I have no excuse to make for our Courts trusting the French , or for their entring cordially into their Concerns . If I thought the King was capable either of loving or Trusting them , I could not maintain in my heart that affection and confidence which I ow'e him : It is impossible for me to believe it , he knows them too well , and has had too much practice in affairs to be guilty of such an Errour . As far as I understand the matter , this was the case . We and the Dutch had got thro' a great War at a vast Charge , and with infinite danger : We saw the weakness of Spain in the Buisness of Barcelona : There was no reckoning on them as capable of making a stand if the King of France were freed from a War , since when that press'd him on all lands , yet with a small army he could at his Leisure take that important place : Had Spain any intrinsick strength to resist , there was time enough given them to have brought it all together . If I say France then with so small a body made such a conquest , what could be expected from Spain when the French King should send his whole strength against them ? A Fleet before Cadiz and two small Armies marching in thro Catalonia and Navarre might have found it hard to Subsist , but not to Conquer Spain . The Emperour abandoning all other Thoughts , had during the last War pursu'd his advantages against the Turks , and thereby had both exhausted his own strength , and disgusted his Allies . And on the Conclusion of the Peace of Reswick he had shew'd so great an Inclination to ruine Heresy at any Rate , and so little regard of the Honour of a Prince , to whom he ow'd so much , that this with some other things ( that I love not to remember , because I hope that Court will grow Wiser ) had given so just a Discontent , that few seem'd willing to engage in a New War for him and his Family . And his Councills were so dilatory and uncertain , that instead of pressing the Renewal of a General Alliance upon the Conclusion of the Peace , he seem'd not to regard it , when press'd thereto . We here were so weary of Taxes , and so jealous of a standing Army , that we broght down our Land Force , first to Twelve Thousand , and then to Seven . Our Fleet kept proportion to our Army . The Dutch did not disarm so fast , yet they had no force to spare , and to be sure , they would unwillingly engage in the Quarrel deeper than we did . While the debates concerning the Army were on foot , the ill Health of the K. of Spain was not forgot to be mention'd , and the Danger of the Progress that the French might make , if we were ruduc'd to such an Incapacity of protecting the Spainards , was often represented ; but was often rejected with Indignation , as an Artifice of the Court to get an Army kept up . Things being in such a state , might not the King think that what was left for him to do , was to make the best Bargain he could . How bad soever the Partition may be , it seem'd still more desirable to yield up some parts of the Spainish Monarchy , than to let France conquer it , or rather take it all . Spain it self , the West-Indies and Flanders were the Branches of that Monarchy , in which we were chiefly concern'd , and while these were kept entire , in the same hands , our interests wery pretty safe . It is known , that what advantage soever the Spanish Grandees may make of the Dominions in and about Italy , Spain it self is not the stronger or richer for them , but much to the contrary . It is true , their interests at Rome are fortify'd by them , but we are little concern'd in those . It was not to be imagined , That France that had so much Noise with their pretensions to that Succession , and ( how slight soever they may be ) had involv'd all Europe in Wars upon yet slighter ones ; and that saw how sure they were of Conquering so feeble an Enemy , and so weak a Rival , would let all this go for nothing . They did not fear a new Alliance against them , they knew well the Temper both of the English and Dutch . They therefore pretended to the Italian Dominions . If the King had been in Condition to have talk'd roundly to them , certainly that had been both the wisest and the best method . But those who seem now the most inflam'd against the Partition Treaty , know in their Consciences , that they themselves would never have engag'd in a new War , if the Dominions in Italy , much less if the Dutchy of Milan had been the only Point in debate . I leave it to you to judge what a Parliament would have said , if they had been call'd , and had found the French King in possession of perhaps all the Spanish Monarchy ( as no doubt by what we have seen , he would soon have been , upon the Death of the K. of Spain ) if they had discover'd , That Offers had been made to have compounded for that whole succession , by yielding up the Dominions in Italy , but that the King and his Ministers had rejected the Proposition : I doubt not , but then we should have had Impeachments upon Impeachments and the suspicions of selling and betraying the World into the hands of the French , would then have carryd such Characters of Probability , that we would , in reverse of S — B — S — 's subtil Discovery , have concluded who they were that were the Instruments of France , and suppos'd them to have been as well paid for it , as perhaps some have been for later Services . I confess the Dominions in Italy are very valuable , yet no Naval Power belonging to them , they are not now so considerable as they were some Years ago . Nor is it certain , that notwithstanding the Partition Treaty , they would have been a sure Accession to the Crown of France , perhaps France would have found as much Opposition to it , as she is like to do now to her taking possession of the whole . The Pope would have struggled hard ; It must have alarm'd the Court of Rome , and