I am not satisfied , that his distinctions to avoid the Possibility of sin , are sufficient to avoid the making God the Author of it . For thus he saith † † Edit. the first . , pag. 91. Because it belongs to the Universality of the first cause to produce not onely every reall being , but also the reall positive Modifications of beings ; therefore we say , that in good works , both the works themselves , and their rectitude are positive , and are from God ; in evill works there are also two things considerable , the works themselves , and their pravitie ; the works themselves we doubt not , are positive , and from God , as all other positive things ( are ) ; but their pravities adde no new entities to them , but consist in a mere privation . Thus Master Hickman . In reference to sinfull Actions , others deliver the distinction in these termes , ( telling us , ) [ The sinfull Act is to be considered , either Materialiter , as to the matter of it , and so it is from God , and of his production ; or else Formaliter , as to the Form of it , and so it is from man . But we should remember , that many times , the Materiall Act ( as we may say ) cannot be disjoyned from the formall , and in that case , why he that is the Cause of the one , should not be adjudged the Cause of the other , is a Question that requires a solid determination . If God produced the Act of eating the forbidden fruit materially , why not formally too , seeing that sin consisted wholly in the eating of that fruit ? for Adam could not eat thereof without sin . And if God by an Omnipotent concurse determined Davids lying with Bathsheba , will that distinction mend the matter ? Will the matter of that foul Act tend to the praise of Gods efficiency , when he tells us , † † See 2 Sam. 12.12 . with Num. 15.30 . the Form of it , conduced so signally to his dishonour ? If the Act which is evill ex genere & objecto , be materially of Gods production , why should we invest man with the formality of it , which is the sin ? Is it because the Act is repugnant to the Law of God , to which man stands obliged , 1 Joh. 3.4 . and the transgression of this law is sinne ? This seems to be Master Hickmans sense , ( pag. 91. ) In those things which are to be done according to a Rule , good consists in a conformity to , and convenience with the Rule , but evill in a difformitie or discrepance from the Rule . But I say , that Act of Adultery cannot be materially committed , but it must unavoidably be discrepant to the Law of God ; so that if God produceth this Act materially , it is impossible man should give it any formality , but what is sinfull ; especially seeing this formality or sinfulnesse doth of necessity result from the materiall Act. Indeed were there no Law in force about it , it were possible to conceive , how he that produceth ( that which we now call ) the Act of sin materially , should not , for all that , be the formall cause of it . But the law being now made , and that by God himself too , what Subterfuge can be invented to avoid it , but that God , who is affirmed to produce the Act , should be accounted the Author of the sinne ? But God made the Law , you will say , not to bind himself , but to regulate his Creature ; Though this be true , yet it doth not take away the objection ; for how can it stand with the justice of God , first to make a Law to regulate his creature , and then to impell and Act that creature contrary to that Law , and at last to punish the same Creature , for being so Acted and impeld ? Shall not the Judge of all the earth do right ? Gen. 18.26 . God will be justified when he judgeth a a Psal. 51.4 . ; and therefore when he comes to execute judgement upon all b b Epist. Jud. vers. 15. , he will convince all that are ungodly among them of all their ungodly deeds , which they have ungodly committed ; not which himself hath Acted them unto , or Acted in them .

But Master Hickman perhaps , will stick still to his Metaphysicall formality , and say , here is ( in the supposed Act ) a discrepance or opposition to the Rule which is the Law of God . To this the answer is very easie , that man seldome , or never entertains sin , or consent to it , with a design or minde to oppose himself to the divine Law ; but for the most part to enjoy his pleasure and satisfie his Appetites ; ( Besides if he should consent to sin , with such a set purpose to oppose Gods Law ; yet we must grant , according to Master Hickmans Doctrine , that that Consent , and that purpose ( being reall positive Entities , Acts of the Humane Soul ) are from God and of his production ; ) whence it follows still , either that man doth not sin when he commits such an Act , or , if he doth sin , that the fault is to be transferred upon God , who is the first Cause of that Act.

