,
whilst
the
cloud
hung
over
us
,
lyes
now
,
as
it
were
,
subdu'd
and
imprison'd
under
our
feet
.
That
the
falling
of
Snow
hinders
Sounds
,
't
is
,
because
it
deprives
the
Aire
of
its
agility
.
17.
Hail
is
Rain
congeal'd
in
falling
:
it
receives
a
figure
either
from
the
drops
,
or
from
the
wind
and
the
collision
of
the
drops
now
growing
hard
,
or
else
by
chance
or
the
concurrence
of
accidentall
causes
.
18.
Those
that
discern
monstrous
forms
and
shapes
in
it
sometimes
,
polish
and
finish
up
,
by
the
help
of
their
imagination
,
certain
rude
lines
:
as
't
is
often
seen
in
Stones
and
whatever
other
figures
.
19.
That
it
so
soon
melts
,
the
reason
is
,
because
there
remains
in
it
more
water
,
then
of
the
dry
vapour
;
the
wind
or
congealing
Aire
having
light
upon
great
drops
:
For
,
that
this
is
the
cause
of
congelation
,
our
expecting
Ice
and
a
Rine
the
next
day
witnesses
;
to
wit
,
when
the
wind
is
grow'n
sharper
by
the
cold
of
the
night
.
LESSON
VIII
.
Of
fiery
Meteors
appearing
in
the
Aire
.
1.
Who
'd
expect
Fire
out
of
water
?
Yet
we
have
it
sometimes
out
of
the
Clouds
,
and
even
out
of
Rain
:
Nay
,
in
a
very
Tempest
,
there
stick
to
the
Masts
things
,
the
Ancients
call'd
Castor
and
Pollux
;
a
wonder
familiarly
seen
by
the
Mariners
.
2.
But
these
and
many
such
like
seem
rather
to
rellish
the
nature
of
vapours
that
reflect
light
,
then
of
Fire
:
for
,
both
(
Will
of
the
wispe
,
or
)
Ignes
fatui
do
not
burn
nor
flame
out
,
but
only
shine
;
as
also
those
Dioscuri
(
or
Castor
and
Pollux
)
have
the
form
of
a
globe
,
which
is
not
the
figure
of
Fire
.
Again
,
Flames
,
in
a
thin
and
tenuous
matter
,
are
not
long-liv'd
;
as
appears
in
Lightning
,
and
in
a
Candle
,
which
we
see
sometimes
blaze
up
,
enflaming
the
smoak
about
it
;
but
suddenly
extinguish
again
and
retire
to
the
Wiek
:
The
flames
,
too
,
which
belch
out
of
the
Vulcanian
Mountains
are
often
but
short-liv'd
.
3.
Be
this
therefore
a
sure
rule
;
where-ever
the
figure
is
determin'd
and
constant
,
't
is
no
fiery
or
flaming
matter
:
For
,
the
way
of
Fire
is
,
to
brandish
Pyramids
upwards
,
with
an
uncertain
motion
;
the
crasser
matter
pressing
downwards
.
4.
Besides
,
an
Ignis
fatuus
has
been
found
fallen
down
in
a
slippery
viscous
substance
full
of
white
spots
:
The
same
,
too
,
is
the
matter
of
Falling-starres
;
as
,
both
a
learned
man
hath
found
it
;
&
amongst
our selves
,
when
any
such
matter
is
found
in
the
Fields
,
the
very
Countrey-men
cry
it
fell
from
Heav'n
and
the
Starres
,
and
,
as
I
remember
,
call
it
the
Spittle
of
the
Starres
.
5.
Ignes
fatui
(
or
Wills
of
the
Wisp
)
,
then
,
are
a
certain
viscous
substance
,
reflecting
light
in
the
dark
,
evaporated
out
of
a
fat
Earth
,
and
flying
in
the
Aire
.
They
commonly
haunt
Church-yards
,
Privyes
,
and
Fens
;
because
they
are
begotten
out
of
fatnesse
:
They
fly
about
Rivers
,
Hedges
,
&c.
because
in
those
places
,
there
's
a
certain
flux
of
Aire
:
They
follow
one
that
flies
them
and
fly
one
that
follows
them
;
because
the
Aire
does
so
:
They
stay
upon
Military
Ensigns
and
Spears
;
because
such
are
apt
to
stop
and
tenacious
of
them
:
In
the
Summer
and
hot
Regions
they
are
more
frequent
;
because
the
good
concoction
produces
fatnesse
.
6.
Flammae
lambentes
(
or
those
we
call
Haggs
)
are
made
of
Sweat
or
some
other
Vapour
issuing
out
of
the
Head
;
a
notunusuall
sight
amongst
us
when
we
ride
by
night
in
the
Summer
time
:
They
are
extinguisht
,
like
flames
,
by
shaking
the
Horse
Mains
:
But
,
I
believe
rather
,
't
is
onely
a
Vapour
reflecting
light
,
but
fat
and
sturdy
,
compacted
about
the
Mains
of
Horses
or
Men's
Hair
.
7.
Cardanus
tells
of
a
certain
Carmelite
,
that
as
often
as
he
thrust
his
head
into
his
Coul
,
it
flam'd
out
;
and
that
't
is
usuall
enough
in
Spain
,
for
sparkles
to
fly
out
of
woollen
garments
rubb'd
upon
ones
head
:
Nor
doubt
I
but
these
are
reall
fire
such
as
uses
to
fly
out
of
Wood
,
Canes
,
or
Flints
,
by
rubbing
or
striking
them
,
for
these
and
such
like
are
full
,
both
of
fire
,
and
a
certain
vapour
which
is
fewell
for
it
;
whence
,
when
many
hot
parts
light
upon
a
considerable
part
of
the
vapour
,
they
scorch
and
kindle
it
;
whereupon
,
after
such
a
production
of
fire
,
there
remains
in
some
an
offensive
sent
,
as
of
burning
.
8.
The
Hair
of
Horses
,
and
Cats
,
as
also
Sugar
rub'd
together
in
the
dark
,
are
said
to
produce
the
same
effect
:
The
Eyes
,
too
,
of
some
are
said
to
sparkle
,
viz.
when
they
shine
with
spirits
,
and
reflect
the
light
as
if
they
were
glasse
.
Yet
doubt
I
not
but
the
Eyes
may
,
by
some
preternaturall
disposition
,
yield
reall
light
;
it
seeming
evident
in
Cats
.
9.
But
,
that
the
most
part
of
these
are
idle
stories
,
I
collect
from
this
experiment
,
that
it
has
seem'd
,
even
to
my self
sometimes
,
that
my
Chamber
was
all
light
;
and
I
saw
every
thing
plainly
:
when
,
notwithstanding
,
I
have
often
catch't
my self
in
it
,
and
found
mine
eyes
shut
all
the
while
;
and
that
my
memory
within
,
was
working
upon
those
thiings
which
I
thought
I
saw
:
and
sometimes
I
found
that
I
err'd
,
too
,
imagining
some
things
to
be
in
this
or
that
Place
,
which
indeed
were
not
.
10.
Falling-Stars
are
a
certain
viscid
or
slimy
matter
,
rais'd
out
of
the
Earth
in
very
minute
parts
,
and
coagulated
in
the
Aire
;
which
,
when
,
in
its
fall
,
it
comes
within
our
sight
,
beautifies
all
its
way
with
reflected
light
:
Yet
,
sometimes
,
it
falls
not
downwards
;
but
,
being
carry'd
traversly
by
some
motion
of
the
Aire
,
't
is
call'd
a
Gliding
star
,
'till
,
either
being
dissipated
,
or
by
some
other
Accident
,
't
is
seen
no
more
.
11.
Caprae
,
Trabes
,
Bolides
,
Faces
,
Dolia
,
Clypei
,
(
as
the
Ancients
call
them
)
,
or
whatever
other
names
such
Meteors
may
have
;
whether
they
are
reall
fires
,
or
only
certain
Clouds
brighter
then
ordinary
;
neither
is
it
deducible
clearly
enough
out
of
Histories
,
(
they
relating
scarce
any
thing
save
that
they
burn
in
such
a
figure
;
but
that
they
take
burning
for
shining
't
is
very
credible
,
even
from
hence
,
that
they
mention
no
tokens
of
their
burning
)
;
nor
have
I
ever
met
with
any
very
curious
observer
treating
of
this
subject
.
LESSON
IX
.
Of
truly
fiery
Meteors
,
hanging
in
the
Aire
.
1.
THe
true
fires
,
therefore
,
are
Lightnings
,
Dragons
,
and
those
they
call
Fire-Drakes
:
For
,
first
,
they
have
not
a
clear
brightnesse
,
as
falling
and
gliding
Stars
have
(
which
is
almost
a
sure
sign
of
reflection
)
,
but
a
dimm'd
one
(
from
the
condition
of
the
matter
)
as
it
were
with
smoak
,
as
we
see
in
our
fires
;
though
this
rule
may
fail
on
both
sides
,
unlesse
it
be
prudently
apply'd
:
Again
,
they
are
short-liv'd
:
Thirdly
,
the
ashes
of
Dragons
are
often
seen
,
and
the
effects
of
Lightning
are
well
known
.
The
Nature
of
Fire-drakes
is
like
that
of
Lightning
or
the
blazing
of
Candles
;
so
that
't
is
,
unquestionably
,
a
sudden
kindling
of
an
oyly
vapour
;
and
it
varies
its
figure
with
every
motion
,
as
fire
uses
,
according
to
the
various
dispositions
of
the
combustible
matter
.
To
apprehend
the
Causes
of
these
things
,
2.
Let
us
imagine
the
hottest
days
effect
that
upon
the
Earth
,
which
,
upon
a
Chymicall
matter
,
the
most
intense
heat
does
,
that
,
after
the
gentler
,
is
apply'd
to
extract
Oyles
,
that
is
,
the
most
glutinous
and
crasse
moisture
:
Suppose
that
,
out
of
fat
and
soft
grounds
,
they
raise
Vapours
,
not
liquid
,
but
compacted
with
a
deal
of
dense
matter
,
not
without
a
vast
abundance
of
fiery
parts
imprison'd
in
them
.
3.
That
these
Vapours
can
neither
be
elevated
into
a
very
high
station
,
nor
long
sustain'd
above
:
That
,
yet
,
to
the
proportion
of
the
heat
,
they
are
carryed
higher
(
according
to
the
nature
of
the
Region
and
of
the
concurring
causes
)
in
one
Climate
then
in
another
:
And
that
,
through
the
motion
and
tumult
of
the
Clouds
,
these
vapours
meeting
with
one
another
,
being
of
a
glutinous
substance
,
stick
together
and
are
constipated
;
that
,
being
constipated
,
they
are
kindled
,
and
,
being
kindled
,
either
break
out
or
are
thrown
out
.
4.
Again
;
this
matter
,
being
the
heaviest
of
all
that
are
elevated
,
will
be
hurryed
downwards
,
as
we
see
in
Golden-gunpowder
:
for
the
dilating
of
the
fire
makes
and
applyes
an
impression
of
the
adhering
matter
,
that
way
which
the
matter
leads
:
It
breaks
,
therefore
,
through
the
Clouds
,
there
,
where
't
is
easiest
descending
;
and
being
,
in
the
time
of
its
passage
,
for
the
most
part
,
directed
obliquely
,
because
the
Cloud
is
thickest
towards
the
Earth
,
't
is
,
so
,
hurry'd
to
us
.
5.
When
nothing
but
the
flame
approaches
us
,
't
is
said
to
lighten
:
when
,
without
Thunder
and
in
a
clear
season
,
any
lightnings
appear
,
we
say
it
flashes
.
6.
Hence
,
't
is
apparent
enough
how
Thunderbolts
come
to
be
darted
out
of
the
Clouds
:
For
,
the
fire
in
the
Clouds
being
extreme
violent
,
it
bakes
a
light
stone
,
like
a
Pumice
or
those
which
are
made
in
furnaces
for
Metalls
:
and
that
,
having
the
fire
still
adhering
to
it
,
and
being
light
of
its
own
nature
,
is
carry'd
,
like
an
iron
kettle
or
earthen
Porringer
in
water
,
and
descends
with
violence
.
7.
Again
;
't
is
evident
how
Thunder
is
caus'd
:
For
,
that
most
suddain
rarefaction
of
Fire
cannot
be
made
,
without
a
most
swift
compression
of
one
Cloud
to
another
;
nor
this
,
without
a
mighty
noise
,
such
as
we
hear
at
the
suddain
extinguishing
of
a
violent
and
intense
fire
,
and
at
the
dashing
together
of
the
waves
of
the
Sea
in
a
Storm
.
8.
From
the
different
matter
of
the
Lightning
there
happens
the
variety
of
different
effects
:
As
,
when
,
the
Purse
or
Scabbard
being
intire
,
the
Mony
or
the
Blade
is
melted
;
it
proceeds
from
hence
,
that
,
in
the
Lightning
,
there
is
the
nature
of
those
Salts
,
which
serve
to
melt
Metalls
and
yet
have
no
power
upon
slighter
subjects
:
when
the
Wine
congeals
,
the
Vessell
being
broken
;
't
is
a
sign
of
cold
Spirits
in
the
Lightning
,
by
which
liquid
things
are
rendred
consistent
and
hard
things
are
broken
;
as
we
see
by
the
congealing
of
water
in
a
glasse
or
earthen
vessel
close
stop'd
:
when
water
will
not
quench
it
,
it
has
a
mixture
of
Wild-fire
in
it
,
such
as
we
see
in
burning
Fountains
.
9.
Iron
is
us'd
against
Lightning
,
because
't
is
a
kind
of
matter
something
akin
to
Lightning
,
and
draws
the
volatile
spirits
to
it self
,
so
that
it
does
other
things
no
hurt
:
Mushromes
,
too
,
come
on
the
better
for
Tempests
,
because
the
Rain
which
accompanies
them
is
warm
and
fat
;
as
the
fields
of
Aetna
and
Campania
are
rendred
more
fruitfull
by
the
eruptions
of
the
Mountains
,
because
much
heat
and
fat
matter
descends
withall
.
10.
Hence
,
that
they
call
the
Fiery
Dragon
is
a
certain
weaker
kind
of
Lightning
:
It
s
livid
colour
,
and
its
falling
without
noise
and
slowly
demonstrate
a
great
mixture
of
watry
exhalation
in
it
:
nor
is
there
any
thing
else
of
singular
in
it
worth
taking
notice
of
;
for
,
't
is
sufficient
for
its
shape
,
that
it
has
some
resemblance
of
a
Dragon
,
not
the
expresse
figure
.
LESSON
X.
Of
the
generation
and
nature
of
Winds
.
1.
NOw
,
it
happens
that
the
exhalation
shut
up
in
the
Clouds
is
,
sometimes
,
very
lean
and
dry
;
and
then
,
instead
of
Lightning
,
a
wind
is
pufft
out
:
sometimes
alone
,
and
then
't
is
call'd
Ecnephias
;
sometimes
mixt
with
flame
,
as
when
a
fat
and
lean
vapour
are
mingled
together
,
and
then
't
is
call'd
Prester
.
2.
But
,
if
it
breaks
out
through
a
narrow
passage
,
and
is
whirl'd
about
like
water
,
't
is
call'd
Typhon
or
a
whirlewind
:
for
it
brings
down
with
it
,
even
to
the
Earth
,
that
whirling
impetus
,
and
,
being
reverberated
,
as
it
were
,
back
into
the
Aire
,
hurries
away
,
wrapt
up
in
it
,
whatever
it
meets
unable
to
resist
it
upon
the
Earth
:
All
these
winds
are
properly
call'd
Storms
and
stormy
.
3.
Some
signs
,
by
the
providence
of
God
,
they
send
before
,
of
their
coming
;
as
all
vehement
things
do
:
which
proceed
hence
,
that
,
in
corporeall
things
,
a
part
must
of
necessity
be
made
before
the
whole
;
and
,
in
motion
,
the
weaker
must
goe
before
,
the
violenter
must
follow
.
4.
Hence
it
comes
,
that
Animals
have
a
kind
of
sense
of
Storms
before
they
come
.
Again
,
because
,
for
great
things
,
there
must
precede
great
preparations
;
a
change
in
the
causes
may
,
by
diligent
persons
,
be
observ'd
:
so
Mariners
foresee
future
Storms
,
by
the
Sun
,
the
Moon
,
the
Clouds
;
and
Shepheards
,
Heardsmen
and
such
others
,
by
their
Cattel
.
5.
Out
of
what
has
been
said
,
't
is
easie
to
conceive
the
Generation
of
Winds
:
For
,
if
a
vapour
or
exhalation
be
either
so
dry
or
so
scatt'red
that
it
cannot
coagulate
into
great
drops
,
it
descends
in
the
form
of
dust
;
and
,
where
it
first
finds
resistance
,
there
it
begins
to
take
a
determination
and
make
,
as
it
were
,
a
channell
of
its
Motion
.
6.
And
,
that
way
the
first
parts
have
gone
before
,
the
later
follow
,
(
by
the
force
of
consequence
,
now
,
and
the
impetus
of
the
Aire
)
and
make
way
for
others
:
Thus
,
therefore
,
they
run
through
the
Horizon
,
till
either
the
Sun
has
suck'd
them
up
again
,
or
their
Atoms
have
adher'd
to
other
bodies
,
especially
moist
ones
,
with
which
they
are
easily
incorporated
.
7.
Hence
,
may
be
resolv'd
the
questions
about
winds
:
For
,
first
,
if
the
exhalation
be
high
,
it
makes
the
Rack
ride
,
but
it
comes
not
near
the
Earth
:
when
there
happen
to
be
many
exhalations
of
severall
lightnesses
,
the
Clouds
appear
to
ride
severall
ways
:
when
the
causes
of
the
exhalations
hold
out
pertinaciously
,
the
wind
lasts
longer
from
the
same
corner
:
when
the
vapours
,
flowing
in
from
one
corner
,
are
more
dense
and
abundant
then
from
another
,
then
the
wind
is
more
vehement
on
that
side
.
8.
And
this
happens
,
either
from
the
quality
of
the
Earth
whence
they
are
extracted
:
for
,
out
of
a
moist
and
cold
ground
,
the
vapours
are
densest
;
out
of
a
moist
and
hot
,
most
abundant
;
out
of
a
dry
and
cold
,
they
are
still
lighter
;
out
of
a
dry
and
hot
ground
,
they
are
lightest
of
all
.
9.
As
also
,
their
way
is
to
be
consider'd
:
For
,
they
mix
themselves
with
the
vapours
through
which
they
passe
,
and
are
imbu'd
with
their
qualities
.
Again
,
much
is
to
be
ascrib'd
to
the
Heat
which
dissolves
them
:
for
,
a
moderate
heat
dissolv's
those
that
are
more
subtle
,
a
violenter
those
that
are
heavy
and
thick
.
10.
It
happens
,
too
,
that
the
nature
of
the
Corners
from
whence
the
wind
comes
,
is
accidentally
alt'red
sometims
:
for
example
,
If
,
from
the
North
,
for
the
most
part
,
come
dry
and
fair-weather
Vapours
;
it
may
well
fall
out
that
the
Vapours
carry'd
by
the
South-wind
,
when
they
are
past
us
towards
the
North
,
meeting
with
a
stronger
North-wind
,
will
be
brought
back
to
us
pouring
down
rain
;
and
so
,
from
a
serene
corner
we
shall
have
rain
,
and
,
contrary-wise
,
fair
weather
from
the
South
.
11.
Out
of
the
same
Principles
,
may
be
understood
the
reason
of
Etesiae
,
that
is
,
Winds
that
alwayes
return
at
such
a
set
season
of
the
year
:
For
,
the
originall
causes
of
the
Winds
being
certain
and
determin'd
,
(
among
which
,
the
melting
of
the
Snows
is
the
principall
)
,
which
return
at
set
times
of
the
year
;
the
Winds
,
too
,
unlesse
something
interpose
,
must
needs
return
at
the
same
Seasons
.
Such
are
the
Northern
Etesiae
:
These
constantly
blow
,
in
Italy
and
all
over
Greece
,
at
Midsummer
;
rising
,
as
I
believe
,
out
of
the
Alpes
,
not
from
the
farthest
North
,
since
they
are
not
felt
in
the
intermediate
Regions
:
And
they
rise
out
of
the
Earth
after
't
is
moistned
with
the
Snow
;
for
the
Snows
are
said
to
melt
about
the
end
of
May
;
whence
,
't
is
plain
,
they
that
blow
at
the
middle
of
Iune
cannot
be
rais'd
,
but
out
of
the
Earth
already
well
watred
;
unlesse
perhaps
some
Snows
hid
in
the
Valleys
are
then
first
sensible
of
the
Sun's
violence
,
or
that
the
Sun
should
draw
a
cool
breath
of
Aire
out
of
the
Snows
without
melting
them
.
12.
Such
are
the
East-winds
,
which
we
have
in
England
,
out
of
Russia
and
Muscovia
,
about
the
end
of
March
and
beginning
of
April
,
for
fourty
dayes
together
sometimes
,
upon
the
first
dissolving
of
the
Snow
in
those
parts
.
Such
are
the
West-winds
the
West
of
England
is
subject
to
,
at
the
latter
end
of
Summer
and
beginning
of
Autumn
;
brought
to
us
from
that
part
of
America
under
the
same
Meridian
,
over
a
vast
Sea
and
out
of
moist
Regions
,
whence
,
for
the
most
part
,
they
are
rainy
.
13.
It
appears
,
out
of
the
same
Principles
,
why
some
Winds
are
heavy
and
low
,
others
light
and
high
:
For
,
't
is
plain
,
these
conditions
must
needs
follow
the
quality
of
the
Subject
whence
the
Vapours
are
rais'd
,
and
of
the
heat
that
raises
them
:
For
,
as
Chymists
,
with
a
soft
fire
,
extract
the
purest
and
lightest
Spirits
,
but
,
with
a
violent
heat
,
heavy
and
troubled
ones
;
so
Nature
,
too
,
with
a
moderate
&
gentle
heat
,
raises
the
purer
&
sublimer
winds
;
but
the
heavier
,
more
vehement
,
and
lower
winds
it
forces
out
with
extreme
heats
.
14.
Hence
,
again
,
't
is
plain
,
some
are
wholsome
,
others
hurtfull
:
since
,
their
effects
must
needs
follow
the
condition
of
the
nature
of
those
vapours
whereof
they
consist
.
But
,
we
must
note
,
that
some
winds
have
very
guiltlessely
got
an
ill
name
:
for
,
those
that
in
one
place
are
unwholsome
,
in
another
are
wholsome
.
15.
The
Sea-winds
are
commonly
unwholsome
,
as
bringing
along
with
them
heat
and
moisture
,
the
principles
of
corruption
:
Yet
,
in
very
hot
Regions
they
are
wholsome
;
and
sometimes
in
the
height
of
Summer
,
because
,
then
,
they
refresh
;
and
because
they
are
drawn
up
higher
by
the
Sun
,
they
are
penetrative
,
without
any
harm
.
16.
'T
is
to
be
noted
,
that
the
winds
always
take
the
compasse
of
the
greatest
Circles
:
because
,
being
thrust
out
with
violence
,
they
take
the
shortest
line
;
which
,
upon
the
superficies
of
a
Sphear
,
is
the
Arch
of
the
greatest
Circle
.
LESSON
XI
.
Of
Earth-quakes
and
their
Effects
.
1.
BUt
,
because
we
have
said
,
there
are
Caves
under
ground
;
and
both
our
experience
of
Pits
sunk
,
and
many
extraordinary
effects
demonstrate
Fire
&
water
,
there
,
too
:
there
must
necessarily
be
notable
effects
of
the
vapours
extracted
out
of
the
bowells
of
the
Earth
.
2.
If
,
therefore
,
out
of
some
subterraneous
humidbody
,
vapours
chance
to
be
rais'd
,
by
a
subterraneous
fire
,
too
;
and
they
prove
too
bigg
for
their
place
:
't
is
manifest
that
,
alwaies
increasing
and
becoming
condens'd
,
by
the
continuall
accesse
of
new
vapours
,
they
'l
seek
themselves
a
way
out
,
according
to
the
force
they
have
,
where
ther
's
the
easiest
passage
.
If
that
chance
to
lead
into
any
vast
under-ground
Cave
,
the
Earth
will
quake
with
a
great
impetus
and
groan
;
but
nothing
will
appear
above
ground
.
3.
But
,
if
the
easiest
issue
be
towards
the
superficies
of
the
Earth
,
the
vapour
will
burst
out
through
it
:
and
,
if
it
be
noxious
to
Beasts
or
Birds
,
't
will
bring
either
Death
or
a
Disease
along
with
it
;
making
with
the
eruption
either
a
gaping
Hollow
or
a
Mountain
,
according
as
the
Earth
either
sinks
or
is
sustain'd
and
,
as
it
were
,
vaulted
.
Sometimes
't
will
bury
and
swallow
up
Cities
;
sometimes
transport
vast
pieces
of
Earth
;
and
produce
other
effects
,
whereof
we
find
expresse
memorialls
in
History
.
4.
The
Prognosticks
of
an
Earth-quake
,
they
say
,
are
an
infection
of
the
Fountains
with
a
sulphurious
savour
;
an
unusuall
calmnesse
of
the
Air
and
Birds
;
a
swelling
of
the
Sea
without
any
apparent
cause
;
blackish
streaks
under
the
Sun
of
an
unusuall
length
:
all
(
if
they
are
truly
Prognosticks
,
and
not
onely
Accidents
,
which
,
sometimes
and
not
for
the
most
part
,
happen
)
are
the
effects
of
a
spirituous
Vapour
bursting
out
from
the
bowells
of
the
Earth
.
5.
They
are
said
to
happen
chiefly
in
the
Spring
and
Autumn
,
therefore
,
(
if
the
opinion
be
true
)
because
the
Superficies
of
the
Earth
,
being
warm
,
becomes
slacker
with
the
rain
:
But
,
I
should
rather
believe
it
a
chance
that
many
should
be
recorded
in
Histories
about
these
seasons
;
for
,
both
Winter
and
Summer
have
felt
their
Earthquakes
,
and
in
the
Torrid
Zone
,
where
they
are
most
frequent
,
the
differences
of
Spring
and
Autumn
from
the
other
seasons
are
very
inconsiderable
.
6.
The
Sea-shores
are
most
subject
to
these
motions
;
because
the
subterranious
flames
and
fumes
receive
no
little
nourishment
from
the
Sea
;
and
the
moisture
which
soaks
into
the
Earth
,
renders
it
very
fit
for
breeding
vapours
.
LESSON
XII
.
Of
the
Meteors
of
the
other
parts
of
the
World
;
and
especially
of
Comets
.
1.
THese
accidents
of
our
Orbe
,
and
its
parts
,
which
are
usually
call'd
Meteors
,
must
necessarily
be
found
,
too
,
in
the
other
bodies
,
which
,
we
have
said
,
are
enlightned
by
our
Sun
:
And
that
,
out
of
the
nature
of
quantity
and
the
mixture
of
Rare
and
Dense
;
if
they
have
their
severall
degrees
and
differences
.
2.
Nor
in
these
only
,
but
in
whatever
bodies
besides
,
wherein
alterations
are
wrought
,
by
the
operation
of
fire
upon
denser
matter
;
for
the
same
reasons
.
3.
'T
is
evident
,
too
,
that
our
Sun
cannot
warm
and
enlighten
all
those
bodies
that
reflect
light
to
us
:
for
,
if
it
were
as
far
distant
from
us
,
as
Astronomers
suppose
the
Sphear
of
the
Fixed
stars
,
't
would
appear
to
us
to
be
but
of
the
sixth
Magnitude
;
and
consequently
,
it
could
not
communicate
to
us
any
considerable
either
light
or
heat
:
how
much
lesse
,
in
the
situation
where
't
is
,
could
it
reflect
so
far
as
to
us
a
light
of
the
first
Magnitude
,
from
any
Star
so
far
distant
.
4.
Adde
to
this
,
that
one
that
should
collect
,
from
the
proportion
of
the
basis
of
a
Cone
to
its
Axis
,
how
much
light
the
Sun
could
reflect
to
us
from
the
eighth
Sphear
,
would
find
it
absolutely
invisible
.
Besides
,
the
very
Aire
,
through
which
the
light
passes
,
by
little
and
little
drinks
up
and
extinguishes
it
:
whence
,
in
a
thicker
Aire
,
it
spreads
it self
a
lesse
way
,
then
in
a
rarer
;
so
that
,
in
so
vast
a
journey
,
't
would
be
utterly
deaded
and
not
seen
.
5.
A
Meteor
of
the
Planets
,
perceptible
by
us
,
is
a
Comet
;
which
its
very-little
Parallaxis
convinces
to
be
,
sometimes
,
sited
above
the
Moon
.
6.
That
't
is
not
fire
,
its
constant
figure
;
its
Tayle
,
not
oppos'd
to
its
motion
but
to
the
Sun
;
its
lasting
consistency
;
its
matter
,
light
and
to
be
seen
through
;
and
lastly
,
its
Motion
,
more
regular
then
we
observe
in
fire
,
largely
convince
:
farther
,
that
it
has
nothing
of
fire
but
the
colour
:
adde
to
this
,
that
Fromundus
,
with
his
very
eyes
,
discern'd
the
Tayle
of
that
Comet
in
the
Year
1618
,
to
consist
of
the
reflection
of
the
Sun
's
light
.
7.
Be
it
,
therefore
,
A
vapour
which
partly
reflects
the
light
of
the
Sun
,
partly
,
drinking
it
in
,
either
repells
it
back
again
to
us
by
refraction
from
it self
,
or
,
letting
it
through
,
by
reflection
from
another
body
:
And
,
its
fore-part
will
be
the
Head
,
it
s
hinder
(
whether
part
,
or
something
only
accessnry
to
it
)
will
be
the
Tayle
.
8.
And
since
,
by
this
generation
of
a
Comet
,
any
figure
of
its
Beard
,
any
Motion
,
any
winding
of
its
tayle
,
but
,
for
the
most
part
,
the
opposition
of
its
Tayle
to
the
Sun
and
the
lesser
light
of
its
Tayle
then
of
its
Head
,
may
be
fairly
solv'd
;
this
intire
subject
is
clearly
display'd
.
9.
Out
of
the
same
principles
may
be
deduc'd
,
that
fading
Stars
are
Comets
;
but
,
so
far
off
,
that
the
secundary
or
refracted
light
of
their
Tail
,
by
reason
of
the
height
,
either
cannot
be
distinguisht
from
the
body
,
or
cannot
be
extended
to
us
,
because
of
its
extreme
faintnesse
:
as
also
that
,
its
motion
cannot
be
discern'd
.
10.
Even
these
,
therefore
,
witnesse
that
there
are
Meteors
among
the
very
fixed
Stars
;
and
those
,
so
much
the
more
constant
and
lasting
as
the
bodies
out
of
which
they
are
extracted
are
larger
.
LESSON
XIII
.
Of
the
Ebbing
and
Flowing
of
the
Sea
,
and
its
Accidents
.
1.
SInce
,
out
of
what
has
been
said
,
Torrid
Zone
,
there
are
vast
waters
,
&
,
consequently
,
in
some
measure
,
secure
from
the
incursion
of
Shore-winds
:
there
must
needs
be
light
vapours
rais'd
up
by
the
Sun
through
all
that
Tract
,
which
,
the
Sun
retiring
,
must
turn
into
winds
,
taking
that
course
which
the
Suns
rarefaction
of
the
aire
makes
most
easie
;
&
this
,
all
the
year
long
;
&
consequently
,
there
must
be
a
continuall
East-wind
.
2.
And
,
because
the
Aire
naturally
moves
in
a
Circle
,
still
yielding
and
flying
before
it self
;
it
must
needs
turn
again
by
the
Shore-side
,
drawing
along
with
it
the
Vapours
it
finds
;
yet
,
not
so
constantly
as
under
the
Aequator
,
because
of
the
Shore-winds
.
3.
Moreover
,
eye-witnesses
affirm
,
that
East-winds
range
for
27
degrees
of
Latitude
from
the
Aequator
on
each
side
;
and
West-winds
the
next
ten
:
and
,
of
Longitude
,
in
the
Pacifick
and
Indian
Sea
,
about
eleven
thousand
Italian
miles
;
and
,
in
the
Ocean
which
leads
to
the
new
world
,
from
the
Canaries
to
the
Bay
of
Mexico
,
about
70
degrees
,
that
is
,
some
four
thousand
more
such
miles
:
so
that
,
if
we
allow
the
Aequator
twenty
one
thousand
miles
,
these
winds
possesse
,
thus
,
almost
three
quarters
on
't
.
