1. Ethickes .

MOrality is the Art of behauiour , prescribing directions for manners arising out of vse and customary conversation .

Manners are either 1 Reall , making a good man {αβγδ} . 2 Complementall , making a faire conditioned man {αβγδ} .

The Vertues arising out of both {αβγδ} Goodnesse is Positiue . Complement varies according to 1 Time . 2 Place . 3 Person .

The one necessary , the other indifferent , if vsed there is a grace and ornament , if not the impeach is not great .

Goodnesse is wrought by actions of Vertue .

Naturall for men to worke : or life tearmed by the Pythagoreans {αβγδ} , a fardle of Actions : Beasts are dull and at command , aguntur non agunt : men only are Actiue , as hauing Wit for Iudging . Will for prosecuting .

Actions are to be perfected by Vertue for directions . Fortune for successe .

Vertue is lame without Fortune , and Fortune blindeheady and headlesse without vertue Our working is either 1 In a state Politicke . 2 In a family Oeconomicke . 3 In private touching our selues only Ethicke .

In Ethicks are foure causes of Actions . 1 The Finall , the vtmost is felicity , the speciall and immediate end , any particular good being in shew or substance good . 2 The Formall as Vertues Vices making our Bonum Verum . Apparens . Actions Good Bad , 3 Materiall , as Passions , whereon our vertues must worke . 4 Efficient as Wit that makes prudence . Will that makes prae election .

This is your Subiect of all Ethicks .

II , Of Particular Ends.

NO Action so suddaine , but proposeth some end : As actions are sundry , so are particular ends : Our appetite affects them as either in shew or substance good . Omnia apperunt Bonum .

Desire naturally is for preservation ; Evill as it is evill is an enimie to being : Hence the ayme of all Appetite must bee some good Appetites are either 1 Naturall , as common Inclinations to a genenerall good of being : as for the Earth to beare downewards , the fire vpwards , 2 Sensitiue called appetitus sensitivus , whose issues are , to wit Griefe for things to to be avoided . 2 Pleasure for things to be prosecuted . 3 Rationall , partly from the Vnderstanding , that iudges the good : partly from the will that affects it : this is in men only , the other in beasts .

Hence ariseth three sorts of Good , viz. 1 Bonum Entis : The obiect proper to the naturall . 2 Bonum sensus : Whose satisfaction is delight . 3 Bonum Moris : Whose manager is Reason .

If reason be gouernesse , we apprehend true good .

If lead by Passion , we follow appearances .

Passion sets a colour on Evill , & perswades the good of it .

Hence are all vitious desires .

Our way for such obiects is with Annibal to beare the gilded pillars in Iuno's Temple , Cic . 1. Divin . before we venter to feast on them .

— Verispeciem dignoscere calle Ne qua sub arato mendosum timeat auro .

Things are desired , either as 1 Vsefull only to others , not for themselues , so riches in themselues are nothing , but are desired for vse only . 2 Vsefull both for others , & desirable in themselues : so Virtues of themselues are comely , and are as meanes to happinesse . 3 Desirable only for themselues , not for others as felicity the last good , {αβγδ} , finis finium .

That we often fayle of the end intended , is for the want of either 1 Iudgen ent in choice of the right meanes . 2 Ability in not prosecuting that we haue chosen . 3 Constancie in not persevering in what wee haue chosen , and began to prosecute .

The excellency of one end aboue another is knowne ,

1 If that end haue the most worthy meanes directing to it

Hence the end of Policy is aboue others as hauing the meanes of other Practick ends subalternate to it .

2 If it comprehend the speciall end intended by actions of lesse worth , as the art of Horse-man-shippe is referred to art Military .

Hence the end of one is more excellent then the other .

Felicity is the best of ends : our soule affecteth it : Vertues worke it : Constancy in goodnesse perfects it : It selfe is the vp-shot of all practicke ends .

III . Of Universall Ends. Felicity .

FElicity is the proposall of the best good .

We propose our good either as informed by passion or judgement : Passion goes by opinion , an as opinion is staggering , so must such proposals be . Hence , to some pleasure , to others wealth , to others honour is Felicity ; all are pleasures for the time , but content not .

This Felicity is not true , but forged .

True felicity is from an vprightnesse of judgement .

That we may finde it out , seeke we what in a man can be Of 1 Greatest perfection . 2 Sole sufficiencie . 3 Quietnesse of minde .

1 Perfection is required to all goods , but the height of perfection to the best goods .

2 Sole sufficiency that there be 1 Contentation in what we enioy 2 No want of what wee enioy not This keeps vs from repining .

3 Quiet of mind that there bee 1 Integrity towards God . 2 True dealing with men Body or fortune 3 Not doting on the goods of Body or fortune 4 Stopping extravagancy of passions . But vsing them alwaies as helps not as ends .

A breach in any of these marres tranquillity .

In a man we consider a double carriage , either as 1 Liuing in this life only Morall . 2 Preparing himselfe for a future life , Christian . Hence Stoicks and Platonickes held , we were free of two Citties 1 The greater , — Heaven . 2 The lesser , — The World .

This world as it beares the image of the Heauenly , and is the way of our iournying thither : So the actions of the one truely morall , are not in opposition to the Christian Each of these liues haue in their end 1 Greatest perfection . 2 Sole sufficiency . 3 Truest quietnesse of minde .

