Some arguments and considerations serving as a full answer to that grand question, whether men can will and do otherwise than what they do? in answer to and occasioned by a late discourse called A refutation of that atheistical notion of absolute necessity / by R.H., a well-wisher to all men.

SOME ARGUMENTS AND CONSIDERATIONS , &c.

Question . ] WEll met , old Friend ! What News abroad ? What new Books are come out lately ?

Answer . ] There are Book 〈…〉 out each Week ; and tho' I do not read much , ye● 〈◇〉 happen'd to see one , a mauling Piece , if it answers the Title .

Quest . ] Say you so ; Pray what was the Title ?

Ans. ] It was A Refutation of the Atheistical Notion of Fate , or absolute Necessity .

If that be it , I have seen it already .

Quest . ] Well , and what do you think of it ?

Ans. ] I think it doth not answer the Title at all .

Well then , if you be for Necessity , you and I shall differ , for I am for Liberty .

Well then , for distinction sake , I shall call you Liberty .

Liberty . ] Well , Necessity , what have you to say against Liberty ?

Necessity . ] I should have had nothing to have said against Liberty , if the Author had proved that there is any such thing ; but I have some Remarks to make on his Book ; and , first , the Title contains a false Charge .

Lib . ] Why , what part of the Title is false ?

Nec . ] That the Notion of Fate is atheistical .

Lib . ] How do yo prove that a false Charge ?

Nec . ] The first Article of the Mahumetan Creed saith , I believe that there is but one God ; and the sixth saith , That Good and Evil only happen , because God hath fore-ordain'd them , having writ on a Table from all Eternity things that are , and are to be ; therefore , all true Mussle-men , and many thousands more , that believe there is a God , and that he determines whatever is and shall be , cannot be Atheists , and therefore , such a Notion cannot be the Notion of an Atheist , nor an atheistical Notion .

Lib . ] But , perhaps he means only , that this Notion will lead Men into Atheism ?

Nec . ] Let him mean what he will , 't is plain , no Man can be an Atheist , while he is of this Opinion .

Lib . ] But what do you say to the whole Subject of his Discourse , viz. That all things are determined by an absolute Fatallity ; and , That God himself and all Creatures whatsoever are necessary Agents , without having any Power of Choice , or any real Liberty in their Natures at all .

Nec . ] It is an incongruous heap of Stuff , for the first Clause may be true for any thing he hath shewed to the contrary ; but that God himself is a necessary Agent ( except he have tyed himself to it for his own Pleasure , or the Good of his Creatures ) I see no reason to believe ; and for the rest of it , it hangs so together , that what both he and I pleads for may be true , for all Creatures may be necessary Agents , and yet have such a real Liberty in their Natures , as may enable them to Choose ; for all Creatures that I can observe , have a Power by , Nature to Choose what is agreeable to their Natures and to do otherwise would be to hate themselves , which they cannot do in Thoughts , whatever their Actions may tend to .

Lib . ] Wherein do you then differ ?

Nec . ] To come to the chief Points of Difference ; Page the 9th , he quotes Hobbs , saying , That nothing can take beginning from it self , but must do it from the action of some other immediate Agent without it ; if therefore a Man have a Will to something which he had not a Will to before , the Cause of his Will is not the Will it self , but somet●ing else not in his own disposing . And Page 11 , he saith , ●●●●ant that nothing can take beginning from it self ; the Will of Man took beginning from God , and yet it will not in the least follow , that the Cause of a Man's Will is not the Will it self , but something else not in its own Disposing ; for he thinks the Acts of the Will take their Original from the faculty of Willing ; and that tho' the first Will , or power of Willing , took its beginning from God , yet the Acts of the Will take their Original from that free Power of Election , which God hath placed in our Natures ; and therefore we say , saith he , that voluntary Actions take their Original , &c. And Page 14 , he saith , He is properly Free who hath the Power of Determining in himself , and when all Requisits are ready , so that nothing shall extrinsically either hinder from , or compel him to Act ; can yet choose whether he will Act or not . Thus , if a Man hath Pen , Ink , and Paper , and a place to write on , his Hand well , and at liberty , and understands how to Write , he hath all things present that are necessary to produce the Effect of Writing , yet he can nevertheless not produce that Effect , because he can choose after all whether he will Write or no .

Lib . ] And what can you say to all this ?

Nec . ] I allow , That he that hath all Requisites for Action , so that nothing shall either hinder him from , or compel him to Act , and can choose whether he will Act or not , is free from Necessitation . But I deny , 1st , That those Requisites , which he reckons up , are all that 's requisite . And , 2dly , That when all Requisites are present , he can choose or refuse to Act. I grant , That God hath placed in our Natures a Faculty of Deliberating , and also a Power to Will ; but not that this Power to Will , includes all that 's requisite in order to Willing , so that where there is one there may be the other .

Lib . ] Why may not the Power of Willing produce the Acts of Willing ?

Nec . ] I shall state the Question so , that the Decision thereof may cut the Thread for ever in this case : The Question is , Whether that general Faculty , or Power , which God at first planted in Human Nature , whereby he enabled Man to Choose , Will and Desire whatever should seem best to him during the whole course of his Life doth include in it , or furnish a Man with whatever is requisite , whereby he may ( have Power to Choose , I do not say , for that it doth furnish him with , but ) Choose and yet have liberty to Refuse what is set before him .