4.
Since
,
therefore
,
notwithstanding
its
calmnesse
,
this
wind
carryes
great
ships
eight
miles
an
hour
;
it
must
of
necessity
drive
the
waters
themselves
,
in
the
middle
,
with
great
violence
,
towards
the
West
:
whence
they
must
needs
overflow
upon
the
shores
,
and
return
again
from
the
shores
to
the
middle
;
and
,
where
they
meet
any
shores
,
withstanding
their
course
to
the
West
,
be
reflected
towards
the
East
:
as
also
,
they
must
rush
into
all
the
Bayes
,
and
,
after
a
determinate
time
,
return
again
,
according
to
the
winding
of
the
shores
;
the
account
of
which
time
must
be
taken
from
the
common
Channell
.
5.
We
have
found
,
therefore
,
an
apparent
cause
why
the
Sea
should
fill
the
shores
with
its
motion
towards
the
East
and
West
,
and
empty
them
again
,
with
a
constant
course
,
which
we
call
the
Ebbing
and
Flowing
of
the
Sea
.
That
this
proceeds
from
an
extrinsecall
cause
,
&
not
because
the
water
moves
lesse
,
that
is
,
slowlyer
then
the
Earth
,
appears
from
hence
,
that
the
Ebbing
and
flowing
is
discover'd
,
in
some
places
not
very
deep
,
to
extend
not
above
six
fathoms
;
all
the
rest
of
the
water
is
calm
and
like
a
Lake
:
whereas
,
if
the
Ebbing
&
Flowing
follow'd
from
the
motion
of
the
Earth
,
it
must
alwayes
be
mov'd
ununiformly
from
the
bottō
upwards
;
without
any
sensible
beginning
of
the
contest
of
the
Waters
.
6.
Hence
the
reason
may
be
given
why
the
Flux
proceeds
from
East
to
West
&
back
again
,
in
the
open
Sea
;
why
no
swelling
should
be
perceivable
in
the
Mid-sea
,
but
only
at
the
Shores
:
The
reason
is
,
because
there
are
no
marks
by
which
we
might
take
the
height
of
the
Sea
;
for
't
is
found
to
swell
there
,
too
,
if
any
Island
occurre
,
how
far
soever
from
any
other
Shore
.
7.
Moreover
,
why
there
should
be
a
continuall
Flux
of
the
Sea
observ'd
,
towards
the
West
;
viz.
because
this
wind
in
the
middle
of
the
Sea
perpetually
drives
the
waves
towards
the
West
.
8.
Why
,
too
,
the
Flux
should
be
more
vehement
in
one
part
then
in
another
:
viz.
from
the
abundance
of
waters
flowing
in
,
and
directed
by
other
causes
the
same
way
;
as
,
by
Rivers
,
or
the
repercussion
of
the
Shores
beating
the
greatest
part
of
the
floud
together
against
some
one
shore
.
9.
Also
,
why
there
should
be
six
hours
Flood
,
and
as
many
Ebbe
:
for
,
since
the
wind
proceeds
from
the
Sun
,
and
the
Sun
enforces
its
activity
upon
one
part
,
for
six
hours
,
and
remit's
it
as
many
;
there
must
needs
be
the
same
generall
Periods
of
its
effects
,
that
is
,
of
the
Sea's
Motion
.
10.
But
,
since
the
Moon
,
too
,
may
suffice
to
encrease
the
wind
;
and
,
the
nearer
't
is
the
Sun
,
the
more
its
power
is
conjoyned
with
the
Sun
's
,
the
farther
't
is
from
the
Sun
,
the
larger
and
stronger
its
force
is
upon
the
Ocean
;
who
can
doubt
but
the
Flux
must
be
encreased
twice
a
Moneth
?
11.
In
like
manner
,
since
the
Sun
is
twice
a
year
in
the
Aequator
,
in
which
place
,
as
just
in
the
middle
,
it
most
vigorously
rayses
the
wind
:
every
six
moneths
,
too
,
the
Flux
must
be
more
eminent
;
but
especially
about
Autumn
,
because
,
between
the
Tropick
of
Capricorn
and
the
Aequator
,
it
rains
mightily
night
and
day
,
for
three
moneths
together
after
the
Summer
Solstice
.
12.
But
,
that
the
Flux
returns
every
day
about
an
hour
later
still
,
't
is
from
hence
,
because
the
Flux
and
reflux
proceed
from
opposite
causes
;
whole
forces
,
before
the
victory
,
must
needs
be
but
equall
,
and
,
by
reason
of
their
equality
,
require
a
convenient
time
.
Whence
,
allowing
six
hours
for
the
flux
and
as
many
for
the
reflux
,
each
must
be
allowed
its
intervall
;
which
,
in
the
Thames
,
(
if
I
well
remember
)
is
little
more
then
a
quarter
of
an
hour
:
This
space
,
therefore
,
thus
,
four
times
repeated
,
in
one
day
,
makes
somewhat
more
then
an
hour
.
13.
Sometimes
too
,
the
winds
stop
the
Flood
;
insomuch
that
,
without
a
Miracle
,
the
Flood
has
three
times
advanced
and
been
beaten
back
in
the
Thames
,
by
the
force
of
an
opposite
wind
.
Lastly
,
it
appears
why
,
in
some
Seas
,
there
's
no
mention
of
Flux
;
as
,
in
the
Red
,
the
Euxine
,
the
Meotis
,
the
Caspian
and
Baltick
Seas
:
ther
's
the
same
reason
for
them
all
;
that
they
are
but
little
Seas
,
and
have
but
narrow
entrances
;
that
,
vast
Rivers
running
into
them
,
their
superficies
is
higher
then
the
Ocean's
;
that
their
current
into
the
Ocean
is
so
strong
,
that
the
Sea
,
especially
the
Mediterranean
,
whose
Flux
is
not
very
high
upon
the
Grecian
Shore
,
is
not
able
to
repell
it
.
LESSON
XIV
.
Of
the
Motion
of
the
Earth
,
and
the
Causes
of
it
.
1.
SInce
,
therefore
,
the
upper
part
of
the
water
is
continually
mov'd
towards
the
West
:
(
and
,
as
,
because
the
water
in
the
middle
runs
one
way
,
that
by
the
Shore-side
must
needs
run
backwards
;
so
also
,
because
the
superiour
water
is
hurry'd
towards
the
West
,
)
that
which
is
next
under
it
must
needs
be
driven
back
to
the
East
,
and
whatever
so
adheres
to
it
that
there
is
no
cause
of
separation
;
that
is
,
which
will
easilyer
be
driven
towards
the
East
then
be
separated
from
the
lower
water
.
2.
But
,
one
part
of
the
lower
water
is
not
separable
from
another
,
unlesse
it
either
ascends
into
the
place
of
that
above
it
,
which
another
part
,
supervening
,
prevents
and
hinders
;
or
else
,
unlesse
it
repells
that
which
is
Easternly
to
it
,
and
that
again
another
,
and
,
in
the
end
,
the
last
,
the
Shore
that
's
oppos'd
against
it
,
which
is
incredible
and
impossible
:
The
whole
body
,
therefore
,
with
the
Earth
adhering
to
it
,
must
needs
be
driven
towards
the
East
,
unlesse
there
be
some
resistance
stronger
then
the
impulse
.
3.
Whereof
ther
's
none
in
its
gravity
,
because
that
motion
is
not
contrary
to
the
motion
of
gravity
;
and
its
bignesse
even
much
facilitates
the
motion
:
The
Earth
,
therefore
,
will
be
mov'd
in
a
Circle
,
and
turn
round
about
its
own
Centre
,
because
this
impulse
is
made
in
a
Circle
.
4.
Again
,
because
't
is
almost
impossible
this
impulse
should
be
equall
on
all
sides
,
and
cause
a
pure
rotation
about
the
Centre
;
there
will
,
of
necessity
,
a
Progressive
motion
be
mixt
with
it
.
5.
And
since
,
as
a
body
cannot
be
,
but
in
one
place
,
so
neither
can
it
move
but
in
one
line
:
all
the
motions
which
Astronomers
assign
the
Earth
must
,
of
necessity
,
compose
one
line
;
and
,
if
the
lashing
or
impulse
of
the
under-water
advance
the
Earth
in
that
line
,
't
will
be
an
adequate
cause
of
the
motion
of
the
Earth
.
6.
Now
,
Astronomers
teach
,
that
the
Earth
,
continually
turning
about
its
own
Centre
,
runs
under
the
Zodiack
;
its
Axis
retaining
a
certain
inclination
to
the
Axis
of
the
Zodiack
:
wherefore
,
when
we
have
found
out
a
line
,
in
which
the
Earth
,
being
thrust
on
,
will
observe
this
motion
;
the
Flux
must
be
imagin'd
to
move
the
Earth
according
to
that
.
7.
Astronomers
prove
these
motions
of
the
Earth
:
because
,
otherwise
,
greater
motions
of
greater
bodies
must
be
suppos'd
;
and
those
,
neither
themselves
constant
,
nor
proportion'd
to
the
bodies
,
and
,
besides
,
more
entangled
,
both
in
the
Stars
and
in
the
Sun
it self
,
as
is
apparent
by
its
Spots
:
Which
if
you
say
make
not
up
a
perfect
Astronomicall
Demonstration
,
that
Maxime
must
be
renounc'd
upon
which
all
Astronomy
depends
,
viz.
that
the
Phenomena
(
or
appearances
)
are
to
be
solv'd
the
best
way
we
can
.
8.
Again
;
because
there
follows
a
variety
in
the
fixed
stars
,
from
the
diversity
of
the
Earth's
position
in
its
Orbis
Magnus
;
when
there
's
once
found
out
a
Telescope
,
of
such
perfection
as
to
be
able
to
distinguish
that
variety
,
we
may
expect
a
Geometricall
Demonstration
:
and
because
,
for
the
same
reason
,
there
must
needs
be
a
variety
of
reflection
from
Mars
and
Iupiter
;
when
the
laws
&
rules
of
light
shall
be
better
known
,
there
will
not
want
a
Physicall
Demonstration
.
LESSON
XV.
Of
the
Oppositions
against
the
Motion
of
the
Earth
and
,
of
its
effects
.
1.
AStronomers
object
,
that
this
annuall
transferring
of
the
Earth
would
cause
a
diversity
of
elevation
in
those
Stars
which
are
near
the
Poles
,
and
a
variety
in
the
appearing
bignesse
of
those
in
the
Zodiack
:
which
,
since
we
see
not
follow
,
neither
is
there
any
such
thing
as
this
Annuall
motion
of
the
Earth
.
2.
'T
is
answer'd
;
The
vast
remoteness
of
the
Fixed
Stars
renders
such
variations
imperceptible
:
and
,
that
their
distance
from
us
is
sufficient
to
produce
this
effect
,
may
be
collected
from
the
effect
it
has
upon
a
Telescope
;
which
,
though
it
amplifies
so
much
the
Planets
and
even
Saturn
himself
,
yet
adds
nothing
or
an
insensible
matter
to
the
Fixed
Stars
.
3.
Out
of
this
motion
of
the
Earth
rises
,
First
,
the
reason
of
Night
and
Day
:
for
,
since
,
in
a
determinate
time
,
't
is
roul'd
about
its
Centre
,
(
suppose
in
about
24
hours
)
,
the
things
that
are
in
the
Heavens
must
needs
appear
sometimes
,
and
otherwhile
disappear
,
to
a
determin'd
place
of
the
Earth
:
and
,
such
a
variety
,
in
respect
of
the
Sun
,
makes
Day
and
Night
;
in
respect
of
the
other
Stars
,
a
variety
not
own'd
by
any
common
name
.
4.
Again
,
by
its
motion
under
the
Zodiack
,
it
attains
various
conjunctions
with
the
other
Planets
.
5.
Lastly
,
in
that
it
carries
its
Axis
turning
still
towards
the
same
parts
of
the
Heavens
,
it
comes
to
passe
,
that
the
part
of
the
Earth
,
enlightned
by
the
Sun
,
possesses
sometimes
greater
sometimes
lesser
parts
of
the
Parallells
,
according
to
which
the
Diurnall
motion
proceeds
;
and
,
consequently
,
that
the
dayes
are
longer
and
shorter
.
6.
Thence
,
too
,
is
it
,
that
the
Sun
becomes
more
perpendicular
at
one
time
then
another
;
whence
the
natures
of
Winter
and
Summer
are
deduc'd
,
and
the
varieties
of
Declinations
,
Descensions
and
Twilights
.
7.
But
,
that
the
Winter
is
shorter
then
the
Summer
,
proceeds
from
this
,
that
the
Motion
,
through
the
inequality
of
the
bodies
rais'd
up
in
the
Winter
time
,
is
swifter
then
in
the
Summer
.
8.
An
effect
,
too
,
of
the
Motion
of
the
Earth
is
the
carrying
of
the
water
about
with
it
;
but
not
the
Tyde
:
First
,
because
,
if
the
Earth
should
stand
still
,
the
water
would
stand
still
withall
;
9.
Again
,
ther
's
no
cause
of
the
unequall
motion
of
the
water
;
since
,
ther
's
the
same
quality
continually
in
the
movable
,
and
not
by
skips
.
10.
Again
,
if
the
whole
water
of
the
Sea
were
so
mov'd
,
't
would
drown
the
Mountains
:
Lastly
,
the
periods
of
the
Earth's
motion
do
not
agree
with
those
of
the
Tyde
's
.
11.
But
,
that
the
Flux
depends
on
an
extrinsecall
Agent
,
which
impells
only
the
Superficies
of
the
Sea
,
is
most
evident
;
by
the
experiment
of
a
late
Diver
,
that
discovers
ther
's
no
Flux
in
the
bottom
of
the
Sea
.
LESSON
XVI
.
Of
the
Motion
of
the
Aire
with
the
Earth
;
and
its
effects
.
1.
OUt
of
what
has
been
said
,
't
is
manifestly
inferr'd
,
that
the
Aire
,
which
clings
to
the
Earth
,
is
roul'd
,
in
the
same
manner
,
about
or
rather
with
the
Earth
:
For
,
since
,
both
by
the
nature
of
Quantity
and
the
weight
of
its
gravity
,
it
presses
towards
the
Earth
,
and
sticks
to
and
incorporates
with
it
;
it
cannot
,
without
some
greater
force
interposing
,
be
separated
from
it
:
Since
,
therefore
,
in
it
,
ther
's
no
resistance
against
Motion
,
and
onely
a
resistance
against
being
torn
away
from
the
Aire
next
it
,
which
takes
another
course
;
and
this
resistance
is
not
greater
then
that
against
being
torn
off
from
the
Aire
below
,
and
perhaps
not
so
great
,
(
since
Aire
is
so
much
the
lighter
the
higher
it
is
)
;
T
is
evident
,
it
will
follow
the
Earth
:
Wherefore
,
to
the
very
confines
of
the
emanations
of
some
Star
,
that
has
a
different
Motion
,
the
whole
Aire
will
be
roul'd
about
with
the
Earth
.
2.
And
,
experience
also
proves
it
:
for
,
else
,
the
twilight
vapours
,
Comets
,
and
Birds
above
the
highest
Mountains
would
seem
hurryed
extream
swiftly
towards
the
West
.
Again
,
't
is
plain
,
those
Clouds
of
dust
,
which
we
call
the
Sun's
spots
,
fly
along
with
the
Sun
;
and
that
,
the
same
way
,
(
as
appears
,
because
the
bright
parts
are
burned
still
the
same
way
,
)
notwithstanding
they
are
judged
to
be
a
hundred
miles
distant
from
the
Sun
.
The
vapours
,
too
,
of
the
Moon
are
found
to
be
carried
about
with
the
Moon
.
3.
From
this
Motion
of
the
Aire
it
follows
,
that
bodies
in
the
Aire
it self
are
so
moved
,
in
respect
to
the
parts
of
the
Aire
and
the
Earth
,
as
if
there
were
no
Motion
at
all
in
neither
;
they
being
carried
still
along
together
with
the
Aire
it self
:
as
,
one
in
a
Ship
,
under
saile
with
a
constant
wind
,
exercises
the
same
Motions
and
with
the
same
facility
in
the
Ship
,
as
he
could
do
if
she
stood
still
.
4.
Wherefore
,
Arrows
,
shot
just
upright
,
will
fall
in
the
very
same
place
;
or
,
shot
towards
the
East
,
they
'l
fly
no
farther
then
if
shot
towards
the
West
:
The
Motion
of
the
Earth
will
raise
no
wind
,
&c.
This
,
too
,
will
be
certain
,
that
the
Aire
cannot
be
carry'd
lesse
then
the
Earth
;
as
,
one
that
sits
in
a
Coach
cannot
rid
lesse
ground
then
the
Coach
it self
.
5.
Nor
can
all
these
be
made
good
by
an
impetus
,
conceiv'd
upon
the
Earth
,
and
remaining
in
the
Movable
after
its
separation
from
the
Earth
:
for
,
neither
could
Birds
retain
that
impetus
for
many
hours
together
,
at
least
,
without
any
notable
diminution
;
and
lesse
could
little
bodies
,
for
many
dayes
:
nor
could
that
impetus
carry
an
Arrow
as
swiftly
acrosse
,
as
directly
.
Besides
,
as
those
that
swimme
against
the
stream
feel
the
strength
of
the
stream
under
water
;
so
,
one
that
should
move
towards
the
West
would
feel
the
Aire
to
be
carry'd
towards
the
East
.
6.
Much
lesse
,
by
the
force
of
its
circular
motion
,
will
the
Earth
throw
any
thing
laid
upon
it
into
Heaven
:
For
,
circular
motion
has
no
such
property
in
its
own
nature
;
since
't
is
still
about
the
Centre
,
and
,
by
consequence
,
keeps
every
thing
,
according
to
its
own
line
,
in
the
same
distance
from
the
Centre
:
But
,
those
things
we
see
thrown
off
from
wheels
,
are
so
,
by
reason
of
their
adhesion
,
and
the
mixture
of
a
straight
motion
with
the
circular
;
as
also
,
because
the
centre
of
gravity
of
such
thrown
bodies
is
remov'd
,
from
that
position
wherein
it
was
sustain'd
by
the
body
under
it
.
LESSON
XVII
.
Of
the
causes
of
the
Motion
of
the
Moon
and
other
Stars
.
1.
SInce
,
supposing
this
motion
of
the
Earth
,
the
Moon
is
carry'd
with
it
about
the
Sun
,
and
keeps
alwaies
the
same
side
towards
it
;
't
is
fairly
convinc'd
to
have
a
kind
of
adhesion
to
the
Earth
.
2.
Yet
,
not
a
Magneticall
one
,
being
it
changes
not
its
aspect
,
nor
has
any
declination
,
for
its
approaching
the
Poles
;
nor
,
though
it
hangs
loose
,
does
it
come
to
the
Earth
:
'T
is
,
therefore
,
an
adhesion
of
gravity
.
3.
And
,
since
gravity
proceeds
from
the
Motion
of
things
descending
towards
the
Earth
;
the
Moon
must
be
situated
within
the
Emanations
of
the
Earth
,
be
carry'd
about
the
Centre
of
the
Earth
,
and
about
the
Sun
.
But
,
because
it
has
a
propension
of
its
own
towards
the
Earth
,
it
is
not
carry'd
so
swiftly
as
the
Emanations
themselves
;
its
progresse
being
,
according
to
Astronomicall
observations
,
but
about
a
28.
part
every
day
.
4.
And
because
,
under
the
Zodiack
,
ther
's
a
perpetuall
tumult
of
vapours
which
ascend
,
and
being
come
up
to
a
certain
height
,
turn
off
from
the
Torrid
Zone
towards
the
Poles
;
the
motion
of
the
Moon
is
compounded
of
a
Motion
under
the
Ecliptick
and
towards
the
Poles
.
5.
It
is
not
,
therefore
,
carry'd
purely
under
the
Ecliptick
:
but
,
because
't
is
mov'd
in
a
Sphericall
Superficies
,
and
by
the
shortest
line
,
that
is
,
by
a
greatest
circle
;
it
will
cut
the
Ecliptick
twice
every
intire
course
of
its
defects
,
that
is
,
every
moneth
.
6.
In
its
Opposition
and
Conjunction
to
the
Sun
,
the
body
of
the
Moon
,
that
is
,
the
whole
complex
of
its
solid
and
vapours
,
becomes
lesse
heavy
:
In
Conjunction
,
because
its
nearnesse
to
the
Sun
and
the
Sun
's
stronger
reflection
from
the
Earth
raises
more
Vapours
in
the
Moon
:
in
Opposition
,
more
vapours
are
rais'd
out
of
its
,
naturally
,
colder
part
;
and
in
the
upper
part
ther
's
allways
abundance
.
7.
Wherefore
,
the
Moon
,
in
these
positions
,
must
rise
higher
from
the
Earth
,
and
,
in
the
Quadratures
,
that
is
,
about
the
passages
from
the
first
to
the
second
and
from
the
third
to
the
fourth
Quarters
,
appear
bigger
.
But
,
because
that
part
which
looks
towards
the
Earth
is
allways
the
heavier
,
it
never
turns
t'other
side
towards
us
.
8.
Nor
is
there
any
fear
least
the
Moon
,
falling
by
reason
of
its
weight
,
should
o'rewhelm
the
Earth
;
both
because
't
is
furnisht
with
a
great
deal
of
fire
and
vapours
lighter
then
the
Emanations
of
the
Earth
;
as
also
,
because
very
gravity
it self
,
near
the
confines
of
the
Earths
emanations
,
is
not
so
powerfull
as
't
is
here
lower
.
9.
But
farther
,
because
't
is
hurry'd
about
two
thousand
miles
every
houre
:
whence
,
were
it
made
of
solid
Iron
,
it
could
not
fall
down
;
since
,
we
see
iron
Bullets
sustain'd
in
the
Aire
,
by
the
power
of
Guns
,
though
their
motion
be
not
two
hundred
miles
an
houre
.
10.
Out
of
what
has
been
said
,
we
may
easily
argue
concerning
the
other
Great
Bodies
.
For
,
all
those
that
belong
to
our
Great
Orbe
either
are
mov'd
about
the
Sun
,
as
being
certain
other
Earths
:
or
else
about
other
Stars
,
as
the
Moon
about
the
Earth
;
such
as
are
the
Medicean
Stars
,
and
the
Companions
of
Saturn
.
11.
And
,
because
we
discover
Suns
among
those
other
parts
of
the
world
;
't
is
very
credible
there
are
proportionable
Planets
dispos'd
among
them
,
too
;
and
that
all
those
Bodies
are
mov'd
in
the
manner
of
ours
.
12.
The
Sun
it self
must
,
of
necessity
,
turn
about
its
own
centre
:
else
,
certainly
,
since
't
is
Fire
,
't
would
appear
divided
into
Pyramids
;
and
,
if
it
were
born
along
with
a
progressive
motion
,
't
would
shew
a
vast
train
of
flames
like
a
Comet
.
13.
Lastly
,
since
't
is
all
full
of
Caverns
belching
out
flames
,
and
fire
flames
out
according
to
the
nature
of
its
fewell
;
these
flames
must
of
necessity
flash
out
with
a
fierce
impulse
against
the
sides
of
the
Caverns
:
and
,
because
they
have
an
eminent
proportion
to
the
body
,
they
must
shake
the
entire
Sun
and
turn
it
that
way
the
Motion
lyes
strongest
;
which
,
the
Phenomena
of
its
Spots
and
bright
parts
testify
to
be
according
to
the
Zodiack
.
LESSON
XVIII
.
Of
the
Primum
Mobile
,
the
Duration
,
and
Quiddity
of
the
World
.
1.
BUt
,
because
this
fire
,
which
bursts
out
from
the
Sun's
bowells
,
is
it self
mov'd
,
too
:
either
this
Motion
,
which
is
the
Mother
of
all
other
,
must
spring
from
it self
;
or
else
we
must
come
to
an
incorporeall
Agent
.
2.
But
,
that
Bodies
which
rest
,
how
many
soever
they
are
,
cannot
start
of
themselves
into
Motion
,
is
most
evident
:
For
,
being
suppos'd
to
rest
,
all
their
intrinsecalls
are
suppos'd
,
without
that
effect
which
is
call'd
Motion
:
Since
,
therefore
,
all
things
remaining
the
very
same
in
the
causes
,
there
cannot
be
any
change
in
the
effect
;
and
yet
,
supposing
Motion
,
there
would
be
a
change
;
't
is
plain
,
there
cannot
any
Motion
spring
out
of
them
,
without
altering
first
somewhat
in
the
causes
,
that
is
,
in
the
Bodies
.
3.
Moreover
,
every
part
of
Motion
being
a
new
effect
,
the
same
evidence
convinces
that
motion
cannot
be
continu'd
,
without
some
Cause
be
suppos'd
continually
altering
the
First
Body
,
on
which
depend
the
motions
of
all
the
rest
.
4.
Since
,
therefore
,
we
have
pursu'd
the
Originall
of
motion
into
the
very
bowells
of
the
Sun
:
we
must
conclude
,
that
there
is
a
Mover
of
another
nature
,
viz.
an
incorporeall
,
from
whom
Fire
receiv's
the
power
of
moving
;
who
,
being
of
an
immovable
Nature
,
establishes
the
Centre
of
the
Sun
,
that
it
may
be
the
Fixer
and
,
as
it
were
,
Basis
of
all
things
rouling
about
it
.
5.
6.
Nor
,
if
the
computation
be
made
forwards
,
will
the
reason
differ
:
for
,
there
must
still
be
infinite
hours
to
come
;
and
one
of
them
will
be
infinite
others
distant
from
us
;
and
,
in
that
one
,
a
certain
now
terminating
an
infinite
,
which
is
impossible
,
whereas
yet
,
what
is
future
is
,
in
that
very
respect
,
possible
.
7.
The
World
,
therefore
,
is
neither
from
nor
to
eternity
:
because
,
the
world
includes
the
motion
of
bodies
passing
on
in
a
determinate
order
,
and
,
as
it
were
,
consists
in
this
.
'T
was
,
therefore
,
created
;
but
,
not
for
it self
:
for
,
if
it
could
have
deserv'd
to
be
made
for
its
own
beauties
sake
;
upon
the
same
title
,
it
would
endure
for
ever
.
It
rests
,
therefore
,
that
't
was
made
for
something
else
;
which
cannot
be
successive
,
since
the
same
evidence
,
with
which
we
have
disputed
about
motion
,
Rationall
soul
,
for
whose
sake
the
world
could
exist
:
Spirits
,
therefore
,
born
in
bodies
and
perfected
in
them
,
(
not
such
as
are
purely
abstracted
from
body
,
who
have
no
use
of
corporeall
instruments
)
are
the
End
for
which
the
world
was
made
.
8.
And
,
the
world
is
nothing
but
a
kind
of
vast
wombe
,
in
which
these
Spirits
may
be
begotten
and
brought
up
;
which
has
so
many
Cells
as
there
are
severall
Races
of
these
Spirits
.
Our
Cell
is
the
Earth
we
inhabit
:
the
Cells
of
the
rest
are
those
masses
of
the
Celestiall
bodies
;
except
the
Solar
ones
,
which
are
the
basest
of
all
the
rest
,
and
,
as
far
as
we
can
guesse
,
only
ministeriall
.
9.
The
Quantity
of
the
world
,
both
for
its
Extension
and
Duration
,
is
such
as
may
fitly
serve
for
the
breeding
up
so
many
differences
of
Spirits
:
providing
the
Cells
,
according
to
the
severall
kinds
;
and
giving
every
Cell
the
bignesse
and
duration
which
was
sufficient
for
the
number
the
Architect
design'd
.
10.
The
Figure
of
the
world
is
not
rendred
uneven
,
either
with
hollownesses
or
jettings
out
;
since
,
the
notion
of
Vacuum
excludes
both
these
:
Wherefore
,
't
is
either
Sphericall
,
or
of
some
other
Curvilineall
figure
,
which
,
most
concisely
,
covers
and
encompasses
so
many
and
such
great
Cells
.
11.
The
exteriour
rimme
of
it
is
not
compos'd
of
any
solid
body
,
but
of
thinnest
Vapours
exhal'd
out
of
the
outmost
bodies
:
unlesse
,
perhaps
,
there
be
reserv'd
in
nature
some
farther
use
of
the
Outmost
body
,
which
we
know
not
of
.
Peripateticall
INSTITUTIONS
.
Fourth
Book
.
Containing
that
part
of
METAPHYSICK
,
which
explicates
the
Essentiall
Notions
of
BODIES
.
LESSON
I.
Of
the
divisibility
of
Substance
,
into
Formall
parts
.
1.
SInce
water
is
,
2.
But
,
if
they
are
not
two
Substances
;
since
there
cannot
be
a
different
proportion
of
the
same
thing
to
it
fels
,
&
yet
the
proportion
of
Quantity
to
the
Substance
in
Aire
is
greater
then
in
Water
;
it
must
needs
be
,
again
,
that
ther
's
a
reall
composition
of
Quantity
to
Substance
and
,
therefore
,
a
Divisibility
.
3.
Whence
,
t
is
inferr'd
,
that
Substance
,
as
t
is
condistinct
from
Quantity
,
is
indivisible
;
since
Quantity
is
divisibility
.
4.
As
also
,
that
the
Notions
of
Rarity
and
Density
consist
in
the
proportion
of
the
Quantity
to
the
Substance
whose
it
is
:
since
rare
bodies
are
more
and
dense
less
divisible
.
5.
You
'l
object
,
Such
as
are
one
in
Quantity
are
one
in
Substance
,
6.
T
is
answered
,
'T
is
a
false
assumption
,
to
say
,
those
things
which
are
one
in
Quantity
are
one
in
their
Substances
,
too
.
To
that
which
is
objected
,
That
all
things
would
be
really
and
materially
one
;
T
is
answer'd
,
Either
't
is
but
the
same
which
we
call
to
be
One
quantitatively
,
and
then
't
would
be
shew'd
what
inconvenience
would
follow
,
that
consequence
being
admitted
:
or
else
,
that
term
,
really
and
materially
,
would
be
explicated
;
for
the
Arguers
seem
to
insinuate
that
it
signifies
,
abstracting
from
our
Notions
,
that
is
,
they
would
be
one
in
no
kind
of
unity
whereof
we
have
any
Notion
.
7.
All
things
,
therefore
,
according
to
that
unity
which
follows
the
notion
of
Quantity
,
(
and
that
is
accidentall
,
)
are
one
:
but
,
according
to
their
Substances
,
and
that
unity
which
follows
the
notion
of
Substance
,
they
are
many
.
8.
It
follows
,
from
what
has
been
said
,
As
oft
as
any
division
is
made
,
the
Substance
it self
is
chang'd
,
which
is
subjected
to
the
Quantity
,
according
to
the
intrinsecalls
of
Substance
,
as
't
is
condistinguish't
against
Quantity
:
For
,
Division
being
that
whereby
more
are
made
of
one
;
and
,
they
not
being
made
more
according
to
the
proper
unity
of
Quantity
;
this
plurality
must
,
of
necessity
,
be
in
the
Substance
as
't
is
condistinguish't
against
Quantity
;
wherefore
,
the
Unity
,
too
,
which
is
destroy'd
,
was
in
the
Substance
,
as
condistinguish't
from
the
Quantity
:
since
,
therefore
,
Vnity
superadds
nothing
to
Entity
,
but
a
negative
notion
of
indivision
;
it
comes
to
passe
,
that
a
change
cannot
be
made
in
the
unity
without
a
change
in
the
Entity
,
and
consequently
,
that
the
Entity
is
chang'd
.
9.
But
,
the
Entity
is
not
so
chang'd
,
that
two
Entities
should
be
made
out
of
nothing
;
but
out
of
one
that
existed
before
:
otherwise
,
there
would
not
have
been
made
a
division
.
There
was
,
therefore
,
a
power
or
possibility
in
the
Substance
,
to
be
many
;
as
,
in
many
,
ther
's
a
possibility
to
be
made
one
again
.
10.
The
Substance
,
therefore
,
is
chang'd
,
in
some
respect
;
and
remains
in
the
many
,
according
to
some
part
of
its
power
:
wherefore
,
't
is
divided
according
to
its
own
proprieties
;
and
,
there
is
,
in
Substances
,
divisible
according
to
Quantity
,
another
proper
divisibility
,
into
the
Power
by
which
it
can
be
what
it
is
,
and
the
Act
by
which
it
is
what
it
is
;
or
,
into
the
Matter
remaining
and
the
Form
chang'd
.
11.