The felicity of the one is presence of all good , when the soule is separated .

The meanes to get this generall is Religion .

The felicity of the other is presence of all good , whilst we liue .

The meanes to get it , is common honestie , or vniversall justice .

Liuing in this world our worke is either in Soule only . Soule and Body .

The worke of our soule only is immanent .

The perfection of it is contemplation .

The obiect and ayme of it is Truth .

The satisfaction is content and quietnesse of minde .

The meanes to attaine it , is Sapience and Pondering .

That is an habit generally wrought by two particulars 1 Vnderstanding for conceit , and apprehension of principles . 2 Science for inference of conclusions .

This true felicity , sith in it is 1 True perfection , 2 Sole sufficiencie , 3 Quietnesse of mind is tearmed Felicitas contemplatiua .

Our worke both in Soule and Body is transient , so called because the action of the soule were secret were it not , that the spreading of the body displaied it : The operations of the soule properly are punctuall and indiuisible : As they partake of the body , so they open themselues both to the view , and vse of others : Hence arise actions of practise , their speciall ayme is the good of others , Homo animal politicum . and sith we are not for our selues only , but to be vsefull to others , & society arises out of community of nature our speciall felicity , for vse must bee practicke .

Felicitas Practica .

There are two speciall Felicities then .

As sinne and vice being in all a double misery 1 Darknesse of vnderstanding for discerning truth . 2 Depravation of will for affecting goodnesse .

So to remedy these our perfection must be Contemplatiue for the one . Practicke for the other .

These come not of the strength of men , sith the blind cannot iudge of colours , the perverse cannot will goodnesse .

They are giuen of God , if any gift comes from aboue to man , saith Aristotle ; {αβγδ} .

It is most fit it should bee our felicity , {αβγδ} .

The sterne to manage these must be faith .

Without it Contemplation is curiosity . Good actions but fashion , & vaine-glory This is the aime of the heathen goodnesse .

With it Contemplation is wisdome . Action is 1 Duty to God . 2 Charity to our neighbour 3 Salvation to our selues . This alone is mans felicity .

IV . Temporall happinesse described .

Felicita● est Actio . THe perfection of things is in their operation : Idlenesse , and want of Action proceeding from Impotency : Hence Felicity being the perfection of man is action .

To will and intend suffices not , but doing is requisite ,

In masteries the crownes are not given to the likeliest in person , but to the best in performance . Arist . Ethic . 1. c . 8.

Actions is a power common to all ; communities commend not , sith commendation aymes at a speciall , and preferring before others : Thence Felicity the highest of goods must be a speciall action of man , that proceeds from the soule not as it is vegetatiue , Animi . and sensitiue ( so agreeing with Beasts and Plants ) but as it is rationall , only proper to man .

In the reasonable Soule we consider two parts , the one Governing . Secundum Virtutem . Governed .

The governing part is by Wit , Will regulating our soules actions , and stopping their vnwarrantable excurrence : This called Recta Ratio , or Virtus .

The part to be gouerned is the seat of Passions .

Though they naturally sprout from the stemme of reason , and are proper to men only , yet in themselues they are wild and vnruly , but strength of reason must order them , Our perfection is not in the latter which must obey . but in the former , which must gouerne .

Reasons in strength and actions of Vertue are nothing , In vita p●rfecta . vnlesse they are continued : Perfection of good must bee with out Ruptures : The intercedents of an after evill marres the glory of the precedent good actions : Hence felicity must be a worke of honesty to the end of our daies .

This felicity ends with our life , and therefore temporall .

The other beginnes after death , and is eternall .

V. Things required to temporall Happinesse .

HAppinesse is a Vertue common not for our selues only , but for the good of others .

An happy mans imployment must be beneficence : his reward esteeme and credit among the people . Tria bono●um genera req●irun●●● ad ●elicitatem .

That he may be best in performance , and highest repute , he must haue the goods of Minde . Body . Fortune .

The mind as most inward , so affordeth goods most proper to felicity ; A man for morall goodnesse is to be iudged for the goods within : Things outward as of the Body and Fortune are often changeable . They are not ouermuch to bee desired , yet if offered they are to be receaued ; we take them for continency , not necessity , as vsefull to set forth our Vertues both to the good and view of others .

Riches and the goods of Fortune serue for the weale of the body , the body for the soule , the soule for God . {αβγδ} .

Thus the goods outward are in direction to the goods inward : they make not a man happy , but adorne him ; they giue his luster , not his being .

The thing that makes happinesse properly and principally is vertue ; yet Fortune must grace it ; as the Stones & Timber make the house , yet for sight we could wish it pargetted , before we dwell in it : And though a man can foot it well , yet he need not refuse a Coach if offer be made . Seneca .

Vertue without Fortune is like a King that hath a sure Counsell , though his vnderlings be rebellious ; Hee is able to keepe him in guard , though abroad there be mutinies ; Hee may bee happy in himselfe in despite of Fortune : like as a strong man can beare , if a greater weight should be laid vpon him , and can suffer cold , though in the interim his teeth chatter .