Lib . ] You have stated the Question fairly , and I think the case so plain , that you must make a very nice Distinction to evade the Consequences .

Nec . ] I shall make no other Distinction but what your Author made before me ; for Page 10. and 13. he blames Hobbs for not distinguishing between the Power of Willing , and the Act of Willing , and therefore he shall have enough of it , he shall never need to blame me for confounding 'em together . And first , to shew him that there may be Power to Will , and yet no Act , Choice or Desire , I shall only need to inform him , that by the aforesaid Power , which God planted in our Natures , we have at all times , if we be wakening , a Power to Will in readiness : And then , secondly , I shall leave him to judge whether he can use that Power at any time , but when he hath some occasion , that 's not of his own Procuring , and at his own Disposing : And , thirdly , if not , what Proof this is that a Power to Will , that lies asleep till it is stirred up , is all that 's requisite , whereby that Power may be put into action ; if a Man cannot put those Powers , which God hath planted in his Nature , ( whereby he is able to Will , Desire and Choose ) into action , unless , besides that Power , there is also some occasion , &c. whereby it may be moved , then that Power is not a sufficient Cause , nor any Cause at all of a Man's Willing , Desiring and Choosing : But a Man cannot put those Faculties into action , neither doth any Man do it , without such occasions as are not of his own procuring , and at his own disposing ; therefore that Power which God planted in a Man , neither is nor can be the Cause of a Man's Willing , Desiring and Choosing : And what think you now ?

Lib . ] I think you have shuffled your self from under the strength of this Argument , by bringing in another Cause of Willing , viz. The Occasions of Willing , as you call them ; but you do not think you have proved an absolute Necessity ?

Nec . ] No ; but if you understand it , you may see that I have proved , That there can be no Liberty from that Argument , because , though we have a Power to Choose , yet that Power cannot be put into Action without something else out of our Power , which that Power doth not govern .

Lib . ] But he hath more Arguments to prove a Free-will by .

Nec . ] He hath none but what either fall under this , and are disproved by what I have said , or else such as will do him no good ; for his Argument , that Pen , Ink , and Paper , &c. are all that 's requisite for Writing , is disproved here ; for , 't is self-evident to thousands of Men , that have those Requisites , and cannot Write , till they have , besides those which he reckons , something to move them to it .

Lib . ] But he proves a Free-will from the use of Reason .

Nec . ] No , but he should have done it in his 7th Sermon ; but doth it follow , that because some Men have the use of Reason sometimes , that therefore all Men have it at all times ? If all Men had the use and benefit of Reason at all times , they would not do Evil ; but they do Evil , therefore they have not the use of Reason ( so as to be said to have a Free-will ) at all times by it .

Lib . ] But he proves Free-will from Page the 19th , from the experience of all Mankind , which are conscious of having a free Power of Deliberating in many cases , which way is best for us to proceed , that we can act this way or that way , according as we like best .

Nec . ] This is very true , and one of these Proofs will do him no good , for all Men that I know of , have such a Power of Deliberating , Willing and Choosing ; but the word ( Free ) ought to have been left out , because , we can forbear to act at all , when we are not moved at all , yet , when we are moved , that is , when we have sufficient Occasions , we are willing , and cannot forbear being so , because that which disposeth of our Wills is present .

Lib . ] Then you own a Will , but not a Free-will ?

Nec . ] Yes , and all the Reason in the World , for 't is not more plain to all Mankind that we have a Will , than it is that our Will doth not govern it self , but is govern'd ; and that it never acts , but when besides it self something else is present to put it into action .

Again , If Men depend as much on God for their Motions and Opperations as for their Being , then they can do nothing towards those Motions and Opperations , but must depend on their first Cause in all cases as much ; and in like manner , as a Sword depends on its Maker , as much for its being a broad , narrow , long or short , good or bad Sword , as for its being a Sword .

But Mr. Goodwin , in his Redemption Redeem'd , saith , There is no Created Being , or Second Cause whatever , but depends on the First , which is God ; and this as well in the Second as in the First Act , i.e. As well in the Motions and Operations issuing from , and performed by every one of them , as in their simple Being and Existence it self .

Now let any Man make it intelligible , How a Man's Actions can be his own , or determined by his own Power and Choice , while this Confession is good and true ?

Lib . ] But there is one Argument I have heard against your Opinion , that is , That though the Will cannot choose without a Motive , yet the Faculties of the Soul in general , can make themselves Motives , and then act by the mediation of these Motives , or make an Object to seem good , and then desire it .

Nec . ] If there be any such Power in Man , it must either be the effect of some Mode or State of Body , or some Property of the Soul : If it be the effect of some Mode , it must be natural , and whensoever present , it would of necessity produce or occasion such a seeming Goodness to attend such an Object as would unavoidably produce a Desire thereof : Thus some particular Mode or State of Body , is accompanied with Hunger , and Hunger doth unavoidably produce a Desire of Food ; but I hope you do not expect Free-will from this Argument . And if the Soul doth make those Faculties , whereby those Objects which it Desires , Hopes , Fears , &c. become desirable , &c. then the Soul doth not depend on any superior Power for the making those Faculties , by which only we can know that we have a Soul , to wit , the Faculties of Hoping , Fearing , Desiring , &c.