Yet
,
the
parts
of
the
Substance
,
and
the
Quantity
it self
with
the
Substance
against
which
't
is
condivided
,
are
not
actually
in
their
compounds
,
before
division
:
for
,
't
is
plain
that
,
if
they
are
in
act
,
one
of
them
,
before
division
,
is
not
another
;
they
are
,
therefore
,
many
,
nor
can
be
divided
,
that
is
,
made
many
.
12.
Out
of
what
has
been
said
,
't
is
evident
,
that
this
Formall
divisibility
has
not
the
true
nature
of
divisibility
,
that
is
,
't
is
lesse
then
the
divisibility
of
a
Magnitude
into
its
parts
:
For
,
a
Magnitude
is
divided
into
parts
,
whereof
every
one
exists
after
the
division
,
by
their
proper
existences
;
but
,
one
,
at
least
of
these
parts
exists
no
longer
,
and
that
which
remains
exists
,
not
alone
,
but
commonly
with
some
other
,
instead
of
the
part
it
has
lost
.
LESSON
II.
Of
the
Formall
parts
of
Substance
,
in
particular
.
1.
HEnce
it
follows
that
,
because
a
change
,
according
to
the
parts
of
the
Substance
,
changes
the
Substance
it self
;
the
parts
are
parts
of
the
Substance
,
as
it
is
such
:
wherefore
,
neither
part
is
a
Substance
;
since
a
part
cannot
be
the
whole
:
But
,
to
be
a
Substance
is
,
To
have
a
nature
capable
of
existence
:
therefore
,
neither
part
,
separately
,
is
,
by
its
nature
,
capable
of
a
Being
:
and
,
any
Agent
to
give
a
Being
to
either
part
,
separately
,
must
first
change
its
nature
,
that
it
may
be
capable
of
Being
;
for
,
to
exist
,
cannot
agree
to
that
,
in
which
there
is
not
a
power
of
receiving
existence
.
2.
And
,
after
the
same
manner
,
must
it
be
said
of
Quantity
and
all
other
Accidents
,
whose
notion
is
wholy
without
,
and
not
comprehended
in
the
notion
of
Substance
;
and
consequently
,
their
notion
is
lesse
fit
and
apt
for
existence
.
3.
You
'l
say
,
if
these
things
are
true
,
it
implyes
a
contradiction
that
any
Accident
should
exist
out
of
its
own
Subject
;
the
contrary
whereof
is
a
matter
of
Faith
.
4.
'T
is
answer'd
,
ther
's
neither
Authority
nor
Demonstration
,
in
Theologie
,
which
convinces
that
an
Accident
may
be
preserv'd
out
of
a
Subject
;
as
,
't
is
plain
,
to
those
that
look
more
attentively
into
it
.
5.
But
,
on
the
contrary
,
't
is
evident
a
Whole
cannot
be
,
without
its
Parts
in
potentiâ
or
power
,
therefore
a
Substance
cannot
be
without
Quantity
,
which
is
its
parts
in
potentiâ
;
nor
can
a
Magnitude
be
,
without
its
Quantity's
having
a
determinate
proportion
to
its
Substance
,
that
is
,
without
Rarity
and
Density
;
again
,
Rare
and
Dense
diversly
mingled
,
import
all
the
rest
of
Corporeall
Qualityes
:
'T
is
evident
,
therefore
,
that
Accidents
cannot
be
without
a
Substance
.
6.
Farther
,
't
is
plain
,
the
division
of
Substance
is
into
a
pure
Power
and
a
substantiall
Form
,
or
,
that
which
makes
it
be
a
Substance
:
For
,
since
,
by
the
division
of
a
Substance
into
its
parts
,
the
Substance
is
chang'd
;
it
must
needs
be
,
that
the
Part
which
is
lost
gives
the
being
a
Substance
to
the
Whole
,
since
,
that
being
withdrawn
,
the
notion
of
Substance
is
taken
away
;
and
that
the
remaining
Part
is
a
pure
Power
;
for
,
since
't
is
a
power
to
the
notion
that
's
chang'd
,
and
that
is
the
first
of
all
others
,
't
is
clear
,
in
the
remaining
part
ther
's
no
notion
,
and
therefore
,
that
't
is
a
pure
Power
or
possibility
.
7.
Whence
,
again
,
't
is
clear
,
ther
's
a
greater
unity
of
the
parts
of
a
Substance
,
then
of
Substance
to
Quantity
:
since
,
Quantity
and
Substance
are
,
intellectually
,
distinct
;
but
,
of
the
Matter
and
Form
of
compounds
,
ther
's
but
one
only
notion
together
.
8.
You
'l
say
,
'T
is
impossible
to
conceive
that
Matter
,
of
it self
,
has
no
notion
;
for
,
it
would
not
be
cognoscible
.
'T
is
answer'd
;
Since
,
to
be
capable
of
being
something
neither
is
,
in
that
kind
whereof
't
is
capable
of
being
,
nor
yet
is
wholly
estranged
from
that
kind
:
so
,
that
which
is
a
capacity
to
the
first
kind
,
that
is
,
to
Substance
and
Being
,
neither
has
it
that
first
notion
,
and
yet
't
is
not
altogether
estranged
from
it
;
but
,
't
is
a
certain
degree
to
participate
Being
it self
,
by
the
mediation
of
another
.
9.
Now
the
ratio
or
notion
in
a
thing
is
That
,
by
which
its
nature
is
fitted
to
the
Understanding
,
or
the
Understandablenesse
of
a
thing
,
or
the
quiddity
,
the
whatnesse
and
,
consequently
,
that
,
whereby
a
thing
is
made
to
Be
:
The
Form
,
therefore
,
primarily
,
is
the
Cause
,
or
the
whereby
the
Being
is
had
.
10.
Whence
,
't
is
evidenc'd
,
there
cannot
be
more
Substantiall
Forms
,
in
the
same
Thing
:
nor
subordinate
ones
;
because
,
since
the
first
Form
gives
the
Being
,
the
second
must
needs
be
adventitious
to
what
has
a
Being
,
and
not
give
it
,
but
be
an
Accident
:
nor
coordinate
ones
;
since
they
have
each
their
own
notions
and
,
consequently
,
constitute
more
Beings
.
11.
'T
is
plain
,
too
,
that
the
Matter
has
a
Being
through
the
Form
,
and
cannot
be
sustain'd
otherwise
then
by
the
Form
;
since
,
of
it self
,
it
has
not
a
capacity
to
Be.
LESSON
III.
Of
the
Vnity
and
distinction
of
Bodies
in
common
.
1.
IT
follows
,
from
what
has
been
said
,
that
there
is
some
plurality
of
Forms
in
nature
,
before
all
Division
:
For
,
since
Division
is
made
,
by
the
interposition
of
one
body
,
between
the
sides
or
parts
of
another
,
there
must
necessarily
be
,
before
division
,
a
body
to
be
the
Divider
and
another
that
may
be
Divided
;
which
,
being
they
are
not
more
then
one
,
through
any
former
division
,
(
since
,
this
is
suppos'd
to
be
the
first
,
)
this
plurality
must
of
necessity
proceed
out
of
the
very
nature
and
notion
of
the
Things
.
2.
And
,
since
Essence
is
nothing
but
that
whereby
a
Thing
is
;
such
Things
must
be
,
essentially
,
distinct
:
Since
,
therefore
,
to
divide
belongs
to
dense
,
to
be
divided
to
rare
;
those
things
that
are
naturally
rare
and
dense
must
be
essentially
distinct
.
3.
Since
,
therefore
,
such
things
are
transmutable
among
themselves
,
and
adequately
divide
the
Universe
;
the
Matter
of
rare
and
dense
things
must
be
the
same
,
and
consequently
,
that
of
the
whole
Universe
.
4.
The
same
is
deduc'd
out
of
the
very
notion
of
Matter
;
which
,
being
a
power
to
the
notion
of
a
Thing
,
is
also
a
power
or
possibility
to
the
notion
of
One
:
since
,
therefore
,
a
Multitude
consists
but
of
Unities
;
before
unity
,
neither
distinction
nor
multitude
can
be
understood
:
There
can
,
therefore
,
be
no
multiplicity
of
matter
;
wherefore
,
that
of
all
nature
is
but
One.
5.
Hence
,
then
,
those
Questions
are
superfluous
,
Whether
one
Form
can
be
the
same
in
divers
Matters
?
and
again
,
Whether
many
Forms
in
one
Matter
?
Since
,
if
it
be
ask'd
,
of
the
proper
unity
of
Matter
,
that
of
all
Forms
is
the
same
;
if
,
of
the
individuall
unity
,
that
the
matter
attains
by
its
conjunction
with
a
Form
,
as
it
does
its
very
Being
.
6.
From
what
has
been
said
,
't
is
clear
,
that
every
body
,
that
is
,
every
Compound
of
act
and
power
is
a
Magnitude
:
For
,
since
ther
's
but
one
possible
First
matter
,
and
that
subject
to
Quantity
;
the
Compounds
of
it
,
too
,
must
of
necessity
be
subject
to
Quantity
.
7.
Hence
,
again
,
it
follows
,
that
no
body
moves
,
unlesse
,
in
some
manner
,
it
be
chang'd
first
:
For
since
a
Bulk
excludes
another
out
of
its
place
,
by
this
,
that
it
intrudes
it self
into
the
other's
place
,
because
two
cannot
be
together
in
the
same
place
;
unlesse
it
become
greater
then
its
own
place
or
leave
it
,
it
cannot
exclude
another
:
'T
is
manifest
,
therefore
,
that
it
must
be
altered
first
,
according
to
one
of
these
mutations
,
if
it
become
a
Mover
of
another
.
8.
Hence
,
again
,
't
is
collected
that
a
Body
is
,
essentially
,
an
Instrument
:
For
,
since
a
Body
has
two
properties
,
to
be
mov'd
and
to
move
;
and
,
to
be
mov'd
appertains
to
it
,
out
of
its
power
and
the
notion
of
Matter
;
't
is
clear
,
the
essentiall
notion
of
it
is
to
be
taken
from
its
vertue
of
moving
,
by
which
it
expresses
act
,
and
which
follows
the
nature
of
a
body
in
respect
as
it
actually
is
:
Since
,
therefore
▪
a
body
does
not
move
,
but
in
as
much
as
't
is
mov'd
;
clearly
,
according
to
its
essentiall
notion
,
't
is
an
Instrument
of
its
mover
or
applyer
.
9.
A
BODY
,
therefore
,
is
a
Thing
in
Nature
,
or
,
A
certain
part
of
the
Vniverse
;
provided
by
the
Authour
of
Nature
,
to
produce
a
certain
determinate
Motion
,
when
't
is
apply'd
.
10.
Whence
,
three
notions
,
or
manners
of
defining
a
naturall
Ens
or
Thing
,
are
discover'd
:
A
Metaphysicall
one
,
which
is
deduc'd
adequately
under
the
notion
of
Being
,
and
't
is
,
A
thing
which
has
an
existence
spread
into
many
potentiall
parts
,
that
is
,
a
Thing
in
or
of
such
parts
:
A
Naturall
or
Physicall
one
,
which
,
by
Sensible
Qualities
,
expounds
the
notion
of
those
parts
and
,
consequently
,
of
the
Thing
:
And
lastly
,
a
Morall
one
,
as
it
were
,
which
collects
the
same
from
the
End
,
that
is
,
from
the
quality
of
its
Motion
;
for
,
the
Metaphysicall
notion
,
properly
,
regards
only
its
capacity
of
Existence
.
11.
And
,
he
that
has
any
one
of
these
three
notions
,
even
by
that
,
has
all
:
for
,
the
Sensible
Qualities
impart
both
a
capacity
of
Existence
and
a
power
for
Action
.
12.
Whence
,
too
,
it
appears
,
that
one
Body
can
have
but
one
primary
Operation
:
for
,
since
the
sensible
qualities
give
both
the
power
of
working
and
the
capacity
of
existence
,
and
they
,
in
the
same
part
of
Matter
,
are
the
same
;
either
they
conspire
to
one
operation
,
or
not
:
if
not
,
neither
will
it
be
one
body
,
but
many
:
if
they
conspire
,
there
is
,
then
,
one
primary
operation
of
such
a
body
;
which
could
not
be
produc'd
,
either
by
another
disposition
,
nor
together
with
any
other
disposition
then
that
.
A
naturall
Body
,
therefore
,
is
that
One
Thing
whose
Operation
is
One.
LESSON
IV.
Of
the
essentiall
unity
and
distinction
of
the
Elements
and
mixt
bodies
.
1.
2.
And
,
if
whole
Nature
were
uniform
,
it
must
be
establisht
in
a
certain
degree
of
Density
and
Rarity
,
springing
from
the
proportion
of
Matter
to
this
Quantity
:
but
,
the
speciall
and
particular
bodies
which
are
in
the
Universe
,
as
it
is
now
framed
,
participate
,
out
of
this
universall
proportion
,
some
more
some
lesse
of
Density
and
Rarity
.
3.
Since
,
therefore
,
the
notions
of
Density
and
Rarity
are
the
first
differences
of
Magnitudes
:
those
bodies
,
which
first
and
least
of
all
exceed
the
nature
of
Body
in
common
,
will
be
distinguish't
by
these
differences
,
that
some
exist
in
denser
parts
,
others
in
rarer
;
which
,
in
our
Physicks
,
we
have
said
,
are
the
Elements
.
4.
Since
,
therefore
,
the
operations
of
rare
and
dense
bodies
,
as
such
,
are
to
divide
and
be
divided
;
and
this
last
is
passion
,
out
of
which
the
essentiall
notion
is
not
deduc'd
;
it
comes
to
passe
,
that
all
the
Elements
receive
their
differences
,
according
to
their
power
of
dividing
:
and
since
,
to
divide
is
a
kind
of
simple
action
;
they
are
distinguish't
by
no
other
differences
then
of
more
and
lesse
,
that
is
,
of
velocity
and
slownesse
.
5.
Among
the
Elements
,
therefore
,
those
which
are
fram'd
by
nature
to
divide
more
swiftly
must
be
more
perfect
;
and
those
are
they
which
are
more
subtile
:
wherefore
,
since
the
greatest
force
of
dividing
agrees
to
Fire
,
that
must
be
the
noblest
;
next
to
which
must
be
Aire
,
then
Water
,
then
Earth
.
6.
Which
last
,
though
,
by
its
Bulk
and
density
,
it
may
seem
more
apt
to
divide
,
and
has
,
as
it
were
,
in
the
first
place
,
the
nature
of
divisive
:
yet
,
by
reason
of
the
grossenesse
of
its
parts
,
in
naturall
action
,
it
can
doe
the
very
least
of
them
all
;
and
consequently
,
't
is
the
vilest
and
most
beggarly
Instrument
.
7.
It
appears
farther
that
,
since
a
body
is
,
essentially
,
an
Instrument
for
a
determinate
motion
;
and
there
must
needs
be
some
least
degree
of
rarity
and
density
;
and
the
littlenesse
in
bulk
hinders
both
the
divisive
power
and
divisibility
:
there
may
be
suppos'd
,
in
every
Element
,
parts
so
little
,
that
,
according
to
the
order
of
the
Universe
,
they
may
neither
have
a
capacity
of
dividing
others
,
nor
of
being
divided
by
others
;
and
so
,
there
may
not
be
in
them
the
essentiall
notion
of
an
Element
,
nor
of
any
other
naturall
body
.
8.
Again
,
since
all
bodies
are
Conjoin'd
;
9.
There
must
needs
,
therefore
,
in
nature
,
out
of
the
pure
conjunction
of
the
Elements
,
be
a
notion
of
a
certain
body
,
whose
parts
cannot
act
at
all
separately
,
but
,
in
conjunction
they
may
:
that
is
,
some
body
essentially
distinct
from
the
Elements
,
and
yet
,
made
out
of
their
conjunction
;
that
is
,
a
body
whose
essence
is
to
be
a
Mixtum
or
mixt
body
.
10.
But
,
since
,
in
bodies
,
universally
,
Unity
and
Magnitude
are
consider'd
:
't
is
plain
,
the
differences
of
those
bodies
are
collected
out
of
three
respects
;
the
specificall
difference
of
the
Elements
,
that
is
,
the
degrees
of
Density
and
Rarity
;
the
Multitude
of
parts
of
the
same
notion
;
and
their
Bulk
.
11.
A
Mixtum
,
therefore
,
is
a
body
of
certain
parts
,
of
divers
degrees
of
rarity
and
density
,
in
a
certain
number
and
bulk
compacted
among
themselves
,
ordain'd
by
nature
for
a
determinate
Motion
.
Moreover
,
't
is
evident
,
that
the
qualities
of
the
Elements
exist
refracted
and
mutually
abated
in
mixt
bodies
;
since
,
the
very
least
must
needs
simply
differ
in
degrees
of
rare
and
dense
,
and
these
degrees
,
by
reason
of
the
composition
,
must
needs
hinder
one
another
.
12.
And
yet
,
that
no
substantiall
Form
of
any
Element
is
found
in
a
Mixtum
:
since
,
a
Form
constitutes
a
Thing
,
and
a
Thing
is
ordain'd
for
Motion
;
but
,
Motion
is
of
the
whole
,
not
of
the
severall
parts
.
13.
Out
of
what
has
been
said
,
't
is
evident
,
that
the
operation
of
a
Mixtum
is
a
certain
Division
qualifi'd
by
the
nature
of
the
parts
of
the
Mixtum
:
which
nature
,
the
better
't
is
,
that
is
,
the
more
serviceable
for
the
best
works
of
nature
,
so
much
the
nobler
is
the
Mixtum
,
essentially
.
14.
Again
,
if
the
whole
mixture
of
the
Elements
be
shut
up
into
so
little
a
part
,
that
one
part
cannot
,
separated
from
another
,
have
its
proper
effect
;
then
the
Mixtum
is
simply
one
and
primely
mixt
:
but
,
if
the
mixture
be
extended
so
amply
,
that
many
parts
may
act
,
asunder
,
according
to
the
divers
parts
of
the
temperament
;
then
,
't
is
not
a
Mixtum
,
but
a
Demixtum
or
Decompositum
,
that
is
,
one
made
up
of
many
Mixtum's
;
as
we
see
in
Metalls
and
other
Mines
,
as
Coal
,
&c.
where
many
Mixtum's
are
joyn'd
together
,
which
are
apt
to
be
separated
by
fire
or
other
artifice
.
LESSON
V.
Of
the
Essence
of
Animals
,
and
of
the
Soul
.
1.
BUt
because
,
among
Mixtum's
,
some
are
solid
and
consistent
,
others
fluid
;
and
of
these
,
by
the
course
of
nature
,
the
conditions
and
temperaments
are
different
and
,
in
some
sort
,
opposite
:
there
must
,
of
necessity
,
out
of
the
conjunction
of
these
,
rise
a
middle
temper
,
which
cannot
but
be
fit
for
some
certain
motions
.
2.
And
,
because
all
things
,
with
us
here
,
are
beset
with
heat
;
the
solid
parts
cannot
be
kept
moist
,
that
is
,
mixt
throughly
with
actuall
moisture
,
unlesse
there
be
some
continuall
cause
or
Fountain
,
out
of
which
the
moisture
,
so
consumable
and
subject
to
be
wasted
by
the
power
of
heat
,
may
be
perpetually
supply'd
.
3.
Now
,
that
Fountain
may
be
suppos'd
within
and
intrinsecall
to
the
Mixtum
,
or
else
conjoyn'd
,
that
is
,
in
a
body
joyn'd
to
it
:
But
,
if
it
be
this
later
way
,
't
is
plain
,
that
watred
Mixtum
is
not
,
of
its
mere
self
,
constantly
what
it
is
,
but
through
its
situation
or
conjunction
to
another
,
from
which
,
if
it
be
separated
,
it
perishes
.
4.
But
,
that
which
is
watred
the
former
way
has
,
within
it self
,
what
is
necessary
to
keep
it
still
a
constant
Instrument
in
nature
,
of
that
operation
which
't
is
fram'd
to
undertake
:
and
,
consequently
,
it
has
one
Form
,
from
that
one
Operation
't
is
ordain'd
to
,
and
that
one
Order
of
parts
conform'd
to
such
an
operation
.
5.
And
,
because
we
find
these
in
all
and
only
Animals
:
an
Animal
is
evidently
counted
to
be
One
naturall
Thing
having
one
Form
.
6.
You
'l
say
,
if
the
severall
similary
parts
of
an
Animal
,
subsisting
in
their
proper
forms
,
were
connected
;
they
'd
have
the
same
effect
as
they
have
now
in
the
Animal
:
ther
's
no
need
,
therefore
,
of
the
particular
form
of
an
Animal
.
7.
'T
is
answer'd
,
Ther
's
no
particular
nature
in
any
similary
part
of
an
Animal
,
which
is
common
to
that
part
alive
and
dead
,
as
if
there
could
be
some
form
,
as
it
were
,
indifferent
;
but
,
the
nature
of
a
living
part
is
contrary
to
the
nature
of
a
dead
part
:
Now
,
naturall
Things
are
naturall
parts
of
the
world
,
unerringly
flowing
from
the
ESSENTIFICALL
IDEA'S
;
and
,
therefore
,
they
receive
essentiall
notions
,
according
to
the
Order
they
have
in
the
Universe
.
8.
But
,
because
the
parts
of
an
Animal
are
so
fram'd
,
that
one
should
water
,
that
is
,
alter
or
move
another
;
't
is
plain
that
,
of
necessity
,
they
must
be
of
severall
conditions
and
figures
:
wherefore
,
the
complex
of
them
is
an
Organicall
bodie
,
having
within
it self
Life
,
that
is
,
a
power
of
moving
it self
;
and
,
its
Form
is
the
Act
of
such
a
body
,
that
is
,
a
Soul
.
9.
But
,
since
the
notion
of
a
Soul
requires
that
the
parts
of
its
subject
,
whose
orm
it
is
,
be
some
Movers
others
Moved
;
't
is
clear
,
that
it
does
not
inform
each
of
the
parts
,
or
,
is
not
in
every
part
,
as
't
is
usually
said
,
and
as
it
happens
in
Elementary
forms
;
but
,
that
't
is
only
in
the
whole
and
,
immediately
,
the
Form
of
the
Whole
.
10.
Notwithstanding
,
the
parts
have
not
,
therefore
,
partiall
or
particular
Forms
:
because
they
are
not
actually
in
the
whole
,
nor
have
,
actually
,
any
nature
by
which
they
could
subsist
out
of
the
whole
;
as
appears
,
in
that
,
being
but
divided
,
they
presently
die
.
11.
Hence
,
't
is
collected
,
wherein
consists
the
Metaphysicall
notion
of
an
Animal
:
viz.
that
,
'T
is
a
Thing
of
many
parts
,
order'd
among
themselves
,
as
to
Action
;
that
is
,
whereof
some
are
active
upon
others
,
and
the
rest
are
passive
from
them
.
12.
To
which
the
Morall
definition
adjoyn's
,
that
'T
is
an
Instrument
for
Action
,
that
is
,
for
that
operation
or
motion
to
which
they
apply
themselves
;
such
as
is
locall
motion
,
which
all
participate
.
13.
And
,
the
Physicall
definition
considers
that
many
Mixtum's
are
contain'd
in
an
Animal
,
as
also
Organicall
parts
,
that
is
,
parts
woven
and
compos'd
of
many
Mixtum's
;
and
so
conjoin'd
,
that
the
libertie
of
each
is
not
taken
away
,
but
that
they
are
active
upon
one
another
,
as
if
they
were
distinct
Things
.
14.
And
,
since
,
from
the
presence
of
an
Object
,
an
impression
is
made
upon
an
Animall
;
whence
it
begins
to
act
about
that
which
is
without
,
so
as
is
convenient
for
the
nature
it self
of
the
Animall
;
yet
,
this
impression
is
,
such
as
makes
no
sensible
change
in
the
Animall
:
we
apprehend
the
Object
to
be
in
the
Animall
,
as
neither
perfecting
nor
hurting
it
,
but
indifferently
,
and
purely
As
another
thing
;
and
this
we
call
Knowing
:
and
,
that
the
Animall
operates
out
of
it self
,
as
it
were
,
what
is
convenient
for
it
,
supposing
this
knowledge
;
and
this
we
call
working
out
of
knowledge
.
15.
Again
,
because
it
appears
,
by
our
Physicks
,
that
the
proper
motions
of
an
Animall
derive
their
Origin
from
the
Heart
,
which
directs
the
Spirits
into
the
nerves
that
are
necessary
for
all
kinds
of
motion
;
and
that
this
Impulse
is
call'd
Passion
;
moreover
,
that
all
Passions
depend
and
emerge
from
LOVE
and
,
in
an
Animall
rightly
dispos'd
,
are
subject
and
conformable
to
love
:
It
follows
,
that
Its
prime
Love
,
or
,
the
prosecution
of
its
chiefly
beloved
is
that
Passion
or
Motion
or
Action
,
to
which
the
fabrick
and
compagination
of
an
Animall
is
immediately
order'd
;
and
consequently
,
that
Animals
,
by
these
,
excell
one
another
.
16.
Now
,
the
prime
pursuit
of
an
Animall
is
after
Food
;
and
Food
is
what
is
conformable
to
the
quality
of
a
body
,
and
preserves
and
causes
a
right
disposition
:
Since
,
therefore
,
an
Animall
agrees
with
other
bodies
in
being
an
Instrument
,
to
be
apply'd
by
another
,
and
an
Instrument
is
,
in
so
much
,
more
perfect
,
as
it
can
perform
,
more
easily
and
more
efficaciously
,
more
or
more
Noble
works
;
that
Animall
will
be
better
then
the
rest
,
which
is
more
easily
applyable
,
and
to
more
things
:
for
commonly
,
the
more
noble
operation
consists
of
the
more
parts
,
and
what
's
apply'd
more
easily
operates
more
efficaciously
.
17.
The
Food
,
therefore
,
of
that
Animall
is
best
,
which
renders
it
of
a
calm
Fancy
and
of
an
Appetite
the
most
indifferent
;
which
,
commonly
,
follow
one
another
:
and
,
that
Animall
is
the
best
,
which
is
primarily
affected
to
such
Food
.
LESSON
VI.
Of
the
Chief
Animal
and
the
essentiall
distinction
of
Bodies
.
1.
OUt
of
what
has
been
said
,
it
may
be
convinc'd
,
if
some
Animal
can
be
apply'd
to
one
or
more
determinate
operations
,
and
another
to
whatever
,
without
any
term
or
limitation
;
this
later
kind
has
so
great
an
eminency
above
the
former
,
that
they
are
not
of
the
same
Order
:
wherefore
,
It
will
be
the
noblest
,
and
something
above
the
Order
of
the
rest
.
2.
'T
is
plain
,
too
,
that
nothing
greater
can
be
imagin'd
,
in
the
notion
of
an
Animal
;
no
,
nor
of
a
Body
:
For
,
if
a
Bodie
be
an
Instrument
applyable
to
a
determinate
action
,
an
Instrument
to
all
extends
to
both
the
noblest
and
the
most
:
Wherefore
,
nothing
can
be
conceiv'd
higher
in
the
notion
either
of
a
Body
or
an
Animall
.
3.
Since
,
therefore
,
in
our
Physicks
,
any
thing
whatever
;
't
is
plain
,
that
a
Man
is
the
prime
both
of
Bodies
and
Animals
;
and
something
beyond
them
.
4.
It
appears
out
of
what
has
been
said
,
that
there
cannot
be
any
other
differences
of
Bodies
,
which
are
not
comprehended
in
the
fore-mentioned
.
For
,
the
Elements
,
differing
in
Rarity
and
Density
,
divide
Body
,
precisely
,
as
it
speaks
Quantity
united
to
Substance
:
The
nature
of
Mixtum's
,
which
consist
in
the
Number
and
Proportion
of
rare
and
dense
bodies
,
follows
that
divisibility
of
quantity
,
whereby
bodies
have
number
and
proportion
:
And
,
the
Site
and
Order
of
Parts
we
chiefly
see
in
Animals
,
whose
members
can
act
one
upon
another
:
Lastly
,
the
Infinitude
of
Quantity
shew's
it self
in
Man
,
in
that
he
is
ordinable
,
after
a
sort
,
to
infinite
things
.
5.
Again
,
since
Quantity
is
divisibility
into
parts
,
those
are
distinct
either
in
Number
,
as
it
were
,
and
Site
only
;
and
bodies
divisible
into
such
parts
are
the
Elements
:
or
,
they
differ
in
Nature
;
and
such
are
the
parts
of
Mixtum's
:
or
,
lastly
,
they
are
parts
which
,
in
the
Thing
it self
,
are
,
as
it
were
,
certain
Things
exercising
their
own
proper
operations
;
such
are
the
Members
of
Animals
;
the
complex
of
which
,
if
it
makes
a
body
orderable
to
all
possible
Action
,
it
constitutes
a
Man
.
6.
Again
,
the
division
which
a
body
makes
is
,
either
simply
dividing
more
and
lesse
;
and
,
by
this
,
the
Elements
are
distinguish't
:
or
,
't
is
a
modify'd
division
,
by
which
certain
bodies
,
with
a
certain
qualification
,
are
distinguish't
;
and
this
is
the
proper
division
of
Mixt
bodies
,
by
which
their
so
many
effects
are
produc'd
:
or
't
is
an
abstractive
division
,
that
is
,
which
,
of
it self
,
has
no
effect
,
but
is
a
way
and
instrument
to
another
division
;
and
such
is
the
motion
of
Animals
;
which
,
if
it
be
in
a
certain
determinate
manner
and
number
,
constitutes
the
other
Animals
,
if
indeterminately
and
with
infinite
variety
,
belongs
to
Man
.
7.
And
,
that
these
differences
are
essentiall
,
appears
from
hence
,
that
they
,
of
themselves
,
divide
and
include
the
notion
and
end
of
a
Thing
consisting
of
parts
,
that
is
,
of
Body
or
bodily
Substance
;
as
cloven-footednesse
includes
pedality
,
and
the
being
divided
into
three
or
four
Toes
includes
cloven-footednesse
:
for
,
no
difference
,
of
any
of
these
above-mentioned
kinds
,
can
be
understood
without
the
notion
of
a
Thing
consisting
of
parts
;
nor
,
be
apapply'd
to
any
other
common
notion
,
unlesse
accidentally
.
8.
Nor
,
is
it
lesse
apparent
,
that
these
essentiall
differences
are
the
very
Accidents
,
that
is
,
the
very
complexion
or
clinging
together
of
rare
and
dense
parts
:
which
is
call'd
Substantiall
or
essentiall
,
in
as
much
as
it
furnishes
the
body
for
its
prime
and
chief
operation
;
and
as
,
saving
the
order
to
the
chief
operation
,
't
is
mutable
,
so
far
't
is
some
of
the
Accidents
:
For
,
since
the
parts
are
not
actually
in
a
formall
Compound
;
't
is
clear
,
that
whatever
is
in
the
Compound
cannot
be
this
and
that
,
severall
and
distinct
Things
.
9.
A
transmutation
,
therefore
,
is
accidentall
only
or
more
then
accidentall
,
in
as
much
as
't
is
greater
or
lesse
,
or
,
as
it
extends
to
severall
notions
.
10.
Hence
,
again
,
't
is
evident
,
that
Genericall
unity
,
though
it
be
founded
in
nature
(
as
appears
out
of
what
has
been
said
)
:
yet
't
is
not
truly
any
other
then
Mentall
(
that
is
,
by
being
in
the
understanding
)
as
to
the
effect
of
unity
;
though
the
similitude
in
which
't
is
founded
be
reall
.
11.
And
that
the
ultimate
essentiall
unity
,
which
they
term
Specificall
,
and
imagine
common
,
is
no
other
then
the
very
Individuall
unity
:
For
,
since
all
difference
consists
of
the
collection
of
rare
and
dense
,
and
all
operation
follows
the
same
differences
in
the
very
instant
of
the
birth
or
first
being
of
every
thing
,
when
the
Individuation
is
determin'd
;
it
must
needs
be
,
that
whatever
Accidents
there
are
,
in
the
thing
once
made
,
either
fit
or
avert
it
from
the
primary
operation
,
to
which
't
is
ordain'd
:
Since
,
therefore
,
every
change
in
the
Form
makes
an
essentiall
difference
,
and
all
variety
in
respect
of
the
primary
operation
is
a
change
in
the
Form
,
't
is
plain
that
every
Accident
concurs
to
an
essentiall
change
;
and
(
which
was
intended
)
that
Numericall
difference
,
which
is
the
ultimate
and
compleat
proportion
of
a
Thing
to
its
operation
,
is
essentiall
.
12.
