1. Whether a particular action in question be lawful , or not lawful ; or , which is all one , whether it be forbidden , or not forbidden .

2. Whether a particular action in question be commanded , or not commanded .

3. Whether a particular action in question be commanded , or forbidden .

In each of these Cases , the doubt is to be supposed only of the things specified in the Case , other considerations being supposed to be out of doubt . These things premised , the resolution is as followeth :

In the first Case , where the onely doubt is whether the action in question be lawful , or not lawful , ( the doubt remaining ) the action is to be forborn ; by the first and second Principle . 1. Because a man is bound to abstain from all actions contrary to the glory of God ; and every sin is so : 2. And every action done doubtingly is a sin ; likewise by the fifth and sixth , because in doubtful cases the safest course is to be taken . And it is more safe to do that which I do not doubt to be lawful , than to do that which I do doubt whether it be lawful or not . Now the doubt being onely whether the action be lawful to be done , or not lawful ; and not at all ( in this Case ) whether it be lawful to be forborn , the resolution is cleer , by the foremention'd Principles ; because , if I do this action , I must necessarily sin , whether the action in it self ( abstracted from my doubt ) be lawful , or unlawful : If it be unlawful , I sin doubly ; 1. by doing an action which in it self is unlawful ; 2. by doing it , notwithstanding my doubt : If it be lawful in it self , as abstracted from my doubt , yet under it , and with it , it is not , and therefore I must needs sin in doing it ; and therefore ought to forbear it . As for Example : Suppose a man doubt whether it be lawful to eat blood or bloudings , upon the account of the Apostolical Canon , Acts 15.29 . and some other Canons of Councils , and Opinion of the Primitive Church . In this Case , a man ought not to eat such things , because he doubts not at all the lawfulness of abstaining from them , as having no colour of obligation upon him to eat : But whether it be lawful to eat , is his onely doubt , and that doubt makes it a sin to him : Or , suppose a man to doubt whether it be lawful to lend money to Vsury , or to play at Cards or Dice , or to drink a health upon the reflections of the Fathers upon those things , as not agreeable to Christian sobriety , or as things scandalous , and of no good report . He that doubts the lawfulness of those things , though ( whilst he doth no more ) he cannot condemn the use of them in others , that are free from that doubt ; yet is bound to abstain from them himself , because he is perfectly free so to do , as he is not in the use of them , by reason of his doubt .

In the second Case , where the doubt is , whether the action in question be commanded , or not commanded , the action is to be done by the same Principles ; because the onely doubt supposed in this Case , is whether the action be commanded , or not ; and not at all whether it be lawful : so that it is supposed , out of doubt to be lawful to do it , and doubted onely whether it be lawful to omit it . In this Case , I say , a man is bound to do the action ; because if he doth it , he supposeth himself not to sin , because he doubts not the lawfulness of it . But if he doth it not , he must needs sin , by the 2. Principle : Either doubly by omitting that which is commanded , ( and so obliging him before , and without his doubt , and also by omitting the same Duty doubtingly ) : Or at least he must needs sin singly , by acting doubtfully without necessity , and where a safer course was in his choice . As for Example : Suppose a man doubts whether the Canon , or Custom of the Church to keep the Lent-fast ; or other Fast-daies appointed by Law , do binde his Conscience or not , having no reasonable excuse for the omitting those observances ; but doth not at all doubt , but that it is lawful for him to keep them , whether in compliance with the Church , or upon other accounts . The resolution of this doubt is plain ; to wit , that the Fasts ought to be kept in this Case , because they cannot be omitted without sin , whereas it is supposed they may be kept , without any doubt of sin . In these two Cases , the resolution is demonstrated by the foremention'd Principles .