Again , If the Soul can make an Object to seem good , desirable , &c. when there is no Reason why it should seem so before the Soul makes it seem so , then the Soul can make the thing not only to seem good , but also to be good ( for , whatever seems good is good ) to him , and thereby governs both the Nature of Men and Things , or the reasonableness of Things being desirable , hopeful or fearful , and so leaves nothing for God to do with the Minds of Men ; for it must do all , or else it signifies nothing at all , it must make the Object to appear good , and yet keep it self at liberty whether it will desire it or not ; for if he hath not Power also to forbear desiring it when he hath made it seem best , he hath catcht himself , as ill as if some other Agent had laid a Necessity on him ; if he be independant in making the Object to seem good or bad , without any Cause or Reason at all , and also independant as to any inclinations of Desiring when he had made it seem good , then he is equal at least with God , if not above him ; but if he can do but one of those Acts , he will still be bound by the other . Again , if the Soul made the desirableness of her Objects , and her own Will to desire 'em , 't is probable he might foresee whether that Desirableness would continue or not , and make nothing desirable but what would continue both desirable and attainable .

But there is few of those Objects which she desires that do continue desirable and attainable , therefore I will leave any Free-willer to judge whether the Soul doth make the seeming Goodness of things , and the Reasons thereof .

Again , If it were in the Power of Man to make good things seem good at all times , he might for that very Reason ( because it would seem one good thing among the rest ) make it seem good as well at one time at at another , to provide and secure himself against what may happen from the four last things , viz. Heaven , Hell , Death and Judgment , which are things always alike dangerous , because always alike uncertain as to the time when they may overtake us ; but these Considerations have not always such an Effect , and such Impressions on our Minds as it were to be wished they should have , therefore it is not in the Power of Man to procure Reason and the exercise thereof , but that it is the effect of Grace , and when Grace hath refined and improved our Nature , good things seem good to us , till then ill things seem good to us , but neither Good nor Ill is made to seem good nor ill by us , but to us .

Lib . ] This seems to take off an Objection , which it brings into my Remembrance , namely , That tho' we have not a Freewill to do Good , yet we have a Free-will to do Evil .

Nec . ] We have a Will ( as I said before , till our Natures are refined ) to do Evil , but here again the word ( Free ) ought to have been left out , because 't is evident , that we do not those things out of a Principle of Freedom or Liberty , but the quite contrary , viz. a State of Slavery , 't is the Effects of natural Corruption , out of which we are not able to free our selves till God Refines our Nature , by some means accountable as some sanctified Affliction , &c. or some unaccountable way , as the inward working of Grace upon our Minds , thereby blunting the edge of our Appetites .

Lib . ] I think God suffers us to fall by the Corruption of our Wills .

Nec . ] I know not what you can mean less by suffering you to do an ill thing , than by appointing you as Instruments to do it .

If , First , you grant that God knows the Wills of Men , and can turn them whether he pleases ( tho' neither you nor I knows how he should do it , if they have no dependence on him , ) and if God did not know and could hinder what he suffers , he could not be said to suffer it ; and if he knows what will be the event , and yet gives his consent ; and for some Reason , approves and thinks fit to continue them in health and being while they act , and without sustaining Nature in her due course and vigour , they could not Act : And do you think that God would suffer Men thus willingly , or thus willingly suffer them , to will and to do of their own Pleasure , if he had not some end which he thinks fit to carry on thereby ? And if it were thus , what would this sort of Willing fall short o● Acting upon the Wills of Men , especially when Acting in God is supposed to be nothing but a Willing that a thing shall be done ?

Lib . ] There is as much Difference as between willing that a thing may be , and willing that a thing shall be .

Nec . ] And this Difference will vanish all at once for this Reason , viz. That if God doth not Will that a thing may be , it cannot be , and if he Wills it shall be , it can but be , for if Men be not First Causes , they must be Second , Third , &c. and what are these more than Instruments in the Hands of a First Cause ?

Lib . ] But doth not this Distinction of God's Willing that a thing may be and that a thing shall be , import that a thing may be , or it may not be ?

Nec . ] I did not approve of that Distinction , only I supposed it , to shew that I thought it would be of little use to you : However , we being ignorant of what God wills , till his Will makes Some Impression on our Faculties , and supposing he can move our Wills , we say such a Thing may be , or it may not be , for any thing we know , because we neither know any thing of it , nor can do any thing in it , till we have further Orders and Motives from without ; and do you think that our being ignorant of what God Wills , can be any Proof that he doth not Will what he suffers , or weaken the Belief of what by Experience we already know , viz. That we never Will , till something out of our own Power moves us .

Lib . ] I think we shall be worse put too it with y●● than with Hobbs , because Hobbs's Opinions were somethin● more Extravigant than yours , and therefore easier to ta●● hold of .