By the way , ( before we proceed further ) Let me ask you one Question ; Can a man a a Viz. under the same influx and assistance . do any more good than he doth ; or omit any more evill than he b b That is , whether he can be guilty either of omission or commission ? and upon what account ? omitteth ? I know you are clearly for the Affirmative : But that will hardly stand with M. Hickmans Metaphysicks ; for I argue thus ; and first for good works ; He that can do more good than he doth , can do some good that God doth not produce in him ; the consequence is apparent ; because he is supposed to do allready all that God produceth in him . But man cannot do some good , that God doth not produce in him ; for every good is a reall being , and every reall being , or reall positive modification of beings is from God , and produced by him , saith M. H●ckman . Thus for good ; Then for evill ; That man cannot omit more evil than he omitteth , according to M. Hickmans Metaphysicks , I prove thus ; He that can neither omit the Act to which the evil ( of sin ) adhereth , nor avoid the obliquity of that Act , which is the sinfulnesse of it ; He can omit no more evil than he omitteth ; the consequence is evident : But a man can neither omit the Act ; nor avoid the obliquity . Therefore &c. He cannot omit the Act , for that is of Gods production ; nor avoid the obliquity , for that is either to be done by some other Act , or without it . If by some other Act , that is not in his power , for every Act is from God ; and 't is absurd to say it may be done without it .

If Master Hickman holds the negative of that Question ; the Brittish Divines of the Synod are against him ; and a world of absurdities do follow that opinion , viz. That a man cannot bury his Talent , nor receive the grace of God in vain , nor be idle and neglect the great Salvation ; nor watch , nor fast , nor pray , nor do any one good duty more then he doth , nay , that he can do no duty properly so called , nor sin at all , if he be thus chaind by a Fatall necessity to every Action and omission . And then what will become of the word of exhortation and the power of Godlinesse ?

But let us follow Master Hickman a little in that instance of Hating God † † Pag. 90. ; This , saith he , is Complexum quid , and must not be spoken of , as if it were one ; the vitall action or hatred , is a thing positive , and consequently , ( he grants ) that is from God ; but the undue referring or terminating of that Act to such an object , ( to God , ) which is altogether lovely : that , saith he , is the sinfulnesse of the Action . But whence is this derived ? He saith ( pag. 75. ) onely from mans corruption , and the Devils temptation . But what is mans corruption ? is it not his vitiosity ? yet he saith , ( pag. 97. ) where the cause it self is vitious , its vitiosity is not the cause of the vitiosity of the effect ; for vitiosity of it self , neither can effect , nor be effected . And for the temptation of the Devil , is not that an Act ? if it be , then it is from God , for every Act is from him , saith M. Hickman . If he saith the malice of the temptation is from the Devil ; I demand , what is that malice of the Devil ? Is it not his vitiosity ? and then ( as before ) where the cause is vitious , its vitiosity is not the cause of the vitiosity of the effect ; for vitiosity it self , neither can effect , nor be effected ; what then ? the vitious cause ( saith he ) taking together the being , and the supervenient privation , is the cause of the vitious effect , taking it in like manner for the being , and the super added privation . But I say again , the being , whether mans or the Devils , doth not act ( according to Master Hickmans Metaphysicks ) for every Act is from God and produced by him , and consequently 't is the Act of God that gives the corruption of man , and the malice of the Devil their life and vigour ; and how then can God be freed from being the Cause or Author of the sin ? Besides , in the hating of God there is , not onely , the Act of hatred , which he confesseth to be positive , and so from God ; but there is also the turning of the will in this Act , and the undue determination of it upon God , the object altogether lovely , wherein consists the sinfulnesse of the Action , as he confesseth . I demand then , is not this determination of the will an Act ? If it be ( which I presume cannot , with any shew of reason , be denyed ) then , whose Act is it , and from whom ? If he saith , from man himself , his best course is to whisper this assertion as softly as he can , else , I must tell him in his own language ( p. 96 , 97. ) he and I both were best not to make too much noise , lest we should awaken the youngsters to fall aboard us with such an Argument as this . If man be the efficient Cause either of a good action or a bad action , then he doth effect it by another action , and so we may proceed in infinitum . Well , for fear of these dangerous Bugbears , we will , for once , ascribe it unto God . So that God is made the cause of that hatred , and of determining the will upon this lovely Object , which is God . Now if we should impannell a Jury of honest men , to inquire who is the Cause or Author of this sin of hating God ( in this case ; ) who would they finde guilty , think ye ? Doctor Molin saith , In Anat. c. 13. parag. 10. Quod si Deus insontem creaturam destinavit ad perditionem , necesse est eandem destinaverit ad peccatum , sine quo non potest esse justa perditio , & sic Deus erit causa impulsiva peccati . Nec homo poterit juste puniri ob peccatum , ad quod est aut praecise destinatus , aut Dei voluntate compulsus . If his destinating men to sinne makes him the impulsive cause of sinne , how can he produce in them the Act that is sinfull , and determine their wills unto it , and yet not be the Cause of the sinne ? Let us put a Case for illustration . Suppose a Prince should make a Law , injoyning his subjects to write none but perfect Italian Characters , and then should take the hand of a child to write with , and the Characters prove Bastard Roman , or Secretary : or suppose one should take a dead mans hand and forge a Deed with it * * Such a case hath been and a Triall upon it too : and the dead hand acquitted by the Jury . . Though the Subtilty of Master Hickmans Metaphysicks should finde the childe guilty , and distinguish the Forgery upon the dead body , yet without all peradventure an honest Jury would bring in a better verdict . If it be objected , that these are no competent instances , because there is no vitall Ptinciple in the one , nor power to resist in the other ( and what else is to be alleaged I cannot imagine ) , it is to be remembred that , according to this Doctrine , the will of man in sinning , is full as much acted by Allmighty God , as the hand of the child and dead man , in those instances , are by those who make use of them respectively . That is , the will is merely passive ; and how can it be otherwise ? For every Act is from God ; and if God useth the will to this Act of sinning , how can the will avoid it ? Should the will resist Gods motion , when he does Act it ? That is impossible , 1. Because that Motion , according to the Doctrine of the Calvinists , is omnipotent and insuperable , 2. Because to resist is to act , and every Act is from God , and produced by him . And now we see how little reason Master Hickman had to sleight and reject the Answer , which Gregory de Valent . and Bradwardine give to that Objection , from the hating of God , as he doth ( pag. 89 , 90. ) I recite not their words , saith he , because I need not their help , and because they seem to make impossible hypotheses , as if the hatred of God were produced by God in a stone , whereas it cannot be that there should be the hatred of God in a stone , which neither hath , nor can have any knowledge . The stone is like to be the less miserable for wanting this capacitie . But how much doth Master Hickman make man better ? He allows him a will and understanding , I suppose , but no more use of these faculties , is ascribed to man , by his Metaphysicks , than to a stone ; For to use them is to Act them , and Act them a man cannot , because he can produce no action without another action , and so in infinitum , and then the youngsters will fall aboard us again .