An happy man vseth ill fortune , as a good Captaine bad armes , though vnframable , yet vsing them according to art military , or as a skilfull craftsman shewing his art on a shooe of bad leather , both may doe well , but better , if their meanes were better .

The goods of the mind are either 1 Wit for iudging . 2 Will for choosing , what we haue iudged . 3 Power for prosecuting what we haue chosen . 4 Ability for ordering our Prosecutions ,

Habits are the lowest gifts of the minde .

1 They are gotten by vse and custome , the other art naturall .

2 They worke on passions , whose grounds is sense .

The other are without sense , sith 1 Prosecution 2 Choice . 3 Iudgement 4 Power 5 Wit . 6 Will . are inseparate substances .

Habits are only for the corporall .

Their kinds are Intellectuall , Morall .

The intellectuall , some by doctrine , & instinction , and are 5 , to wit , 1 Vnderstanding for contenplation 2 Science for contenplation 3 Sapience . for contenplation 4 Prudence . for action , 5 Arte for action ,

The morall come by vse , and custome , viz If ruling passion , it is Vertue . If ruled by it , it is Vice .

Their properties are 1 To be begotten by vs. 2 Being gotten long to continue with vs.

Qualitas acquisita difficultèr mobilis .

The difference betwixt the worke of nature , and of manners is , Nature first begins with the habit , then comes to the action , as first we haue the power of laughing , before the act : Manners are first in action , then in habit .

The goods of the Body are 1 Health . 2 Strength . 3 Grace of person .

Though Vertue could appeare in deformity , yet it is more honourable in a comely personage ; as the Ruby planted in Iron hath his luster , yet it sparkles more in a bed of Gold .

The goods of fortune are 1 Wealth . 2 Worth of birth . 3 Reputation and credit . 4 Friends . 5 Goods of Posterity .

1 Goods either in Money . Goods . Lands .

The vse and end 1 For necessity principall . 2 Then for pleasure 1 Not of pampering . 2 But of recreation .

It is requisite for pourveiance : Poverty and Want are repining : necessity of hauing armeth to Importunity and impudency in procuring : Thence the beggers life , though most to be pittied for want , yet deserues least favour for their boldnesse . The Pythagoreans would haue an happy man wealthy , but not in abundance : That much prosperity is like over-much light , it quels the eye-sight . That wee must wish for no more prosperity , then may fit vs for action , as the Pilot takes not the shippe of most weight , but of most convenience for coasting : That the evills of much prosperity are greater , then they of adversity ; as in the body superfluities worke more dangerous diseases , then defects : That as affliction compells our minde ; so height of wealth puffes it vp , and empties it : Hence we see the rich often iniurious and incroaching : A happy man by wisdome prevents these .

2 Worth of birth , this is requisite , that there be no staine of blood . Low birth deiects the minde .

Bastardy is dishonourable , as debarring inheritance to the common rites of a Citizen .

Lewdnesse of parents is a disparagement to the child , as Diogenes seeing a boy wantonly giuen , gaue this the reason of it , that surely his father was drunken , when he begot him : Contrarily it was Diophantes brag , that he could prevaile in any demand with the Athenians , sith his father Themistocles could doe so before him .

3 Reputation is either viz : in Height of place , as preferments . Good opinion of our fellow Cittizens .

1 Preferments are properly due to the best : Lewd gouernours come in rather by intention then right : Optimates is an attribute to those , that for the common good so carry themselues , that Sud consilia optimo cuique debentur : They are defined by Tully , Optimates sunt , qui nec nocentes sunt , Cicero pro Sextio . nec naturâ improbi , nec furiosi , nec malis domesticis impediti : Hence hee ranges even rusticks and trades-men , so they be honest .

The reason may be , the ground of evill society must be religion , and justice ; without it can neither bee restraint from injuries , nor punishment of evill doers , nor reward for the well deseruing . Wealth and Power make a Society spracke , and passable , but iustice informes , and acts it : This is as the soule to quicken it , that as the Organe to vent and spread it : Hence the right of gouernance principally is due to the best in life .

2 Good opinion in the minds of others is proper to the Vertuous .

It opens it selfe in Words Works of service .

Three things breed in a man credit Wisdome . Honesty . Loue and kindnesse . Arist . 2. Rhet .

The speciall of these is Honesty : for a man truely honest hath that wisdome , that he can distinguish the good from the bad ; to follow the one and avoid the other : and his loue is such , that he will labour to benefit all , and iniurie none : This repute for good actions common and ordinary opens it selfe into praise for actions extraordinary , into honour , glory and admiring : honour and admiration ascends vpward , and is the title due to the extreame point of goodnesse : We yeeld it to things of most distance , & farthest out of our compasse : Hence all things most admired are most perfect : for the persons most admiring are of the lowest condition ; therefore Pythagoras boasted he had got his good by Philosophy , that he had learned to wonder at nothing , sith admiration proceeds rather out of the gaze of ignorance , then from a true view of iudgement .

As in Nature there is excesse and defect , as in monsters , so in manners also .

Things honoured and admired are out of the reach of Envy .

In vicina versamur invidiâ , simplicius longe posita miramur

Hence good cannot be envied , since Envy is not at lower perfections : Praise is a title due to vertue , and is the reward of it ; we attribute it not simply , but in comparison ; nor is a man so much praised for his absolute good , as because in that good he exceeds others , that are in comparison worse then himselfe : Hence praise stands in a proportionate preferring before others : Non vt optimis par sit , sed vt malis melior .