Nec . ] I shall not here justify Hobbs in any thing , bu● this Notion against Liberty , and in that part of Mr. H. ' ● Argument with Hobbs , he came as poorly off as ever Ma● did , for to Page 22. he quotes his Adversaries , grantin● that they are really Free , because they had granted hi● they had a Power to deliberate whether they should do such a thing or not , so that deliberating and determining are all one with him , any thing rather than not be a free Agent forsooth : And Page 19 and 20 , he quotes a Man , convincing another Man that he could walk , by getting up and shewing him that he could walk , which was all that he drove at , or disputed about : The thing in dispute was not , whether he had the occasion of walking within himself , or whether he could walk without occasion , but whether he would walk . But this sharp , or rather short-sighted Philosopher can see no difference between walking , and the occasion of walking , and therefore poor Man , thinks that this very instance will baffle all the pretended Arguments for Necessity ; but he has exposed himself and one of his pretended Arguments for Liberty to very little purpose , but to confirm the Opinion he argues against , Page the 21. he argues for as great a Power as can be conceived to be in GOD , and declares himself ignorant of any other Cause , to determine Mens Actions , and calls their free Will the cause of those Actions , and saith they depend on it ; and yet in the foregoing Page it is nothing but an Opinion , that there is a Liberty of Action in humane Nature , and this free Power or Liberty which we find in us , we call the Will , by which we understand not any particular act of Volition , but the Power or Faculty of Willing : now I think it will be hard to find an Animal in all the Universe that has not a Liberty of Action , and a Power of Willing ; but I am astonished to hear that one that pretends to be a Divine and Philosopher , should at the same time own himself grosly Ignorant of any Cause , these Actions have without him .

Lib . ] He doth not sure mean that God hath not the Disposing of Mens Wills at all ?

Nec . ] I cannot gather from his Book any such Acknowledgment , and therefore in this Case of Free-will he talks either like a Fool or an Atheist .

Again , Page 13. he quotes an Argument of Hobbs's , viz. That Cause is a sufficient Cause , which wanteth nothing to produce its Effect : But such a Cause must also be a necessary one , for had it not necessarily produced its Effect , it must have been , because something was wanting for that purpose , and then it could not have been sufficient : Now how do you think he argues against this Iron-sided Argument ?

Lib . ] I cannot tell , 't is like he is not afraid of Hobbs's Arguments .

Nec . ] Yes , as sure as he was alive .

Lib . ] Why do you think so ?

Nec . ] Why , any Body that sees how he doth mannage it , may be sure of it , for he made hard shifts to run away from it , and is not yet , nor never will be got clear of it .

Lib . ] How was it then ?

Nec . ] First , he saith , without giving any Reason for it at all , That all this Argument of Hobbs's proves for his purpose nothing at all .

Lib . ] And had he no Reason to say so ?

Nec . ] None at all .

Lib . ] I cannot believe that , what did he say ?

Nec . ] First he charges Hobbs with proceeding on in his former Errour of confounding the Act of Willing , with the Power of Willing .

Lib . ] And why did you say he did not Reason at all ? I think this was a fine Saying .

Nec . ] Yes , it was well enough contrived , to scatter something behind him , to entertain such Readers as understood no more than himself , while he was making his escape from under the Claws of an Argument , that would have frightned a much wiser , and more hardy Disputant , than ever he is like to be .

Lib . ] Why , he tells you that Hobbs was in an Errour , or confounding Things and Words , &c.

Nec . ] And I say , he was in an Errour for saying that Hobbs confounded the Act of Willing , with the Power of Willing ; for there was no such Words in the Argument there cited , and he could not confound such Words , when there was neither such Words nor Meanings , but was only speaking of the Sufficiency , of a Cause .

Lib . ] And did he take no notice of the Argument as to that point ?

Nec . ] Yes , he took notice of it , to shew that he was afraid of it .

Lib . ] How doth it appear , that he was afraid of it ?

Nec . ] Because he saith , he will not now dispute what Hobbs saith of a sufficient Cause , being a necessary one .

Lib . ] But he ought to have Disputed it , when he had quoted it on purpose to Dispute it .

Nec . ] Well , it may be , he thinks such a loose shuffling way of Talking , is good Disputing , and perhaps , thinks others will think so too , or else he would have been ashamed of it ; but he will make amends for it and fill up that side with something which he hopes yit will take for a sufficient Argument against a sufficient Cause , being a necessary one .

Lib . ] And is that any better , for I am almost sick of his Arguments , and his Arguing at this rate ?

Nec . ] You must know that in Page the 9th , he had quoted Three or Four of Hobbs's Arguments , and some of 'em he had slubbered over slightly , so as not to hurt them , and some of 'em he had left untouch'd , among which was this , viz. So that whereas 't is out of Controversie that of voluntary Actions , the Will is the necessary Cause ; and by this which is now said , the Will is also caused by other Things whereof it deposeth not , it follows that voluntary Actions have all of them necessary Causes , and are therefore necessitated . Now when he had left these Arguments in Page the 9th , which had not only proved , that the Will was necessitated ; because the Cause of a Man's Will , was not the Will it self , but something else , not in his own Disposing , but also that voluntary Actions are necessitated , and having some how or other got to Page 13 , was as I shewed you before , unluckily fallen in with this knotty Argument that shews why a sufficient Cause must be a necessary Cause , he be-thinks himself of a way to kill two Birds with one Stone , and get out of one Argument , by steping back and taking hold of one Clause of a Sentence ; which taken alone , might be wrested thus , That the Will is the Cause of voluntary Actions ; and would have us to believe , that Hobbs had granted the Will of Man , was a sufficient Cause to produce an Effect . And having foolishly supposed , that Hobbs had granted the Will of Man as a sufficient Cause ; he at last as foolishly loses all he had , only in Immagination got , by granting , that the Will of Man did produce the Effect necessarily . Now if he had taken the Sentence together , he could but have been foyled , and now after all his Shifts he is notoriously fool'd , and Hobbs's Argument affords this plain Inference , If nothing takes beginning from it self , but must do it from the Act to some other immediate Agent without it : And if the Cause of a Man's Willing , is not the Will it self , but something else not in his own Disposing , and if the Will is also caused by other Things whereof it disposeth not : Then the Will of Man is not a sufficient Cause to produce any Effect , and are therefore produced by the Action of some other immediate Agent : by whose Mediation whatever we Choose , Will or Desire , to have , to do , or to be , seems best at that time , and under those present Circumstances , and could not seem otherwise , because there was nothing present , by whose means any thing else could seem better , without which nothing else could be Willed , chosen or done .