indeed all Popery mightily , to see the Pope surrounded with French Armies , and so much in their Power . The Popes pretensions on the Kingdom of Naples are of an old standing , and are not disputed . If the Pope should have refus'd to change his Vassal , and have upon that made use of the Arms of the Church , and invited the Germans to his Assistance , and the Venetians to open Passages to them both by Sea and Land , this must have brought on a new War , and made Italy the seat of it . It would have made an irreconcilable Breach between France and Rome . It is easy to see , what this might have ended in . It is true , we by the Treaty were to have assisted the French , but in the Progress of the War , we might have found just Reasons of getting out of the Quarrel , and of becoming the Umpires in it . Would it be a Reflection on the King's Honour , if it were suggested , That perhaps he would have stood to this Treaty as most Princes do , when they see where the advantage lyes , and as the French King has always done , and most signally in Relation to this very Treaty : I can't think so meanly of the King's Wisdom and Experience , as to believe that he built much on the Faith and Honour of his most Christian Majesty , but he might imagine that age had qualify'd that unquiet spirit , which has given the the World so much Disturbance . He might think that a bigotted Prince would above all other things desire to have the Papacy under his protection , that is to say at his Mercy . He would perhaps chuse rather to have the Dominions that were yielded to him by the Treaty , which he might expect without the Trouble and Charge of a War , than to embroil all his Affairs , and engage in the Decline of his Life in a War , of which it is not easy to see the End. A Lady that has great Credit with him , might be known to be fond of this Accession of Empire , both as laying a great Obligation on the Succession ; and as securing the quiet and Life of one in whom she has so particular an Interest . A Ministry compos'd of such young Persons as might hope to out-live their Monarch , for all his Immortality , would probably conclude that it would be more meritorious in another Reign to have extended the Empire of France , than to have rais'd a younger Son of France , so as perhaps he might be able one day to Dispute matters with his Elder Brother . Upon one or more of those Reasons , or perhaps upon much better , the King might have reckon'd that the Treaty would have been better stood to by the French , without relying so entirely upon a Faith that had been so often given , and so seldom kept . He had likewise other things to depend on ▪ It was reasonable to hope , that the Emperour would have come into it , tho' it had been only with this Design , that by his sons being in possession of the best parts of the Spanish Monarchy , he might thereby be the better enabled to lay Claim and struggle for the rest . Was it reasonable , to think that a Prince who had no Naval Force would have maintain'd a Dispute in oposition to all the Naval Power of the World united against him . And could a Prince of such an exhausted Revenue hope to succeed in Competition against a Court so dexterous in all the methods of it , and so well furnish'd with all that was necessary for making it most effectual . The Emperour's Conduct in this matter had been so unaccountable in being so unactive to prevent it , that there was no Reason to suspect his not submitting to the Partition Treaty , when he saw it could not be help'd . The King might likewise trust somewhat to the Vertues and to the Vices of the Spaniards . They have had an antipathy to the French of above 200 Years standing . The Spaniards have never before this time been guilty of betraying their Country , a Fidelitry without example has long supported a sinking Monarchy , and so it might have been still depended on , and their coming so tamely under a French Yoke , is a thing that was so little look'd for , that till all saw it , none could believe it . Upon all these Accounts it might seem reasonable enough for the King to imagin that the Treaty would have been stuck to without an Absolute Confidence in the Virtues of the most Christian King . And after all , as the K. of Spain had liv'd beyond all mens Expectations , so the King might have hop'd that he might languish out yet a few years more , and then the Revenue of the Crown of England would have been clear'd of all Anticipations , and in the mean while the French King would have been Oblig'd to keep such Measures as would have secur'd us from all attempts , and have sunk the hopes of a Treacherous Party among our selves , who had set up their Rest upon the greatness of France , and begin now to revive their dead hopes , which seemd quite wither'd by the Peace of Reswick , and by the seeming Friendship between our Court and that of Versailes . And now , if you will lay all this together , you will retract a little of the forwardness , and of the Severity of the Censures with which you may be apt to load that Treaty . Every Partition-Treaty is not to be Condemn'd . The Triple Alliance was the Glory of K. Charles's Reign , and would have been its strength , if he had stuck to it . And that was a Partition of the Spanish Nea●herlands , of which the Council of Madrid complain'd so much , that they would abandon all Flanders , rather than submit to it ; and yet they were wiser when they saw they could not help themselves . When Spain could not be defended but by our Arms , and by our Treasure , it might be both reasonable and just for us to consider what Interest we had in preserving any of their Dominions , and to take Care of those , wherein we were concern'd most nearly , and particularly , and best able to defend , but leave the rest to take their Fate . I am ,