Glory is simply without reference to defects of others : it admits no proportion by reason of distance : praise may bee given and taken of equalls : Glory is for a superiour onely ; praise recants downe-wards to conferre with defects , and after conference to extoll the better deserts of the other : Glory admits not of comparing , but is a title absolute .

Hence Felicitas bonum Honorable . Non laudabile .

4 Goods of posterity as of Children Kindred somewhat to be respected of an happy man .

It followes him after death as a complement of his glory , yet so that it nothing detracts from him , if the contrary happen .

5 Friends are requisite to happinesse partly for Vse . Comfort .

1 For vse , sith a man cannot rely vpon the purchase of his owne hands only , but he often requires an helpe : Management of things are sundry , and sith they must each haue their severall dispatch , they cannot so well be compassed by one .

2 For comfort , sith a man is pliable to vtter himselfe to some one of trust : Troubles are incident to all ; and there is ease in revealing them . — Strangulat inclusus dolor . Againe our nature abandoneth solitarinesse : Presence of friends keepes vs from feeding on our owne hearts , like Bellepheron in the wildernesse .

Ipse suum cor edens hominum vestigia vitat .

To friendship three things are required , 1 Virtus , vt pulchrum . 2 Consuetudo , vt iucundum . 3 Usus , vt necessarium .

Vertue the ground , that must b●gin it .

Pleasure , and conversation , that continue it .

Vse and helpe , that must shew , vtter and exercise it .

As it is the prop and stay of mans life , and followes immediatly from the sociablenesse of his nature , so it relies on three goods

The end of all appetites Bonum honestum . Bonum vtile . Bonum iucundum .

Friends must not be suddenly gotten . many in multitude .

1 Suddaine friends haue but small root of loue .

It was Zeuxis answere when hee was reprehended for sloe painting , that hee must bestowe time in drawing those lines , which he hoped should continue for ever . Observance of their passions and qualities must precede , before we enter to cl●se with them .

1 Whether they be agreeable in manners to vs.

2 Whether they incroach not too fast into our acquaintance , for towardnesse of this is an occasion of suspect : for such a one is either a common friend and so lesse intire , or he comes to you but for advantage and so for advantage will betray you .

2 Multitude of friends empties affection , as the channell must haue many shallowes , that is cut into sundry streames . One bragged to Chilo , that he knewe not many his enimies : he replied that by that he knewe not many was his friends . Friendship is a tenure precise , and proper to one , not to bee enlarged to multitudes : Agesilaus would vse all in courtesie , but he was familiar and friendly but to few .

The Giant that had 50 bellies , was faine to haue an 100 hands , and had by this no more benefit of sustenance , then they that to one belly haue but two hands . Amicitia tantum inter dues .

Men of worth haue many fellowes , few friends .

Friendship is when they follow principally for Vertue .

When they follow for goods outward Countenance . Power .

1 Countenance : It is greatnesse of retinue vsefull to men of place . In pace decus , in bello praesidium .

2 Power : It is faction , and by it they raise themselues , depresse their adversaries . In gouerment it is good to vse men of one ranke equally : for to countenance some extraordinarily is to make them insolent , and the rest discontent . In favour it is best to vse men with much difference , and election for it makes the persons preferred more carefull , and the rest more officious .

VI . The Stoicks tenent of Happinesse .

HAppinesse being the perfection of man must bee in things that most honour him , nothing so worthy of him as vertue . It proceeds immediatly from his soule , as pertaking both of wit and will .

Hence as beasts are devoid of both these , so they cannot be styled Vertuous . Happy .

To liue according to vertue , and the prescript of nature is accounted all one . The Reasons are three .

1 Nature is the finger of God in creatures , whose worke is for the best , and vertue is naught but the perfection of God .

2 Man by nature an image of God , as Vertue and Goodnesse flowes immediatly from the one , so ought from the other .

3 Our soule hath will and wit : Wit the apprehender of Truth , and will of Good : the conioyning of both is mans nature , which of it selfe must both iudge and affect true good : this only is vertue . Vertue is tearmed by them any speciall action proper to any speciall nature : Heavens , Elements , and dead bodies are by nature actiue , and vertuous : As things are most materiall , so are they lesse quicke : Hence soules are most vertuous , and this vertue is their felicitie .

VII . Of Passions in generall .

PAssions are the matter of Vertue . Materia Virtutis .

They are the nailes , that fasten soule and body together .

In them we note their 1 Rising and increase . 2 Issues and consequence . 3 Prevention and stopping .

Their rising partly from 1 The soules nature . 2 The occurrences of obiects .

The soule growes in passion 1 Not by the vnderstanding part . 2 But by the sensitiue part , which 1 Iudgeth a Truth . 2 Induceth a colour of Truth .

The sensitiue works for passion Abroad by the fiue outward senses . Within by the imagination or fancy .

The worke of the phantasie is to resume what the memory hath retained , and the common sense iudged , and out of them to make collections of appearances .

These appearances goe masked vnder the habit of Truth . Good .