Wherefore
,
since
,
from
the
highest
ratio
or
notion
of
a
Thing
consisting
of
parts
,
one
may
descend
,
by
numberlesse
degrees
,
to
whatever
Individuall
;
Genericall
degrees
will
be
without
any
known
number
,
but
the
specificall
will
be
no
other
then
that
of
an
Individuum
.
LESSON
VII
.
Of
the
mutation
of
the
Individuality
in
the
severall
kinds
of
Bodies
.
1.
ANd
,
hence
,
't
is
evident
that
,
a
Thing
being
chang'd
but
accidentally
,
the
Individuality
is
not
chang'd
;
because
that
's
taken
directly
under
the
notion
of
Thing
or
Body
;
which
is
the
last
that
's
destroy'd
in
the
thing
,
as
't
is
the
last
that
's
made
.
2.
For
,
since
change
is
made
by
locall
motion
,
and
that
's
divisible
without
end
;
if
,
upon
every
accidentall
variation
,
the
Substance
should
be
chang'd
,
substantiall
transmutation
would
be
continually
successive
,
and
would
not
subsist
but
in
motion
,
that
is
,
so
,
that
one
part
would
not
be
whilst
another
is
;
and
consequently
,
the
notion
of
a
Substance
would
never
be
nor
its
Being
be
Indivisible
;
nor
would
there
be
any
Thing
by
whose
mediation
Accidents
might
subsist
;
to
conclude
,
there
would
be
nothing
in
Nature
,
the
constancy
and
firmnesse
of
Substance
being
once
taken
away
.
3.
Among
the
Elements
't
is
plain
,
the
Notion
of
the
Individuum
is
chang'd
by
mere
division
;
so
that
,
any
whatever
least
particle
being
taken
away
or
added
,
the
notion
of
the
Individuum
is
chang'd
:
But
,
the
quality
of
Rarity
or
Density
being
chang'd
,
the
notion
of
the
Individuum
is
not
,
therefore
,
altered
.
4.
For
,
since
the
mutation
according
to
Rarity
and
Density
is
a
continuall
one
,
that
is
,
divisible
without
end
;
there
would
be
an
infinite
succession
of
Individuums
:
But
,
it
appears
to
the
Considerer
,
that
it
happens
not
so
in
division
;
whose
Motion
though
it
be
continuall
,
yet
the
being
divided
follows
indivisibly
.
Besides
,
if
,
both
by
division
and
change
of
rarity
,
the
quidditative
notion
of
an
Element
should
be
varied
,
there
would
be
no
accidentall
change
in
the
Elements
.
5.
Of
Mixtums
,
the
manner
is
partly
the
same
,
partly
different
:
for
,
if
a
dissolution
intervene
between
the
heterogeneall
parts
which
essentially
constitute
a
Mixtum
,
there
will
be
a
change
,
not
of
the
Individuum
,
but
of
the
Genericall
notion
;
but
,
if
any
parts
of
the
same
temperament
be
either
added
or
taken
away
,
the
Individuall
notion
is
accounted
chang'd
.
6.
But
,
the
Unity
of
an
Animal
is
not
prejudic'd
by
the
withdrawing
of
neither
similary
nor
dissimilary
parts
;
but
only
of
those
,
wherein
the
prime
force
of
its
Instrumentality
precisely
consists
:
and
,
that
being
maim'd
,
it
suffers
a
Genericall
change
.
7.
For
,
since
the
divisibility
of
the
Elements
is
,
precisely
,
into
the
parts
of
a
Magnitude
;
out
of
that
division
,
by
the
course
of
nature
,
a
variation
in
the
Substances
must
necessarily
follow
.
8.
As
also
,
since
the
composition
of
Animals
clearly
aym's
,
by
a
certain
Way
,
at
a
certain
End
;
a
substantiall
variatio
in
them
must
only
depend
upon
the
change
of
the
adequate
complexion
necessary
to
the
End
of
the
composition
.
9.
Lastly
,
Mixtums
;
since
their
notion
is
constituted
betwixt
both
these
;
as
't
is
aggregated
of
similary
parts
and
has
a
conformity
with
the
Elements
,
so
far
,
it
follows
,
they
must
be
subject
to
their
way
of
change
;
but
,
as
't
is
compounded
of
dissimilar
parts
,
yet
cohering
in
Proportion
not
Order
,
so
far
't
is
chang'd
by
the
change
of
the
Proportion
without
any
respect
to
the
Order
.
10.
You
'l
object
;
Since
every
Accident
concurs
to
the
designation
of
the
Substance
;
upon
any
Accident
's
being
chang'd
,
the
ultimate
substantiall
difference
must
be
altered
:
especially
,
since
a
Substance
is
defin'd
to
be
nothing
but
A
certain
Resultance
from
Accidents
.
11.
'T
is
answer'd
,
that
,
as
,
't
is
evident
,
Plurality
is
,
so
,
nothing
else
but
division
ended
,
as
,
notwithstanding
,
not
every
part
of
the
division
changes
Unity
,
but
only
the
Figure
:
so
,
it
happens
in
Rarefaction
,
that
't
is
indeed
the
production
of
a
new
Element
,
when
't
is
perfected
;
yet
,
every
part
of
rarefaction
does
not
partially
change
the
Substance
of
an
Element
.
12.
Now
,
rarefaction
and
condensation
is
perfected
,
when
't
is
become
such
,
that
the
former
degree
cannot
be
restor'd
to
the
Thing
that
's
rarifi'd
or
condens'd
,
out
of
the
precise
nature
of
Common
causes
;
but
ther
's
need
of
a
speciall
cause
for
this
effect
:
for
,
't
is
plain
,
that
,
otherwise
,
it
is
not
,
in
respect
of
the
world
,
a
new
Thing
or
part
;
since
,
by
the
very
common
constitution
of
the
world
,
't
will
return
to
its
former
nature
.
13.
Much
more
,
in
the
destruction
of
an
Animal
,
every
alteration
is
,
so
,
a
way
to
its
destruction
,
as
,
notwithstanding
,
every
part
does
not
partially
change
the
very
Substance
of
the
Animal
.
14.
Hence
,
't
is
collected
,
how
ther
's
made
an
Augmentation
of
the
same
numericall
Animal
,
through
the
whole
course
of
its
life
;
and
how
,
many
of
its
members
being
cut
off
,
the
same
still
numericall
Animal
remains
:
For
,
it
being
said
,
that
the
Substantiall
notion
of
an
Animal
is
to
be
rated
from
its
prime
Passion
,
and
that
That
is
the
Love
of
Food
,
that
is
,
of
preserving
it self
;
moreover
,
that
an
Animal
being
once
made
,
the
identity
is
not
chang'd
,
unlesse
the
quality
of
its
first
operation
be
chang'd
,
according
to
the
order
of
nature
;
it
follows
,
that
an
Animal
is
not
chang'd
substantially
,
as
long
as
the
love
of
preserving
it self
remains
in
it
.
15.
But
,
the
cutting
off
of
members
,
clearly
,
does
not
take
away
this
disposition
;
and
,
the
change
which
is
made
by
the
digesting
Food
into
it self
is
mean't
to
continue
the
Animal
:
't
is
clear
,
therefore
,
neither
of
these
destroy
the
bounds
of
nature
,
which
,
we
have
said
,
are
the
Ends
and
determiners
of
Substance
;
&
consequently
,
the
nature
of
Individuation
remains
firm
.
16.
Now
,
why
an
Animal
,
remaining
the
same
in
Substance
,
should
not
be
rarefi'd
although
more
quantity
come
to
it
:
the
reason
is
plain
;
because
,
the
Substance
of
an
Animal
is
,
of
it self
,
indifferent
to
many
Magnitudes
,
that
is
,
to
be
lesse
and
bigger
,
and
that
which
it
receives
is
deriv'd
to
it
by
the
destruction
of
other
bodies
;
so
that
materia
prima
(
which
is
a
capacity
of
quantity
)
has
that
comparison
to
the
augmented
Animal
,
that
is
,
is
a
Capacity
of
as
much
quantity
in
the
Animal
,
as
it
was
before
in
many
Things
:
whence
,
it
comes
to
passe
,
that
in
the
Animal
,
the
quantity
and
substance
retain
the
same
proportion
to
the
Standard
or
universall
substance
,
which
before
they
had
to
it
in
the
Animal
and
its
food
.
17.
It
appears
,
again
,
out
of
what
has
been
said
,
how
the
Suppositum
may
be
said
to
have
more
in
it
then
the
Nature
;
though
these
are
,
indeed
,
one
and
the
very
same
thing
:
For
,
the
Nature
speaks
the
complexion
of
Accidents
,
precisely
as
't
is
a
complexion
;
and
so
makes
an
Instrument
of
the
operation
intended
by
nature
:
and
the
notion
of
this
is
one
and
determind
;
and
ther
's
nothing
in
it
but
essentially
and
formally
.
18.
But
,
the
Suppositum
is
the
thing
which
the
Nature
constitutes
:
whence
,
because
it
so
explicates
the
nature
,
as
that
,
besides
,
it
includes
confusedly
other
notions
;
as
also
,
because
the
nature
is
a
complexion
of
many
,
the
natures
of
every
one
must
needs
be
conjoyn'd
with
this
Nature
or
Substance
:
it
comes
to
passe
,
that
all
the
Accidents
,
according
to
their
particular
natures
,
are
in
the
Suppositum
;
and
consequently
,
that
there
is
more
in
the
Suppositum
,
then
in
the
Nature
.
LESSON
VIII
.
Of
the
proper
Action
of
the
Chief
Animal
.
1.
IT
appears
,
farther
,
that
,
since
an
Animal
is
governd
by
Passion
;
and
Passion
rises
from
goods
or
ills
to
Nature
,
that
is
,
those
things
which
are
conformable
or
dissonant
to
nature
:
Man
,
if
he
be
applyable
to
all
things
,
that
is
,
prompt
to
embrace
any
ill
of
nature
,
or
fly
any
good
;
must
of
necessity
have
such
a
faculty
in
him
,
that
,
in
his
Brain
,
ills
of
nature
greater
then
any
such
good
may
be
joyn'd
to
the
good
which
he
is
to
eschue
,
and
likewise
greater
goods
to
the
ill
he
is
to
embrace
;
that
,
so
,
he
may
,
by
the
applyer
,
be
impell'd
to
his
destin'd
actions
.
2.
These
goods
,
therefore
,
with
ills
,
and
contrariwise
,
since
they
are
not
conjoyn'd
in
the
things
themselves
,
and
yet
must
appear
to
him
conjoyn'd
,
and
this
not
by
mistake
but
by
the
design
of
nature
;
't
is
plain
,
there
is
in
the
Man
a
faculty
whereby
it
may
appear
to
him
that
those
goods
are
conjoyn'd
with
the
ills
,
and
that
he
from
that
appearance
is
mov'd
;
and
not
because
the
appearances
are
naturally
conjoyn'd
(
as
,
peradventure
,
't
is
in
Beasts
)
,
which
,
not
having
any
conjunction
from
a
conjunction
of
the
objects
in
nature
,
(
as
,
future
or
past
things
)
,
cannot
from
such
conjunction
,
that
is
,
by
force
of
nature
,
have
a
power
of
moving
through
conjunction
.
3.
And
,
since
this
conjunction
moves
a
man
,
not
as
being
a
manner
of
the
knowledge
of
things
,
but
because
't
is
the
thing
known
;
the
other
conditions
,
too
,
of
Things
and
chiefly
their
very
Existence
must
be
,
so
,
in
a
man
and
,
so
,
move
him
:
The
objects
,
therefore
,
as
existing
,
that
is
,
Existence
as
Existence
must
be
known
by
a
man
.
4.
And
,
because
existence
,
by
its
own
Form
and
its
very
being
existence
,
excludes
non-existence
;
he
that
knows
a
thing
exists
knows
that
it
does
not
not-exist
,
or
(
which
is
as
much
)
that
what
exists
,
whilst
it
does
so
,
cannot
not-exist
.
Man
,
therefore
,
has
a
foundation
whereby
he
may
be
certify'd
of
all
Truth
,
viz.
that
The
same
cannot
be
and
not-be
,
at
once
.
5.
Since
,
therefore
,
then
we
are
judg'd
to
understand
,
when
we
know
a
thing
is
and
cannot
be
otherwise
;
a
Man
,
certainly
,
is
to
be
call'd
an
Vnderstanding
Creature
.
6.
Again
,
since
our
knowledge
rises
from
our
Senses
,
&
our
Senses
,
sometimes
,
are
so
imperfectly
mov'd
by
the
Objects
,
that
,
though
we
perceive
ther
's
something
,
yet
we
know
not
its
quality
,
(
for
example
,
we
see
a
body
,
which
we
know
not
whether
it
be
alive
or
dead
;
or
,
we
discern
it
moves
it self
,
but
doubt
what
kind
of
Animal
't
is
)
:
't
is
evident
,
we
know
some
one
thing
,
of
more
like
to
one
another
which
we
are
acquainted
with
,
to
be
,
without
distinguishing
the
individuality
,
that
is
,
we
have
an
universall
notion
which
is
indifferent
to
many
.
7.
And
,
compounding
these
former
with
this
farther
Consideration
,
that
'T
is
the
same
thing
to
know
One
thing
is
another
,
&
to
know
that
Those
things
,
which
are
the
same
with
a
third
,
are
the
same
between
themselves
:
't
is
plain
that
a
Man
is
Discoursive
;
and
that
his
knowledge
is
deriv'd
from
those
things
,
whereof
he
's
certain
,
to
something
,
whereof
he
was
not
certain
,
but
is
rendred
certain
by
the
very
derivation
.
8.
And
because
,
of
those
things
which
are
unknown
,
either
part
is
indifferent
to
the
Understanding
,
and
the
Understanding
is
undetermin'd
concerning
them
:
it
follows
,
that
a
Man
,
by
this
Discourse
,
of
undetermin'd
,
is
rendred
determin'd
;
and
,
because
the
Principles
of
determination
are
in
himself
,
it
comes
to
passe
that
a
Man
determines
himself
and
moves
himself
.
9.
Again
,
since
,
't
is
clear
,
that
one
part
of
a
Man
is
affected
from
another
part
,
as
from
a
sensible
object
;
for
example
,
One
hand
Feels
the
other
or
whatever
other
exteriour
part
of
the
Body
;
in
like
manner
,
we
are
sensible
of
our selves
by
Smell
,
Hearing
,
and
Sight
:
it
follows
,
that
a
Man
can
think
and
discourse
of
himself
and
,
consequently
,
of
his
actions
;
and
,
by
consequence
,
that
he
can
determine
himself
to
act
or
not-act
,
the
understanding
descending
by
discourse
to
the
good
or
illnesse
of
the
action
he
is
about
to
doe
.
10.
A
Man
,
therefore
,
moves
himself
to
act
and
is
Master
of
his
action
,
and
,
out
of
the
notion
of
good
and
ill
,
differently
disposes
his
action
;
which
we
use
to
call
being
Free
:
a
Man
,
therefore
,
is
Free
.
11.
You
'l
object
,
that
liberty
,
according
to
the
common
notion
of
men
,
consists
in
this
,
that
,
Supposing
all
things
requisite
for
action
,
yet
a
Man
can
,
out
of
an
intrinsecall
faculty
,
immediately
will
to
act
or
not-act
.
'T
is
answer'd
,
This
is
not
the
notion
of
the
vulgar
;
which
holds
to
act
and
not-act
for
the
notion
of
liberty
,
without
that
addition
of
supposing
all
things
requisite
besides
the
action
it self
:
nor
is
it
the
notion
of
the
Learned
,
that
have
sought
in
Nature
it self
,
how
the
notion
of
the
vulgar
should
be
explicated
.
12.
But
't
is
an
errour
in
Metaphysick
,
in
as
much
as
it
supposes
an
indifferent
,
as
indifferent
,
to
act
;
and
that
to
be
in
Effect
which
never
was
in
Cause
,
that
is
,
an
effect
to
be
without
a
cause
.
13.
Again
,
't
is
erroneous
in
Morall
Science
:
for
the
Notion
of
Vertue
would
be
taken
away
;
whose
nature
't
is
to
incline
to
will
actually
,
so
that
,
a
more
vertuous
person
is
more
determin'd
to
will
just
things
then
a
lesse
vertuous
.
14.
Perswasion
,
too
,
and
Negotiation
would
be
taken
away
:
for
,
if
the
determination
of
the
will
should
proceed
not
out
of
the
preceding
causes
,
in
vain
would
be
the
endeavours
of
drawing
men
to
follow
one
thing
more
then
another
.
15.
Out
of
what
has
been
said
,
it
may
be
determin'd
,
that
Man
,
by
force
of
his
Intellective
vertue
,
consider'd
in
it self
,
is
capable
of
infinite
Science
:
For
,
since
,
whatever
is
added
is
still
a
degree
and
disposition
in
the
Man
to
farther
Science
't
is
apparent
,
the
understanding
is
not
burden'd
but
rendred
more
capable
by
former
Science
:
Wherefore
,
since
Science
,
for
its
part
,
may
,
by
addition
,
encrease
without
end
,
and
is
only
restrain'd
by
uninfinitenesse
of
the
number
of
the
Objects
,
it
must
needs
be
that
Man
is
capable
of
comprehending
all
,
that
is
,
infinite
Science
,
together
and
at
once
;
that
is
,
he
is
of
a
capacity
absolutely
infinite
,
in
respect
of
bodies
;
comprehending
infinite
of
them
,
as
a
Superficies
comprehends
infinite
Lines
,
and
a
Line
infinite
Points
.
16.
Again
,
since
,
among
knowable
things
,
those
are
contain'd
,
too
,
which
are
to
be
done
by
a
Man
;
to
this
,
also
,
humane
Science
extends
,
even
to
know
what
's
to
be
done
.
And
,
since
Science
is
an
active
Principle
,
a
Man
,
by
Science
,
will
be
enabled
to
direct
his
actions
;
that
is
,
to
govern
his
life
;
and
this
most
perfectly
,
because
he
is
enabled
to
know
what
's
best
to
be
done
.
LESSON
IX
.
Of
the
Soul
of
the
Chief
Animal
,
or
,
of
the
MIND
.
1.
OUt
of
what
has
been
hitherto
explicated
,
't
is
easily
deduc'd
that
Man
,
according
to
this
principle
,
is
rais'd
above
the
notions
of
Matter
and
Quantity
.
For
,
since
Matter
is
a
certain
capacity
of
Quantity
,
Quantity
of
Figure
,
Figure
is
determin'd
by
Place
,
and
all
these
in
Time
:
but
,
't
is
clear
,
that
the
intention
and
thought
of
Man
,
in
an
universall
conception
,
is
entertained
about
something
indifferent
to
infinite
Figures
,
Places
,
Times
,
and
Magnitudes
;
and
this
,
not
out
of
the
nature
of
the
thing
,
but
because
't
is
in
the
Mind
of
Man
:
'T
is
most
evident
that
the
Mind
is
something
of
another
kind
then
Matter
and
Quantity
;
and
consequently
,
nobler
,
since
't
is
an
addition
to
the
perfectest
bodies
.
2.
Again
,
since
Thing
and
Existence
is
that
which
first
and
primely
fixes
the
Mind
,
and
to
which
it
seems
to
be
a
certain
capacity
:
but
Thing
(
out
of
what
has
been
said
)
abstracts
from
and
is
before
great
and
little
,
3.
Again
,
since
all
the
negotiation
of
our
Mind
reduces
divisibles
to
indivisibility
;
as
appears
in
Numbers
,
Figures
,
Points
,
Lines
,
Superficies
,
Instants
,
Comparisons
,
Denominations
,
Relations
,
Negations
&c.
but
,
nothing
is
so
different
as
an
indivisible
from
a
divisible
:
't
is
clear
,
on
all
sides
,
that
the
nature
of
the
Mind
is
wholy
opposite
to
the
nature
of
Quantity
;
and
Quantity
implying
a
kind
of
undeterminatenesse
and
confusion
,
that
the
Mind
is
still
the
nobler
part
.
4.
Nor
,
with
lesse
evidence
,
is
it
prov'd
that
the
Mind
is
a
Substantiall
principle
of
Man
:
For
,
since
his
operations
are
manifestly
indivisible
;
but
,
what
is
receiv'd
in
a
divisible
,
ipso
facto
becomes
divisible
upon
the
division
of
the
subject
;
't
is
clear
,
his
operations
are
not
receiv'd
in
a
Magnitude
,
and
,
consequently
,
that
his
Mind
is
an
indivisible
Substance
.
5.
Again
,
if
the
Substance
of
Man
be
wholy
materiall
and
divisible
,
his
Mind
it self
and
all
its
affections
can
be
nothing
but
certain
Manners
and
determinations
of
divisibility
(
as
,
't
is
plain
,
of
the
other
qualities
which
are
accessory
to
bodies
)
:
but
,
't
is
plain
,
out
of
what
has
been
said
,
that
't
is
no
such
thing
:
wherefore
,
neither
that
the
whole
Substance
of
Man
is
materiall
,
but
,
in
part
,
Spirituall
and
indivisible
.
6.
'T
is
clear
,
too
,
that
the
Mind
is
not
another
,
but
the
same
Substance
with
the
Man
:
For
,
since
an
Instrument
to
all
things
includes
the
being
an
Instrument
to
some
;
wherein
consists
the
notion
of
an
Animal
:
't
is
clear
,
that
a
Man
is
a
certain
Species
of
Animal
;
and
consequently
,
that
his
Mind
,
by
which
he
is
a
Man
,
is
formally
one
and
the
same
Thing
with
the
rest
of
the
Substance
of
Man
.
7.
And
indeed
,
were
it
suppos'd
a
distinct
Thing
from
the
Substance
of
the
Man
,
it
would
not
suffer
from
the
body
,
nor
could
it
acquire
any
thing
through
its
conjunction
to
the
body
,
nor
be
at
all
conjoyned
to
it
:
for
,
it
must
be
either
entitatively
,
and
this
cannot
be
otherwise
then
by
unity
of
Substance
,
for
a
Thing
speaks
Substance
;
or
,
some
other
accidentall
way
,
whereof
ther
's
nothing
common
to
a
body
and
a
Spirit
.
8.
You
'l
say
,
Since
a
Spirit
is
a
Thing
of
another
order
then
a
body
,
how
can
it
concurre
into
the
same
Thing
?
then
,
how
will
it
be
cemented
?
and
,
what
neighbourhood
of
one
to
the
other
?
'T
is
answered
,
that
,
as
,
in
a
Magnitude
,
one
part
is
fastned
to
another
,
and
has
the
power
of
a
Subsister
without
division
,
that
is
,
the
propriety
of
a
sever'd
Thing
without
separation
:
so
,
the
Soul
also
,
may
be
the
same
with
the
body
,
without
confusion
of
properties
.
9.
And
,
because
,
in
a
corporeall
Substance
,
ther
's
admitted
a
certain
negatively
indivisible
vertue
antecedent
to
divisibility
,
viz.
a
not-yet
divisibility
of
the
Substance
before
the
Quantity
:
such
as
is
the
connexion
and
gradation
from
the
divisibility
to
the
negative
indivisibility
;
another
like
that
will
be
apt
to
unite
,
without
a
Paradox
,
the
Mind
positively
indivisible
,
to
the
Substance
negatively
indivisible
.
10.
And
,
how
will
it
unite
?
but
,
according
to
those
parts
,
in
which
the
Substance
primarily
and
principally
resides
:
which
,
as
't
is
principally
in
the
Heart
,
that
being
a
certain
Fountain
of
the
whole
Thing
;
so
,
specially
,
as
to
the
notion
of
Animality
,
't
is
in
the
Brain
,
whence
Sense
and
Motion
is
deriv'd
to
the
whole
Animal
,
which
are
those
operations
from
which
't
is
denominated
an
Animal
.
11.
Since
,
therefore
,
the
other
actions
,
which
do
not
affect
the
Heart
nor
the
Brain
,
strike
not
home
to
the
inmost
Substance
;
so
,
neither
do
they
reach
Mentall
Knowledge
or
the
integrity
of
the
Soul
:
but
,
the
changes
that
strike
upon
these
Principles
affect
the
Soul
,
too
;
and
,
it
comes
to
passe
that
not-the-same
ordination
of
bodily
parts
,
especially
of
the
Spirits
and
Heart
,
follows
in
Man
from
the
Brain
's
being
affected
,
which
would
follow
in
another
Animal
;
but
one
,
from
the
propriety
of
the
affected
Substance
,
conformable
to
the
whole
,
not
to
the
body
alone
.
12.
But
,
any
other
unity
,
then
that
the
Soul
should
intimely
be
comprehended
in
the
definition
of
Man
,
and
consequently
,
should
consist
of
the
same
notion
and
indistinct
predicates
,
is
not
to
be
look'd
for
in
Substance
.
LESSON
X.
Of
the
Proficiency
and
Deficiency
of
Man
,
and
of
his
Essence
.
1.
THis
,
therefore
,
is
out
of
Controversie
,
that
Man
,
as
to
his
Soul
,
suffers
from
Corporeall
Agents
:
For
,
since
the
Soul
it self
is
a
certain
Affection
or
Qualification
of
a
divisible
Substance
,
which
is
introduc'd
and
expell'd
by
corporeall
actions
;
't
is
clear
,
that
those
actions
,
which
reach
to
the
very
Substance
,
must
,
of
necessity
,
affect
and
be
receiv'd
in
it
,
after
its
manner
.
2.
Consequently
,
it
acquires
Science
:
For
,
since
,
't
is
nothing
but
a
certain
Possibility
to
Science
,
as
to
its
perfection
;
't
is
manifest
,
that
all
its
change
is
towards
Science
,
viz.
to
be
some
kind
of
Knowledge
,
either
perfect
or
imperfect
.
3.
Whence
,
even
they
,
that
deny
the
Soul
acquires
Science
,
say
that
't
is
excited
and
admonish't
by
the
presence
of
the
body
:
but
,
to
be
excited
and
admonish't
is
to
receive
knowledge
:
the
Soul
,
therefore
,
acquires
knowledge
from
the
Body
.
4.
Nor
makes
against
this
Socrates's
experiment
of
a
Boy
,
orderly
ask'd
and
answering
right
to
Geometricall
propositions
:
for
,
this
questioning
was
a
production
of
Science
,
not
a
renovation
;
for
't
was
an
application
of
the
notion
of
the
same
Being
,
which
is
between
the
Terms
,
to
the
understanding
of
the
Boy
;
whereby
it
came
to
passe
that
the
Truth
to
be
known
was
by
the
notion
of
Thing
,
knit
to
the
Soul
of
the
Boy
,
and
made
,
as
it
were
,
a
part
of
it
,
in
which
the
vertue
of
knowledge
and
Science
consists
.
5.
Yet
,
the
Soul
has
not
,
by
this
Science
,
a
power
to
move
the
body
:
For
,
we
see
,
Science
is
often
overcome
by
Passion
;
but
,
if
it
had
any
proper
activity
,
it
could
not
be
resisted
by
any
power
of
its
own
body
:
Moreover
,
it
would
no
longer
be
a
part
of
a
Man
,
but
something
grafted
in
him
of
a
superiour
nature
,
according
to
that
vertue
.
6.
It
follows
,
therefore
,
that
,
by
vertue
of
the
Soul
,
more
motives
of
goods
or
ills
are
conjoynd
to
the
singular
objects
;
by
whose
conjunction
the
Heart
and
the
body
is
affected
otherwise
to
those
goods
or
ills
,
then
it
would
be
had
they
not
that
conjunction
:
So
that
,
the
force
of
Pain
and
Pleasure
is
that
which
moves
a
Man
,
even
then
when
he
seems
to
follow
the
firmest
Reason
;
namely
,
because
to
be
Reasonable
to
follow
this
and
to
fly
that
,
is
nothing
else
but
that
more
of
delightfull
is
conjoynd
with
this
and
more
of
painfull
with
that
.
7.
In
vertue
of
these
,
therefore
,
a
Man
is
chang'd
,
and
acts
otherwise
then
if
he
had
not
understanding
.
Nor
,
is
he
carry'd
,
from
the
very
beginning
,
by
reason
or
any
proper
power
,
to
this
connection
of
goods
with
ills
;
but
is
prevented
by
some
chance
or
obvious
disposition
of
objects
&
corporeall
causes
,
either
intrinsecall
or
extrinsecall
.
8.
Now
,
this
disposition
in
the
Soul
,
upon
which
Operation
follows
,
we
call
the
WILL
,
and
the
first
beginning
Volition
;
which
,
't
is
apparent
,
is
left
by
precedent
judgements
,
chiefly
those
that
are
about
good
or
ill
,
since
,
by
such
judgements
,
't
is
plain
,
a
Man
is
determin'd
to
action
.
9.
Hence
,
it
appears
,
how
the
Soul
fails
in
Opining
:
For
,
seeing
Objects
occurre
to
the
Soul
,
not
deduc'd
and
drawn-in
,
by
its
own
force
and
nerves
,
as
it
were
,
but
,
by
the
agitation
of
bodies
;
if
the
affection
to
any
thing
so
presses
a
Man
to
action
,
that
it
leaves
not
room
for
the
objects
to
run
in
that
order
which
is
necessary
for
demonstration
;
the
Man
must
needs
fall
to
acting
,
before
he
has
any
absolute
evidence
what
's
to
be
done
.
10.
If
this
be
done
by
reflection
,
a
Man
see
's
that
he
's
mov'd
uncertainly
;
but
,
he
see
's
,
too
,
that
nature
requires
he
should
move
upon
apparences
;
whence
,
he
does
no
unbeseeming
incongruous
thing
:
But
,
if
it
be
done
without
reflection
,
a
Man
takes
an
uncertainfor
a
certain
;
which
is
,
to
Opine
;
for
he
says
,
this
is
,
which
he
has
no
determinate
cause
to
say
.
11.
From
this
precipitation
of
action
,
it
happens
,
that
one
Man
operates
better
,
another
worse
;
according
as
one
,
more
frequently
or
more
grievously
,
precipitates
his
action
,
then
another
.
And
,
those
that
come
nearest
to
evidence
,
as
far
as
nature
will
bear
,
doe
the
uttermost
of
their
power
;
which
is
to
operate
vertuously
:
but
,
those
that
very
much
recede
from
it
,
are
call'd
vitious
:
between
which
,
a
certain
middle
state
of
Men
inclines
notoriously
to
neither
part
.
12.
'T
is
clear
,
therefore
,
whence
the
defectibility
of
Vice
rises
in
Man-kind
:
to
wit
,
because
,
by
too
much
precipitation
of
bodily
motion
,
false
or
the
worse
opinions
are
generated
.
Whence
,
it
follows
,
that
man
is
not
only
changeable
from
imperfect
to
perfect
,
but
also
from
good
to
evil
,
and
contrariwise
:
For
,
if
he
has
opin'd
a
falsity
,
upon
farther
light
,
he
may
be
led
to
the
Truth
,
and
if
,
invited
by
apparences
,
he
has
follow'd
the
Truth
,
by
others
he
may
be
averted
again
.
13.
Whence
,
't
is
evident
,
ther
's
some
opposition
in
the
Soul
,
that
is
,
some
acts
incompossible
at
once
in
it
:
for
,
since
those
things
which
are
in
the
Soul
inhere
in
it
,
in
vertue
of
Being
;
't
is
plain
,
it
must
be
gather'd
,
out
of
the
very
notion
of
Being
,
what
things
consist
together
in
the
Soul
and
what
not
.
Now
,
't
is
clear
,
that
't
is
against
the
notion
of
Being
,
that
the
same
should
Be
and
not-Be
:
but
,
of
those
things
that
are
,
all
agree
in
the
notion
of
Being
,
nor
does
any
thing
hinder
that
white
and
black
,
light
and
darknesse
,
hot
and
cold
should
coexist
;
wherefore
,
neither
does
any
thing
forbid
their
being
together
in
the
Soul
:
but
,
for
the
same
to
Be
and
not-Be
,
which
is
,
to
be
affirm'd
and
deny'd
,
't
is
wholy
repugnant
.
14.
Since
,
therefore
,
Man
suffers
no
repugnancy
in
himself
to
have
whatever
other
things
together
in
his
Mind
;
it
comes
to
passe
,
that
he
is
capable
and
cognoscitive
of
all
Things
:
He
can
,
therefore
,
know
what
's
best
for
himself
,
or
,
in
what
State
he
may
most
perfectly
enjoy
himself
:
Nor
,
will
he
doubt
that
he
is
to
strain
towards
this
by
all
his
actions
;
wherefore
,
he
will
be
govern'd
against
nature
,
if
he
be
employ'd
otherwise
then
is
convenient
to
attain
This
last
End
.