I Am convinc'd , by your Letter , that it is not safe to rely on common Fame , or to yield too far to the impressions , which the first appearances of things , and some general prejudices are apt to make . I consider the Partition Treaty after another manner than I did . I see , the King might have too good Reasons to hearken to a Proposal of that Nature , from the French King , without the least disposition to trust him , or to enter into close Measures with him ; which in my Opinion must always prove fatal to himself , to his Kingdoms , and indeed to all the rest of Europe . But tho' you have gone a great way towards justifying the King , upon many personal accounts , for engaging in this Treaty ; I do not find , you are your self reconcil'd to it . You rather make an Excuse for the King , than a Defence of the League . Therefore , for my own Satisfaction , and that of our Friends , I must become a little further troublesome to you . I can't but think it a lessening of the King's Character , if only in order to keep himself quiet at home , and to sink the Hopes of a Treacherors Party among our selves ( as you express it , ) he could be induc'd to enter into a Treaty unjust in it self and ruinous to Christendom . It is so Represented to us . One is said to have openly call'd it a Felonious Treaty . And we are told that a great man , in another Publick Assembly , said it was ridiculous and dishonourable in the Project , and Mischievous in the Consequences . And yet after all , this Treaty was made by the King , let who will be concern'd in the Advice : And the Dutch are Parties to this Treaty , who are not us'd to be so grosly mistaken . We have been told , the King has a clear and more Universal Knowledg of the Affairs of Europe than any Man , and therbfore we are amaz'd to see him enter into an Affair so very lyable to censure . Tho you are no Friend to this Treaty , yet you hear the Talk of those who do not so much mislike it , and you will do me a very good Office , to make a report of what is said in favour of it , that I may know how they Vindicate the Kings Honour , which is very dear to me ; and may not rest under the Suspicion that the King would engage in unwise and unjustifyable Measures , upon the bare Consideration of Personal Safety and Present Quiet .