If of truth , they perswade a weak vnderstanding & so breed , viz. 1 Curiosity 2 Folly 3 Giddines and hence are 1 Hereticks . 2 Poets 3 Fond students . these erre in the Theory .

If of good they perswade a weake will , and breed some passions , which make men vicious and erre in the practike : That which makes a fancy ventrous & resolued in these collections , is opinion proceeding naturally from the soule , and as phantasie is a part of it , so opinion must be the issue of it .

Hence arise the tenents against the Stoickes .

1 Passions are a naturall part of the soule .

2 They may be moderated well from their excurrence , but cannot be throughly barred of their existence in vs.

3 They are not in themselues evill , but in their degrees .

4 They are often profitable , and meanes to further vertue , as feare teaches vs to avoid evill , selfe-loue to prosecute our good , Mercy and pitty teaches a King : Clemency and anger wheteth our valour .

5 Their excesse is not positiuely evill , but vpon circumstances , as with my friend I may be angry for his fault , but bee reconciled againe : with my foe I may be more implacable .

6 Though strengthned by opinion , yet not proceeding from without vs , but naturall apprehensions within .

7 In a man two parts Vnderstanding Sense both in reluctance to the other .

1 Vnderstanding takes the good of most worth for honestie .

Hence ariseth conscience , or {αβγδ} .

2 Sense takes the good of most Pleasure . Profit hence are passions .

The will hath two inclinations to follow , either Reason , or Sense .

In iudgement we often condemne , what in passion wee prosecute .

— Video meliora , proboque . Deteriora sequor —

obiects that moue our phantasie are Evills to be avoided . Goods to be followed .

The ground that perswades our soule to appehend these obiects , is selfe-loue .

This as it is 1 Ruled by reason is good : and the duty of man . 2 Ruled by Sense is bad : and nurseth passions .

It may be defined , — An inordinate inclination of the affecting too much pleasure of the body against the prescript of right Reason .

The issues of passions are Generall . Speciall ,

1 The Generall are .

1 Rebellion against reason .

2 Division in themselues .

3 Insatiable in their extent .

4 Importunate for action . Hence they worke headinesse , and suddaine resolution .

5 Desirous of things 1 Foolish . 2 Inconvenient , 3 Impossible .

6 Inconstancy of prosecution .

2 The speciall are .

1 Driuing the body to distemper by 1 Raising the humors . 2 Altering the Complexion . 3 Forecing new motions .

As in feare the blood chilleth , in anger boyles , in griefe the heart closeth , in ioy opens .

2 Blinding the Iudgement ; The Reason is ,

The Vnderstanding receiues her notice from the fancyes impression : which befriending Passion representeth often to the Iudgement not true and reall , but apparent and conceited shapes .

3 Perverting our will .

The will inclines oftner to passion , then Iudgement , because passion is giuen more to choice and liberty .

The Iudgement is precise and setled to one part .

The prevention of passions is to Discouer Temper them

1 Discouery is had ,

1 From the vse of company ; as Augustus judged of his two daughters Iulia and Livia , finding one delighted to converse with graue men , the other with yongsters ; pronounced the one staid , the other light .

2 From the view of complections ; as the Cholericke breeds anger ; the sanguine pleasure , slegme , sloth ; melancholy , sadnesse .

3 From the vse of talke , as if it be 1 Suddaine . 2 Often . 3 Personally impeaching . 4 Censuring .

2 To discouer our selues obserue we what our enimies speake of vs. They are ready to seize on what is faulty in vs , when our selues are blinded with selfe-loue .

After the discouery ou● Passions must be tempered .

The temper of them must be reason , and wisdome checking the sence , and stopping the Excurrence of Phantasie .

Men by reason teach birds to speake , dogs to hunt , horses to curveat , though sense perswade the contrary .

And we discharge our selues of the meat wee haue eaten with pleasure , when we heare it was polluted or forbidden .

The way to temper them is not to roote out but to prune them , as the taming of Horses is not to take away their motion , but their skips : and Lycurgus should not so much cut downe the vines ro barre drunkennesse , as haue planted cesterns of water to haue allayed the heat thereof . It was Zeno his saying of musicall instruments , that euen barren wood & dead guts would speake , if strained to their pitch , and ranked in order .

Wisedome must be our Astrolabe to take the height and elevation of our passions , if they ouer-grow .

Our waies to slacke them are ,

1 To bend to the other extreame ; as if my sight be scattered by view of white , I must regather it by viewing a black obiect : And Epamminandas way to stop his surfet on sweet meats , was to close his banquet with a draught of Vineger .

2 Abstinence from things hurtfull , though lawfull .

3 Stop all occasions , that are motiues to set passion on head .

4 Barre selfe conceits , and fancifull apprehensions .

5 Yeeld not to inconstancy and fleeting .

6 Labour to mortifie the Flesh .

If passion be too violent , that we cannot slack it , our labour must be ,

1 To stay execution ; As Archytas professed to his baylife that carelesly kept his ground , that were he not angry , hee would tell him part of his minde : And Plato would not himselfe beat his man , while he was moued , but gaue him vp to Spensippus to be handled by him .

2 To conceale it in what we may ; for it breeds disrespect , if wee open our yeelding to it : this made Plutarch to be vpbraided by his servant , when he could not dissemble his anger that it was a shame for him to be angry , sith he had written a booke to the contrary .