15.
Whether
,
therefore
,
one
Man
rules
another
,
or
whether
some
superiour
Power
governs
him
;
he
govern'd
against
nature
,
if
he
withdraw
him
from
This
chiefest
Good
:
And
because
Nature
is
the
Principle
of
acting
;
a
Man
,
as
far
as
he
is
able
,
will
reduce
himself
to
a
rectitude
and
straight
course
towards
his
ULTIMATE
GOOD
,
and
will
resist
all
contrary
operation
.
16.
Though
Man
,
therefore
,
be
an
Instrument
,
fram'd
to
be
mov'd
by
another
,
as
all
other
Animals
:
yet
,
't
will
be
with
this
difference
,
that
other
Animals
are
ordain'd
to
be
mov'd
to
the
End
of
the
Mover
,
without
any
respect
to
their
proper
good
;
but
,
Man
is
govern'd
to
the
Mover's
End
,
no
farther
then
as
the
same
is
a
Motion
towards
the
proper
Good
of
Man
.
17.
MAN
,
therefore
,
is
an
Instrument
,
fram'd
by
nature
apt
for
universality
of
Action
,
that
is
,
to
do
any
thing
whatever
,
so
it
be
in
order
to
his
proper
good
:
or
,
a
Thing
,
of
connected
parts
,
in
a
passive
and
active
order
,
that
is
,
which
can
order
themselves
:
or
,
lastly
,
Consisting
of
a
RATIONALL
SOUL
and
an
ANIMAL
BODY
.
Peripateticall
INSTITUTIONS
.
Fifth
Book
.
Containing
that
part
of
METAPHYSICK
,
which
treats
of
SUBSTANCES
ABSTRACTED
from
Matter
,
and
of
the
Operation
of
Things
.
LESSON
I.
Of
the
Souls
separation
from
the
Body
.
1.
OUt
of
what
has
been
said
,
't
is
evident
,
that
a
Humane
Soul
perishes
not
at
the
dissolution
of
its
Body
:
For
,
since
,
whilst
it
exists
in
the
Body
,
it
has
immanent
acts
which
cannot
belong
to
a
Body
;
it
must
of
necessity
have
,
of
its
proper
self
,
the
vertue
of
a
Thing
,
or
,
of
receiving
Existence
:
Since
,
therefore
,
ther
's
nothing
farther
requir'd
to
exist
,
in
a
thing
already
existing
,
but
the
having
in
it self
a
power
of
sustaining
existence
;
and
,
't
is
plain
,
that
,
the
body
being
taken
away
,
this
power
is
not
withdrawn
,
(
since
't
is
in
the
Soul
,
apart
from
and
besides
the
Body
)
;
't
is
evident
that
,
by
the
dissolution
of
the
Body
,
the
Soul
is
not
dissolv'd
.
2.
Adde
to
this
,
that
,
since
there
is
no
other
substantiall
divisibility
,
but
of
Form
and
Matter
;
and
Matter
is
not
necessary
to
the
Souls
existence
;
ther
's
no
divisibility
in
the
Subject
of
existence
,
as
existence
is
in
the
Soul
,
by
means
whereof
the
Soul
can
be
alienated
from
Being
.
3.
We
see
,
too
,
that
all
mortality
of
Bodies
either
proceeds
from
contrariety
,
or
from
the
divisibility
of
a
quantitative
Subject
;
whereof
,
since
neither
is
to
be
found
in
the
Soul
separated
,
't
is
plain
,
that
'T
is
not
subject
to
corruption
.
4.
You
'l
object
,
if
the
Soul
in
the
body
is
capable
of
existence
,
't
is
capable
of
action
or
of
a
Motive
power
;
as
quantitative
parts
,
though
they
have
a
common
existence
,
yet
act
upon
one
another
.
'T
is
answer'd
,
quantitative
parts
are
accessory
to
and
find
the
Substance
already
perfect
:
but
formall
parts
(
at
least
essentiall
ones
)
do
not
presuppose
the
Substance
establisht
;
whence
,
the
active
power
follows
not
any
one
,
but
all
.
5.
You
'l
say
,
that
Existence
,
too
,
supposes
all
the
parts
of
a
Thing
,
as
't
is
a
Thing
:
wherefore
,
neither
will
the
Soul
be
capable
of
existence
in
the
Body
.
'T
is
answer'd
,
that
action
belongs
to
the
Soul
in
the
Body
as
existence
does
:
For
,
existence
makes
not
the
Soul
,
while
't
is
in
the
Body
,
to
be
a
Thing
;
for
that
's
primely
of
the
whole
,
and
the
whole
Man
is
the
Thing
;
but
it
makes
the
Soul
to
be
That
which
may
be
a
Thing
:
So
,
also
,
't
is
not
absolutely
a
principle
of
acting
,
but
't
is
a
principle
by
which
action
becomes
other
then
't
would
be
without
it
;
and
consequently
,
it
has
a
Being
,
whence
action
may
be
,
but
not
whence
'
t
is
.
6.
It
appears
,
again
,
that
the
Soul
separated
is
not
,
truly
,
the
same
Thing
with
the
Soul
in
the
Body
;
but
is
substantially
chang'd
.
For
,
first
't
was
joyn'd
substantially
to
the
Body
and
was
one
with
it
:
but
,
't
is
clear
,
that
when
,
by
division
,
more
things
are
made
of
one
,
the
Thing
divided
is
chang'd
;
especially
when
the
Unity
it self
was
substantiall
,
as
in
the
present
case
;
since
the
Soul
adheres
to
the
corporeall
Substance
,
not
by
quantity
,
but
by
identification
.
7.
Again
,
the
Soul
,
now
separated
,
is
the
immediate
and
adequate
Subject
of
its
own
existence
:
whereas
,
in
the
body
,
the
Man
himself
was
the
Thing
,
and
the
Soul
only
a
part
of
the
Thing
,
or
,
whereby
the
Thing
was
.
Yet
,
't
is
the
same
Thing
,
as
to
its
notion
and
definition
;
since
it
consists
of
those
predicates
it
had
in
the
Body
.
8.
You
'l
object
,
In
the
Body
,
it
had
not
a
power
of
receiving
existence
in
it self
;
therefore
,
neither
will
it
have
out
of
the
Body
:
for
a
part
and
a
Thing
are
of
an
intirely
different
kind
,
and
vastly
distinct
from
one
another
.
'T
is
answer'd
,
that
,
as
,
in
the
parts
of
a
Magnitude
,
't
is
manifest
,
that
they
are
neither
Things
,
nor
only
parts
of
a
Thing
;
but
something
between
,
which
is
so
a
part
,
that
it
may
be
some
kind
of
whole
:
So
,
it
repugns
not
,
that
there
should
be
something
in
formall
parts
which
is
,
de
facto
,
a
part
,
and
yet
may
be
a
whole
;
and
that
should
be
a
kind
of
Middle
thing
,
which
has
enough
in
it self
to
become
a
whole
,
yet
should
not
actually
be
a
whole
:
Whence
,
when
the
Soul
is
separated
,
there
is
not
any
thing
added
to
it
,
to
make
it
more
capable
of
existence
,
but
that
is
withdrawn
from
it
,
which
hindred
it
from
existing
.
9.
Now
,
he
that
desires
to
frame
to
himself
,
in
some
sort
,
a
notion
of
a
separated
Soul
;
let
him
ponder
with
himself
that
object
which
corresponds
to
the
words
Man
or
Animal
,
as
such
:
which
when
he
shall
see
,
abstracts
from
Place
and
Time
,
and
is
a
Substance
by
the
only
necessity
of
the
Terms
;
let
him
conceive
the
like
of
a
separated
Soul
.
10.
Then
,
let
him
attentively
consider
some
self-evident
and
most
naturall
proposition
:
in
which
,
when
he
shall
have
contemplated
that
the
object
is
in
the
Soul
with
its
proper
existence
and
,
as
it
were
,
by
it
;
let
him
think
a
separated
Soul
is
a
Substance
that
is
all
other
things
,
by
the
very
connexion
of
Existences
.
11.
Lastly
,
when
,
in
Bodies
,
he
shall
observe
that
Motion
proceeds
from
the
quality
of
the
Mover
&
a
certain
impulse
;
and
that
this
impulse
is
deriv'd
again
from
another
impulse
,
and
so
up
even
to
that
which
is
first
mov'd
,
and
beyond
:
let
him
imagine
the
Soul
is
a
kind
of
principle
of
such
impulse
;
whatsoever
thing
that
must
be
.
12.
What
is
said
of
the
Substance
of
the
Soul
,
undoubtedly
must
be
understood
,
too
,
of
its
proper
Accidents
;
for
,
since
they
depend
only
upon
it
,
(
being
something
of
it
,
nay
even
the
very
Soul
)
,
and
it
would
be
more
imperfect
without
them
;
they
must
run
the
same
fortune
with
it
,
unlesse
some
speciall
reason
interpose
.
13.
Whatever
things
,
therefore
,
were
in
the
Man
,
according
to
his
Soul
,
at
the
instant
of
his
Death
,
remain
in
the
Soul
after
separation
:
wherefore
,
all
his
Resolutions
or
Iudgements
,
whether
speculative
or
practicall
,
shall
remain
in
it
;
where
,
since
they
cannot
be
without
Apprehensions
,
even
they
,
too
,
shall
remain
:
And
,
since
all
things
,
which
are
made
to
follow
out
of
or
have
connexion
with
these
,
are
in
a
separated
Soul
,
in
vertue
of
these
,
its
Science
must
needs
be
extended
to
all
those
;
all
such
,
therefore
,
which
have
once
been
in
it
and
are
not
blotted
out
,
after
death
all
remain
.
14.
Since
,
therefore
,
in
a
Soul
ther
's
an
infinite
capacity
;
and
ther
's
no
opposition
of
apprehensions
among
themselves
,
nor
any
other
opposition
,
but
of
contradiction
,
whereby
the
same
is
affirm'd
to
be
and
not-be
:
all
the
apprehensions
,
scrap'd
up
together
in
the
whole
life
,
and
judgements
unretracted
must
,
of
necessity
,
remain
;
unlesse
some
speciall
Cause
withstand
.
15.
The
whole
Notion
,
therefore
,
of
the
past
life
,
all
the
particular
acquaintances
of
Familiars
and
other
Individuums
,
all
Sciences
and
Arts
,
attain'd
in
the
life
time
,
survive
after
Death
.
LESSON
II.
Of
the
Science
of
a
separated
Soul
,
and
its
unity
with
the
Soul
.
1.
BUt
,
all
these
things
being
so
,
now
,
in
the
Soul
,
that
time
was
,
they
were
not
;
't
is
plain
,
they
are
so
conjoyn'd
to
it
,
that
ther
's
no
repugnancy
it
may
be
without
them
:
wherefore
,
so
there
be
a
cause
,
they
may
be
divid●d
from
it
:
some
kind
of
divisibility
,
then
,
there
is
between
the
Soul
and
the
things
in
it
.
2.
Not
that
which
is
between
the
parts
of
a
Magnitude
;
since
,
here
's
an
indivisibility
on
both
sides
,
whereas
a
Magnitude
is
not
made
up
of
indivisibles
.
Nor
,
that
which
is
between
Matter
and
Form
;
since
the
Soul
,
which
is
before
,
is
able
to
preexist
of
it self
;
and
whatever
things
come
into
it
supervene
to
a
Thing
already
existing
.
Nor
that
which
is
between
Substance
and
Quantity
;
since
Quantity
is
in
a
Thing
,
as
somewhat
of
it
;
but
things
known
are
in
the
Knower
as
other
things
which
preexist
out
of
him
.
3.
'T
is
,
therefore
,
a
speciall
manner
of
divisibility
which
is
not
exactly
found
in
bodies
:
For
,
since
a
body
essentially
includes
a
power
or
possibility
,
the
unity
of
a
body
is
by
the
privation
of
act
on
one
side
;
whence
follows
the
unity
of
act
in
the
Compound
:
But
,
a
separated
Soul
is
compos'd
only
of
Act
or
Quiddity
,
as
white
or
hot
,
and
Existence
or
Being
,
as
when
we
say
,
't
is
:
whence
,
its
unity
to
another
actually
existing
must
be
,
so
,
as
an
act
can
be
joyn'd
to
an
act
,
that
is
,
by
identification
or
a
community
of
Being
:
and
,
after
this
manner
,
are
in
a
separated
Soul
whatever
are
in
it
.
4.
Whence
,
first
,
this
is
evident
,
that
a
separated
Soul
knows
it self
:
For
,
since
,
to
be
in
another
,
by
way
of
knowing
,
is
distinguish't
,
in
this
,
from
the
other
manners
of
inexisting
;
that
,
in
others
,
what
inexists
is
now
no
Thing
in
it self
,
but
that
's
in
which
it
is
;
things
know'n
,
by
inexisting
,
lose
not
the
being
what
they
were
,
though
they
acquire
the
being
of
that
which
they
were
not
:
for
,
Heat
,
in
that
which
is
hot
,
is
something
of
the
Subject
,
nor
has
any
proper
Being
of
its
own
;
but
,
the
hot
Subject
which
is
felt
is
,
so
,
in
him
that
's
sensible
of
it
,
that
he
knows
't
is
hot
;
therefore
,
this
Subject
to
be
actually
hot
is
in
the
person
that
's
sensible
of
it
.
5.
In
like
manner
,
the
Soul
exists
substantially
,
because
Being
is
made
something
of
the
Soul
.
Again
,
this
,
that
the
Soul
is
,
is
in
the
Soul
:
for
,
since
the
Soul
is
a
certain
Power
of
being
all
things
that
exist
;
and
it self
also
exists
;
it
cannot
but
,
by
reason
of
its
intimate
conjunction
,
be
present
to
it self
according
to
this
its
power
,
which
is
that
it
cannot
but
be
understood
.
6.
Again
,
since
all
those
things
are
in
the
Soul
which
we
have
,
above
,
recounted
;
they
must
needs
be
,
too
,
all
known
in
the
Soul
:
And
,
because
,
't
is
clear
,
that
,
in
a
Syllogism
,
the
Conclusion
is
nothing
but
the
very
Premisses
;
all
is
known
by
a
separated
Soul
,
which
is
deducible
out
of
those
things
that
are
in
the
Soul
.
7.
And
,
because
,
such
is
the
connexion
of
Truths
,
that
,
out
of
any
one
,
all
others
,
may
,
by
links
,
be
drawn
in
;
it
comes
to
passe
that
a
Soul
,
which
knows
any
whatever
sensible
Truth
,
knows
intirely
all
cognoscible
things
;
that
is
,
every
Soul
penetrates
absolutely
all
things
.
8.
For
,
if
any
Infant
never
knew
its
own
Being
,
it
is
not
to
be
esteem'd
to
have
arriv'd
at
all
to
the
nature
of
Man
:
For
,
since
,
even
in
us
,
to
be
sensible
of
or
to
know
is
by
suffering
from
another
;
we
know
another
thing
is
,
because
we
know
we
have
suffered
from
it
:
but
,
if
we
know
we
have
suffered
from
it
,
we
already
know
we
are
:
the
first
knowledge
,
therefore
,
even
in
the
body
,
includes
the
knowledge
of
our selves
.
9.
And
,
since
Passion
is
a
participation
of
the
Thing
from
which
we
suffer
;
it
must
needs
be
that
the
Thing
is
in
us
,
when
we
are
sensible
of
it
:
and
,
because
it
does
not
denominate
according
to
its
own
proper
appellation
,
but
according
to
the
quality
of
that
wherein
it
is
,
(
for
,
we
do
not
call
an
Eye
white
or
wooden
,
but
a
Seeer
of
white
or
wood
)
;
it
must
needs
be
that
't
is
in
it
,
as
another
thing
,
and
as
of
the
nature
of
the
sensitive
Subject
.
Now
,
the
reason
why
in
the
body
,
too
,
the
Soul
does
not
know
it self
,
but
the
Man
,
a
part
of
whom
it
is
,
is
because
't
is
he
that
is
and
not
it
,
as
has
been
said
.
10.
You
'l
object
,
this
multiplicity
of
knowledge
is
fram'd
or
aggregated
,
either
of
severall
knots
and
articles
,
as
it
were
,
so
that
whatever
was
knowable
in
this
world
by
new
discourse
,
the
same
is
,
in
some
sort
,
a
new
addition
in
the
Soul
;
or
of
one
simple
knowledge
which
,
eminently
and
in
one
formality
,
in
a
manner
,
comprehends
all
these
knowledges
:
but
,
neither
of
these
seems
possible
;
not
the
first
,
because
't
would
be
a
certain
infinity
,
either
in
act
,
which
is
impossible
,
or
in
power
,
and
then
't
would
be
some
continuity
and
a
principle
of
continuall
motion
;
nor
the
later
,
for
such
an
universality
seems
not
to
have
any
thing
above
it
.
11.
'T
is
answer'd
,
the
manner
of
a
separated
Soul
,
in
some
sort
,
contains
both
;
though
't
is
neither
way
formally
:
For
,
since
,
the
parts
in
formall
composition
are
not
actually
;
't
is
plain
,
that
neither
can
there
be
,
in
this
composition
of
the
knowledge
of
a
separated
Soul
,
formall
knots
and
articles
of
discourse
,
&
consequently
,
no
actuall
infinity
:
Again
,
since
one
part
is
not
beyond
another
,
that
is
,
extended
,
as
in
quantity
,
but
all
,
by
a
certain
identificaon
,
grow
together
;
there
can
be
no
continuity
between
,
though
the
parts
be
in
power
,
that
is
,
only
in
the
possibility
of
the
Subject
.
12.
Besides
,
that
this
power
is
not
such
that
there
should
be
any
correspondent
naturall
cause
to
reduce
it
into
act
:
but
,
't
is
only
a
certain
defectibility
of
act
,
upon
which
ther
's
no
active
power
but
only
a
Logicall
or
a
Creative
one
,
which
will
never
act
.
13.
'T
is
,
therefore
,
a
certain
actuall
Metaphysicall
composition
,
in
which
there
is
a
Logicall
possibility
that
any
of
these
later
known
things
may
be
away
,
without
hurting
those
that
were
known
before
;
yet
so
,
that
it
can
never
come
to
passe
it
should
be
reduc'd
into
act
:
Wherefore
,
't
is
neither
the
precise
contemplation
of
one
formality
precontaining
infinite
;
nor
yet
any
actuall
infinity
,
or
naturall
divisibility
.
14.
But
,
it
may
be
compar'd
to
the
Metaphysicall
composition
of
degrees
;
in
which
we
see
Peter
or
Bucephalus
so
agree
with
infinite
Things
or
Animals
,
that
it
contracts
thence
no
multiplicity
,
and
yet
we
may
alwaies
frame
some
new
apprehension
of
them
in
our
Mind
.
LESSON
III.
Of
the
eminency
of
a
separated
Souls
acts
,
above
those
it
exercises
in
the
Body
.
1.
OUt
of
what
has
been
said
,
it
may
be
evidenc'd
,
that
simple
Intuition
or
the
inexistence
of
a
thing
in
the
Soul
serv's
,
in
stead
of
that
composition
which
is
found
,
here
,
in
our
judgements
.
2.
It
appears
,
also
,
that
an
actuall
universall
intuition
of
Things
supplses
,
abundantly
,
any
need
of
Discourse
.
3.
'T
is
plain
,
too
,
that
,
with
that
,
ther
's
no
want
of
Memory
or
Remembrance
;
ther
's
no
need
of
ordering
or
framing
Idea's
;
and
lastly
,
whatever
the
Soul
operates
,
here
,
by
distinct
acts
and
in
time
,
there
,
together
and
with
one
only
labour
,
(
not
so
much
,
is
wrought
out
,
as
)
exists
.
4.
Again
,
whereas
,
by
reslexion
,
those
things
we
have
,
in
the
body
,
thought
on
,
we
farther
know
that
we
have
thought
on
them
;
so
that
we
can
never
know
the
last
reflection
,
though
we
had
infinite
:
a
separated
Soul
,
by
the
simple
inexistence
of
it self
in
it self
,
necessarily
see
's
all
its
knowledge
without
any
reflection
.
5.
Again
,
't
is
plain
,
that
a
separated
Soul
,
in
another
manner
,
excells
Place
and
Time
,
then
in
the
Body
:
since
,
in
that
,
it
only
abstracts
from
them
,
but
,
out
of
that
,
it
comprehends
them
.
For
,
this
universall
and
actuall
knowledge
places
all
Place
and
all
Time
within
the
Soul
;
so
that
it
can
act
in
every
place
at
once
and
together
(
as
far
as
concerns
this
respect
)
,
and
provide
for
all
time
;
wherefore
,
't
is
,
in
a
manner
,
a
Maker
and
Governour
of
time
and
place
.
6.
It
appears
,
moreover
,
that
't
is
active
,
out
of
its
very
self
:
for
,
since
it
comprehends
all
things
,
it
needs
not
Sense
,
as
in
the
body
,
to
perceive
that
infinity
of
Individuality
;
but
it
know's
,
even
,
to
the
utmost
divisibility
of
Magnitude
,
whatever
circumstances
are
requir'd
to
action
:
It
knows
,
too
,
what
is
good
for
it self
;
whence
,
it
,
naturally
&
of
it self
,
has
both
power
and
an
actuall
will
,
which
alone
are
requir'd
to
act
;
for
power
depends
on
pure
Science
,
and
whoever
is
impotent
is
ignorant
what
is
to
be
done
,
by
him
,
to
produce
such
an
effect
.
7.
Hence
,
lastly
,
it
follows
,
that
the
proportion
of
Pleasure
and
Grief
,
out
of
the
body
,
is
infinite
,
to
that
in
the
body
:
For
,
since
Pleasure
is
nothing
else
,
but
a
judgement
concerning
a
good
possest
,
out
of
which
follows
an
activity
to
enjoy
and
retain
it
;
and
Grief
is
the
same
,
concerning
an
ill
,
which
the
Soul
desires
to
repell
:
Whether
we
contemplate
the
Manner
of
the
Souls
Being
,
to
which
its
acts
are
proportion'd
;
't
is
of
a
superiour
notion
,
that
is
,
of
an
infinite
eminency
.
8.
Or
,
the
Firmnesse
and
Evidence
of
its
Knowledge
;
since
all
knowledge
receives
strength
from
antecedents
and
consequents
,
it
must
of
necessity
attain
an
infinite
excellency
:
for
every
knowledge
of
a
separated
Soul
has
infinite
things
connected
with
it
,
out
of
which
't
is
confirm'd
.
9.
Or
,
its
Eminency
above
Time
and
Place
;
't
is
rays'd
in
a
like
degree
:
Or
,
lastly
,
its
force
of
Activity
;
't
is
beyond
all
comparison
.
Wherefore
,
to
the
least
,
either
Pleasure
or
Grief
,
of
the
Future
life
,
even
abstracting
from
the
Perpetuity
,
nothing
can
be
comparable
in
this
mortall
state
,
or
considerable
in
respect
of
it
.
10.
Again
,
't
is
collected
,
out
of
what
has
been
said
,
that
all
separated
Souls
,
or
,
at
least
,
the
most
part
are
improv'd
in
this
,
that
whatever
false
judgements
they
have
taken
up
in
the
whole
course
of
their
lives
,
they
throw
them
off
by
Separation
:
For
,
since
,
the
excellency
of
a
separated
Soul
is
immense
above
the
powers
of
an
imbody'd
one
,
&
the
connection
of
all
Truths
is
,
immediately
upon
the
Separation
,
imprinted
in
it
;
it
must
needs
be
that
a
true
judgement
of
all
things
is
impress'd
:
since
,
therefore
,
Contradictories
cannot
consist
together
in
the
Soul
,
the
false
judgements
must
be
expell'd
;
and
Souls
,
as
to
this
,
be
universally
improv'd
.
11.
Nor
,
is
it
lesse
evident
that
,
among
Souls
,
there
will
be
some
difference
,
by
reason
of
the
employments
they
have
follow'd
in
their
life
time
:
For
,
since
,
whilst
we
live
in
the
body
,
one
exercises
his
Understanding
more
about
one
thing
,
another
about
another
;
and
,
as
,
the
first
act
works
a
knowledge
of
the
thing
,
so
,
the
following
acts
cannot
but
encrease
this
knowledge
and
more
perfectly
impresse
it
upon
the
Soul
:
It
follows
,
since
all
these
must
needs
participate
of
the
elevation
caus'd
by
the
Separation
;
the
Soul
must
know
more
perfectly
,
too
,
in
Separation
,
its
accustomed
Objects
and
whatever
depend
on
them
,
in
a
due
proportion
,
then
other
things
;
whence
,
it
comes
to
passe
,
that
the
Sciences
here
acquir'd
,
not
only
,
remain
in
the
future
life
,
but
,
are
in
the
same
proportion
,
there
,
as
they
were
,
here
.
LESSON
IV.
Of
the
Felicity
and
Infelicity
of
separated
Souls
,
and
their
Immutability
.
1.
ANd
,
because
the
Affections
in
the
Soul
are
nothing
else
but
judgements
,
upon
which
operation
does
or
is
apt
to
follow
;
and
the
stronger
the
judgement
is
,
so
much
the
apter
operation
is
to
follow
out
of
it
,
if
it
be
a
judgement
concerning
good
or
ill
:
it
comes
to
passe
,
that
our
Affections
to
our
Acquaintance
and
Friends
,
and
the
rest
which
we
have
cultivated
in
this
life
,
shall
remain
in
the
future
:
wherefore
,
we
shall
both
better
know
and
more
rejoyce
in
our
Parents
and
Friends
,
then
in
others
,
(
other
circumstances
alike
)
.
2.
And
,
because
the
Affections
shall
remain
,
&
that
,
in
the
proportion
they
were
in
,
during
life
:
it
follows
,
that
those
who
have
,
in
this
life
,
delighted
in
those
things
&
Sciences
,
which
the
Soul
is
apt
and
fit
to
enjoy
in
Separation
,
(
for
example
,
in
naturall
Contemplation
,
or
that
of
abstracted
Spirits
,
especially
,
if
with
great
affection
)
,
will
have
a
vast
Pleasure
in
the
State
of
Separation
,
through
the
perfection
of
the
knowledge
they
'l
enjoy
.
3.
But
,
those
that
have
given
themselves
up
wholly
to
corporeall
pleasures
will
be
affected
with
vast
Grief
,
through
the
impossibility
of
those
pleasures
,
there
.
4.
You
'l
object
,
that
separated
Souls
will
see
the
unworthinesse
of
such
pleasures
,
and
consequently
,
will
correct
in
themselves
such
erroneous
and
false
judgements
,
nor
will
have
such
appetites
as
would
torment
them
.
'T
is
answer'd
,
these
griefs
follow
not
out
of
false
,
but
inordinate
judgements
;
for
,
't
is
true
,
that
such
like
pleasures
are
a
good
of
the
body
and
of
the
Man
(
whose
appetite
is
the
appetite
of
the
Soul
)
;
again
,
supposing
the
deordination
of
the
Soul
,
't
is
true
,
that
these
pleasures
are
conformable
and
good
,
even
to
it
:
but
grief
follows
,
hence
,
that
the
judgements
or
affections
about
these
are
greater
,
then
in
proportion
to
those
other
desires
,
which
ought
to
be
preferr'd
before
them
.
5.
Whence
,
it
comes
to
passe
,
that
the
Soul
's
seeing
these
objects
to
be
unworthy
and
not
regardable
,
in
comparison
of
the
better
,
increases
its
pains
;
whilst
it
can
neither
cease
to
desire
those
it
desires
,
through
the
excesse
of
these
affections
above
the
rest
,
and
yet
sees
they
are
vile
and
unworthy
.
6.
Moreover
,
out
of
what
has
been
said
,
't
is
deduc'd
,
that
,
in
the
state
of
separation
,
no
variety
can
happen
to
Souls
,
from
a
body
,
or
the
change
of
bodies
:
For
,
since
a
change
passes
not
from
any
body
into
the
Soul
,
but
through
the
identification
of
the
Soul
with
its
own
body
;
and
this
identification
ceases
,
by
the
state
of
Separation
;
it
follows
,
that
no
action
nor
mutation
can
be
derived
from
any
Body
,
to
the
Soul
.
7.
Nor
,
has
the
Soul
,
of
it self
,
a
principle
of
changing
it self
:
not
from
hence
only
,
because
an
Indivisible
cannot
act
upon
it self
:
but
also
,
because
,
since
a
mutation
of
the
Soul
cannot
be
any
other
,
then
,
either
according
to
the
Understanding
or
Will
;
but
the
Understanding
is
suppos'd
to
know
all
things
together
and
for-ever
,
whence
,
by
the
course
of
nature
,
ther
's
no
room
left
either
for
ignorance
or
new
Science
;
and
the
Will
is
either
not
distinct
from
the
Understanding
or
,
at
least
,
is
adequately
govern'd
,
in
the
state
of
separation
:
it
follows
,
that
naturally
no
mutation
can
happen
to
a
separated
Soul
from
within
,
or
caus'd
by
it self
.
8.
Nor
,
yet
,
from
any
other
Spirit
,
without
the
interposition
of
the
body
:
For
,
since
all
Spirits
are
indivisible
,
their
operations
,
too
,
will
be
such
;
but
an
indivisible
effect
,
supposing
all
the
causes
,
of
necessity
exists
in
the
same
instant
:
wherefore
,
if
any
thing
be
to
be
done
between
Spirits
,
't
is
all
,
in
one
instant
,
so
done
and
perfected
,
that
,
afterwards
,
another
action
cannot
be
begun
:
for
if
it
begin
,
either
the
causes
were
,
before
,
adequately
put
,
or
not
;
if
they
were
,
the
effect
was
put
;
if
they
were
not
,
some
of
the
causes
is
chang'd
that
it
may
now
begin
to
act
,
and
not
this
,
but
the
former
,
is
the
first
mutation
,
whereof
,
't
is
to
be
urg'd
,
whether
the
causes
were
put
before
?
9.
If
you
say
,
the
Spirit
waits
a
certain
time
:
First
,
time
is
motion
and
not
without
a
body
:
Then
,
since
,
among
Spirits
,
nothing
is
chang'd
by
time
,
one
that
acts
according
to
reason
could
not
expect
a
time
by
which
nothing
could
be
chang'd
.
Certain
,
therefore
,
it
is
,
that
There
can
be
no
change
,
by
the
power
of
nature
in
a
separated
Soul
.
10.
From
the
collection
of
all
has
been
said
concerning
the
Soul
,
't
is
deducible
,
that
Our
life
is
a
Mould
or
a
March
to
our
Eternity
;
and
,
according
as
a
Man
behaves
himself
in
this
life
,
such
an
Eternity
he
shall
,
hereafter
,
possess
:
since
Good-deeds
and
Rewards
,
Crimes
and
Punishments
are
equally
eternall
.
11.
To
conclude
,
He
that
has
liv'd
perfectly
shall
be
perfect
in
the
future
life
,
he
that
has
liv'd
better
shall
be
better
,
he
that
has
liv'd
well
shall
be
well
;
he
that
has
liv'd
ill
shall
be
ill
,
he
that
has
liv'd
worse
shall
be
worse
,
they
that
live
worst
they
,
too
,
shall
be
worst
of
all
for
ever
:
so
true
it
is
that
THINGS
WILL
NOT
BE
ILL
GOVERN'D
,
that
is
,
their
very
Nature
exacts
and
forces
them
into
a
good
Government
.
LESSON
V.
Of
the
nature
of
Existence
,
and
its
Vnity
with
the
Thing
.
1.
OUt
of
what
has
been
said
,
't
is
clear
,
that
all
bodies
and
a
separated
Soul
it self
,
sometimes
,
are
and
,
time
was
,
they
were
not
:
whence
,
't
is
evident
,
that
the
notion
of
Being
or
Existence
is
different
from
the
notion
of
that
Thing
whereof
't
is
affirm'd
;
since
,
't
is
deny'd
,
too
,
of
it
,
and
since
,
of
all
Substances
that
are
so
different
,
't
is
said
,
according
to
the
same
notion
,
that
they
are
.
2.
Besides
,
if
,
for
Peter
or
a
Man
not
to
be
,
were
the
same
,
with
Peter
not
to
be
Peter
or
a
Man
not
to
be
a
Man
;
't
were
a
proposition
destructive
of
it self
,
and
,
consequently
,
impossible
;
but
now
't
is
prudent
and
pertinent
to
Sciences
.
3.