There is another very considerable thing to justify this Treaty , if it be true , ( as it has been affirm'd , ) that during the Transaction in Holland , in the Sumer 1699 , the Emperor's Minister's , tho' they declar'd they could never make themselves Parties to an Agreement for dismembring of the Spanish Monarchy , which would wholly ruine their affairs at Madrid , yet they did not express any great aversion to be seemingly forc'd to some Reasonable Terms . It has not often been known , that a deliberate Act of three Sovereign Powers , made upon very weighty Grounds , has been so frankly call'd unjust . The Emperour has not found cause to give it that hard Name . Nay , the French themselves who have violated this Treaty , in the most open and shameless Manner , and want to the highest Degree an Excuse for Breach of Faith , and had a good one , if the Treaty was unjust , yet they have never call'd it by that Name , but have contented themselves to take up the wretched Pretence , that by breaking the League , they have pursu'd the Spirit and meaning of it .

This is all I shall say to you , at present , with respect to the Justice of this Treaty , that which you desire further , is to hear how it is defended from being Impolitick to such a Degree as to be Ridiculous , as you say it has been styl'd . I have already stated to you , how the Circumstances of Affairs abroad stood , and in my Answer to your former Letter , I have observ'd to you what Disposition , as to War , had appear'd in England , and I will repeat nothing . It was evident , the French King was in a Condition to take possession of what Parts he pleas'd , of the Spanish Dominions , if not of all , without opposition : And that if some thing was hot done previously to the King of Spains Death , it would be too late then to talk of forming Alliances .

This Reasoning has been too unhappily justify'd by what we have seen since . France has taken Possession of all the Dominions of Spain , without the least Obstructions , and before any Measures could be entred upon to prevent it . The Friends to the Partition-Treaty say , the World will Judge which was the wisest Course , to provide before hand against so great an Evil , or to he put to play the difficult After-Game of recovering things out of the hands of France .

In so critical a Juncture , the King and the States-General judgd it reasonable , to hearken to the Proposal of a Negotiation , as the only means left to prevent the impending Destruction of Europe . They were not insensible , how little the French Faith was to be depended on , but they were not put in a worse Condition by the Treaty . On the contrary , if the French King should not stand to it , the English and Dutch had an indisputable Ground to resent the Perfidiousness , and would be justify'd by all Christendom , in directly joyning to assist the House of Austria . And till that Breach happen'd , the Empeaor might see how far he might depend upon their actual Assistance , and what care they had taken of the House of Austria .

To think of Treating with the French King upon such a Subject , and to yield nothing to him , was indeed Ridiculous . All then that remain'd , was to make the best Terms possible ; in the doing whereof , as the Interest of the House of Austria was to be sincerely and heartily espous'd , and a solicitous Care us'd that the Balance of Europe should not be entirely broken , so it concern'd England and Holland , who were the Parties contracting , not to neglect themselves but to make such a Distribution , as might be least prejudicial to their Interests .

The Three Things which they were principally oblig'd to take care of , was their security , their Trade , and the common interest of the Protestant Religion . In order to this , they were first to take care of the Barrier in Flanders , for making good whereof so much Money had been spent , and so much Blood had been spilt . It being demonstrably plain , that if France was possess'd of the Spanish Neitherlands , it was not possible for the Dutch to bear long the Expence of supporting themselves ; and when they fell a Prey to France , ( notwithstanding the vain discourses , we heard not long before , of what we were able to do , ) England was not likely to be free any great while .

The Second thing which concern'd both Nations highly , was the preserving the Trade of Spain , and the use of her Ports . This need not be inlarg'd upon , the present Apprehension of the Danger of losing this Advantage , has made it very sensibly understood by every body .

The Third Thing which concern'd England infinitely , and The Dutch not a little , was to keep The West-Indies , and the Trade thither , in the Condition they then stood . For it will not be deny'd , if ever France can appropriate to it self the Trade of Spain , and The Management of the Spanish West-Indies , she will soon be Mistress of the World .

These were the great Things to be first look'd after , and for these the Treaty did fully provide . It is not to be deny'd but that the Turky Trade was of great consequence to both Nations , and the Trade of Italy not inconsiderable , especially to Holland ; and it were to have been wish'd that every thing could have been entirely gain'd , but when that was impossible , the most weight was to be laid on what was of the greatest Consequence . It is said in a certain Letter , which is charg'd by some , as favouring the Partition-Treaty ; and by others as written against it , That if Sicily were in the French hands , they would be entirely Masters of the Levant Trade . They who declare themselves for that Treaty , quarrel at that Expression as too forcible . No Question , in Case of a Rupture , if the French had Sicily , they might at least for a time , give a great Interruption to the Turky Trade , but if the Ports of Spain and its Dominions were open to the Dutch and English Fleets , that Inconvenience would be in a great Measure avoided . Whereas , as the Case now stands , for want of the Effect of such a Treaty , the Spanish Ports are like to be entirely shut up ; and consequently all Trade into the Mediterranean , if ever a War should break out , must become entitely impracticable .

