A
LETTER
TO
THE
Paris
Gazetteer
Upon
the
Taking
of
NAMUR
.
SIR
,
YOU
will
undoubtedly
stand
in
need
of
all
your
Wit
,
to
put
a
handsom
gloss
in
your
Gazettes
upon
the
Taking
of
Namur
.
It
is
attended
with
so
many
mortifying
Circumstances
for
your
Court
,
which
not
only
your
Enemies
and
your
Allies
,
but
your
own
People
are
perfectly
well
acquainted
with
,
that
notwithstanding
all
your
Skill
in
disguising
the
truth
,
and
the
long
Experience
you
have
added
to
your
natural
Tallents
to
make
your self
Master
of
that
Art
,
it
will
prove
a
hard
Task
for
you
to
impose
upon
the
World
on
that
Subject
.
Though
your
Nation
is
fam'd
for
making
a
great
deal
of
noise
for
a
very
small
matter
,
and
for
exalting
its
least
Advantages
up
to
the
Skies
,
I
believe
I
may
be
allow'd
to
say
,
that
no
Frenchman
ever
strain'd
that
Character
to
such
a
height
as
you
have
done
.
With
what
Emphasis
did
not
you
cry
up
the
Glory
of
having
made
new
Lines
in
Flanders
,
to
cover
those
places
of
yours
which
were
most
expos'd
.
That
Evidence
of
your
Weakness
and
Fear
has
receiv'd
the
same
Eulogies
from
your
Pen
,
as
you
had
given
before
to
your
greatest
Conquests
;
and
as
if
the
Ministers
of
your
Crown
were
proud
of
being
the
Eccho's
of
a
poor
Gazetteer
:
they
talk'd
of
those
Lines
in
the
Northern
Courts
,
as
of
an
inpenetrable
Bulwork
,
which
would
secure
France
against
all
the
Endeavours
of
her
Enemies
.
The
Confederates
,
said
those
Gentlemen
,
will
be
convinc'd
at
last
,
that
they
can
expect
nothing
from
the
continuation
of
the
War
but
the
ruin
of
their
People
,
and
the
exhausting
of
their
Treasures
:
They
will
find
the
utmost
Efforts
of
their
Arms
useless
in
the
Low-Countries
,
where
they
have
their
most
formidable
Armies
and
where
they
are
Commanded
by
a
Prince
who
is
the
Head
and
Soul
of
their
League
.
These
Discourses
season'd
with
some
forc'd
Reflections
upon
the
immense
Sums
which
the
Poll-Tax
was
to
have
produced
,
together
with
the
fair
Appearances
they
had
in
France
of
a
fertile
Year
,
were
the
perpetual
common
places
of
the
conversation
of
those
great
Ministers
,
who
seem'd
to
have
no
Instructions
,
but
your
Gazettes
.
Confess
,
Sir
,
that
at
that
time
you
were
very
far
from
believing
that
the
Confederates
were
in
a
Condition
,
to
perform
so
great
an
Enterprize
as
that
of
the
Siege
of
Namur
successfully
,
and
that
it
was
not
without
the
utmost
astonishment
,
your
Court
receiv'd
the
News
of
our
having
a
design
upon
that
place
.
It
is
true
that
your
surprise
soon
gave
way
to
the
flattering
hopes
of
seeing
that
great
design
miscary
,
upon
the
account
of
the
great
obstacles
which
could
not
fail
of
rendring
the
Execution
of
it
difficult
,
and
by
reason
of
the
potent
Diversion
which
you
did
propose
to
make
in
Flanders
.
The
Prince
of
Orange
,
said
your
Emissaries
in
all
parts
,
performs
an
Act
of
Despair
,
this
project
of
his
savours
of
something
beyond
Rashness
,
and
his
Allies
will
soon
discover
the
Vanity
of
the
hopes
he
endeavours
to
feed
them
with
.
Without
doubt
you
did
not
consider
that
in
daily
representing
the
vast
difficulties
of
the
enterprise
,
you
heighten'd
the
Glory
of
the
Success
;
but
besides
your
being
persuaded
that
the
Confederates
would
miscarry
in
it
,
you
could
not
have
the
confidence
to
talk
of
the
Seige
of
Kamur
,
as
of
a
design
of
small
Importance
,
after
having
made
so
great
a
Noise
throughout
all
Europe
of
the
taking
of
that
Place
,
when
you
took
it
from
the
Spaniards
.
It
is
sufficiently
known
,
that
of
all
his
Conquests
your
King
valued
himself
most
upon
that
.
Of
all
the
Sieges
he
has
made
in
Person
,
none
ever
cost
him
so
much
time
,
nor
has
any
acquir'd
so
much
Reputation
to
his
Arms.
And
yet
you
must
needs
grant
that
he
had
not
the
third
part
of
those
Obstacles
to
overcome
,
which
our
great
Prince
has
now
Triumph'd
over
.
Your
Frontiers
were
defended
by
such
strong
Places
,
and
those
so
well
provided
every
way
,
that
you
had
certainly
no
manner
of
Diversions
to
fear
when
you
besieg'd
Namur
.