Neither
would
there
any
one
and
the
same
thing
be
a
Subject
of
contradictory
enunciations
,
or
of
affirmation
and
negation
;
and
consequently
,
the
art
of
Logick
and
the
foundation
of
all
humane
discourse
would
be
taken
away
:
Nothing
,
therefore
,
is
more
evident
then
that
Existence
is
distinguisht
,
mentally
or
by
definition
,
from
the
Thing
whereof
't
is
spoken
.
4.
But
yet
,
that
it
should
differ
,
really
,
actually
and
,
as
it
were
,
numerically
or
in
the
Subject
,
from
the
Thing
whose
't
is
,
't
is
equally
impossible
:
since
,
so
,
they
would
either
of
them
be
Things
;
5.
Notwithstanding
,
since
a
Thing
really
acquires
and
loses
existence
,
(
for
,
to
be
made
is
to
receive
,
to
be
dissolv'd
is
to
lose
existence
)
;
't
is
evident
,
ther
's
a
reall
divisibility
between
a
Thing
and
Existence
.
6.
But
,
this
divisibility
is
lesse
then
any
of
those
,
hitherto
,
explicated
:
both
because
,
in
separation
,
neither
part
of
the
Compound
remains
;
as
also
,
because
existence
out
of
a
Compound
is
not
intelligible
,
since
't
is
its
ultimate
actuality
or
actuation
.
And
,
as
't
is
commonly
said
,
that
Union
cannot
be
understood
out
of
Composition
,
nor
Action
without
a
Term
;
so
,
neither
can
Being
without
it
actually
be
,
and
consequently
,
make
those
things
be
which
are
by
it
.
7.
Lastly
,
't
is
evident
,
that
existence
is
the
perfection
of
every
and
all
Things
;
since
,
the
notion
of
all
Substances
(
as
't
is
explicated
above
)
is
nothing
else
but
to
be
such
a
capacity
of
existing
:
quasi
-
)
possibility
,
since
they
have
a
vertue
terminative
of
the
understanding
(
that
we
call
to
be
a
quiddity
)
which
a
possibility
has
not
.
8.
Notwithstanding
,
because
this
notion
is
nothing
else
,
but
a
disposition
and
preparation
to
existing
;
Existence
is
not
only
the
perfection
,
but
,
if
it
were
perfect
,
it
would
be
the
whole
perfection
of
any
Thing
whose
it
were
.
9.
It
follows
out
of
what
has
been
said
,
that
no
Thing
,
of
those
that
sometime
are
sometime
are
not
,
is
of
it self
;
but
,
all
require
some
other
thing
to
make
them
exist
:
For
,
since
they
are
sometime
and
sometimes
are
not
,
't
is
evident
,
the
notion
in
them
,
which
is
presuppos'd
to
Being
,
and
whereof
't
is
said
it
is
,
is
,
of
it self
,
indifferent
to
Being
and
not-Being
;
and
,
which
follows
,
this
notion
being
put
,
Being
is
not
put
or
the
Thing
is
not
,
in
force
of
this
notion
;
and
something
else
,
therefore
,
is
requir'd
,
which
being
put
,
Being
must
necessarily
be
apply'd
to
that
notion
:
'T
is
from
without
,
therefore
,
that
these
Things
exist
,
and
not
from
their
own
intrinsecall
nature
and
force
.
10.
And
,
because
this
notion
has
not
its
indifferency
from
otherwhere
,
but
from
it self
;
as
long
as
it
has
Being
,
so
long
an
extrinsecall
cause
must
make
it
exist
:
for
,
since
its
necessity
of
existing
is
from
something
without
,
that
extrinsecall
being
taken
away
,
it
is
no
longer
:
And
,
because
from
an
indifferent
nothing
follows
,
its
exexisting
is
not
deriv'd
from
any
intrinsecall
;
and
,
which
follows
,
if
,
the
extrinsecall
being
taken
away
,
it
should
exist
,
this
,
its
existing
,
would
be
an
effect
without
a
cause
.
LESSON
VI.
Of
the
Existence
,
Simplicity
,
and
Eternity
of
GOD.
1.
AGain
,
it
follows
,
there
is
some
Thing
,
for
whom
't
is
impossible
not
to
exist
:
For
,
since
an
effect
is
because
another
is
,
't
is
clear
,
the
same
cannot
be
the
cause
of
it self
:
nay
,
if
two
should
be
put
,
as
,
adequately
,
cause
and
effect
to
one
another
,
the
same
would
be
put
as
cause
of
it self
;
for
,
if
A
be
because
B
is
,
and
B
again
because
A
is
,
't
is
clear
,
that
A
is
because
A
is
,
that
is
,
't
is
cause
and
effect
to
it self
.
2.
Wherefore
,
since
those
things
that
may
not-Be
need
an
extrinsecall
cause
to
Be
;
nor
can
all
things
have
an
extrinsecall
cause
,
unlesse
some
two
be
,
reciprocally
,
causes
to
one
another
:
it
follows
,
there
must
be
something
which
needs
not
an
extrinsecall
cause
;
and
consequently
,
must
have
,
from
its
intrinsecalls
,
that
it
cannot
not-Be
,
and
for
which
it
must
be
impossible
not
to
Be.
3.
Again
,
since
an
impossibility
of
not-existing
imports
and
carryes
Existence
along
with
it
;
and
this
impossibility
is
intrinsecall
and
essentiall
to
the
Thing
in
which
it
is
;
it
follows
,
too
,
that
Existence
is
essentiall
to
such
a
Thing
.
4.
And
,
since
existence
is
equally
universall
with
the
notion
of
Being
or
Thing
,
that
is
,
every
Thing
has
an
existence
correspondent
to
it
,
which
it
may
actually
have
;
and
Being
is
the
most
universall
predicate
of
that
wherein
't
is
;
it
follows
,
that
Existence
is
the
most
universall
predicate
of
the
Thing
to
which
't
is
essentiall
.
5.
But
,
on
the
other
side
,
because
Existence
being
put
,
the
Thing
is
compleat
,
as
to
its
essence
;
nor
can
any
essentiall
predicate
supervene
to
that
which
exists
,
but
all
are
presuppos'd
to
existence
:
't
is
clear
,
that
,
to
the
most
Genericall
notion
of
a
Thing
to
which
Existence
is
essentiall
,
there
can
no
essentiall
Difference
supervene
;
and
consequently
,
that
,
between
Things
to
which
existence
is
essentiall
,
there
can
be
no
essentiall
difference
,
that
is
,
but
One
only
such
Thing
can
exist
.
6.
There
is
,
therefore
,
some
Thing
essentially
existing
of
it self
;
from
which
,
being
but
One
only
,
all
other
Things
must
,
of
necessity
,
receive
their
birth
and
existence
:
Now
,
such
a
Thing
we
conceive
to
be
that
we
call
GOD
:
There
is
therefore
,
a
GOD.
7.
The
notion
,
therefore
,
of
God's
existing
is
,
that
his
existence
or
essence
is
diametrically
and
contradictorily
oppos'd
to
not-Being
:
not
,
in
the
Understanding
,
as
a
Chimaera
is
oppos'd
to
a
non-Chimaera
;
nor
,
in
possibility
,
as
a
man
to
not-a-man
;
nor
,
in
an
irradiate
act
,
as
it
were
,
and
impress'd
like
a
Seal
in
water
,
as
our
being
and
not-being
,
running
and
not-running
:
but
,
in
the
thing
it self
,
by
the
highest
and
ultimate
actuality
,
substantially
,
by
the
very
essence
of
Being
and
exercising
,
by
the
very
notion
of
existing
,
it self
substantially
and
concentrally
within
it self
and
about
it self
and
upon
it self
reflected
,
exercised
,
and
exercising
.
8.
This
is
the
solidity
and
stability
of
the
First
thing
and
GOD
;
whilst
,
the
stability
of
all
the
rest
is
no
other
,
but
to
depend
and
Be
from
Him
.
9.
Out
of
what
has
been
said
,
is
deduc'd
the
most
eminent
Simplicity
and
Indivisibility
of
God
.
For
,
since
existence
is
essentiall
to
him
;
and
there
can
be
nothing
in
a
Thing
,
neither
before
nor
after
existence
;
't
is
clear
,
that
God
is
so
Existence
,
that
he
is
nothing
besides
,
formally
.
10.
Therefore
,
He
is
not
corporeall
or
compos'd
of
parts
excluding
one
another
:
for
,
a
Body
,
since
it
has
a
Being
in
parts
,
of
necessity
includes
something
besides
Existence
,
divisible
from
that
.
11.
The
same
is
for
composition
of
Matter
and
Form
,
Subject
and
Accidents
;
for
these
,
since
they
include
something
divisible
from
Being
,
cannot
be
pure
existers
.
12.
Nor
is
there
any
room
for
composition
of
Genus
and
Differentia
;
since
,
Difference
supervenes
to
a
Genus
,
at
least
,
with
a
foundation
in
the
Object
for
so
apprehending
it
.
Ther
's
,
therefore
,
absolutely
,
no
composition
at
all
in
God
.
13.
But
,
whatever
composition
there
is
in
our
Understanding
concerning
God
,
proceeds
out
of
the
pure
defect
of
our
understanding
,
which
cannot
adequate
the
Simplicity
of
the
Divine
Essence
.
GOD
,
therefore
,
is
pure
Being
,
pure
Actuality
,
the
pure
Brightnesse
of
eternall
Light
.
14.
Again
,
hence
't
is
deduc'd
that
God
is
Eternall
,
or
,
that
there
is
not
in
God
past
and
future
,
but
only
present
.
For
,
since
God
cannot
not-Be
,
by
reason
of
the
essentiall
exercise
of
his
Being
;
and
,
has
this
essentially
,
that
he
cannot
not-have-been
nor
not-be-to-be
,
but
possesses
his
essence
indivisibly
:
it
comes
to
passe
,
that
't
is
the
same
thing
to
God
not
to-not-have-been
and
not
not-to-be
,
as
to
Be
what
He
is
;
but
,
there
cannot
be
,
either
by
imagination
or
in
time
,
an
instant
suppos'd
,
in
which
God
possesses
not
his
Essence
;
in
every
moment
,
therefore
,
of
time
whether
reall
or
imaginary
,
He
is
his
not
not-to-have-been
and
his
not
not-to-be
hereafter
,
that
is
,
his
to-have-been
and
his
to-be
.
15.
In
every
instant
of
time
,
therefore
,
He
is
in
every
instant
of
time
past
and
future
:
not
,
that
the
time
past
and
future
are
;
but
,
that
the
indivisible
existence
of
God
possesses
all
that
length
,
which
passing
times
make
,
contracted
▪
by
the
eminency
of
his
Simplicity
,
in
an
indivisible
act
;
and
never
either
loses
or
gains
,
because
His
repugnancy
to
not-Being
is
actuall
Being
,
and
Actually-to-Be
is
his
Essence
.
LESSON
VII
.
Of
the
Perfection
,
Immutability
,
and
Science
of
God
.
1.
FArther
,
the
Perfection
and
Plenitude
of
God
is
deduc'd
,
that
is
,
whatever
goodnesse
and
perfection
is
possible
,
all
this
is
eminently
found
in
God
.
For
,
since
existence
cannot
receive
existence
from
another
,
but
is
by
its
own
force
;
't
is
plain
,
that
whatever
existence
is
and
whatever
perfection
is
in
existence
has
its
Being
from
that
power
▪
by
which
existence
exists
:
the
whole
perfection
,
therefore
,
of
existence
is
in
that
existence
which
is
of
it self
and
by
its
own
notion
;
but
this
existence
is
,
as
has
been
said
,
the
very
essence
of
God
;
wherefore
,
in
God
,
there
is
all
the
perfection
which
is
t
in
existence
or
can
be
in
it
.
2.
Since
,
therefore
,
whatever
is
in
any
Thing
,
besides
Existence
,
is
nothing
else
but
a
disposition
to
existence
,
or
a
capacity
of
it
,
or
a
compart
in
which
and
by
which
imperfect
existence
is
to
subsist
:
't
is
clear
,
too
,
that
perfect
existence
subsisting
includes
,
more
eminently
and
perfectly
,
all
this
perfection
,
and
consequently
,
that
All
the
Plenitude
of
Being
is
in
God
.
3.
Besides
,
since
God
or
Being-of-it-self
is
but
One
alone
;
whatever
is
besides
must
,
of
necessity
,
receive
Beginning
,
Goodnesse
or
perfection
from
Him
:
but
,
that
the
adequate
cause
contains
all
the
perfection
of
its
effect
is
,
of
it self
,
evident
:
all
that
ample
and
inexhaustible
plenitude
,
therefore
,
of
intire
Being
is
in
God
and
flows
from
Him
.
4.
Out
of
these
foresaid
Attributes
of
God
,
his
Immutability
is
demonstrated
:
For
,
from
this
Plenitude
of
Perfection
,
He
is
Immutable
;
because
he
can
neither
acquire
nor
lose
any
thing
.
5.
From
his
Simplicity
,
again
,
he
is
Immutable
;
because
all
mutation
includes
▪
a
divisibility
of
that
which
is
chang'd
,
from
that
according
to
which
it
is
chang'd
.
6.
And
lastly
,
from
His
Eternity
,
he
is
Immutable
;
because
what
is
chang'd
has
sometime
and
sometime
has-not
the
same
thing
;
but
,
what
God
has
he
has
indivisibly
for
ever
,
and
,
in
that
very
respect
,
he
cannot
not-have
it
.
7.
Out
of
the
premisses
,
too
,
't
is
collected
,
that
God
knows
&
understands
both
Himself
and
all
other
things
,
by
his
one
only
essentiall
act
of
Being
.
For
,
since
God
is
Existence
it self
&
the
Plenitude
of
Being
,
nothing
can
belong
to
existence
which
is
not
primarily
in
Him
:
since
,
therefore
,
to
know
,
is
to
have
the
thing
known
,
after
a
certain
proper
manner
of
existing
,
in
one's
self
;
God
cannot
not-be
in
Himself
,
after
this
manner
of
existing
,
that
is
,
not-be-known
by
Himself
.
8.
Again
,
since
all
other
things
are
in
God
;
but
,
to
inexist
as
another
thing
,
is
a
perfecter
manner
of
inexisting
then
simply
to
inexist
;
it
appears
,
that
all
other
things
in
God
inexist
after
this
manner
,
too
,
that
is
,
are
known
.
9.
Nor
,
does
this
any
thing
prejudice
the
divine
Simplicity
:
For
,
since
those
things
that
are
known
inexist
as
another
thing
,
the
bounds
and
divisions
of
the
Creatures
in
God
are
as
other
things
,
and
produce
not
their
effect
,
viz.
of
distinguishing
,
in
Him
;
but
,
their
being
in
Him
has
nothing
whereby
one
should
be
oppos'd
to
another
;
as
appears
even
in
us
,
in
whom
two
Contraries
inexist
together
,
that
the
one
may
be
known
by
the
other
.
10.
It
appears
,
too
,
that
God
knows
other
things
,
in
his
own
Essence
:
which
,
since
it
may
doubly
be
understood
;
one
way
,
that
His
essence
should
be
the
Principle
of
the
knowledge
of
other
things
;
and
another
way
,
that
the
knowledge
of
the
Creatures
should
be
,
as
it
were
,
a
part
of
the
knowledge
of
His
essence
:
't
is
to
be
taken
this
second
way
.
11.
For
,
since
the
Essence
of
God
is
not
from
another
,
but
by
its
own
formall
power
of
existing
;
't
is
plain
,
its
manner
of
existing
is
opposite
to
the
being
from
another
:
there
ought
not
,
therefore
,
to
be
put
any
Vertuall
causality
,
whereby
one
should
be
from
another
in
God
;
because
,
whatever
is
in
Him
is
because
it
is
,
or
by
vertue
of
self-being
.
12.
You
'l
say
,
the
Creatures
are
something
distinct
and
another
thing
from
God
;
wherefore
,
the
knowledge
of
them
,
too
,
is
distinct
from
the
knowledge
of
God
.
'T
is
answer'd
,
by
denying
the
consequence
:
for
,
some
distinct
things
are
of
that
condition
,
that
the
knowledge
of
one
is
part
of
the
knowledge
of
another
;
and
so
it
happens
in
the
present
case
.
13.
For
,
since
God
cannot
know
his
Essence
,
unlesse
he
know
his
Science
and
the
,
as
it
were-vertuall
parts
of
his
Essence
;
and
,
since
the
Creatures
flow
immediately
from
God
,
without
any
other
help
;
it
comes
to
passe
,
that
God
is
a
Cause
actually
causing
by
His
essence
:
't
is
plain
,
therefore
,
that
part
of
the
knowledge
of
the
essence
of
God
is
,
to
know
that
He
actually
causes
such
Creatures
,
which
includes
,
that
such
Creatures
exist
:
part
,
therefore
,
of
the
knowledge
of
the
divine
Essence
is
to
know
the
Creatures
exist
,
in
all
their
differences
and
circumstances
.
14.
Again
,
the
universall
answer
is
evident
to
all
those
questions
,
Whether
God
knows
Future
contingents
?
the
secrets
of
Hearts
?
Infinite
things
?
Materia
prima
?
Negations
?
Mentall
or
imaginary
things
?
&c.
15.
For
,
't
is
evident
,
as
far
as
these
are
apt
to
exist
and
to
be
known
,
so
far
they
proceed
from
God
;
and
the
knowledge
of
them
is
part
of
the
knowledge
of
God
:
but
if
,
on
any
side
,
they
have
no
entity
nor
cognoscibility
,
so
far
they
are
not
known
by
God
:
But
,
to
enquire
,
of
each
of
them
,
what
cognoscibility
they
may
have
,
belongs
to
their
proper
places
,
not
to
this
of
the
Science
of
God
.
LESSON
VIII
.
Of
the
Divine
Volition
and
Liberty
.
1.
NOr
is
it
lesse
evident
,
out
of
what
has
been
said
,
that
,
since
God
,
operating
by
Existence
,
of
necessity
applyes
himself
to
the
particularities
of
the
Creatures
,
(
since
Particulars
only
can
exist
)
;
and
more
things
cannot
be
in
one
but
by
Science
;
that
,
I
say
,
He
makes
the
Creatures
by
his
Science
:
wherefore
,
since
Science
,
when
't
is
so
perfect
as
to
be
able
to
proceed
into
action
,
is
call'd
Will
;
't
is
clear
,
that
there
is
a
Will
in
God
.
2.
And
,
since
the
Science
of
God
is
every
way
perfect
,
it
appears
,
by
the
same
evidence
,
that
there
is
all
the
perfection
of
Will
in
God
,
or
,
all
Morall
Vertues
,
as
far
as
they
follow
out
of
pure
perfection
.
He
is
,
therefore
,
Gracious
,
Iust
,
Mercifull
,
Patient
,
and
whatever
other
use
to
be
pronounc'd
of
Him
;
out
of
the
eminent
perfection
of
his
Essence
,
as
't
is
call'd
Science
.
3.
And
,
since
Liberty
is
among
the
Perfections
of
Will
,
by
which
the
Will
or
the
Person
that
knows
chuses
one
out
of
many
,
according
to
the
Principles
of
his
proper
nature
;
and
,
the
Science
of
God
is
larger
and
more
ample
then
His
Operation
;
nor
is
there
any
thing
,
out
of
himself
,
by
which
he
can
be
impell'd
to
operate
this
more
then
that
;
't
is
clear
,
that
God
,
freely
and
according
to
his
innate
inclination
,
chuses
and
operates
this
rather
then
that
.
4.
You
'l
object
,
since
God
is
a
pure
Act
,
there
cannot
be
put
in
God
a
naturall
inclination
,
according
to
which
election
may
be
made
;
because
it
would
have
the
notion
of
a
Principle
in
respect
of
the
act
of
election
:
there
cannot
,
therefore
,
be
put
Liberty
in
God
.
'T
is
answer'd
,
there
cannot
be
put
,
in
God
,
election
in
fieri
,
or
,
to-be-made
,
but
only
in
facto
esse
,
or
,
already
made
,
that
is
,
such
a
Will
as
is
election
already
in
act
;
and
to
this
there
is
not
requir'd
the
notion
of
cause
and
effect
.
5.
Moreover
,
naturall
inclination
,
as
't
is
put
in
God
,
is
not
any
active
principle
,
but
a
certain
common
and
abstracted
notion
by
which
we
know
God
;
and
,
to
which
,
that
more
particular
notion
is
conformable
,
according
to
which
we
attribute
the
name
of
election
to
God
:
as
,
for
example
,
to
this
Volition
,
by
which
God
will
's
that
which
is
best
,
the
volition
of
the
World's
Creation
is
conformable
,
by
which
is
chosen
the
best
in
particular
.
6.
You
'l
object
,
again
,
since
God
essentially
has
all
Vertues
,
He
alwaies
does
,
of
necessity
,
that
which
is
best
;
and
would
doe
against
his
own
Essence
,
should
he
doe
any
thing
otherwise
then
he
does
:
'T
is
,
therefore
,
determin'd
to
him
essentially
,
to
doe
every
thing
as
he
does
:
but
,
that
which
proceeds
out
of
Nature
and
Essence
is
not
free
:
God
,
therefore
,
does
nothing
freely
.
7.
'T
is
answer'd
,
Even
in
us
,
after
we
see
any
thing
to
be
better
,
't
is
against
Nature
to
doe
the
contrary
:
neither
are
we
free
,
because
we
can
decede
from
nature
;
for
,
so
,
Liberty
would
not
be
a
perfection
but
an
imperfection
,
since
all
perfection
is
according
to
nature
:
but
,
Liberty
consists
in
this
,
That
,
among
many
,
which
,
at
the
beginning
,
seem
indifferent
,
we
can
find
which
is
more
according
to
nature
;
and
embrace
that
,
because
't
is
conformable
to
Naure
.
8.
Therefore
,
in
God
,
too
,
Liberty
is
,
so
,
to
be
put
,
that
it
be
understood
He
has
arriv'd
,
by
his
Science
and
understanding
,
to
act
what
is
conformable
to
his
nature
:
and
though
,
after
He
's
suppos'd
to
have
arriv'd
to
that
,
't
is
against
His
essence
to
doe
another
thing
or
not
to
doe
this
;
yet
,
His
Liberty
is
not
,
thence
,
diminisht
:
as
,
there
is
not
lesse
liberty
in
a
constant
Man
,
that
changes
not
his
judgement
once
establisht
,
then
in
a
Fool
,
that
,
at
every
little
appearance
of
reason
,
alters
his
opinion
,
but
a
greater
;
for
,
a
constant
Man
,
therefore
,
changes
not
,
because
he
alwaies
exercises
his
wisely-made
choice
,
that
is
,
the
better
,
whereas
a
light
person
exercises
now
the
worse
,
now
the
better
.
9.
Again
,
for
the
most
part
,
those
things
that
are-not-chosen
are
not
against
the
nature
of
the
chooser
,
in
themselves
,
but
from
some
Accident
or
complex
of
circumstances
;
whence
,
the
terms
precisely
consider'd
,
the
chooser
may
doe
them
according
to
nature
,
but
,
because
of
some
circumstance
,
he
cannot
:
And
,
even
thus
,
Liberty
may
be
attributed
to
God
;
for
,
to
doe
some
particular
thing
,
which
he
does
not
,
is
not
against
the
nature
of
God
precisely
compar'd
to
this
Thing
;
but
,
when
the
other
circumstances
are
collected
,
it
appears
another
thing
is
better
,
and
then
't
is
against
the
nature
of
God
to
doe
this
:
yet
,
this
prejudices
not
His
Liberty
;
which
consists
in
this
,
that
He
rejects
that
which
,
in
it self
,
is
according
to
His
nature
,
because
,
by
accident
,
't
is
against
it
;
which
we
experience
in
our selves
to
be
the
track
and
path
of
Liberty
.
10.
You
'l
say
,
that
God
is
determin'd
by
the
very
Being
of
his
Essence
;
and
,
so
in
Him
can
be
understood
no
indifferency
to
the
utmost
circumstance
.
'T
is
answer'd
,
this
hinders
not
but
that
we
are
necessitated
to
conceive
That
perfectly-determin'd
Essence
,
by
divers
abstractive
notions
;
in
one
of
which
this
determination
is
not
,
so
precisely
and
by
design
,
exprest
as
in
another
;
and
so
,
to
us
,
the
more
particular
of
them
becomes
the
determination
of
the
more
common
;
and
of
both
is
compounded
the
notion
of
liberty
exercis'd
in
God
.
11.
You
'l
object
,
thirdly
,
If
God
were
free
,
he
could
not-doe
what
he
does
;
therefore
,
't
were
possible
for
him
not
to
have
the
Volition
and
Science
which
He
has
;
't
is
possible
,
therefore
,
there
should
not-be
the
same
God
.
'T
is
answer'd
,
by
granting
God
can
make
that
which
He
does
not
;
but
,
by
denying
the
consequence
,
that
He
could
have
another
volition
then
he
has
:
for
,
when
we
say
,
God
can
make
another
thing
then
He
does
,
we
compound
the
Power
of
God
or
His
fecundity
with
the
Object
whereof
we
speak
;
but
,
when
we
speak
of
his
Volition
,
we
speak
of
his
Vnderstanding
compleated
to
action
,
and
This
proceeds
to
action
upon
the
consideration
of
all
accidents
,
out
of
which
,
as
't
is
said
,
it
happens
that
this
object
is
not
made
,
because
't
is
not-best
and
against
Nature
.
12.
'T
is
,
therefore
,
to
be
deny'd
that
there
can
be
in
God
another
act
of
volition
,
or
,
that
his
Will
is
indifferent
to
this
and
another
act
;
though
his
effective
power
,
taken
abstractedly
,
is
indifferent
to
more
,
because
it
respects
the
only
notion
of
Being
,
or
,
Thing
,
in
them
:
And
thus
,
't
is
evident
,
how
there
is
not
,
thence
,
inferr'd
any
possible
mutability
in
God
.
13.
You
'l
say
,
His
Will
,
abstractedly
taken
,
is
indifferent
,
too
,
to
more
acts
.
'T
is
answer'd
,
we
speak
not
of
the
Will
as
it
means
the
faculty
,
to
be
abstracted
in
God
;
but
of
the
Will
as
it
signifies
the
act
or
Volition
;
and
that
alwaies
imports
that
the
last
determination
is
made
,
though
it
expresses
not
what
't
is
:
whence
,
the
notion
of
it
is
different
from
his
Omnipotency
,
which
,
because
't
is
referr'd
to
things
without
,
does
not
of
necessity
imply
the
second
act
.
LESSON
IX
.
Of
the
Divine
Names
,
how
they
are
improperly
spoken
of
God
.
1.
OUt
of
what
has
been
said
,
hitherto
,
of
God
,
we
find
farther
,
that
the
Names
which
we
attribute
to
God
are
all
imperfect
,
and
,
not
one
of
them
all
has
any
notion
whose
formall
object
is
in
God
.
For
,
since
God
is
a
most
Simple
Entity
,
precontaining
in
one
most
simple
formality
,
the
whole
plenitude
of
Being
,
that
is
,
the
objects
of
all
our
notions
&
the
significations
of
all
our
Names
:
2.
And
is
,
too
,
Existence
subsisting
;
but
we
have
but
one
only
name
and
notion
of
existence
,
which
signifies
nothing
besides
:
'T
is
clear
,
that
our
names
do
infinitely
come
short
of
the
most
simple
essence
of
God
;
both
in
their
genericall
notion
,
because
God
is
in
none
of
our
Predicaments
;
in
their
integrity
,
because
no
name
of
ours
represents
all
that
is
in
God
;
and
in
their
form
,
because
none
of
our
apprehensions
have
a
formall
likenesse
in
God
.
Whatever
,
therefore
,
we
pronounce
of
God
,
must
needs
be
apply'd
to
Him
improperly
and
by
an
accommodation
of
the
name
.
3.
Whence
,
again
,
't
is
clear
,
that
all
the
names
,
which
are
spoken
promiscuously
of
Created
things
and
God
,
are
spoken
analogically
;
and
their
primary
signification
is
that
in
which
they
are
spoken
of
the
Creatures
:
For
,
't
is
evident
,
that
men
first
impos'd
it
on
created
things
,
and
of
them
they
have
,
in
some
manner
,
perfect
notions
;
and
consequently
,
names
attributed
according
to
those
notions
are
,
in
some
sort
,
proper
:
but
,
they
are
infinitely
far
from
explicating
the
Divinity
:
whence
,
it
cannot
be
doubted
,
but
they
are
more
properly
pronounc'd
of
the
Creatures
then
of
God
.
4.
You
'l
object
,
Perfections
simply-simple
are
formally
in
God
,
and
more
originally
in
Him
then
in
the
Creatures
:
names
,
therefore
,
signifying
these
,
are
more
originally
spoken
of
God
then
of
the
Creatures
.
'T
is
answer'd
,
that
,
't
is
evident
,
all
names
whatever
are
translated
from
the
Creatures
to
God
;
whence
,
there
can
be
no
doubt
which
signification
is
the
former
:
but
besides
,
't
is
false
that
there
are
Perfections
simply-simple
(
as
Divines
term
them
)
in
created
things
,
which
can
be
signifi'd
by
humane
names
;
but
those
things
which
are
simply
,
that
is
,
for-themselves-purely
,
desirable
by
us
,
we
call
simply-simple
perfections
,
and
,
through
ignorance
,
think
they
are
simply
desirable
by
every
Thing
.
5.
But
,
ther
's
none
of
these
formally
in
God
,
as
't
is
prov'd
;
and
,
if
any
were
,
formally
,
then
the
same
name
would
signifie
God
and
a
Creature
,
in
the
same
signification
,
and
would
be
univocall
.
Nor
imports
it
,
that
these
perfections
descend
from
God
:
for
so
do
all
others
,
which
yet
they
know
are
metaphorically
transferr'd
.
6.
This
notwithstanding
,
the
names
which
are
spoken
of
God
are
truly
spoken
,
and
it
may
be
argu'd
from
one
to
another
in
Him
:
For
,
since
he
that
speaks
knows
he
understands
not
what
that
is
which
he
signifies
by
this
name
;
but
knows
't
is
such
as
has
effects
,
like
those
proceed
from
that
perfection
,
which
is
call'd
by
this
name
in
Creatures
:
't
is
clear
,
that
this
name
truly
,
both
signifies
what
is
in
God
,
because
the
speaker
means
to
signify
this
;
and
,
in
some
sort
,
makes
known
God
to
us
,
since
it
manifests
God
to
be
something
,
whence
such
like
effects
proceed
,
as
from
a
just
,
a
mercifull
&c.
Man
.
7.
And
,
since
such
effects
contain
others
in
them
,
or
produce
them
out
of
themselves
,
or
they
accompany
them
:
't
is
clear
again
,
from
the
affirmation
of
the
said
names
,
we
may
proceed
to
the
affirming
others
;
which
may
signifie
,
that
the
consequent
effects
,
too
,
have
their
root
in
God
,
or
,
something
conformable
to
their
root
in
Men.
8.
You
'l
object
,
at
least
,
There
are
three
kinds
of
names
,
which
are
pronounc'd
properly
of
God
:
Proper
names
,
which
agree
not
to
any
other
,
as
,
to
be
GOD
,
Omnipotent
,
Omniscient
,
and
the
like
,
which
suit
not
with
any
Creature
,
&
consequently
,
are
,
of
necessity
,
attributed
properly
to
God
:
next
,
Relatives
,
as
,
to
be
a
Creatour
,
Lord
,
Iudge
,
&c.
which
,
being
they
speak
onely
an
extrinsecall
denomination
from
their
effect
,
it
cannot
be
doubted
but
they
are
properly
pronounc'd
,
since
,
doubtlesse
,
their
effects
are
from
Him
:
lastly
,
Negative
names
,
which
,
since
they
only
deny
something
of
God
,
cannot
be
counted
improper
;
such
are
,
to
be
incorporeall
,
immateriall
,
infinite
,
immense
,
&c.
9.
'T
is
answer'd
,
Even
these
names
,
too
,
are
improperly
spoken
of
God
.
For
,
first
,
those
which
seem
to
be
Properly
spoken
of
God
include
something
common
to
be
the
basis
of
what
is
superadded
,
which
makes
a
Proper
name
;
since
,
therefore
,
that
common
is
improperly
spoken
,
that
proper
,
too
,
which
includes
that
common
,
is
improperly
spoken
:
as
,
when
God
is
call'd
Omniscient
,
the
Searcher
of
Hearts
,
&c.
if
Science
be
improperly
spoken
,
then
Omniscient
,
if
a
Searcher
,
Powerfull
,
&c.
then
Omnipotent
and
Searcher
of
hearts
are
spoken
improperly
;
and
the
same
is
of
the
notion
,
GOD
,
whether
we
take
it
for
a
comprehension
of
all
,
or
whatever
else
.