Lib . ] If you do no not run too fast , so as to be called back again , you will soon have done , for this is a home touch ?

Nec . ] You may call me back , if you can disprove what I say , and give Reasons for what you say , or take me affirming any thing of this Nature , without assigning the Cause .

Lib . ] But will not some Men say , that all this amounts to no more than that when a thing is , it is ; but that it doth not prove that , Men are previously necessitated to Will , &c.

Nec . ] Yes , it doth if you consider it ; besides , if you observe carefully the working of your Mind when you deliberate , it will be self-evident , that by how much the seeming goodness of an Object is previous to the desire of that Object , by so much the Necessity of the Will is previous to the Act of Willing ; that is , so long as the Object seems best and fittest to be chosen , before the Will doth desire it , so long before the Will doth desire that Object it is under a Necessity to desire it . And , tho' this previousness be short and quick they are grasping at any thing that seems good , yet every Man is conscious , that the seeming Good was the Instrumental Cause of the Choice , and was therefore so long before it , as to be perceivable ; besides , if the Object did not seem best some time before the Will did choose it , the Will could not choose or desire it ; for the Will always stays to see the seeming bestness , before it can desire ; So that it is clearly made out , that the Will was necessitated to make that Determination à Priori , and that it could have made no other , because no Agent did occasion or produce a liking of any other .

Lib . ] All your Arguments still run on some supposed Agent , or Mover of the Will besides itself , and whereof it hath not the Disposing .

Nec . ] I suppose an Agent whereby the faculty of Willing is improved into Acts of Willing , by Motives , Occasions and Instruments , ( as Mediums ) appointed by that Agent , or first Mover : But , of this first Mover of Mens Wills , Mr. H●●●●● pretends great Ignorance , to which I say , That , if there is no Cause of the Determinations of Mens Wills , but what is within their Wills , then God doth not govern the Wills of Men . But Mr. H●●●●s in Page 21 , declares himself wholly Ignorant of any Cause that doth determin Men to Action , therefore Mr. H●●●●● is wholly Ignorant of God's Governing the Wills of Men . And I leave any sober Man to judge , whether my Notion of God's Governing the Wills of Men , or Mr. H●●●●●'s , of Mens being their own Movers , be more Atheistical .

Lib . ] But we ( whatever Mr. H●●●●● doth ) do acknowledge every good and perfect Gift to come from God .

Nec . ] But if you allow that they come from him , you do not allow that they can signifie any thing , by what he can do , since he can but present Objects to your liking , it is your Will that must give the finishing stroke ; without which all is to no purpose , for if your Will , as to the particular Acts of it , be Independent , it must be felf-sufficient , and such a faculty , that without it , nothing can be sufficient , Grace is not sufficient for you , for if God Wills , that the Hearing or Reading such a Sermon , or Book , shall have a more lively Impression on your Mind at one time , than at another ; tho' your Body was in an equal State ; yet his Will must stoop and give way to your Will ; he is the Instrument , and you the principle Agent , or else quite contrary .

Lib . ] But you charge us too hard now ; for we pray to God , that he would incline our Hearts to keep his Laws .

Nec . ] But then you should relinquish your Notion of Free-will , or else you can mean nothing by such Prayers , unless it be that yours depend on God , and on your self at the same time , and that it can be in and out at your own disposing at the same time , or at your own and God's disposing at the same time , or that God and you must be independent by turns , but he must not be independent in any Act of his Will , except you please to allow that he is so : however , I believe those that made those words of the Common-prayer , and the Tenth Article of the Thirty Nine Articles of the Church of England , ( according to which , by their Ordination , your Clergy are obliged to Preach ) were good sober Men , or at least had good sober Thoughts at that time ; the Article holds forth that Man cannot turn and prepare himself to Faith and Prayer without the Grace of God by Christ , preventing us that we may have a good Will and Working with us , when we have that good Will : But the Brains of your Beardless Clergy are in such a Hurry , and byass to serve some Opinion or Intrest , that they cannot think ; for while the Faculties of Men are imployed in advancing other Mens Opinions for Self-interest , and are content with a Supposition of the Truth thereof , 't is not likely they should find , or search much after Truth .

Lib . ] But you are so hot in Reflecting , that I doubt you have no more Arguments ; If you have , let 's have them ?

Nec . ] You have had enough already , if you know when you have enough ; however , take what follows , viz. That Faculty , Power , or Agent , whereby the general Faculty of Willing is put into Action , is nothing in and inseparable from the Object , considered in its own Nature as an Object , nor in and inseparable from the Faculty of Willing : Because , if that Agent , which puts the Power of Willing into an Act of Willing , w●ere in and inseparable from the Object before us , or in and inseparable from the faculty of Willing , or that Power whereby we are enabled ( but not moved ) to Will , and then it would follow that so long as the Object continues before us , and the Faculty of Willing continues in us , which is all our Lives , we should continue to Will and Desire that Object : But , we do not continue to Will and Desire the same Object , so long as it continues before us , and the Faculty of Willing continues in us ; therefore that Power , Faculty , or Agent whereby the Capacity of Willing is improved into Acts of Willing , is not the Faculty of Willing , but some other Agent , differing both from the Object and the Faculty of Willing ; which Acts , as a Medium , between the Object and the Will , to unite or bring together the Object and the Thing desired ; which is done in Fruition . Again , That Cause cannot be a sufficient Cause if any thing is wanting , without which , the Effect cannot follow : But , without this Agent whereby the Object before us to be chosen , can seem best , that can be bad at that time , the Effect cannot follow .