The onely difficulty is in the third Case , where the doubt is double , viz. whether the action in question , be commanded , or forbidden . In this Case , ( the doubt remaining ) it seems impossible to avoid the necessity of sinning , because the action in it self must either be forbidden , or commanded , or neither commanded , nor forbidden : Now if it be forbidden , and I do it with this doubt , I sin doubly , as before was shewed ; if I do it not , and it be commanded , I sin likewise doubly upon the same account . If it be neither commanded , nor forbidden ; yet I cannot but sin whether I do it or no , because I either do or leave undone a thing which I doubt whether I may lawfully omit , or do : For if a man must not chuse to do a thing , which he doubts whether he may do or not , for that onely reason , because he doubts ; then neither may be omit an action , which he doubts whether he may omit or no. If then the Case be ( as is supposed ) that the doubt is whether a thing be commanded or forbidden ( either directly and immediately by God himself , in his Word , or the Law of right Reason , or indirectly , and mediately by his Authority vested in lawful Governours , not exceeding their Commission ) : the same reason that makes it unlawful to do it ( viz. the doubt whether he may do it or no ) will make it equally unlawful to omit it . As for instance , Suppose a man doubts of a ceremony in Gods Worship , commanded by the Church , whether it be not forbidden by God : In this Case the doubt must needs fall in both ways : For first , the Command of the Church is reason enough to doubt whether it be not commanded of God , because that Authority by the Law of God extends to all things not forbidden by God , and the doubt whether it be forbidden or no , supposeth him not to know , or believe that it is ; and therefore must needs leave him in doubt whether it be not commanded , because if it be not forbidden , it is commanded . 2. The reason of the doubt whether it be not forbidden by God , may be various taken from the Opinion of some Learned and good men , or grounded upon some dubious interpretation of some Texts of Scripture , or upon some mistaken Principle , or seeming consequence from a true one . The question is , what is to be done in this Case , it being concluded by the third Principle , that it is absolutely necessary for a man either to do , or not do it ; neither of which elections can be made without sin , by reason of the doubt both ways , as is supposed .

The common answer to this streight , is , That a man ought to depose his doubt ; which answer is perfectly unreasonable in most Cases , because it is for the present impossible . It being not in the power of any man to cease his doubting the truth of any proposition immediately , and arbitrarily , without removing or solving the reasons of his doubt : So that this advise to a distracted Conscience is no better , than if a Physitian called to a sick Patient , should prescribe for the onely remedy of his Distemper , an Exhortation to shake off his sickness , or not to entertain it any longer , which would be taken for no better than a plain mocking the Patient . The onely reasonable meaning that this advice can have , is , That a man should do what in him lies to resolve his own doubt , by labouring to understand the true resolution of the Question on either part : But this advice may be impracticabe in many Cases , and is in all Extempore , where neither means , nor time is allowed sufficient to effect it . The Question then is , What other advice may be given for the present , and what resolution is to be made thereupon .

This Question is onely capable of being resolved by the fourth and the last Principles , which may be thus applied in all actions ( and therefore in this , notwithstanding my doubt ) I am to act as reasonably as I can ; and it being supposed , that whether I do this action or omit it at this time , I must necessarily sin , ( because I cannot depose my doubt , nor avoid sin , if I act , or not act with it ) I am to inquire what reason I have to adventure upon one of these sins rather than upon the other ; and if I can finde any sufficient to turn the Scale , that must determine my choice , by the last Principle . And in this disquisition , the most considerable Reason of the Election to be made on either part , will consist in the degree of the sin , if any such may appear , or be justly suspected : For seeing the greatest Reason that can be for the abstaining from any action , is the avoidance of sin , the dehree of the sin , doth proportionably augment the Reason : If then the action , whereof I doubt whether I should do it or not , hath to me an appearance of a greater sin in the doing it , than it can be in the omission ; that Reason is very sufficient to restrain me from the action , and oblige me to the forbearance , till I can be otherwise informed to the better satisfaction of my Conscience : For , 2 Thess. 5.22 . when we are commanded to abstain from all appearance of evil , it is most reasonable to conclude , that the appearance of the greatest Evil , doth most strongly oblige my abstinence . As for Example : Suppose the action , whereof I am in doubt , hath an appearance of Idolatry ; as in the Corinthians case , the eating things sacrificed to Idols had , and as the worshipping a piece of bread , or the invocation of Saints departed , may justly have : In such cases , I say , it is most reasonable to abstain from the action , because it is most safe so to do ; because by the doing of this action , I do at least suspect , I may be guiltie of Idolatry , which is a far greater sin , than a bare omission of an Act of obedience to any humane authority can be .

