THE Design of this Proposal is , To raise the Value of Tallies to such a Proportion , that all Tallies may be discounted for five or six per Cent. and that the worst of them being those at the greatest distance to be payd , shall be the best ; which is done by the Profit that is gain'd from the often disposing of them .

The Method is thus :

I. THat an Office be settled by Act of Parliament for Transferring and Discounting Bills drawn on Tallies : These Bills to be so limitted , that they may not exceed the Value of the Tallies , and so distinguish'd , as to be known upon what Funds they are drawn , that it may appear when they are payd off by their several Funds , and when to be brought to the Lords of the Treasury to be Cancell'd .

II. That all Persons have liberty to subscribe their Tallies to this Office , which is to be the Stock of the Office , every Hundred Pound Tally , being One Hundred Pound Stock ; and at the time of such Subscription , Five Pounds per Cent. in Money be payd into the Office for every Hundred Pound Tally , to raise a Fund of Money to discount the Bills .

III. That these Bills be made payable by the Office upon a Months Notice , and not at demand : That they be drawn on the Value of the whole Stock , by equal Proportion of Ten per Cent ; and that they be delivered to the several Owners of the Stock , at such distance of time , as never to exceed the Money in the Office that lies to discount them .

IV. That after the Rate of Five Pounds per Cent. be allowed for Discounting the Bills , and be payd to the Office at the time of the Months Notice ; and that Five Pounds per Share , be payd upon Transferring the Stock of the Office , with other small Fees for entring the Bills and Transfer's not exceeding five Shillings per Cent ; which Fees are to belong to the Owners of the Stock , and are to encrease the Fund of money for discounting Bills .

V. That there be a Clause in the Act of Parliament , that no Obligation or Promise to Transfer any Bill or Stock of the Office shall be good in Law , or oblige to Transfer them ; and that only the actual Transferring in the Books of the Office shall pass the right of any Bill or Stock : This will effectually prevent Stock-jobbing , which would lessen and disturb the value of the Bills and Stock ; And , if not prevented , will frustrate the whole design : For the Bills and Stock of the Office , would be continually sold by Contracts and Policies , to avoid paying Fees , as is usual in other Stocks .

From these Considerations , that the five per Cent ' paid for discounting the Bills , will increase the money deposited for discounting them ; and with the Interest , will be always more than Ten per Cent. of the Stock , that the Bills being made payable upon a months notice , the Office will know a month before , what is to be paid ; and therefore can the better provide for Payment ; and that from delivering the Bills to the Owners of the Stock , in such proportion of Ten per Cent , as never to exceed the money that lies for discounting them . It plainly appears , that there will always be a sufficient Fund of money in the Office , to discount these Bills ; and that these Bills will always be punctually paid ; because of the Profit by discounting them ; and therefore will have an undoubted Credit .

These Bills having gained a Credit , will pass current betwixt man and man , after the rate of Ninety five Pounds for one hundred ; because upon Payment of five Pounds , the hundred Pound Bill will certainly be paid by the Office ; which makes the same reckoning as if the Bills passed for one hundred ; and there can be no Loss by them ; because being at first delivered to the Owners of the Stock , if they pass them away after the rate of ninety five for one hundred , they receive the five Pounds again in the value of their Stock , when ever the Bills are discounted .

Besides , the five Pound , paid for Transferring the Stock , will encrease the value of it ; and the oftner it is Transferred , the greater will be the value . Whereas otherwise the great necessity for money at this time , that the general Scarcity of it will occasion many Sellers , which would very much sink the value of the Stock , as in all other cases the many Sellers and few Buyers makes things cheap ; and the Stock would be of the same value or worse than the Tallies now are , whereof many of them cannot be discounted for Thirty , nor Forty per Cent.

But if it be considered what great Profit the Office may probably get , by the often discounting of Bills , and Transferring of Stock : That if the Bills should be delivered out to half the value of the Stock , and the Stock should be Transferred ten times , the first value of the whole Stock would be paid to the Office ; and that if the Profit should not be so great , it will be always certain without any Loss : It is very evident , that all the Tallies subscribed to this Office will so rise in their value as to be current money , upon paying the Charge of Transferring them ( being five per Cent' ) ; and those that are now the worse Tallies , will be the best , because they continuing longest in the Office before they are paid off , will receive the greatest Share of Profit which may be so great in time as to Double the first value .

Thus by Settling this Office , the Publick Credit may be Raised , and Paper-Credit Restored . But if these Tally's should be Subscribed to the Bank of England , it would be very uncertain whether it can be done , tho' they should endeavour to follow the same method ; because the Subscribers will never be able to Raise so much Mony , at this time of Scarcity , as will be sufficient to Discount the Bank of Englands Bills , and those drawn on Tally's ; which cannot be less than near Two Millions , to pay off the Bank of Englands Bills , besides what will be necessary to discount their Own .

For , tho' it may be supposed , that the Bank of Englands Bills , may be taken into the Subscriptions with the Tally's , and then less mony will serve , that cannot be Rely'd on , unless those that have the Bills are forced to Subscribe ; which would be Unreasonable : For , it being a known Truth , that their credit can never be Rais'd without Paying their Bills ; those that have them will not Subscribe ; because they know when the Bank is engaged in such a Design , they will be under a necessity to pay their Bills with Ready Mony : And this consideration will be an obstruction to the Subscribing the Tally's ; because they will be Apprehensive , that the ready mony , that they deposite , for the Discounting of their own Bills , will be made use of to pay off the Bank of England's ; which will make the whole design Uncertain .

And , besides the danger of Relying on such an Uncertainty , at a time when the Nation so much wants credit , from the ill consequences , if they should not succeed ; it may be as dangerous , on the contrary , to the Nation , if the Bank of England should succeed ; for then by the Conjunction of Seven or Eight Millions , they would have so great credit , as might give them such a Power , as to make them dangerous to the Constitution of England ; and let the Inconveniency be found hereafter never so great , it may be out of the power of the Government to Remedy ; because they are founded upon a PERPETVITY not redeemable , but upon a Great Sum of Mony ; which will be very difficult for a PARLIAMENT to raise , when such a Powerful interest may joyn to oppose the Raising of it . Whereas , if this Office be Settled , it will in time determine of it self , when the Tally's are paid off , and the power in the interim may be so limitted , as no such Jealousy may arise from their Constitution .