Therefore without that Agent to mediate and produce that seeming Goodness , nothing can be a sufficient Cause ; for Confirmation of which , Mr. Ha●●●● in Page the 11th of his 7th Sermon saith , All Men desire good , and cannot do therwise ; if they cannot do otherwise , then they cannot Will and Choose , when that Qualification is absent .

But a first Principle , quoted by Mr. H●●●●● , as self-evident , makes that Qualification necessary to make a Cause sufficient : Therefore according to Mr. H●●●●● , a Cause is not sufficient without the presence of that qualification , whereby whatever is afterwards desired , may seem best before-hand .

From whence it is self-eviden● , and allowed by Mr. Harris that to produce ( for Instance ) the Effect of Writing , 't is not sufficient to have in Reading as Materials . Secondly , A Power to use ' em . Thirdly , Knowledge how to use ' em . Fourthly , A supposed Capacity of being made Willing , by a Fifth , viz. The Mediation of some immediate Agent , whereby the Act of Writing is represented , as fittest to be done at that time ; the four first are not sufficient to make up a Cause , without the 5th Requisit , which produces a 6th , viz. An Act of the Will , and that 6th produces a 7th , viz. the Act of Writing : Now the four first Wheels , if they be present , and in good order , are always put in Motion by the 5th , which when it begins to move , it thereby produces the 6th and 7th Motion , viz. Willing and Acting . Now if this Agent , number 5 ( which I suppose the only free Agent in the Universe , as being utterly out of the disposing of any created being , ) be not present , I leave any considering Man to judge , if he can Will , Choose , or Desire at all , or that it being present , he can sorbear Willing , Choosing , &c. or first , whether it be not so necessary , that without it , no Cause can be sufficient . And 2d , whether the presence of this Qualification doth not make the Effect unavoidable . And 3d , whether this Agent is not wholly out of Man's disposing . And 4th , whether all this doth not amount to a Proof of an absolute Necessity ; that whatever is , must be , and cannot be otherwise ; because the Spring of Willing and Acting is not in Man ; and therefore whether a Man may not as well choose , whether the Wind shall blow , as choose otherwise than he doth : Nor need I any Postulata , nor to gather the strength of my Argument from a supposed , or unproved ) Weakness of that of my Adversary's , for instead of saying , ( if Man hath the disposing of his own Will , then God cannot , &c. ) I might have said , 't is self-evident , to every deserning Man , that the Spring , Source , Motives , and Occasions of Willing , are not procured and dispenced with by his own Power ; and that if he sits or lies down , 't is impossible he can rise again , till something or consideration not of his own procuring comes into his mind , and lays an absolute Necessity on him , which he cannot at that time dispence with ; And what Reason have you to believe , that God did or could sore-ordain a Sacrifice for Sin , and not likewise ordain Sin for that Sacrifice to Triumph over ?

And since the seeming Truth of a thing hath the same Effect on the Faculty of believing , that seeming good hath on the Faculty of Willing or Desiring , therefore of the truth of this Notion , I can be as certain , as I can be of my own Being . For I can be as certain what I think true , and why I think so , namely , because it appears so to the best understanding I at present have : And also , what I think best , and why I think it so , because it seems so to the Faculties which I at present have to judge by , and I cannot make it seem otherwise , because I neither made my self , nor govern the Agent , and Instruments whereby I am moved .

Lib . ] But what will become of the Consequences that , attend this Notion , for if it be true , it will be a sad Truth ?

Nec . ] That 's strange , that Truth can be of so sad a consequence ; but if it should be so , since I did not make it true , but only find it so , the Consequences cannot lie at my door .

Lib . ] But you ought to be concerned about ' em .

Nec . ] If I had time , I would be so far concerned about 'em , as to see whether none be charged on it , but what belongs to it .

Lib . ] There is enough belongs to it , for it perfectly destroys all the Notions of Good and Evil , Rewards and Punishments , and all manner of Obligations both to divine and human Laws ; and consequently , is the most destructive Principle that can be advanced to the good of Society ; for if all Things and Actions whatever , are absolutely necessitated , and cannot possibly be otherwise ; there can be no such thing as ●right and Wrong , Good and Evil : and why should any one trouble themselves about paying any Veneration to the Deity , if he could not help making them just such as they are ?

Nec . ] Here is one false Consequence built upon another . But let us see , how much of this will vanish by supposing God to be a Free Agent ; and that there is a Relative Good and Evil , attending the Actions of Men towards one another , and that these Things , whose properties , and those Actions which by Means of the Circumstances of Mankind , are useful and beneficial to Mankind , have a Relative Goodness , that is , they are Good so far as they relate to the good of Mankind , and the Universe , and farther than this , you can see no Good in any thing whatever . For Instance , For a Man to save the Life of his Father , Mother , Wife , or Child , would be counted a good and reasonable Action ; and there is this Reason , viz. Because they are Relations that are or may be of use to him ; but if he cannot save one of them , but by the loss of his own Life , where lies the Goodness of it then , is it Naturally , Morally , Eternally , and in it self Good , for a Man to kill himself , to save another , or to save another by killing himself ; and if such an eminent Act of Charity , such an Act of Generosity may be otherwise than Good , then things are only good by their Circumstances .