A man ( saith Plato ) is sometimes his owne lord , when reason rules him ; sometimes his owne vassall , when sence and passion .

VIII The division and number of Passions .

THe bent and aime of all passions are either , The gaining of a good : The avoidance of evill .

Good & evill are gained avoided by 2 inclinations of the soule 1 The concupiscible that affects . 2 The irascible that prosecuts & venters on what we affect .

Both these haue their obiects Good . Evill .

The attainment of the Good breeds pleasure . Evill breeds griefe .

Thence Pleasure Griefe are the heads of all passion .

The passions aiming at good are either 1 Loue . 2 Desire . 3 Hope . 4 Boldnesse . 5 Pleasure .

The good presented is affected first by Loue Desire these proceed from the concupiscible ,

Then it is prosecuted for attainment by Hope Boldnesse these proceede out of the ●rascible .

Then being attained there resorts pleasure : this only for the good present , the other for the Good absent .

The passions aiming at the avoidance of evell are .

1 Hate opposite to loue .

2 Abomination or detesting , opposite to desire being but the vehemence or high degree of hate , as desire is of Loue ,

3 Despaire opposite to hope .

4 Feare to boldnesse .

5 Paine or Griefe the Issue of all , when the evill is in presence .

As Goods Evills come Nearer or further of their attainment , so they partake more or lesse Pleasure of Griefe ,

These 10 Passions are simple , seeing they partake either of Pleasure alone , or Griefe alone ,

There are seauen mixt passions .

These worke either on our selues . or on others .

1 They that worke on our selues are 2.

1 Shamefastnesse 2 Repentance mixt of 1 Feare for infamy . 2 Sorrow for fault . 3 Desire of Amendment

2 They that worke on others , are either for them or against them .

1 For them are 2.

3 Pitty whose obiect is the evill of another , which wee would haue remoued .

Mixt of Griefe for the evills befalling Desire for the removall of them .

4 Zeale , conceaved in the behalfe of one we loue .

Mixt of 1 Griefe for the wrongs done . 2 Anger against the party wronging . 3 Loue to the party wronged . 4 Boldnesse to right him in what we may .

The passions that worke against another either In thought only . Or in deed .

1 In thought , 1.

5 Iealousy or suspition mixt with Griefe . Anger . Feare . Hate .

2 In deed , 2.

6 Anger mixt with either 1 Griefe for wrongs . 2 Hate against the party wronging . 3 Desire of revenge . 4 Boldnesse in venturing .

7 Maligning : this is different from anger , sith anger is moued vpon wrong done : This without that motiue : only because it is well with another .

This containes Envy muttering at anothers good . {αβγδ} , ioying at others fall .

The former mixt of Hate Griefe . Desire of falling .

The latter of Hate . Ioy for the Evill fallen .

This of Passions in generall .

IX Of loue the first Passion .

THe obiect of Loue is goodnesse ; the issue ioy and content .

It is either with or without passion .

1 Without Passion it 's in God Angells both haue wills which are the affectors of good and this affecting is Loue .

1 Gods loue is partly in Reflexe to himselfe . Communicating good to others . viz. the creatures .

1 By reflex into himselfe , he views his owne goodnesse : & goodnesse is the Loadstone of Loue .

2 He communicates to creatures goods of Nature . Grace .

1 Nature is generall to all , & comprehends the Workes of Creation Preservation temporall . In this is the true Bonum Entis , which God loues .

2 Grace is speciall to some and comprehends the spiritual acts of his loue as Redemption Satisfaction Glorification In this is the true Bonum moris , and this is Gods loue .

2 Angells loue is by contemplation of God . the Workes of God .

They see in all perfection of good , the fountaine is God , the streames scatter into each part of the world : things they cannot hate , only sinne they hate , which is as nothing .

This loue hath these tenents .

1 It is in the best natures , and the perfection of them .

2 As the best things are most louely , so they are most in imparting their loues to others .

3 It is Impotence to bee hating , envying , murmuring , all which are opposite to Loue .

4 It cannot be perfect in man , it is truest in God , & nature ; these are not interrupted by Passions .

5 The bond of matrimonie hath not truely this loue , sith it is spiced with lust : we may rather terme it the Vnion of affections willed by God for Avoidance of further evill .

6 It workes for the best things with reluctance to sense .

2 Loue with Passion is either Proper Improper .

1 Loue improper is in beasts , {αβγδ} , the Empresse of Nature .

Birds build their neasts , and spare their owne crawes to fill their young ones : the Partridge flags before the Faukner , and ventures the taking , that her young ones may escape . The most timorous creatures grow most resolute in these combats : In the worst natures are some sparkles of loue : As in Gold-mines amongst much earth shines a luster , and in beast are rude lines of mans naturall affection ; As in wild figs and oliues are the spices of the sweete , though in harsher manner :

2 Loue proper is in men alone .

It is either of our selues . or others .

1 Loue of our selues called {αβγδ} either 1 True according to reason , or 2 Fancied according to Sense .

1 True selfe-loue apprehends that which is simply good , both in present and future .

It respects the goods of the soule before those of the Body .

It chooses the lesse good of most durance before the greatest good of lesse continuance .