10.
Again
,
't
is
false
that
Relative
names
speak
nothing
intrinsecall
,
but
only
an
extrinsecall
denomination
:
for
,
they
signify
a
proportion
and
a
community
of
the
nature
of
things
,
which
have
either
an
unity
or
coordination
in
acting
&
suffering
,
or
a
naturall
subjection
;
which
,
if
they
are
not
in
the
things
,
(
as
,
in
God
,
in
respect
of
his
Creatures
,
they
cannot
be
)
,
at
least
,
they
are
in
the
Soul
,
since
they
are
express'd
in
words
;
and
consequently
,
even
such
Names
,
too
,
are
improperly
pronounc'd
.
11.
Lastly
,
Negative
names
,
when
they
are
simple
,
signifie
some
positive
disposition
;
as
,
to
be
blind
or
lame
expresse
a
vitious
and
defective
disposition
of
the
Legs
or
Eyes
:
and
so
likewise
,
to
be
incorporeall
,
immateriall
,
infinite
&c.
in
God
,
explicate
a
difference
of
Substance
distinct
from
corporeity
and
limitednesse
,
that
is
,
a
difference
under
the
same
genus
;
whence
,
they
are
improperly
spoken
of
God
.
12.
But
,
if
a
purely-negative
proposition
were
pronounc'd
of
God
,
it
would
not
be
improper
:
Whence
,
that
Science
which
inquires
into
the
Impropriety
of
the
names
which
are
spoken
of
God
,
and
denies
all
things
of
Him
,
is
the
most
sublime
and
proper
of
all
.
LESSON
X.
Of
the
degrees
of
impropriety
in
the
Divine
Names
.
1.
OUt
of
what
has
been
said
,
't
is
easily
determin'd
which
names
are
,
more
or
lesse
improperly
,
pronounc'd
of
God
.
For
,
there
being
three
degrees
of
them
,
The
first
,
of
those
which
signifie
things
the
most
excellent
in
and
simply
desirable
by
men
;
such
as
are
those
we
call
the
Vertues
,
both
Morall
and
Intellectuall
:
The
second
degree
,
of
those
Goods
of
the
same
persons
,
but
participated
in
others
which
include
imperfection
;
such
as
are
the
goods
of
Animals
or
the
other
Things
below
Man
:
lastly
,
The
third
,
of
those
which
signifie
directly
and
formally
imperfection
:
2.
3.
You
'l
ask
,
since
both
the
names
of
couragious
and
a
Lion
are
improperly
spoken
of
God
,
why
this
should
be
esteem'd
spoken
symbolically
and
metaphorically
,
and
that
properly
?
'T
is
answer'd
,
that
,
in
the
Creatures
we
see
both
the
terms
,
and
,
therefore
,
we
easily
discern
when
a
name
is
spoken
metaphorically
and
not
properly
;
for
we
see
a
Lion
to
be
another
thing
then
Courage
:
but
,
when
names
are
transferr'd
to
God
,
one
of
the
extremes
is
obscure
to
us
,
and
consequently
,
the
translation
,
too
.
4.
Moreover
,
in
a
Lamb
,
a
Lion
,
&c.
besides
meeknesse
and
courage
,
there
are
many
other
things
,
which
't
is
not
the
intention
of
the
speaker
to
transferre
:
but
,
in
meeknesse
and
fortitude
,
ther
's
nothing
but
their
own
particular
notions
;
wherefore
,
it
seems
that
,
of
necessity
,
either
they
must
be
in
God
to
whom
they
are
apply'd
,
or
else
the
name
cannot
be
at
all
pronounc'd
of
him
:
and
,
therefore
,
many
think
these
are
formally
in
the
Divinity
;
though
they
mistake
.
5.
Out
of
what
has
been
said
,
't
is
deduc'd
,
that
some
things
cannot
be
attributed
to
God
,
which
yet
are
commonly
spoken
of
Him
.
First
,
a
Distinction
,
whether
formall
or
vertuall
,
between
his
Predicates
:
for
,
they
that
affirm
these
things
observe
not
that
Distinction
is
a
name
of
negation
and
imperfection
;
whence
,
for
these
to
be
in
Him
,
either
vertually
or
eminently
,
is
as
much
as
that
He
can
be
nothing
or
defect
.
6.
Worse
,
yet
,
is
the
notion
of
Cause
and
Effect
,
in
respect
of
Himself
,
attributed
to
God
;
for
example
,
that
his
Attributes
flow
vertually
from
his
Essence
,
that
He
understands
other
things
because
He
understands
himself
,
that
He
wills
the
means
because
He
wills
the
end
,
and
the
like
:
for
,
't
is
clear
,
that
the
notion
of
an
effect
,
likewise
,
speaks
imperfection
;
whence
,
't
is
no
eminency
to
precontain
it
.
7.
Like
this
't
is
,
to
put
Instants
either
of
nature
or
Intellectuall
,
in
one
of
which
some
thing
should
be
and
another
thing
not-be
in
God
,
till
the
next
instant
:
for
,
by
this
,
there
is
put
a
posteriority
in
God
,
which
is
imperfection
.
8.
But
,
foulest
of
all
,
God
is
put
to
suppose
Creatures
,
or
to
depend
on
them
,
whether
possible
or
actuall
;
as
,
when
't
is
said
,
the
Intuitive
Vision
of
God
supposes
the
futurition
of
Creatures
;
that
God
knows
not
a
free
act
but
in
its
existence
;
that
a
conditionate
futurition
is
presuppos'd
,
before
the
disposition
of
the
divine
Providence
;
and
such
like
:
which
,
since
they
make
the
Divine
essence
,
really
,
both
posteriour
to
and
depending
upon
Creatures
,
are
intolerable
and
absurd
.
9.
The
Imperfections
,
too
,
either
of
the
Things
God
has
made
or
of
our
Understanding
,
they
unwarily
cast
upon
God
:
as
,
when
God
wills
the
Means
should
be
for
the
End
,
they
weakly
suspect
that
He
wills
the
Means
because
He
wills
the
End
;
when
any
one
act
of
God
is
conceiv'd
by
us
,
we
not
conceiving
another
,
they
believe
that
there
is
something
in
God
,
too
,
whence
one
notion
may
be
,
though
another
be
suppos'd
not-to-be
.
10.
It
appears
,
out
of
what
has
hitherto
been
said
,
that
,
of
all
the
names
attributed
to
God
,
the
name
of
BEING
sounds
least
imperfection
:
for
,
both
it
stands
in
the
highest
degree
of
Actuality
,
whereas
the
rest
speak
Act
only
;
and
't
is
most
Universall
,
whence
it
has
this
,
both
to
contain
all
things
and
not
to
be
bound
to
differences
,
and
therefore
,
to
include
the
plenitude
of
perfection
:
and
lastly
,
Being
or
Existence
is
perfecter
then
Essence
,
which
is
nothing
but
a
capacity
to
that
;
but
,
all
other
things
are
in
the
order
of
Essences
and
more
imperfect
.
LESSON
XI
.
Of
the
Existence
,
Nature
,
and
Science
of
INTELLIGENCES
.
1.
OUt
of
the
premisses
,
't
is
easily
collected
,
that
there
is
some
Substance
,
by
its
nature
and
originally
,
incorporeall
:
For
,
since
God
alone
is
Being
of
himself
,
and
whatever
is
produc'd
participates
existence
from
Him
,
and
Existence
,
among
those
things
which
integrate
a
Thing
,
is
the
least
unlike
God
,
and
is
the
most
perfect
and
supreme
;
it
appears
,
that
all
other
things
which
are
in
a
Thing
are
caus'd
by
God
,
by
the
means
of
Existence
,
and
that
alone
immediately
flows
from
God
;
and
,
by
consequence
,
nothing
is
immediately
made
by
God
,
which
is
not
in
the
Creature
in
vertue
of
Existence
.
2.
Again
,
't
is
clear
,
that
,
supposing
whatever
Bodies
to
exist
,
they
,
because
they
are
many
,
must
be
in
a
determinate
place
:
and
because
,
the
same
things
being
put
and
none
chang'd
,
there
alwaies
remains
the
same
;
all
Bodies
,
in
vertue
of
Existence
alone
,
if
nothing
be
chang'd
in
them
,
will
alwaies
remain
in
the
same
place
;
and
consequently
,
in
vertue
of
God
alone
and
Bodies
,
there
will
not
any
Motion
follow
.
3.
Since
,
therefore
,
it
appears
in
bodies
,
that
there
is
motion
;
't
is
evident
,
there
is
some
incorporeall
Creature
:
which
,
because
't
is
requir'd
to
give
the
first
motion
to
Bodies
,
cannot
be
a
separated
Soul
,
whose
birth
presupposes
the
motion
of
Bodies
.
4.
'T
is
plain
,
again
,
that
,
since
this
Creature
receiv's
its
Being
from
God
,
of
it self
it
may
not-be
;
&
consequently
,
includes
in
it self
a
divisibility
of
Existence
from
its
Essence
.
5.
6.
Counting
,
therefore
,
those
things
which
integrate
a
Thing
or
Being
,
there
are
three
kinds
of
Things
:
GOD
,
filling
the
highest
degree
of
Existence
;
Bodies
,
by
their
latitude
immensly
expanding
the
infinity
of
Matter
;
and
This
middle
kind
of
Act
,
neither
essentially
actualiz'd
,
nor
flowing
into
matter
,
possessing
and
filling
a
kind
of
middle
order
of
subsisting
.
7.
'T
is
,
therefore
,
a
pure
Act
,
because
't
is
not
mingled
with
a
substantiall
power
or
possibility
:
't
is
not
the
purest
,
because
't
is
compounded
with
Existence
,
which
is
a
Substantiall
composition
&
,
as
is
manifest
,
common
to
all
but
that
One
Thing
of-it-self
.
8.
Again
,
't
is
evident
,
that
an
incorporeall
Creature
is
Intellective
;
&
,
so
,
actually
,
Understanding
:
for
,
since
the
necessity
of
its
existence
is
collected
from
the
motion
of
Bodies
,
't
is
evident
,
it
has
some
power
to
alter
Bodies
,
that
their
motion
may
follow
;
wherefore
,
since
action
proceeds
from
an
Agent
as
it
actually
is
,
that
motion
of
Bodies
must
,
of
necessity
,
be
actually
in
this
Creature
,
&
consequently
,
the
Bodies
chang'd
.
9.
Since
,
therefore
,
ther
's
no
Matter
in
this
Creature
,
nor
,
consequently
,
any
determination
of
matter
,
as
its
motion
or
quality
;
it
comes
to
passe
,
that
Bodies
are
in
It
as
existing
in
themselves
,
that
is
,
as
another
thing
:
since
,
therefore
,
to
be
known
is
,
to
be
,
as
another
thing
,
in
another
,
this
our
Creature
is
Cognoscitive
;
and
since
,
to
be
known
by
the
notion
of
Being
,
or
as
existing
,
is
to
be
understood
;
and
movable
things
are
known
to
exist
;
the
Creature
we
are
in
search
of
is
an
INTELLIGENCE
.
10.
It
follows
,
too
,
that
an
Intelligence
,
in
its
own
essence
known
,
knows
God
and
all
other
things
that
exist
:
For
,
since
an
Intelligence
has
whereto
an
existing
thing
may
be
conjoyn'd
,
retaining
the
property
of
its
being
another
;
&
,
it
s
own
Essence
existing
is
intimately
conjoyn'd
to
this
power
;
't
is
clear
,
that
It
primarily
and
formally
so
inexists
.
11.
And
,
since
,
knowing
that
its
own
Essence
exists
,
it
must
needs
see
that
It
exists
accidentally
;
it
sees
evidently
,
that
It
has
a
Cause
of
existing
,
and
that
such
an
One
as
we
have
been
in
search
of
above
:
It
sees
,
12.
It
sees
,
therefore
,
that
nature
actually
emanes
and
flows
out
from
Him
;
and
,
because
it
sees
what
is
the
End
of
nature
,
viz.
that
so
many
kinds
and
subdivisions
of
Animals
should
shoot-out
and
ripen
into
Spirits
of
eternall
Being
;
It
sees
what
is
necessary
for
this
;
and
consequently
,
the
whole
Plot
of
the
World
,
and
wherein
It self
will
be
usefull
for
it
.
LESSON
XII
.
Of
the
comparison
of
Intelligences
to
Souls
and
Bodies
.
1.
T
Is
clear
,
too
,
that
an
Intelligence
has
a
reall
divisibility
of
Essence
from
knowledge
:
for
,
since
,
't
is
of
the
notion
of
the
knowledge
of
its
Essence
,
that
it
exists
,
and
its
existing
is
divisible
from
Its
essence
;
much
more
the
knowing
its
existence
,
which
is
posteriour
to
and
supposes
its
existence
;
2.
Since
,
too
,
its
Essen̄ce
is
limited
to
a
certain
degree
of
existence
whereof
't
is
capable
;
't
is
clear
,
the
plenitude
of
Being
is
not
essentiall
to
It
:
Since
,
therefore
,
by
Its
knowledge
,
It
has
the
plenitude
of
Being
,
knowledge
is
not
essentiall
to
It
:
There
is
,
therefore
,
a
non-repugnancy
in
Its
essence
to
the
not-having
such
knowledge
;
and
consequently
,
a
reall
divisibility
of
its
Essence
against
its
knowledge
.
3.
You
'l
say
,
that
power
is
in
vain
which
is
never
reduc'd
to
act
;
but
,
this
divisibility
is
not
reduc'd
to
act
;
therefore
,
't
is
in
vain
,
&
ther
's
none
.
'T
is
answer'd
,
't
is
not
a
power
,
but
a
non-repugnancy
,
which
was
in
act
whilst
the
Intelligence
existed
not
.
4.
Out
of
what
has
been
said
,
we
are
arriv'd
to
the
comparison
of
an
Intelligence
to
a
separated
Soul
:
for
,
as
they
agree
,
in
that
they
are
both
immateriall
Things
,
existing
by
their
own
existence
;
so
,
they
disagree
,
in
that
an
Intelligence
is
adequate
to
its
existence
,
but
a
separated
Soul
exists
by
an
existence
which
is
,
by
nature
,
common
to
the
Body
,
and
consequently
,
't
is
not
adequate
to
its
existence
.
5.
Again
,
though
both
understand
their
own
Essence
and
,
by
that
,
other
things
;
yet
't
is
with
this
difference
,
that
an
Intelligence
has
this
knowledge
of
it self
from
its
manner
of
existing
,
but
,
a
separated
Soul
,
that
is
,
because
it
strikes
him
;
but
,
his
being
struck
includes
that
he
is
;
therefore
,
in
all
knowledge
,
a
man
must
needs
know
that
himself
is
:
The
Soul
,
therefore
,
has
,
in
its
first
knowledge
,
the
notice
of
its
own
existence
and
,
from
the
body
,
receiv's
the
knowledge
of
its
Being
;
which
unlesse
it
carry'd
along
with
it
,
it
could
not
reflect
upon
it self
whilst
't
is
separated
,
because
't
is
a
power
or
possibility
;
for
a
power
is
indifferent
to
an
act
and
non-act
,
and
has
neither
but
by
force
of
an
Agent
distinct
from
it
.
6.
This
,
therefore
,
is
the
universall
difference
of
separated
Souls
from
Intelligences
,
and
proper
to
them
as
they
are
incompleat
Spirits
:
that
a
Soul
,
out
of
the
pure
notion
of
its
identity
with
its
Intellect
,
does
not
inform
its
Understanding
;
for
,
otherwise
,
it
would
not
be
a
power
:
but
an
Intelligence
has
this
,
out
of
the
very
genericall
manner
of
its
nature
,
by
the
force
of
identity
To
be
present
to
its
intellective
vertue
.
7.
Hence
,
again
,
it
follows
,
that
a
Soul
,
in
vertue
of
those
things
which
are
in
it
by
the
communion
of
the
body
,
is
carry'd
to
all
other
things
:
but
,
an
Intelligence
,
in
vertue
of
its
own
Essence
existing
.
8.
A
Soul
,
therefore
,
even
in
separation
,
uses
these
common
notions
it
findes
,
impress'd
in
it
;
and
consequently
,
too
,
by
other
such
like
,
attains
to
the
plenitude
of
Being
:
but
an
Intelligence
,
by
the
pure
degrees
of
Things
,
at
sight
of
one
Thing
,
transcends
to
another
,
nor
needs
incomplete
notions
.
9.
Lastly
,
a
Soul
,
because
't
is
naturally
the
compart
of
a
certain
Body
,
is
determin'd
to
that
,
nor
can
act
upon
another
but
by
means
of
the
motion
and
affection
of
its
own
Body
:
and
,
it
affects
its
proper
body
by
identification
;
because
the
impression
or
alteration
of
one
is
,
of
necessity
,
the
alteration
of
the
other
,
according
to
its
manner
,
by
reason
of
their
identity
.
10.
But
,
an
Intelligence
is
not
determin'd
to
any
Body
,
but
indifferent
,
and
is
determin'd
only
by
choice
to
this
rather
then
that
;
and
changes
that
,
because
,
being
of
it self
in
act
and
exercise
,
the
exercise
,
according
as
the
corporeall
nature
is
subject
to
It
,
passes
into
the
Body
,
by
reason
the
Intelligence
is
in
such
a
determination
.
11.
Again
,
since
an
Intelligence
and
a
Body
are
call'd
,
univocally
,
Things
,
and
the
notion
of
existence
is
found
the
same
in
both
;
and
all
existence
which
is
a
compart
with
essence
is
,
of
necessity
,
proportion'd
to
a
part
of
Being
,
and
limited
:
but
,
between
two
limited
Things
under
the
same
univocall
notion
,
there
must
needs
be
a
proportion
:
't
is
evident
,
that
Bodies
are
not
infinitely
inferiour
to
Intelligences
,
in
the
notion
of
Substance
;
and
consequently
,
that
the
action
,
too
,
of
an
Intelligence
upon
a
Body
is
not
but
in
proportion
.
12.
And
indeed
,
if
the
operation
of
an
Intelligence
,
viz.
motion
,
were
suppos'd
unlimited
in
respect
of
a
Body
:
it
would
not
be
connaturall
for
an
Intelligence
to
move
a
Body
,
but
to
change
it
instantly
,
nor
for
a
Body
to
be
mov'd
by
It
:
That
nature
,
therefore
,
might
grow
up
by
continu'd
degrees
,
there
would
need
a
kind
of
Thing
of
a
middle
nature
,
between
Bodies
and
separated
Souls
,
on
one
side
,
as
the
Summe
and
fruit
of
Bodies
;
and
an
Intelligence
on
the
other
;
to
which
middle
Creature
it
should
be
connaturall
to
move
Bodies
.
13.
Be
it
,
therefore
,
certain
that
an
Intelligence's
power
of
moving
is
limited
;
but
yet
,
rais'd
,
too
,
above
the
motive
power
of
a
Soul
:
and
immediately
't
is
deduc'd
,
that
,
because
there
are
many
primarily-mov'd
Bodies
and
,
as
it
were
,
Suns
;
nor
is
it
likely
that
one
Intelligence
can
move
them
all
;
many
Intelligences
,
too
,
viz.
a
severall
,
to
the
severall
Suns
,
must
be
assign'd
.
LESSON
XIII
.
Of
the
Distinction
,
Subordination
,
and
Number
of
Intelligences
.
ANd
,
because
To
be
another
thing
,
as
another
,
is
the
notion
of
Knowledge
,
and
,
out
of
that
,
follows
the
comparative
power
,
or
,
that
many
may
inexist
together
;
it
appears
,
that
the
perfection
of
Understanding
is
argu'd
from
hence
,
that
more
may
be
together
in
one
Understander
then
in
another
:
but
,
since
,
in
Intelligences
,
as
also
in
a
separated
Soul
,
all
things
inexist
together
;
this
togethernesse
must
not
be
referr'd
to
the
time
but
to
the
way
of
Knowledge
,
that
they
should
be
accounted
together
which
are
contain'd
under
one
Step
or
divisibility
.
2.
Intelligences
,
therefore
,
will
be
essentially
distinguisht
,
in
that
One
comprehends
the
Universe
,
by
fewer
links
and
knots
,
as
it
were
,
then
another
:
so
that
,
the
Supreme
,
by
one
divisibility
,
knows
whatever
is
and
what
,
according
to
the
order
of
nature
,
can
follow
out
of
these
;
and
this
capacity
follows
out
of
the
amplitude
and
eminency
of
its
Substance
:
the
lowest
is
that
which
has
,
for
the
severall
Substances
,
severall
divisibilities
.
3.
'T
is
manifest
,
out
of
what
has
been
said
,
that
there
is
a
perfect
Subordination
amongst
the
Intelligences
:
for
,
the
Superiours
comprehend
the
adequate
perfection
of
the
Inferiours
,
and
not
in
part
only
,
as
't
is
in
Bodies
.
4.
Moreover
,
a
Superiour
is
active
upon
a
greater
body
,
or
more
active
upon
an
equall
body
,
then
an
Inferiour
:
whence
,
if
each
be
suppos'd
willing
to
act
diversly
upon
the
same
body
,
the
Superiour
will
prevail
,
and
the
Inferiour
will
not
be
able
to
act
.
5.
It
appears
,
notwithstanding
,
that
this
Subordination
extends
not
,
to
this
,
that
a
Superiour
Intelligence
can
act
upon
an
Inferiour
,
or
contrariwise
:
for
,
since
there
is
not
in
an
Intelligence
any
notion
of
power
or
possibility
,
consequently
,
neither
is
there
any
mutability
;
but
,
as
Its
existence
once
infus'd
,
by
reason
of
the
connection
with
its
Form
which
has
not
an
indifference
to
more
,
remains
unchangeable
as
long
as
its
Form
;
so
also
,
the
knowledges
of
an
Intelligence
cannot
,
like
Accidents
,
be
present
and
absent
,
but
,
once
infus'd
by
the
power
of
the
Giver
,
they
are
subject
to
no
mutation
but
from
Him
.
Since
,
therefore
,
there
is
no
other
divisibility
of
an
Intelligence
,
but
either
in
Its
being
or
its
knowing
;
't
is
evident
,
It
can
receive
no
change
from
another
Intelligence
.
6.
'T
is
apparent
,
too
,
that
,
because
an
Intelligence
embraces
whole
nature
,
by
necessary
deduction
;
It
has
,
of
necessity
,
in
its
very
birth
,
all
the
good
which
't
is
ordain'd
to
have
:
since
,
the
good
of
every
thing
is
that
which
is
according
to
its
nature
,
and
,
the
whole
possible
good
which
can
belong
to
a
Creature
,
whose
entire
nature
is
to
be
intellectuall
,
is
to
understand
:
whence
,
since
an
Intelligence
understands
all
things
by
force
of
its
nativity
;
by
the
same
gift
that
gives
It
being
,
it
arrives
to
the
possession
of
all
connaturall
good
.
7.
Every
Intelligence
,
therefore
,
is
blessed
,
in
respect
of
the
good
it
possesses
;
nor
can
it
lose
this
Beatitude
,
more
then
Its
essence
with
which
't
is
conjoyn'd
.
8.
Lastly
,
't
is
evident
,
there
are
three
things
chiefly
to
be
consider'd
in
Intelligences
,
Understanding
,
Will
,
and
Action
:
among
which
,
Action
is
the
meanest
,
as
being
about
inferiour
things
;
&
though
,
by
it
,
they
rule
over
Bodies
as
Instruments
,
yet
those
things
must
needs
be
nobler
by
which
themselves
are
perfected
,
which
things
belong
to
the
Vnderstanding
.
9.
And
,
the
Will
differs
no
otherwise
from
the
Understanding
,
then
the
imperfect
Understanding
from
the
perfect
:
for
,
when
the
things
that
are
understood
are
appropriated
to
the
nature
of
the
understander
,
and
are
made
something
of
it
,
then
the
Understanding
begins
to
be
Will
.
'T
is
evident
,
therefore
,
that
the
Will
is
of
those
intelligible
things
,
the
understanding
whereof
most
of
all
perfects
the
understander
.
10.
Wherefore
,
the
greatest
nobility
of
Intelligences
is
,
to
excell
according
to
Will
;
the
middle
,
according
to
Understanding
;
the
lowest
,
according
to
Action
:
though
,
't
is
clear
,
that
these
notions
are
so
correspondent
to
one
another
in
Intelligences
,
that
,
as
much
as
the
Will
of
one
excells
that
of
another
,
so
much
,
too
,
must
both
its
Understanding
and
power
of
Acting
.
11.
Now
,
that
the
multitude
of
Intelligences
is
but
finite
,
't
is
evident
from
hence
,
because
all
Multitude
(
since
it
rises
and
is
encreas'd
from
One
by
Unities
,
and
Unity
cannot
be
a
step
from
a
finite
to
an
infinity
)
of
necessity
,
is
finite
.
12.
But
,
since
they
are
not
made
for
the
good
of
another
thing
,
as
their
End
;
nor
have
any
thing
common
,
whereby
they
should
naturally
respect
one
another
;
nor
any
order
of
cause
and
effect
;
and
there
is
no
term
,
no
limits
of
Understanding
:
limitation
,
among
them
,
cannot
depend
on
any
other
,
then
the
occult
proportion
of
their
Natures
,
by
which
they
integrate
the
compleat
order
of
being
without
matter
.
LESSON
XIV
.
Of
the
Action
of
GOD
,
Intelligences
,
and
Bodies
,
severally
.
1.
FRom
the
knowledge
of
the
Agents
,
by
the
same
steps
we
are
led
to
the
knowledge
of
their
Actions
.
First
,
therefore
,
't
is
evident
,
out
of
what
has
been
said
,
that
,
since
God
alone
exists
of
himself
and
essentially
,
something
flows
immediately
from
Him
;
and
consequently
▪
is
created
,
and
that
God
creates
:
for
,
't
is
evident
,
what
is
made
is
made
out
of
no
presuppos'd
matter
;
since
God
himself
is
mutable
,
and
no
Thing
,
besides
,
preexists
.
2.
'T
is
plain
,
too
,
this
Action
is
in
an
instant
:
for
,
were
it
in
Time
,
since
,
in
the
intermediate
Time
,
there
is
no
Substance
wherein
it
should
be
subjected
,
it
would
neither
subsist
nor
be
in
another
:
wherefore
,
of
necessity
,
some
Substance
flows
instantaneously
from
God
.
3.
'T
is
manifest
,
therefore
,
that
both
the
Intelligences
and
the
first
Bodies
proceed
from
God
,
by
such
Action
.
4.
Nor
must
it
be
ask'd
,
by
what
extrinsecall
power
they
receive
birth
from
God
:
for
,
since
God
is
essentially
Being
it self
,
't
is
plain
,
that
whatever
is
requir'd
,
intrinsecally
,
for
God
to
be
a
cause
actually
causing
,
is
essentially
found
in
God
;
and
,
since
nothing
besides
himself
exists
,
that
which
is
in
Him
is
of
such
vertue
that
the
effect
follows
;
wherefore
,
't
is
a
necessary
consequence
,
because
the
subsistent
Being
is
Being
it self
,
Creatures
are
,
or
,
if
Being
be
,
the
Creature
is
;
as
if
you
should
say
,
if
the
Sun
be
not
capable
of
its
own
light
,
the
things
about
it
are
illuminated
,
or
,
if
the
Fountain
overflows
,
the
neighbourhood
is
watred
.
5.
Physicks
,
viz.
locall
Motion
,
Condensation
,
and
Rarefaction
.
6.
And
,
for
Locall
Motion
,
't
is
manifest
that
't
is
,
really
,
nothing
but
the
division
of
a
Magnitude
:
and
the
division
of
a
Magnitude
consists
both
of
the
conjunction
of
the
dividing
body
to
the
divided
,
and
its
separation
from
the
body
with
which
't
was
formerly
one
:
to
conjunction
there
's
nothing
else
requir'd
,
but
that
no
Quantity
keep
off
the
Place
from
what
is
plac'd
in
it
,
7.
But
,
the
body
impelling
either
it self
changes
place
,
without
any
other
mutation
,
and
then
,
it self
,
too
,
is
impell'd
;
or
else
,
from
some
other
mutation
only
it
receiv's
the
being
impell'd
,
or
,
without
impulse
,
to
impell
:
Since
,
therefore
,
besides
division
,
there
are
but
two
simple
mutations
,
Rarefaction
and
Condensation
,
and
condensation
is
both
a
negative
action
,
as
being
the
less'ning
of
Quantity
,
nor
makes
it
the
body
aspire
to
anothers
place
;
't
is
plain
,
there
's
no
simple
,
properly
call'd
,
action
in
bodies
,
but
Rarefaction
.
8.
Since
,
therefore
,
't
is
clear
,
that
the
Action
of
an
Intelligence
is
a
simple
and
properly
an
Action
,
as
,
that
which
begins
and
causes
the
action
of
all
other
bodies
;
it
comes
to
passe
,
that
the
proper
Action
of
an
Intelligence
upon
Bodies
is
Rarefaction
:
And
,
since
ther
's
no
other
action
,
properly
,
upon
a
body
,
nor
has
an
Intelligence
any
action
upon
any
other
thing
but
a
body
;
it
follows
,
that
Rarefaction
alone
is
the
action
of
an
Intelligence
.
9.
You
'l
ask
,
wherein
consists
this
action
of
an
Intelligence
upon
a
body
?
or
,
what
consequence
is
this
,
An
Angel
wills
,
therefore
a
Body
is
rarefy'd
?
'T
is
answer'd
,
out
of
what
has
been
said
,
't
is
clear
,
that
an
Intelligence
,
by
love
or
desire
,
ingrafts
the
thing
to
be
done
into
Its
own
Essence
and
existence
,
in
a
particular
manner
,
as
if
it
were
something
of
It self
:
whence
,
't
is
plain
,
that
the
Intelligence
,
by
the
act
of
its
own
being
stands
bent
to
the
Body
upon
which
't
is
to
act
,
according
to
all
the
circumstances
necessary
,
out
of
its
own
knowledge
to
the
Effect
.
10.
On
the
other
side
,
't
is
plain
,
both
that
the
Body
is
susceptible
of
the
desired
effect
,
and
that
the
effect
follows
out
of
,
or
rather
,
is
but
the
eminency
and
excesse
of
its
own
act
,
or
Form
,
that
is
,
Quantity
,
upon
matter
,
nay
,
of
its
commonest
act
or
corporeity
;
as
also
,
that
the
Body
is
,
in
some
sort
,
continu'd
to
the
Intelligence
,
by
its
Form
or
Substantiall
act
.
11.
And
,
though
the
act
of
the
Intelligence
is
of
another
kind
,
yet
,
because
the
notion
of
existence
,
to
which
both
dispose
,
is
the
same
;
the
act
of
the
Body
must
needs
,
from
the
assistance
of
the
Intelligence
,
grow
,
as
it
were
,
and
be
chear'd
;
and
consequently
,
more
overmaster
its
possibility
;
and
,
which
follows
,
the
Substance
be
made
rarer
,
either
to
the
transmutation
of
the
Substantiall
Form
,
or
within
the
same
nature
.
12.
We
answer
,
again
,
'T
is
evident
,
that
,
precisely
out
of
the
notion
of
Understanding
,
ther
's
a
connection
between
the
understander
and
that
which
is
understood
:
In
such
an
one
as
receiv's
his
Science
from
the
Objects
,
the
Object
is
the
cause
of
Understanding
;
in
one
whose
Understanding
is
His
being
,
the
being
of
the
thing
understood
is
from
the
understanding
;
lastly
,
in
one
whose
Understanding
is
neither
his
being
,
nor
from
the
object
,
but
concreated
and
naturall
to
him
,
the
changes
in
that
which
is
understood
(
if
it
admit
of
any
without
the
change
of
existence
)
may
be
from
him
.
13.
Next
,
from
hence
is
understood
the
operation
of
a
Body
,
wherein
that
consists
,
viz.
in
nothing
else
but
in
the
formall
power
of
existing
what
it
is
.
For
,
let
there
be
three
bodies
,
A
,
B
,
C.
following
one
another
between
the
parallell
sides
of
three
places
,
or
of
one
place
equall
to
all
the
three
;
and
let
an
Intelligence
rarify
A
:
since
that
cannot
encrease
,
unlesse
either
B
be
diminish't
or
driven
on
,
so
long
as
't
is
easier
for
B
to
be
condens'd
then
to
drive
on
C
,
so
long
B
will
be
condens'd
;
when
't
is
arriv'd
to
the
term
of
condensation
,
by
little
and
little
it
encroaches
into
the
place
of
C
,
and
forces
C
to
enter
into
the
place
of
another
;
till
't
is
come
into
so
ample
or
condensable
a
field
,
that
the
rarefaction
of
A
operates
nothing
else
but
condensing
the
farthest
body
,
and
then
the
motion
ceases
.