Your
Army
of
opposition
was
superiour
to
that
with
which
we
might
have
endeavoured
the
relief
of
it
.
It
was
not
oblig'd
to
keep
at
a
distance
from
that
which
was
employed
at
the
siege
,
since
your
Country
was
secure
,
and
thus
your
two
Armies
made
but
one
,
and
were
at
liberty
to
assist
each
other
mutually
at
all
times
.
Add
to
this
the
advantage
of
the
Posts
,
in
which
you
could
not
be
attacked
without
rashness
,
the
weakness
of
the
Garrisons
,
the
ill
condition
of
the
place
,
which
was
commanded
on
the
side
of
St.
Nicholas
,
where
you
have
made
new
Fortifications
since
,
and
the
little
care
that
was
taken
of
transporting
into
the
Castle
the
Beer
,
Brandy
,
and
the
other
Provisions
which
are
necessary
to
animate
a
Souldier
to
make
a
vigorous
Resistance
.
We
have
found
all
things
in
a
very
different
Condition
from
this
.
You
are
sensible
that
80
Battallions
are
hardly
sufficient
to
guard
the
line
of
Circumvallation
of
the
Town
and
Castle
of
Namur
,
since
it
requires
3
separate
Camps
,
and
contains
5
Leagues
Circumferrence
.
Therefore
the
King
of
England
being
necessitated
to
employ
such
a
vast
body
of
Foot
,
could
leave
no
Army
in
Flanders
,
but
such
a
one
as
was
very
inferior
to
the
Mareschal
de
Villercy's
.
The
distance
from
those
two
Armys
did
not
permit
that
which
was
before
Namur
,
to
send
any
succors
to
the
other
.
Nevertheless
that
Army
was
obliged
to
cover
large
Towns
which
were
either
quite
open
,
or
ill
Fortify'd
.
This
was
undoubtedly
sufficient
to
slatter
your
Court
with
the
hopes
of
a
considerable
Diversion
,
and
even
with
the
gain
of
a
decisive
Battle
.
The
News
which
was
brought
to
Versailles
,
that
Prince
Vaudemont
tarry'd
for
the
Mareschal
de
Villeroy
in
the
Camp
of
Wouterghem
,
prepared
every
body
to
receive
an
account
of
his
defeat
:
They
argued
before
hand
upon
the
advantagious
Consequences
of
a
Victory
which
they
look'd
upon
as
certain
,
and
it
was
not
without
the
utmost
Indignation
against
the
Mareschal
de
Villeroy
the
Court
was
inform'd
,
that
in
his
presence
,
and
when
he
look'd
upon
his
game
as
certain
,
Prince
Vaudemont
had
made
a
retreat
towards
Ghent
,
worthy
of
the
Admiration
of
the
most
Experienc'd
Generals
.
It
is
most
vertain
that
had
this
Prince
hasten'd
his
retreat
towards
Ghent
but
one
day
before
,
the
Mareschal
de
Villeroy
losing
the
hopes
of
fighting
him
,
might
have
fallen
upon
Bruges
or
Newport
;
but
Prince
Vaudemont
making
a
feint
to
come
to
Action
,
filled
his
Enemies
head
so
full
with
thecare
of
a
Battle
which
seem'd
to
be
at
hand
,
that
after
his
Glorious
Retreat
in
view
of
your
Forces
,
he
had
time
enough
to
provide
for
the
safety
of
the
Places
which
were
threaten'd
,
and
to
cover
them
by
a
Detachment
which
the
Mareschal
de
Villeroy
was
very
much
surprised
to
find
when
he
drew
near
those
Places
.
This
second
disgrace
oblig'd
him
to
rest
satisfied
with
the
taking
of
Dixmuyde
and
D●ynse
,
Towns
which
he
has
not
been
able
to
keep
,
and
of
which
he
caused
the
Fortifications
immediately
to
be
destroy'd
;
besides
that
those
Garrisons
surrendring
themselves
Prisoners
of
War
,
without
any
Defence
,
that
Conquest
has
acquired
no
Honour
to
your
Arms
,
and
has
only
served
to
discover
your
Breach
of
Faith
,
which
you
have
given
fresh
proofs
of
in
forcing
our
Men
to
list
themselves
,
and
in
refusing
to
send
them
back
again
to
us
,
by
a
manifest
infraction
of
the
Cartel
.
If
a
Prince
de
Vaudemont
were
necessary
to
defend
Flanders
,
we
may
well
be
allowed
to
say
that
none
less
than
a
Prince
so
Powerful
,
so
resolute
,
and
so
Brave
as
His
Majesty
of
Great
Britain
,
was
necessary
to
overcome
all
the
Obstacles
which
seem'd
to
render
the
taking
of
Namur
impossible
.
Namur
was
no
longer
a
Town
lyable
to
be
taken
in
Five
or
Six
days
time
by
its
weak
side
.
The
Eminence
which
did
command
that
Place
,
was
secured
and
covered
by
your
New
Fortifications
.