The Treaty of Partition , if it had been stood to , had plac'd Spain , the West-Indies , the Netherlands and Milan , in such hands , as France could expect no sincere Assistance from . What real Addition of Power Naples and Sicily would have brought to her , is not so plain , France is a compact united Strength . Whether she would have been stronger by the Possession of two remote Countries , whose Natives have the utmost hatred to the French , Experience only would have shewn . Italy would have been alarum'd to the last degree , to find the French taking Possession of so large a Part of it , which it could not be possible to prevent , considering the Power and Preparations of France . But this would not have been the first time that the French had got to be Masters of Naples and Sicily , and yet were not able to hold them . Certain it is the Court of Rome would have found it self oblig'd to set all its Engines on work to prevent the establishing of that Slavery , which was inevitably coming upon them . They would be discerning enough to see , that from the hour the French King became peaceably settled in the Possession of Naples and Sicily , the Pope must sink in his Character , and would be no more than a French Bishop . The rest of the Catholick World would hardly consider him as a Common Father , who could be made and unmade at the Pleasure of France . Without pretending to Prophecy , one may say literally , That Heaven and Earth would have been mov'd upon this Occasion : The Church would have drawn out all her Forces Spiritual and Temporal , and besides the Influence she would always have upon the Italian Princes and States , which is avowedly not little , They themselves are quick-sighted enough to see what different Figures the Princes of France make in this Age from what they made heretofore , and to learn Caution from so significant Examples . Besides , the Pope's Remonstrances would have had the more Authority as well as Vigor from the scandalous Appearance it would have had to the whole Papal World , that France in Conjunction with two Heretick Powers should dispose of the Fiefs of the Church . The Emperour would undoubtedly have been solicited by all sorts of Arguments to assist the Church , and assert the Liberty of Italy , and how far he might have been able to resist , might not be difficult to guess . All the Catholick Princes of Germany were at liberty to act as the Conjuncture invited them . The Italians would not have apprehended any thing from Spain , they would have understood easily which way the Arch-dukes Wishes would go . The Duke of Lorrain's affection to the House of Austria is so well known , that it is certain the French could have depended on nothing from Milan , in his hands . And tho' the late Chancellor in his Letter , said , that if the Treaty should take place , and Milan could not be reliev'd by Sea , it would be of little signification in the hand of any Prince : We see he was mistaken , and that very powerful Reliefs might be sent by Land to Milan , and the Emperour and Empire might always have an open way into Italy , thro' that Countrey . The King of France would have been cautious to have left his Frontier naked towards Flanders , when in Possession of a Prince of the House of Austria , or to have left the Rhine unguarded , when the Pope would be sure to have a prevailing Power with the Ecclesiastical Electors , and the other Catholick Princes of the Empire .

This would have been the highest Security to the Protestant Interest , for which certainly we were above all other things concern'd . Italy would have been the Scene of the War , where upon all Accounts we ought to wish it , and not only as being the most remote from us . The Apprehension of a Catholick League , which is no Chimaera , and which it is to be too justly fear'd may be the immediate Consequence of a settled Peace among the Popish Powers , when the Zeal of the Emperour , as well as of the French King is consider d , would have been far remov'd . In such a State of Things , we could apprehend nothing as to our Trade , not even in the Mediterranean . All Parties would have found it reasonable to be courting the Great Naval Powers of the World . We might be Neuter if we thought fit , or might have made our own Terms . We were not bound to take any other Share in the War than we pleas'd , for tho' we stood oblig d to see the Treaty executed , yet in the utmost Strictness that was all . We were not bound to maintain the respective Parties in Possession . We might have enjoy'd the Advantages of Peace , or we might have otherwise found our Advantages in return for our Assistance , in case we chose to give it to either side .

But they who have a mind to extoll the Wisdom of the King and the States , for entring into the Treaty of Partition , found themselves most on the ill Consequences which have appear'd upon the laying it aside . They pretend to think it wonderful , that Men should be quarrelling with so much heat at a Transaction , whereby such large Territories of the King of Spain's Dominions were to be deliver'd up to the French King ; and at the same time , with so much Patience and Temper see him take Possession of the WHOLE , and shew so little Concern to redeem that Time which was lost , by their late Coming Together . They say it will cost many Lives and much Treasure , before Europe can see Things upon so good a Foot , as that Treaty put them .