The same resolution upon parity of reason is to be made , where the omission upon due consideration may appear to be a greater sin , than the performance of the action which seems to be the case of refusing obedience to authoritie ; causing disorder , and having at least an appearance of Schism , in matters of meer ceremony , or circumstance in the publick worship of God , upon a bare suspition of their want of allowance from God , or being some way forbidden : I say , That the disobedience in this case , if the action should prove not to be forbidden by God , is a greater sin than the action would be in obedience to authority , though it should prove to be forbidden ; whilst we have so much reason to doubt whether it be or no : For it cannot with reason be conceived , that the Transgression of a Divine Precept ( in a matter of circumstance ) so obscurely revealed , as hath not been discover'd by the Catholick Church for many Ages , nor yet is by the Rulers , and most learned and pious Doctors and Pastors of the present Church , can be so great a sin , as is the transgression of so plain a Precept , as that of obedience to authori●ie ; especially when that disobedience produceth the effects of Disorder , Schism , Scandal , with separation from the publick Worship of God , and privation of the means of his Grace . These things considered , I say , it is not reason able to think , but that the sin of disobedience , in case the thing should prove to be not forbidden ( as by this doubt is supposed possible ) is far greater than the doing of the act , though it should prove to be forbidden . And therefore in this case , the action is to be done , notwithstanding the doubt , by way of caution against a greater sin : It being a greater sin to disobey doubtingly , than to obey doubtingly in such a matter .

But if for ought appears to me , there is no such difference , but that it may be as great a sin to omit th● action , as to do it , considering my doubt as well whether it be not commanded , as whether it be not forbidden ; I am then to consider what other reasons may incline me , either to the action , or to the omission , in respect of advantage , or disadvantage to my self or other on either side . As for Example : Suppose on the on-side , if I forbear the action , I do not onely sin again● God , ( upon one or both of the foremention'd accounts that is , as doing that which is forbidden in it self , 〈◊〉 forbidden to me , because I doubt the lawfulness of it ) but I also deprive my self of many advantages which might have by the doing it , and incur considerable damage in my Libertie , Estate , Reputation , with othe● incommodations to my friends . On the other side , if do the action , I do onely sin against God , by acting doubtfully , or it may be by transgressing some unknown command , abstracted from that doubt ( which inconveniences are equally supposed in the forbearance : ) But I avoid the forementioned disadvantages , without incurring any other of equal concern . In this case , I say , it will be perfectly unreasonable to chuse the more hazzardable resolution , with rejection of the less : And therefore the resolution will be as clear what is reasonable to be done in this case , as is in any of the former ; with this onely difference , That the practice under this duplicitie of doubt cannot be without a necessitie of sin : What then can I , or should I do more in this case , than this ? commit my self to the Mercie of God , with a cautionary profession of my desire to obey him : And that if I could any way possibly avoid the hazzard of transgressing his Will , I would do it , notwithstanding any motives whatever , respecting my self , or mine own interest . But because I cannot so do at this time , for want of present means to understand his Will ; I act according to the general Rule , and law of my Nature , that is my reason , as far as it will afford me any direction , begging his pardon of my present ignorance , and the inevitable effect thereof .

Against this resolution , if it be objected ( as was before intimated ) that there can be no such necessitie of sinning against God : Whilst every man is bound to depose his doubt , and imbrace his Dutie : I answer first , That this destroyes the supposition of the Cose , and therefore is no just Objection to the answer , which is given upon the admission of it . 2. That it is not true that there can be no such necessitie of sinning , or that every man is bound immediately to depose his doubt , though it be not in his power so to do . For though God doth not put a man upon any such necessitie of sinning against himself , yet a man may by his own fault , and by his culpable ignorance , bring himself into this streight .

But here it must needs be observed , that the intire resolution is grounded upon that Principle : That whatsoever is done doubtingly is a sin : Which Principle I take up in this Discourse , onely upon the account of its common reception , grounded upon the words of the Apostle : He that doubteth is damned if he eat . And therefore the resolution , that supposeth this Principle , can be serviceable to such onely as receive it .

But whether this Maxime be universally true , or can be inferr'd from the Apostles Words , by the necessary sence of them , and whether it ought to be extended to such actions as fall under the command of Authority , and not rather to be restrained to such actions , as the Apostle speaks of in that Chapter , viz. such as are indifferent in themselves , and wherein a man is sui juris , not supposed to be under command of authority either way , is a just Problem .

For the Apostle in the Discourse of that Chapter , wherein he delivers that conclusion : He that doubteth is damned if he eat , &c. speaketh onely of such actions wherein a man is sui juris , at perfect libertie , on one side at least , that is , either to eat , or not to eat . For though he might have reason to doubt , whether it was lawful for him to eat such meats , yet he is supposed to have none at all , to doubt but that it was clearly lawful for him to forbear , and therefore by the premised resolution of the first question , he ought not to eat with this doubt .