14.
The
operation
,
therefore
,
of
A
is
,
to
be
greater
,
whence
follows
A
's
being
united
,
according
to
some
part
of
it
,
to
the
place
of
B
:
Again
,
the
operation
of
B
is
,
either
to
be
made
lesse
and
so
only
to
quit
its
place
,
or
else
,
keeping
it self
in
its
Quantity
,
to
unite
it self
with
the
place
of
C
:
Since
,
therefore
,
to
be
united
to
the
place
of
C
is
nothing
else
,
but
to
be
a
Magnitude
between
which
and
the
place
of
C
ther
's
nothing
interpos'd
;
the
whole
operation
of
B
and
A
is
no
other
,
then
to
be
what
they
are
,
by
a
kind
of
formall
consistence
.
15.
Because
,
therefore
,
a
body
has
no
operation
but
division
,
't
is
plain
,
that
the
whole
action
of
a
body
is
reduc'd
to
Being
what
it
is
,
or
a
formall
consistency
in
its
proportion
of
Quantity
to
Matter
and
its
continuity
to
place
;
and
,
that
its
true
power
of
acting
is
infus'd
by
Intelligences
.
16.
'T
is
plain
,
too
,
that
an
Intelligence
,
by
that
one
rarefactive
Vertue
,
can
operate
whatever
is
to
be
done
by
Bodies
:
For
,
since
all
corporeall
action
is
perfected
by
division
,
and
division
is
arriv'd
to
by
this
vertue
,
all
action
of
a
Body
is
attain'd
to
by
this
vertue
.
LESSON
XV.
Of
the
cooperation
of
the
Agents
,
to
the
making
of
Substances
,
a
rationall
Soul
,
and
to
all
other
effects
.
1.
HEnce
,
we
are
arriv'd
to
the
production
of
Substances
:
For
,
since
some
are
produc'd
out
of
nothing
,
some
out
of
others
preexisting
;
the
former
must
,
of
necessity
,
have
flow'd
immediately
from
God
:
The
Agent
,
therefore
,
which
produces
out
of
nothing
,
makes
all
the
other
qualities
and
conditions
of
the
Thing
,
by
the
notion
of
existence
:
Existence
,
therefore
,
is
first
in
execution
;
and
,
since
the
greater
is
not
made
for
the
lesse
,
it
must
be
first
,
too
,
in
intention
.
2.
Wherefore
,
since
every
Agent
,
by
acting
,
endeavours
to
expresse
its
own
essence
upon
the
effect
;
the
Essence
of
him
that
produces
out
of
nothing
must
be
Existence
it self
.
3.
Nor
is
it
to
be
expected
,
that
another
Creature
should
be
made
use
of
,
as
to
preparing
the
matter
;
both
because
Existence
is
nobler
then
all
the
rest
in
a
Thing
,
whence
it
admits
not
of
any
preparation
for
the
rest
,
since
preparations
are
only
in
the
baser
in
order
to
a
better
:
as
also
,
because
,
existence
being
put
,
the
Thing
is
already
put
:
whence
,
the
operation
upon
nothing
is
compleat
by
the
very
putting
of
existence
,
and
consequently
,
of
that
cause
alone
which
puts
existence
.
4.
Supposing
,
then
,
that
God
has
created
certain
Substances
;
and
that
,
because
,
of
themselves
,
they
are
defectible
,
they
alwaies
have
that
being
from
God
;
't
is
infer'd
,
that
God
perpetually
poures
out
the
power
of
being
,
as
the
Sun
Light
.
Imagine
,
now
,
an
accidentall
transmutation
on
Body's
part
,
(
such
as
is
explicated
in
our
Physicall
discourse
)
,
and
,
(
as
't
is
declared
above
)
through
certain
changes
,
an
arrivall
to
a
constancy
of
being
in
another
degree
.
5.
It
must
needs
be
,
that
,
As
,
when
the
Earth
is
turn'd
to
the
Sun
or
Wood
laid
on
the
Fire
,
from
the
perpetuall
and
minutable
action
of
the
Sun
or
Fire
,
joyn'd
with
the
mutability
of
the
Earth
and
Wood
,
sometimes
one
sometimes
another
part
of
the
Earth
will
be
enlightned
,
and
sometimes
one
sometimes
another
part
of
the
Wood
will
burn
:
So
,
supposing
that
naturall
motions
make
Matter
,
in
severall
Sites
,
sometimes
capable
of
a
perfecter
existence
,
sometimes
of
a
more
imperfect
;
from
the
same
constant
effusion
of
existence
on
Gods
side
,
the
Substance
must
needs
be
sometimes
nobler
,
sometimes
more
ignoble
,
respectively
.
6.
Suppose
,
farther
,
an
existent
body
so
chang'd
,
that
the
matter
may
be
capable
of
a
Form
which
,
in
its
essence
,
includes
some
notion
,
that
exceeds
the
power
of
matter
:
is
it
not
plain
,
that
,
out
of
the
very
same
constant
effusion
of
existence
from
God
,
a
Substance
will
exist
which
will
be
,
so
,
corporeall
,
that
't
will
be
,
in
some
respect
,
Spirituall
?
7.
For
,
since
the
putting
of
existence
puts
a
Thing
;
purely
at
the
second
causes
determinating
God
to
the
position
of
such
an
existence
,
not
that
alone
is
put
,
but
whatever
follows
out
of
it
,
though
it
exceed
the
power
of
second
causes
:
And
so
,
it
appears
,
how
,
putting
the
generation
of
a
Man
,
a
rationall
Soul
is
put
;
and
how
the
power
of
nature
so
concurres
to
it
,
that
yet
the
notion
of
Creation
,
or
rather
of
con-creation
,
supervenes
,
and
is
necessary
.
8.
Lastly
,
how
it
both
is
and
is-not
ex
traduce
,
and
,
at
once
,
by
Generation
and
Creation
;
and
how
,
in
this
case
,
an
Instrument
,
in
some
sort
,
is
made
use
of
for
Creation
.
9.
And
,
because
the
internall
Dispositions
of
a
Soul
,
as
,
to
know
and
to
will
,
even
they
are
indivisible
,
and
follow
out
of
the
materiall
impressions
made
upon
the
Body
:
it
must
needs
be
that
,
as
the
Soul
it self
follows
out
of
the
generation
of
Man
,
by
the
help
of
the
universall
Action
of
God
;
so
these
Dispositions
,
too
,
from
the
impression
made
upon
the
man
,
and
from
the
nature
of
the
Soul
,
must
indivisibly
alter
the
Soul
.
10.
And
,
whoever
would
see
an
evident
example
of
these
things
,
let
him
conceive
how
,
by
cutting
,
a
piece
of
wood
is
made
more
;
for
,
all
the
time
of
the
cutting
,
the
figure
is
chang'd
,
yet
the
wood
remains
,
by
the
same
unity
,
one
;
but
,
indivisibly
,
the
cutting
being
finisht
,
they
are
,
now
,
two
pieces
of
wood
;
without
the
dualities
beginning
at
all
,
before
,
or
any
thing
of
its
nature
,
but
only
some
variation
about
the
Figure
.
11.
Out
of
what
has
been
said
,
we
are
deduc'd
to
see
,
how
God
performs
all
the
works
of
the
Creatures
in
them
.
For
,
first
,
if
we
speak
of
Intelligences
,
Since
their
internall
operations
are
nothing
else
,
but
to
be
all
other
things
after
a
certain
manner
;
't
is
manifest
,
they
are
,
actually
,
even
to
the
uttermost
positive
circumstances
,
by
force
of
their
Creation
.
12.
For
,
by
force
of
that
,
their
essence
is
conjoyn'd
to
it self
,
as
't
is
a
cognoscitive
vertue
;
and
,
out
of
this
conjunction
,
the
next
divisibility
,
which
is
,
of
God
to
the
same
cognoscitive
vertue
,
since
all
the
causes
are
put
,
is
,
of
necessity
,
in
them
.
13.
And
,
what
is
said
of
this
divisibility
is
,
with
the
same
facilnesse
,
discover'd
of
all
the
rest
whatever
;
since
they
are
all
connected
:
their
externall
action
,
too
,
Matter
,
which
is
its
subject
,
being
put
,
follows
,
by
force
of
their
internall
,
without
any
other
change
in
them
.
LESSON
XVI
.
Of
the
government
of
God
,
and
the
locality
of
Incorporeall
Things
.
1.
AS
for
the
rest
,
the
same
way
leads
to
the
discovery
that
God
is
not
the
cause
of
any
imperfection
and
not-being
,
or
ill
,
which
is
in
created
things
and
their
action
:
For
,
since
the
action
of
God
is
only
to
infuse
Being
,
and
this
as
much
as
the
Creature
is
capable
;
't
is
plain
,
what
there
is
of
Being
is
to
be
attributed
to
God
,
but
what
ther
's
wanting
of
Being
is
to
be
refunded
into
the
incapacity
of
the
Subject
.
2.
And
,
since
the
defect
of
action
proceeds
out
of
the
defect
of
the
Principle
,
that
is
,
out
of
some
not-being
in
the
principle
;
in
the
same
manner
,
all
defect
in
acting
is
to
be
reduc'd
,
likewise
,
into
some
defect
in
being
of
the
Creature
,
and
not
into
God
,
as
its
cause
.
Wherefore
,
God
is
the
Authour
of
all
Good
,
because
all
good
is
from
being
;
but
,
of
no
ill
,
since
ill
is
from
not-being
.
3.
Consequently
,
't
is
evident
,
that
God
cannot
annihilate
any
thing
,
or
withdraw
his
concourse
from
the
action
of
any
Creature
:
For
,
to
be
able
to
annihilate
is
to
be
able
to
make
a
no-Thing
;
and
,
to
withdraw
his
concourse
is
not
to
give
Being
to
things
created
;
either
of
which
cannot
happen
,
but
from
a
defect
of
Goodnesse
and
of
the
overflowing
,
as
it
were
,
of
Being
in
God
.
4.
You
'l
say
,
Therefore
,
God
does
not
act
freely
ad
extra
,
that
is
,
upon
the
Creatures
:
But
,
5.
You
'l
say
again
,
In
the
same
manner
,
therefore
,
it
must
be
said
,
that
God
cannot
make
any
thing
which
He
will
not
make
.
But
,
this
Consequence
,
also
,
is
deny'd
;
for
,
his
Power
is
refer'd
to
possible
things
,
or
,
which
have
entity
and
intelligibility
;
and
therefore
't
is
not
to
be
deny'd
that
he
can
doe
any
thing
that
's
possible
;
though
,
in
another
respect
,
it
be
impossible
it
should
happen
that
He
should
,
actually
,
make
this
.
6.
But
,
the
Power
of
God
,
which
is
the
very
notion
of
Being
and
Thing
,
has
not
,
for
its
act
,
the
not-being
of
any
thing
and
not-acting
;
and
therefore
,
't
is
not
to
be
said
,
that
He
can
give
not-being
,
or
can
not-act
.
7.
Let
us
remember
,
now
,
that
God
understands
all
and
every
thing
done
by
the
Creatures
,
and
wills
all
things
which
follow
out
of
his
operation
;
and
,
we
have
it
,
that
God
is
Governour
of
the
World
,
and
that
there
can
be
no
resistance
against
his
Will.
8.
For
,
since
whatever
is
has
its
birth
from
his
will
,
nor
can
there
be
any
thing
which
is
not
effected
by
Him
and
His
works
;
't
is
clear
,
whatever
He
wills
not
is
not
,
nor
can
be
so
long
as
he
wills
not
that
it
be
.
9.
Nor
is
it
lesse
evident
,
that
neither
the
Contingency
of
naturall
causes
,
nor
the
Liberty
of
rationall
Creatures
is
infring'd
,
by
this
government
of
God
.
For
,
since
Contingency
is
nothing
else
,
but
that
the
nature
of
the
cause
is
such
that
it
may
and
uses
to
be
hindered
,
by
other
causes
;
and
Liberty
,
that
a
Creature
,
upon
the
consideration
of
more
proceeds
to
action
:
and
,
't
is
so
manifest
,
that
both
these
are
in
nature
,
and
no
waies
touched
by
the
operation
of
God
(
as
that
operation
is
explicated
)
that
it
needs
only
the
remembring
:
't
is
clear
,
that
the
government
of
God
is
sweet
,
and
offers
no
violence
to
the
natures
of
naturall
causes
.
10.
You
'l
object
,
that
Propositions
,
concerning
a
future
,
whether
contingent
or
free
,
Subject
,
are
determinately
true
;
especially
,
since
they
are
known
by
God
and
are
predefin'd
:
wherefore
,
the
effect
cannot
not-be
:
there
is
,
therefore
,
no
either
contingency
or
liberty
;
whether
this
happens
out
of
the
force
of
Contradiction
,
or
of
the
irrefragable
will
of
God
.
11.
'T
is
answer'd
,
't
is
false
that
Propositions
concerning
a
future
contingent
have
a
determinate
truth
:
for
,
since
a
man
speaks
out
of
consideration
of
causes
,
the
Sense
of
his
proposition
is
What
the
causes
may
bear
:
Nor
imports
it
,
whether
it
be
pronounc'd
actively
or
passively
;
as
if
you
should
say
,
what
the
causes
will
act
,
or
what
effect
will
be
made
by
them
;
for
,
it
signifies
still
the
same
.
12.
If
it
be
,
therefore
,
ask'd
,
what
men
mean
by
such
propositions
,
't
will
rain
,
't
will
be
hot
,
Socrates
will
be
angry
or
go
to
Sea
,
&
c
?
't
is
clear
,
they
mean
to
explicate
effects
,
as
in
defectible
causes
,
and
consequently
,
they
have
no
determinate
truth
.
But
,
if
it
be
ask'd
,
what
the
proposition
will
signify
,
if
it
be
referr'd
immediately
to
the
effect
,
as
it
sounds
?
't
is
answer'd
,
no
sensible
man
uses
to
speak
so
or
make
such
propositions
;
and
so
it
belongs
not
to
the
present
question
.
But
,
if
there
be
suppos'd
such
a
power
of
Contradiction
in
the
Objects
,
as
to
determine
the
truth
of
propositions
;
all
things
must
fall
out
by
the
necessity
of
Fate
and
be
from
themselves
,
13.
'T
is
plain
,
lastly
,
that
this
action
of
God
,
by
which
He
moves
a
Creature
,
is
miscall'd
a
Concourse
;
since
such
a
word
leads
the
hearer
into
an
apprehension
of
a
certain
equality
in
acting
,
between
God
and
a
Creature
:
'T
is
,
therefore
,
more
properly
call'd
premotion
or
predetermination
;
since
God
makes
us
doe
even
to
every
the
least
positive
circumstance
of
action
.
14.
'T
is
collected
,
too
,
out
of
what
has
been
said
,
how
God
is
said
to
act
in
all
things
,
both
by
the
immediation
of
his
Suppositum
or
Substance
and
of
his
Vertue
;
but
,
an
Intelligence
upon
one
body
only
by
the
immediation
of
Its
Substance
,
upon
the
rest
by
the
immediation
only
of
Its
vertue
.
15.
For
,
since
the
action
of
God
is
the
influx
of
Being
it self
,
and
nothing
can
act
without
Being
,
nor
Being
flow
from
any
but
God
;
God
must
needs
immediately
act
upon
all
Substances
by
Creating
and
Conserving
them
:
and
consequently
,
in
such
his
acting
,
no
third
Substance
intervenes
between
Him
and
the
Creature
.
Again
,
the
action
of
all
bodies
proceeding
from
Intelligences
,
and
They
being
made
act
by
God
;
the
vertue
of
God
makes
every
thing
act
,
and
so
is
more
immediate
to
the
effect
then
the
vertue
of
the
nearest
cause
:
whence
also
,
God
is
,
by
the
immediation
of
his
vertue
,
more
immediate
,
then
the
next
cause
which
produces
the
action
.
16.
But
,
an
Intelligence
,
which
immediately
rarifies
A
,
moves
not
B
,
but
by
the
mediation
of
A
;
the
Suppositum
A
,
therefore
,
is
between
the
Intelligence
and
B
;
wherefore
,
the
Intelligence
acts
not
,
by
the
immediation
of
Its
Suppositum
,
upon
B
:
But
,
because
A's
being
rarify'd
is
the
cause
that
A
moves
B
;
and
A
is
rarify'd
by
the
vertue
of
the
Intelligence
;
the
vertue
of
the
Intelligence
makes
B
be
mov'd
by
A
;
the
vertue
,
therefore
,
of
the
Intelligence
,
not
the
Suppositum
,
is
immediate
to
B.
17.
And
,
hence
it
follows
,
that
God
is
said
to
be
Immense
;
but
,
an
Intelligence
to
be
definitively
in
Place
:
For
,
since
nothing
either
is
or
can
be
without
Existence
,
't
is
clear
,
neither
can
there
be
any
Place
,
upon
which
God
does
not
,
immediately
,
act
:
but
,
an
Intelligence
,
having
a
determinate
proportion
to
a
body
,
so
acts
upon
a
certain
quantity
,
that
it
cannot
,
together
and
at
once
,
immediately
act
upon
another
.
Since
,
therefore
,
incorporeall
Things
are
not
in
Place
circumscriptively
;
an
Intelligence
must
be
definitively
,
but
God
,
without
end
,
in
all
Place
,
by
immediate
operation
.
LESSON
XVII
.
Of
the
Conservation
of
Creatures
,
and
the
Durations
of
Things
.
1.
T
Is
clear
,
too
,
out
of
what
has
been
said
,
that
this
action
of
God
is
the
conservation
of
things
,
both
as
to
their
Substance
,
and
as
to
their
intrinsecall
Accidents
:
For
,
since
the
essence
of
created
things
has
not
,
of
it self
,
a
necessary
conjunction
with
Being
,
but
such
an
one
as
may
,
of
its
own
nature
,
be
lost
;
't
is
plain
,
they
are
not
conjoyn'd
,
by
force
of
their
own
notions
,
for
that
time
during
which
they
may
be
not-conjoyn'd
;
and
,
by
consequence
,
as
long
as
they
are
conjoyn'd
,
they
have
this
,
to
be
conjoyn'd
,
from
an
extrinsecall
;
they
,
therefore
,
remain
conjoyn'd
by
an
Extrinsecall
power
.
2.
But
,
't
is
of
the
same
nature
,
to
be
conjoyn'd
and
to
remain
conjoyn'd
,
or
,
to
be
for
any
duration
conjoyn'd
;
they
have
,
therefore
,
this
from
the
same
cause
and
vertue
:
and
,
since
't
is
not
any
change
,
but
,
on
the
contrary
,
the
effect
is
that
nothing
should
be
chang'd
;
by
the
very
same
action
,
too
,
they
keep
their
being
,
which
is
,
to
be
conserv'd
.
The
same
action
of
God
,
therefore
,
is
Conservation
,
in
respect
of
Substances
:
3.
Out
of
what
has
been
said
,
too
,
we
may
know
,
what
Action
signifies
in
the
effect
it self
:
And
,
if
the
question
be
of
the
Divine
action
,
as
it
immediately
flows
from
God
,
't
is
plain
,
that
'T
is
the
very
Substance
it self
;
not
only
,
because
it
cannot
be
subjected
in
a
Substance
,
which
subsists
no
otherwise
then
by
it
;
nor
,
because
the
existence
of
Things
form'd
out
of
our
conceits
is
universally
rejected
;
but
also
,
because
any
intermediate
action
(
such
as
the
Moderns
feign
the
Making
)
which
should
be
put
,
serves
to
no
purpose
.
4.
For
,
either
God
,
before
this
action
,
is
determin'd
in
himself
to
act
,
that
is
,
that
this
action
should
follow
from
Him
,
or
,
He
is
not
;
if
not
,
this
action
will
not
follow
,
for
,
from
an
indifferent
nothing
follows
;
but
,
if
He
be
determin'd
,
this
action
has
not
the
power
of
determining
Him
,
for
which
the
Opponent
requires
it
as
necessary
:
but
,
the
effect
can
,
as
immediately
,
follow
out
of
Himself
,
as
this
action
.
And
,
this
same
discourse
holds
against
the
like
fictitious
action
,
too
,
of
Creatures
.
5.
Again
,
in
as
much
as
the
action
of
God
is
Conservation
,
't
is
nothing
but
the
very
Being
of
the
thing
conserv'd
.
For
,
first
,
the
Duration
of
an
Incorporeall
thing
cannot
be
divisible
;
for
,
if
it
were
divisible
,
't
would
be
continuate
and
divisible
without
end
:
either
,
therefore
,
some
part
,
together
and
at
once
,
in
an
incorporeall
,
that
is
,
indivisible
thing
,
or
not
:
if
together
,
that
part
will
not
include
succession
;
if
not
,
no
part
can
ever
be
.
6.
And
,
this
Argument
has
not
lesse
force
in
a
Corporeall
Creature
;
for
,
though
it
be
divisible
in
extension
,
yet
,
't
is
indivisible
in
succession
,
and
consequently
,
it
cannot
sustain
together
more
parts
of
successive
duration
.
7.
Again
,
if
,
to
endure
be
,
for
the
same
thing
to
be
the
same
it
was
;
is
it
not
clear
,
ther
's
nothing
requir'd
but
a
non-mutation
?
and
,
on
the
other
side
,
that
,
of
two
things
which
exist
,
if
one
perish
,
that
's
said
to
be
chang'd
;
that
which
endures
remaining
still
unchang'd
?
There
is
,
therefore
,
no
novelty
in
permanency
.
8.
Moreover
,
to
change
the
existence
,
the
Essence
,
too
,
must
needs
be
chang'd
,
since
,
't
is
the
aptest
capacity
of
existence
:
the
notion
,
therefore
,
of
Substance
will
be
in
perpetuall
change
and
instable
,
and
consequently
,
out
of
God
,
nothing
stable
.
9.
You
'l
object
,
Since
't
is
often
said
,
that
a
Creature
may
not-be
,
and
yet
,
whilst
it
is
,
it
cannot
not-be
;
't
is
manifest
,
that
its
cannot
not-be
,
or
,
to
be
whilest
it
is
,
successively
supervenes
to
a
Creature
:
Since
,
therefore
,
ther
's
a
greater
necessity
of
indivisibility
,
on
God's
part
,
then
on
a
Creature
's
;
the
succession
is
to
be
concluded
on
the
Creatures
side
.
10.
'T
is
answer'd
,
'T
is
just
contrary
:
for
,
as
,
if
the
action
of
God
were
put
(
by
way
of
imagination
)
to
be
successive
,
no
man
would
require
any
other
succession
,
to
understand
the
duration
of
a
Creature
;
so
,
if
the
action
of
God
be
put
equivalent
to
continually
successive
,
no
man
can
complain
of
the
unintelligibility
of
Duration
.
11.
Because
,
therefore
,
the
action
of
God
is
conformable
to
His
existence
,
and
His
existence
indivisibly
comprehends
the
past
and
future
;
it
must
needs
be
that
the
action
,
as
it
is
the
internall
determination
of
God
,
in
the
same
manner
comprehends
succession
.
This
action
,
therefore
,
actuates
the
Creature
,
with
a
certain
indivisibility
that
eminentially
contains
divisibility
;
and
,
without
any
divisibility
,
makes
the
existence
of
a
Creature
,
by
contradiction
,
impossible
to
be
taken
away
successively
;
yet
,
without
any
more
then
a
vertuall
succession
intervening
in
the
Creature
.
12.
For
,
what
has
formally
the
vertue
which
is
in
succession
,
can
as
well
perform
this
as
succession
it self
:
but
,
such
,
we
have
said
,
is
the
action
of
God
:
whence
,
't
is
plain
,
that
,
even
from
this
effect
,
the
notion
of
Gods
Eternity
is
demonstrated
à
posteriori
.
13.
Hence
,
't
is
deduc'd
,
that
the
duration
of
corporeall
and
spirituall
Substances
is
,
intrinsecally
different
:
Since
,
corporeall
Substances
have
,
from
the
notion
of
Matter
,
an
intrinsecall
possibility
to
not-be
;
and
consequently
,
a
weaker
connection
to
Being
,
intrinsecally
,
out
of
their
own
nature
;
but
duration
consists
in
the
connection
of
existence
and
essence
,
as
to
the
effect
of
permanence
.
14.
Adde
to
this
,
that
there
are
,
in
nature
,
causes
which
destroy
Bodies
,
but
,
there
are
none
which
are
able
to
infest
Spirituall
Substances
:
whence
,
since
God
destroyes
nothing
,
of
Himself
,
Intelligences
are
absolutely
immortall
,
as
also
,
separated
Souls
;
and
Bodies
,
when
motion
ceases
,
will
be
immortall
accidentally
,
in
the
mean
time
they
are
simply
mortall
,
unlesse
perhaps
there
are
some
exempt
from
the
generall
order
.
15.
Out
of
what
has
been
said
,
too
,
both
the
notion
and
difference
of
three
Durations
is
evident
:
LESSON
XVIII
.
Of
the
manner
of
Action
,
on
the
Subject's
side
.
1.
THe
solution
,
also
,
of
that
old
Question
is
evident
,
Why
God
made
not
the
World
before
?
For
,
if
we
consider
,
that
ther
's
no
beginning
of
an
Infinite
,
and
that
,
where
ther
's
no
beginning
,
there
can
be
no
determinate
distance
from
the
beginning
;
it
will
appear
,
that
't
is
impossible
there
should
be
any
eternall
flux
of
Time
or
instants
,
(
even
by
imagination
)
,
wherein
there
can
be
taken
a
now
and
then
,
and
any
constant
difference
of
duration
,
or
,
something
to
be
before
,
something
after
,
determin'd
.
2.
Wherefore
,
such
a
Question
proceeds
from
the
weaknesse
and
infirmity
of
our
understanding
,
and
signifies
nothing
;
and
consequently
,
bears
no
answer
:
For
,
for
God
to
make
this
world
before
,
in
time
,
that
he
made
it
,
would
be
to
have
made
a
world
before
a
world
;
since
,
the
time
of
the
beginning
of
the
world
is
nothing
else
but
the
very
motion
,
with
which
the
world
began
to
be
mov'd
.
3.
In
like
manner
,
evident
is
the
solution
of
that
question
,
Whether
God
could
make
a
permanent
Thing
(
that
is
,
whose
essence
includes
not
succession
)
from
all
eternity
?
For
,
if
there
be
no
quiddity
or
possibility
of
an
infinite
in
succession
;
't
is
clear
,
that
God
could
not
so
make
a
Creature
,
that
it
should
have
Eternity
,
by
relation
to
infinite
succession
:
Therefore
,
not
otherwise
then
by
some
positive
eminence
confer'd
on
it
:
Since
,
therefore
,
Duration
consists
in
the
connection
of
existence
to
a
Thing
,
He
could
no
otherwise
make
a
Creature
from
Eternity
,
then
by
giving
it
such
a
connection
by
which
,
simply
,
it
could
not
not-be
,
wherein
consists
the
very
Eternity
it self
of
God
.
Clearly
,
therefore
,
't
is
impossible
that
even
a
permanent
Thing
could
have
been
from
Eternity
.
4.
But
,
as
for
the
not-immediate
action
of
God
,
or
(
which
is
all
one
)
as
't
is
the
same
with
the
action
of
the
Creature
,
't
is
plain
,
the
same
account
is
to
be
given
as
of
the
action
of
the
Creature
.
And
,
of
these
,
Philosophers
have
pronounc'd
,
that
Action
is
something
between
the
Agent
and
effect
:
as
,
in
the
change
of
Place
,
between
the
Rest
in
the
term
whence
and
the
term
whether
,
there
interven's
motion
;
which
they
falsely
imagine
to
be
more
beings-in-place
successively
,
since
,
as
Aristotle
has
demonstrated
,
all
that
time
the
movable
happens
not
to
be
in
a
place
equall
to
it
,
whereas
,
yet
,
equality
is
of
the
very
notion
of
Place
.
5.
So
,
too
,
in
other
mutations
,
especially
that
which
is
call'd
Substantiall
generation
,
the
Subject
,
by
the
precedent
motion
,
which
properly
is
the
very
action
,
is
not
,
neither
actually
nor
in
part
,
in
the
term
it self
;
but
is
chang'd
only
in
its
Quality
.
6.
So
,
too
,
it
falls
out
in
Rarefaction
,
which
is
immediately
from
an
Intelligence
:
for
,
since
the
proportion
of
an
Intelligence
to
a
Body
is
finite
;
It
cannot
,
instantaneously
,
reduce
a
body
to
any
how-little-soever-a
degree
of
rarity
:
wherefore
,
there
must
of
necessity
,
between
It
prepar'd
for
action
and
the
term
,
intervene
some
motion
;
during
which
,
the
body
rarify'd
is
neither
in
any
determinate
degree
of
rarity
,
nor
in
any
determinate
Place
.
7.
Out
of
all
which
,
this
,
at
length
,
is
concluded
,
what
a
kind
of
being
Passion
or
mutation
has
in
the
Subject
:
for
,
since
't
is
repugnant
,
the
Formall
parts
in
a
Compound
should
be
actuall
;
they
must
be
only
in
possibility
or
power
,
and
some
other
third
thing
,
resolvable
into
parts
,
actually
exist
.
8.
This
third
thing
,
therefore
,
has
a
certain
resolvable
and
changeable
nature
;
wherefore
,
't
is
clear
,
there
is
some
cause
which
has
the
power
of
changing
it
:
Let
B
,
therefore
,
be
the
changeable
nature
,
A
the
changing
cause
;
if
A
be
apply'd
to
B
,
must
not
B
,
of
necessity
,
become
another
thing
then
it
was
,
that
is
,
be
chang'd
?
9.
This
is
,
therefore
,
for
B
to
have
suffered
by
means
of
A
,
viz.
to
become
another
thing
then
it
was
:
another
thing
,
I
say
,
or
altered
;
for
,
if
nothing
perceivable
remain
,
't
is
become
another
thing
;
but
,
if
there
remain
whereby
it
may
be
mark'd
to
be
this
same
as
was
before
,
't
is
only
altered
,
because
the
foundation
,
or
,
that
which
is
the
sustainer
still
remaines
,
but
't
is
innovated
in
some
respect
.
10.
For
example
,
Let
there
be
a
Gallon
of
water
in
a
Cubicall
vessell
,
and
(
to
avoid
dispute
about
a
thing
that
concerns
us
not
)
let
's
suppose
the
Figure
to
be
nothing
else
,
but
that
that
very
quantity
,
according
to
its
three
dimensions
,
be
no
farther
extended
then
,
actually
,
't
is
;
(
which
conceit
,
being
purely
negative
,
can
adde
nothing
to
the
quantity
)
:
let
the
same
water
,
then
,
be
suppos'd
in
a
vessell
of
another
figure
;
and
consequently
,
it self
,
too
,
to
have
put
on
other
limits
:
Since
the
former
terms
were
nothing
but
the
very
Quantity
of
the
water
,
neither
can
the
later
differ
from
it
.
11.
'T
is
evident
,
therefore
,
that
this
Quantity
,
remaining
a
Gallon
,
(
which
is
its
difference
,
whereby
,
as
quan-tity
,
't
is
limited
)
,
has
a
possibility
to
be
,
now
Pyramidall
,
now
Cubicall
;
and
consequently
,
is
changeable
,
no
Thing
being
chang'd
:
To
this
possibility
,
therefore
,
if
the
power
of
two
such
vessells
be
suppos'd
successively
apply'd
;
't
is
clear
,
purely
upon
the
water
's
and
their
conjunction
,
there
follows
a
change
in
the
Quantity
of
the
water
,
by
little
and
little
,
and
,
at
length
,
what
in
one
vessell
was
of
one
figure
,
in
another
becomes
of
another
,
chang'd
according
to
the
manner
,
unchang'd
according
to
the
notion
of
Quantity
.
12.
Thus
,
Substances
become
altered
,
according
to
Qualities
,
the
Quantity
unchang'd
;
according
to
Quantity
,
the
Substance
unchang'd
;
according
to
Substance
,
the
Matter
remaining
:
for
no
other
cause
,
but
that
the
Subject
or
that
which
suffers
is
so
mutable
,
and
an
Efficient
,
which
has
the
power
of
changing
,
is
apply'd
.