Again , To enquire whether the Evil of things consist in the Act or the Will , or in neither , let us see whether it would be Evil for a Man to desire to have the use of a Wife , or really to have the use of one : The Answer will be , That it cannot be said , that it either is or is not , unless you have recourse to the Circumstances of the Parties , if the Woman he desires be under the Relation , and Circumstances of a Wife of his own , then 't is not , otherwise 't is Evil , because he will thereby become a means to alinate the Mind of the Woman from the Love of her Husband , which he can never restore : Thus you see that things are only Good or Evil by the Circumstances of things ; the same thing which differs not , either in the Act or Desire , from another thing which is Adultery , may be just and honest ; to kill another Man in his own Defence , ceases to be Murther , and to save a Man's Life by destroying his own , is made Self-murther , and all this by the Difference of Circumstances only , yet it is to be observed , that these Circumstances are sacred and indispensible by Man , because Man neither made those Circumstances , nor can alter one of them , for the Nature of 'em was settled by God , when he made those Creatures , which have such a Relation to , and Dependence on one another . Thus you see I have made way for Good and Evil , ●right and Wrong .

Lib . ] But this Doctrine admits of no Rewards and Punishments , nor Sin against God .

Nec . ] It neither helps nor hinders them , because it knows not how God will dispose of his Creatures in a future State , and therefore believes no more than what it can give some Reason for , and supposes that God will either make some Allowance for the Frailties of Human Nature , or that they may be attoned for by the Sacrifice of the Lamb slain from the Foundation of the World ; and thinks with those that have writ with most Caution and Depth of Thought , ( viz. Dr. Tillotson , Arch-Bishop of Canterbury , of Hell Torments , ) that God will manage Things fairly in that Day . But tho' it is not severe in censuring as some , yet it doth not hinder us from believing it convenient to provide as far as in us lies for the worst that may happen , only it knows no Reason for that Branch of Repentance that supposes us to have resisted his Will ; yet I may be sorry that I am encompass'd about with such a Floud of Infirmities , and pray that I may be delivered from this Body of Corruption ; because Observation and Experience shews me , that I am loaded with Inclinations to such things , which tho' they be pleasant when I desire them , have trouble behind 'em , and have been led into such Inconveniences , that I may feel the Effects of these Inclinations still , and therefore not knowing what may be hereafter , I desire God ( when my Mind is well-affected ) that he would continue that Zeal , and Warmth of Devotion , whereby I may choose and desire such things as he knows are and will be best for me to all intents and purposes ; and because we do not only receive Good at the Hands of God , but Evil ; we may therefore desire God to remove ill Things from us ; and when he doth so , we may give him Thanks for confirming those benefits and favours on us ; because for any thing we know , he might have done otherwise : Thus we may hope for Good , because God is Good , and sometimes doth us Good in a remarkable manner , and we may be afraid of Evil , because God is Powerful , and doth afflict us sometimes , and gives ill Agents Power to hurt us . And thus we may in all our Ways acknowledge a Supream Power , by what Names or Titles soever dignified or distinguished ; and when our trail Natures have betrayed us into Folly and Inconvenience , we may ( notwithstanding this Notion ) with Humility ( since we cannot observe that Fretting either brings Good or removes Evil ) submit and acknowledge our Weakness , and desire supernatural Assistance , that we may not only do well for our selves , but also , that we may do something that 's good and useful to our Generation ; and to do it , so as to do nothing to any one , which we would not ●●cept of from any other in a like Case : than which , there is no higher Attainment our Natures are capable of in this State , for it includes forgiving Injuries , passing by Affronts , &c. which do cross the grain of our Natures ( which , till improved , differs not from those of Brutes ) as much as any thing can do : So that there is nothing that relates to God , our Neighbour , or our Selves , but may be perform'd by Men of this Opinion : If God gives Grace , and if that be wanting , it is not the believing that we are free Agents that can supply its Defects , any more than the contrary Notion can hinder its Op●eration and Effects .

Lib . ] But to what purpose do you reckon up what parts of Religion your Opinion admits of , since you have no reason to boast of any thing you do ?

Nec . ] I am not about to Boast , for , What have we , that we did not receive ? I only observe to you , that tho' , when we do Well , we cannot do otherwise , yet our Opinion doth not hinder us from doing Good ; neither can it make us to do Evil , because it leaves nothing for us to do , but to believe , that we can do nothing , but as Instruments , and hope that God will consider our Natures , that we are but as a Wind that passeth away and returneth not again , and that therefore he will heal our Backslidings , and prepare us for himself , whereby we may be fitted to resign up our Souls into the Hands of God , who gave 'em to be dispos'd of as he thinks fit .

Lib . ] But why should Men be punish'd for committing Murthers , Robberies , &c. when they could not do otherwise ?

Nec . ] It cannot be thought unjust or unreasonable for Men to make Laws , which , for ought we know , may prove a Defence to us , and a Caution to others , which might otherwise do Evil .