I shall not insist upon the objection from the word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , which the vulgar Latine translates discernit ; that is , maker difference or distinction of meats , thinking it not indifferent to eat of that meat : this variation of sence , was thought fit to be put in the Margent of our English Bibles , by the last Translators . In which Case it is evident he must needs sin , and that presumptuously against his Conscience , and so is damned ; that is , condemned by his own Conscience , if he eats : But from hence there can be no such conclusion made , as that he must needs sin if he onely doubts ; that being not the Apostles meaning by this translation . And it is certain , that the word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is so used in many Texts of scripture , as Act. 15.9 . 1 Cor. 4.7 . & Jude 22. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 : And of some have compassion making a difference .

But because the same word doth elsewhere as oft signifie to doubt , and is so renderd in this Text by the Syriack , and most other Translators , I adhere to that Translation ; and the rather because , the following words are most consonant to this sence , Seeing he eateth not of faith : For though it be true indeed , that he that makes difference of meats , and eateth that which by such difference , he esteemeth to be unlawful , cannot cat of Faith , because he eats directly contrary to it ; yet is this a more jeune sence , and not so proper , as to say , he that doubteth , eateth not of faith .

Omitting therefore this Objection from the variety of translation , I advance another more considerable ; that is , whether because he that eateth when he doubteth , whether it be lawful for him to eat , but is at perfect liberty not to eat , is damned ? it will follow that whosoever doth any action ( wherein he hath no such liberty of forbearance ) with any doubt , be in like manner condemned . As for Example : He that is commanded by lawful Authority to do an action , whereof he doubts whether it be lawful by the law of God or no , to do it : It is certain , this person if he were free , ought not to do this action , because of his doubt , whilst he might forbear it without any doubt : But under this command , he hath no more libertie to forbear this action , than he hath to do it ; And therefore it will not follow by this instance of the Apostle , wherein the case is so different , that he must necessarily sin if he do it , more than if he do it not .

But it may be urged , that although from the first words of that Text ( he that doubteth is damned if he eat ) this Vniversal conclusion , cannot be inferred ; yet from the next words , which are added as a reason thereof , it may , Seeing he eateth not of faith , and whatsoever is not of faith is sin . For thus it may be urged : Whatsoever is not of faith is sin : But whatsoever is done doubtingly , is not of Faith ; Ergo , whatsoever is done doubtingly is sin . The 1. of these Proposit ons is expresly asserted by the Apostle ; and the second seems to be rightly collected from the connection of those words , 〈◊〉 , quoniam , ac quia . He that doubteth is damned if he eat , seeing ( or because ) he eateth not of faith : Which reason would not be true , if it were possible , notwithstanding the doubt , to eat of Faith . And if that be not possible in this instance , it may seem to be so in all others : whence the universal conclusion will be inferred rightly .

To this Argument , a rejoynder may be offer'd to this sence ; That there is no necessary consequence , in the deduction of the universal Proposition , from the particular Case ; admitting the truth of that universal Proposition , whatsoever is not of faith is sin , without any limitation in the matter ; and understanding Faith , ( as in that Text it can onely be meant ) to signifie no more than a perswasion of the lawfulness of the action to him that doth it . May it not be said , that although in that Case , he that doubteth onely whether it is lawful to eat , and not at all whether it be lawful to forbear , cannot eat of Faith , because it is at his free choice , to forbear the action that he doubts , and to determine himself to that wherein he hath no doubt ; yet in another Case , where the action is doubful both waies , it may be possible , notwithstanding his doubt , to act in Faith . For , as many things may be lawful to be done , whilst they are left free , being not forbidden by authoritie , which are not lawful , when they are forbidden , though but by men : So may some things be unlawful to be done , when they are not commanded , that yet may be lawful when they are . It may be as great a sin to disobey an unlawful command , as to give it ; if he that disobeys , knows no better for his disobedience , than he that gave the command , did for his giving it . Of this kinde are doubtful actions , which are not to be done , when a man is free , for that onely reason , because they are doubtful : The doubt being a sufficient reason to bar the lawfulness of the action , as before hath been said : But when a man is not free , but under the obligation of Authoritie , every doubt is not a sufficient reason to make a thing unlawful : So that in such a Case a man may , notwithstanding his doubt , be perswaded of the lawfulness of-his action , unless that doubt be grounded upon reasons , more credible than is the judgement of the persons , by whom that action is recommended to us , as not onely lawful , but expedient .

But further , that it may be possible for a man , notwithstanding his doubt , concerning the lawfulness of an action in it self , to have a just perswasion that it is lawful for him in a present Case , I offer these grounds of Reason .