If Master Hickman will not see these absurdities , and what reproach falls upon the Holinesse of Almighty God , by this Doctrine , yet Master Baxter doth consider , and sufficiently censure it ; for he saith ( in his Call to the Unconverted pag. 229. ) Some are so loth to think that God can make a self-determining creature , that they dare not deny him that which they take to be his prerogative , to be the determiner of the will in every sin , as the first efficient immediate Physicall cause . And many could be content to acquit God from so much causing † † Mark that word . of evil , if they could but reconcile it with his being the chief cause of good ; as if truths must be no longer truths , then we are able to see them in their perfect order and coherence : because our ravelled wits cannot set them right together , nor assign each truth its proper place , we presume to conclude that some truth must be cast away . This is the fruit , saith he , of proud self-conceitedness , when men receive not Gods truth as a childe his lesson , in a holy submission to the omniscience of our Teacher , but as Censurers that are too wise to learn .

I hope Master Hickman will become at least M. Baxters Proselyte ; especially , if he considers how impossible it is , that his Doctrine should hold good , in reference to the first sin of the first Angel , that fell from God ; For I argue thus , The Materiality of that first sinfull Act , granted to be from God , from whence will he derive the formality , or irregularity , which is the sinfulnesse of it ? Was it from the Angels own Corruption , or the Malice of his Tempter ? this could not possibly be , for he had neither ; Therefore it must either be from God , and then God is the Cause and Authour of that sin ; or else from the self-determination of his own will , and then , if that determination be an Act , we have at last found an Act , whereof God is not the first immediate Physicall cause . What can Master Hickman say to this ? Truely he seems very fairely to grant it , if I be able to understand him ; whether this be out of inadvertency , or conviction , I determine not : But in contradiction to what he had said before , he saith ( Pag. 97. ) Suppose the first sin of Angels to have been a proud desire to be equall unto God ; the cause of this proud desire was the will of the Angel ; but it was the Cause of the action ( in such a sense as a causality may be said to have a Cause ) Per se , of the vitiosity of the action , it was onely the Cause Per accidens , & per concomitantiam . Thus far M. Hickman .