Lib . ] How can that be , since you intimate that God appoints every thing they do ?

Nec . ] If God doth appoint every thing Men do and suffer , he may appoint the Means as well as the End , every Action being a Means leading towards some End ; and , forasmuch as God doth bring his Ends to pass by Means , therefore we know not but that those Laws may be Instruments to bring to pass some good End of that nature , and perhaps it doth many times when we cannot perceive it : Besides the Majestrate can have no Design against any one in making such Laws , because they neither force any one to break 'em , nor are certain that any one will break 'em , and Self-preservation is a sufficient Motive to ballance that Objection , and the use of all probable Means for the attainment of any good End , is infer'd from our Ignorance of God's Decrees , &c.

I think what I have said takes off all Objections that lies against this Notion , from any Laws Divine or Human , and therefore I need not take notice of his four or five Pages of Consequents , yet in answer to 'em all , I shall tell him , That if he had but had a grain of Sence , he might have seen that this Doctrine could not be Mischevious , Pernicious , nor open a Door to any Wickedness , because it supposes , that none could enter but what was decreed either from Eternity , or like time , cut out for us by parcels as we Act it .

For to suppose that this Doctrine could do any harm to Church or State ; were to suppose that the Doctrine it self could dispose of the Wills of Men , which would first destroy his Notion of Mens Wills , disposing of themselves . And Secondly , It would destroy the Doctrine of Necessity it self , which supposes Mens Wills to be disposed off by some Superior Agent . For an Opinion that a Man is Necessitated to Will and Do whatever he doth , neither Necessitates nor Inclines him to Will or Do , because ( tho' he confoundes 'em ) Believing and Desiring are different Things .

Thus , if a Man believe that Pampering his Body would be a means to procure Lust , and that Abstinence and a severe course of Diet , would be a means to procure a Sober , Religious Temper ; yet Experience shows , that without some Motive or Occasion ( besides the Opinion ) to put him upon the Use of those Means , he cannot use the Means leading to either of those Ends : So weak and inconsistent is he in his Writing and Disputing , that I would have him to leave it off , and not be so much afraid of losing Time and Pains by incouraging Vertue , and discouraging Vice , because he is but a Man , and therefore knows not when good Advice will be lost , and when not ; if therefore he can advise Men to live so as that they may not be afraid to die , he knows not but that God may design Good thereby .

What I have said to disprove Liberty of Will , will be found Self-evident to all that observe what it is they do , and why they do it . And if these Arguments be demonstrative against a Free-will , then it were better ( if it pleased God ) that so much of our Sermons , Discourses , and Religious Performances , as are usually spent in declaring and proclaiming a Free-will , were laid out in ( solemnly as at the Sacrament ) confessing that our Help is only in God , and with Humility , beseech him by his preventing and assisting Grace , to rectifie our Rugged , Revengeful , Lustful , or otherwise Troublesome and Dangerous Inclinations and Appetites : I say , this would be more becoming Creatures under our Circumstances .

Lib . ] How do you think that Men were at first produced , whether did the Earth bring 'em fourth by Nature , like Plants , &c.

Nec . ] As to the Productions of Men , the ingenious Mr. Bently hath said almost all that can be said , and the Consideration of the Frame and Texture of Human Bodies , being so well fitted for the Ends and Uses for which they serve , is a sufficient Argument to me ; that besides the Materials , there was an inteligent Being to dispose those Materials into this Frame , wherein we now see 'em ; for if the Earth , or the Chaos , with heat and moisture , could produce A●nimals , Vegitables , &c. When there was neither Eggs , Sperm , nor Seeds , then dry , or calcined Earth , with Heat and Moisture , wherein we can be sure , that there is no Eggs , Sperm , nor Seeds , might do it again ;

But I know by Experience , that it cannot do it , and therefore I conclude that it never did it .

Again , if the Chaos could have produced Plants in the Figure and Porportion of Men , and that the Motion of Vegitation had been sufficient to Annimate , Ripen , and Loosen 'em from the Ground ,

Then we might expect to see some such Effect still , some stately Oak or Elm might come forth , and perform the Exploits of a Giant or wild Indian , and other Plants might come forth and Reason together among those of their own sort at least , as well as Brutes ; but we never see things happen thus , so that Matter and Motion , Heat and Moysture , are not Sufficient to produce Men , &c. And therefore I conclude , that the Frame and Texture of the Bodies of Annimals , and that Principle that Acts and Annimates them , was the Effect of a Wise and Powerful Being .

Lib . ] And do you think that our Souls will not die with our Bodies ?

Nec . ] If that thinking Faculty which Annimates our Bodies do not Waste and Decline as our Bodies do ; but that generally this Faculty grows , is improved and inlarged in its Notions and Apprehensions of things , as the Body declines , and many times the Declension of one , is the Growth and Increase of the other , as is seen by Mens Desires , Hopes and Fears growing more Vigorous and Intense , when the State of the Body is so Impaired , as not to be able to make known its Thoughts , by Words and Actions as before , but only by Signs , then 't is probable our Souls are more than a Temperament of Body , and do not depend on it for their Beings , but will exist after the Dissolution of our Bodies , and be Immortal .

And since we cannot Act without a Motive , I wish this consideration of our Souls , out living our Bodies , may prove one , and that God would be pleased to set it forward , so that thereby we may provide against the worst ( and then we shall be prepared for the best ) that a future State can bring with it .

Finis .