It is the Well-head of Charitie .

— Charitas incipit a seipso .

And the spurre of Vertue , sith by it we benefit our selues .

2 The propertyes of it are Wishing Working the best to our selues .

3 Consent with our owne parts , as of Reason . Passion .

4 Louing to retire into our owne thoughts .

5 Ioying at our owne good , and grieuing at the contrary .

Hence it is the attribute only of good men .

2 The evill follow showes , and opinatiue good , which failing breeds sorrow : the good man aimes at truth , and therein contents himselfe .

2 Conscience suffers not the evill to view their owne thoughts , they are at oddes with themselues ; Sense and Reason are hard at combate with them : Loue cannot be there , where there is difference .

3 Selfe-loue causeth Ioy ; Evill men , though they haue ioy of sense , they haue griefe of Reason , and their ioy is not for durance , but ends in Repentance .

4 Intemperance is the badge of Euill men , whose worke is to breed diseases in Soule . Body .

A good man so loues himselfe , that he will either stop raysing or labour their allaying .

5 As goodnesse is wisdome , so Evill is Folly , which blindeth vs that wee cannot distinguish the good from the Evill , but choose at randome , and so proue our selues without selfe-loue .

The opposite of selfe loue is either a stupid neglect , or a desperate hate of himselfe , they that mangle themselues , are of this ranke : Selfe-loue fancyed according to sense is the badge of Fooles ; It is the seed-plot of Passion , the bathe of Flatterers , the nurse of vices in manners reall , of Phantasticke humors , in manners of Complement .

It ariseth from 3 heads , viz. 1 Blindnesse of vnderstanding . 2 Easynesse of comparing our selues with others . 3 Partiallity in iudging to our owne side .

The Issues of it are 4.

1 Admiration of our selues . 2 Arrogancy of Speech . 3 Easy excusing our owne faults . 4 Despising of others admonition , and counsell .

The waies to restraine it are .

1 Prise the Act of any aboue thine owne particular , as many eys see more then one , and many hands make better riddance .

2 Amplifie others vertues depressing thine owne .

3 Be sparing in Vauntes , seldome in excuses .

This selfe-loue barres the admittance of goodnesse ; it comes not , vnlesse it be taught . Sought it cannot be , vnlesse it be acknowledged wanting ; Selfe-loue barres this acknowledgement .

Multi ad solidam eruditionem pervenissent Nise se pervenisse iam putassent .

Loue to others is directed either to God . or our Neighbours .

1 Loue to God is only in a sanctified will none can truly hate him but sinners : The reason is because , God is Loue , and sinne is in opposition to God .

2 Loue to our Neighbours is either to Enimyes or Freinds .

1 Loue to our Enimies is one of the cunning'st Poynts of Charit● , and an imitation of the divine nature .

1 Pardoning them , if they repent , as the Lions doe the beasts , that submit them selues .

2 Pardoning them , though persisting , and being without submission .

3 Not pardoning them only , but working a good for them .

The Necessity of this Loue is ,

1 Because God loueth vs being his enimyes , and we must doe , as we would be done vnto .

2 There is none so bad but hath some what excellent in him , and none so harmed vs now , but he may doe vs good hereafter ; and for this is to be loued .

2 Loue to our freindes is either for publicke respect . or private , and particular .

1 Loue for publicke respect is the loue of our Countrey , that is the duty of all ; but it is most splendent in heroickes , who pawne their life for it .

It was questioned , whether this loue was ingrafted by nature , or assumed by custome ? Ob Lipsius .

1 If it come by nature , why doth not the poore loue as well as the rich ?

2 How comes it , that many for gaine leaue their country , never to returne , sith , where we loue , we loue to converse : Some haue beene Traytors against it , and Neroes to fire it .

We answere , Nature cannot be so stricte , right , and even , but sometime she breeds Monsters : gaine may withdraw mens hearts , and fasten them to forraine Coastes .

The Poore loue their home , but rich men more , because they reape the goodnes of their countrey in a larger manner .

Mens loue of countrey is first for themselues , as we feare stormes , least our selues pinch for them , and we quench a fire , least our owne soules be fired by it .

2 Loue for priuate respects is either 1 Ascending to our Superiours . 2 Descending to our inferiours . 3 Betwixt equalls .

1 That in decent is farre more hearty then that in ascent . Hence fathers are more louing to children , then children to fathers :

2 That betwixt Equalls stands vpon more Indifferency of Points ; and in the best counterpoyse of either they may fall to Iarringe : Hence Brothers and Sisters fall to Iarring , and freinds haue many distastes .

These Loues are linked either by bonde Naturall , or Civill .

1 The Naturall bonde is threefold ,

1 Vnder God to parents , who challenge of vs 1 Honour . 2 Maintenance , if need so require .

It was Solons law , that none should be free from their duty , but those that had learned no trade of their fathers .

Parents are either of 1 Blood , that frame vs in body . 2 Manners , that by direction frame vs in Soule ; such are teachers .

It was Socrates his tenent , that by nature both these had challenge of Loue : it is also doubted by many , whether Alexanders debt was not as ample to Aristotle his maister , as to Philip his father .

2 Our bond of nature is to Brethren Sisters .

They challenge of vs ,

1 Counsell .

2 Liberty of Conference .

3 Pleasure of Conversation .

4 Helpes of Fortune ; So we wronge not our selues overmuch in furnishing them : Vivet extento Proculeius aevo Notus in fratres animi paterni .

Brothers loue is 1 Honoured by our freinds . 2 Envied and feared of our enimyes . 3 Vsefull to our selues . 4 Ioyous to our Parents .

King Eumenes his Mother professed her selfe happy in this , that of 4 Sonnes 3 yongest squired the body of the eldest , and that Eumenes was nothing iealous or mistrustfull of them : Nature hath made them in a family feete to beare vp our body both in equality and proportion ; If they exceed , they cause halting , if they trip at one another , they cause fallinge .

A Lady of Persia made it a great dispute , whether they were better to loose her brother , or her sonne ; she sayd they could get a new sonne , but a brother , sith her Parents were dead , they could not .

Brothers dislike ( it may bee ) often admits remedy , but their hate is inreconcileable : As the Ioyntures of Art , though riuen with rents , may be glewed againe , but Natures breach cannot .

The speciall Motiues of their dislike are 2.

1 If we leaue their commerce , and follow strangers as if wee should cut off our flesh and inch in the roome of it a strange peece : And the Arcadian Poet in Homer , when hee had lost his legge , for his best help was to hoppe on a legge of Wood ; strangers wil be distrustfull of vs , sith we leaue our owne .

Can you stile youre freind brother , when you cannot account a brother youre freind : as absurd a thing , as if you mangled his naturall body : but hang'd his Idoll with laces and Garlands .

2 If we are always checking , and thwarting their courses , as Laco sayd by his short wife , of 2 Evills , the least is to bee chosen : So if our brother be bad , rather let him haue his fourth , then demerite his hate .

Though the dog bite and the horse throw vs , yet wee keepe them , and wee suffer Apes , Catts and Lyons , though sometimes harmfull .

Wincking at faults in companie is vsuall , when we would not displease , though it be not so honest , yet for avoydance of further Evills , it may be tolerated .

Wee must bee our Brothers Freind , not his Iudge ,

3 Our bond of Nature is to our kinne either of Blood , or Marriage . both galling offices of loue proper to the familie . as Invitation to Marriage feasts . Funeralls .

2 The civill bond of loue is to 1 Citizens . 2 Countrey-men . 3 Strangers . As particular respects vary , so this order varies .

It is the engaging of man vnto man in heart began by vse and acquaintance : It acteth , as one Soule in 2 Bodyes .

There are 2 branches of it 1 Wishing . 2 Indeauouring the best for another not for his owne but the others sake .

The maine motiues of it are the 3 goods 1 Pleasure . 2 Profit . 3 Honesty .

1 Pleasure are the aymes of Epicures ; loues as they are diverse , and fancifull , so such loues must bee . 2 Profitte are the aymes of Epicures ; loues as they are diverse , and fancifull , so such loues must bee . 3 Honesty makes loue more setled : it appeares not as Alcibiades changing his coate to the fashion of the Place , but as Socrates keepes his tenor .

This loue gets his growth by 3 knots 1 Affecting . 2 Acquaintance . 3 Trust .

The Twine to wind and fasten it must be a Resemblance of Manners .

Motiues to make me effect one

1 I see him sympathize with my Ioy Greife befreinding Brutus .

2 He accounts my friends his and my enimies his ; So Cicero loued App●us Pulcher for Brutus his sake , and by it bound Brutus the more to him .

3 He is pleasant-hearted and iesting ; If I iest with him hee takes it not amisse .

4 He reportes well of me behind my backe and rather in secret shew his mind then in publike it should be told me .

5 Hee delights in my Company .

6 Hee goes neate , but curious in apparell : this was Demosthenes and Hortensius his tricke to get them favorites , when they first began pleadinge .

7 He liues peaceably with others , which perswades me , hee will doe so with me too .

These things may moue affecting in me not acquaintance , sith the Flatterer Dissembler may doe as much

Motiues to moue me to acquaintance .

1 Hee reports well of me before myne Enimies , and if they except , he defends me .

2 I see him honestly given , not giddily .

3 He doth me a good turne , so it be noe preiudice to himselfe .

4 He is noe busie-medler in my matters .

5 He overthwartes me not in talke , especially being either serious or angrie .

6 He keepes the 7 former motiues without dissimulation .

These moue acquaintance , and I would trust him in matters obvious , and ordinary , but in things secret , and nearly touching me , I may not , vnlesse he had Wisdome ioyned to his Honesty .

Motiues to moue me to trust him .

1 He hath all the 7 former circumstances without dissimulation and the 6 latter with wisdome .

2 He is wary , that he be not felt by others to open himselfe by Ignorance .

3 He doth me a good turne though to his owne Preiudice .

4 If I haue wronged him , he will not revenge it , though hauing opportunity .

5 He suffers wrong for my sake .

6 He discloseth to me his hart , opens his faults , sheweth me his hopes and feares .

This makes the vp shot of loue , and the Bond of Freindship . As the Diamond engraues the Diamond , and fire encreases fire : so his loue encreaseth my loue , and makes vp an Vnion betwene vs.

Saris de Amore primâ Passione .