There
were
four
Redoubts
well
lin'd
,
in
which
you
had
Guns
,
which
were
so
closely
covered
by
the
Top
of
the
Rock
,
that
they
were
hardly
visible
but
from
the
Town
.
Each
of
these
Redoubts
had
a
strong
Counterscarp
,
and
were
altogether
covered
by
a
double
Envelope
of
well
Pallissado'd
Retrenchments
.
It
was
absolutely
necessary
to
force
your
Men
out
of
those
Retrenchments
in
order
to
draw
near
to
the
Town
,
where
you
had
not
forgot
to
make
new
Works
also
;
insomuch
that
before
our
Forces
could
come
to
the
Bastion
of
St.
Nicholas
,
and
to
the
Demy
Bastion
of
St.
Roch
,
they
met
with
two
Counterscarps
fi'lld
with
little
Trenches
,
a
Countre-guard
well
lin'd
,
an
Earthen
Ravelin
,
and
a
Dam
which
kept
the
water
within
the
Ditch
;
all
these
works
cover'd
the
new
Wall
of
the
Town
,
after
which
one
met
the
old
Wall
,
which
was
divided
from
the
new
one
by
a
very
broad
and
very
deep
Ditch
.
If
this
was
the
weak
side
of
the
Town
,
what
may
we
not
judge
of
the
rest
,
especially
of
the
Fortifications
of
the
Castle
?
Besides
,
the
Old
Tower
,
it
s
two
Walls
and
the
Fort
of
Terra
Nova
which
were
very
well
repair'd
,
they
had
enlarged
and
perfected
the
Fort
of
Coehorn
,
within
which
they
had
made
several
Traverses
,
and
in
order
to
cover
the
place
through
which
you
had
formerly
taken
that
Fort
,
and
at
the
same
time
to
secure
its
Communication
with
that
of
Terra
Nova
,
they
had
built
between
the
two
extremitys
of
those
Works
a
great
Redoubt
lin'd
and
Casemated
.
Besides
all
this
they
had
improved
the
Casotte
very
much
.
All
these
Forts
had
good
Cavities
,
they
were
defended
by
a
double
Counterscarp
well
Pallissado'd
,
and
they
had
Communications
from
one
to
another
,
with
good
cover'd
Ways
.
In
fine
,
beyond
all
these
Works
,
one
met
with
a
large
Ditch
designed
to
cover
them
,
which
was
cut
into
the
Rock
with
prodigeous
Labour
and
Expence
,
and
which
extended
almost
from
the
Meuse
to
the
Sambre
.
I
own
,
Sir
,
that
all
those
different
Posts
requir'd
abundance
of
Men
to
guard
them
;
and
you
cannot
deny
but
that
you
had
a
whole
Army
in
Namur
;
insomuch
that
besides
all
the
Works
I
have
mention'd
,
you
posted
your selves
in
the
Subburb
of
Jambe
,
the
House
of
the
Ballance
,
and
the
Abby
of
Salsines
.
That
was
easy
for
you
to
do
,
since
that
according
to
the
Calculation
of
your
Gazett
of
the
9th
.
of
July
(
which
contrary
to
your
usual
Custom
is
very
true
in
that
particular
)
your
Garrison
consisted
of
8
Regiments
of
Dragoons
and
21
Battallions
,
including
the
free
Companys
.
You
had
also
abundance
of
Gunners
and
Miners
,
16
chosen
Ingeneers
,
and
at
their
head
,
Monsieur
Megrini
second
Engeneer
of
France
.
Add
to
all
this
a
great
number
of
Officers
of
Note
,
several
Volunteers
who
sought
occasions
to
Signalize
themselves
,
a
brave
and
Vigilent
Governor
,
belov'd
by
his
Garrison
,
and
esteem'd
by
his
Enemies
,
lastly
a
Mareschal
of
France
,
whom
you
look
upon
as
one
of
the
greatest
Captains
of
the
Age
.
This
numerous
Garrison
neither
wanted
Money
nor
Provisions
,
nor
Warlike
Ammunitions
.
There
were
upwards
of
a
hundred
Guns
in
the
Town
and
Castle
,
several
Mortars
,
13
Hundred
Thousands
of
Powder
,
10000
Muskets
of
change
,
Bombs
,
Granado's
and
Bullets
without
Number
;
in
a
word
,
you
had
all
manner
of
Provisions
for
upwards
of
six
Months
.
What
a
prodigious
Army
was
required
to
form
so
many
Sieges
as
were
included
in
the
bare
Siege
of
Namur
?
How
many
Mortars
and
Bombs
were
necessary
to
be
sent
for
?
How
many
Pioneers
were
requir'd
?
Indeed
,
Sir
,
if
all
these
considerations
join'd
to
the
great
Forces
,
the
Mareschal
de
Villeroy
had
with
him
do
not
prevail
with
you
to
confess
that
the
second
Siege
of
Namur
is
quite
different
from
the
first
;
I
own
that
I
have
nothing
more
to
say
to
you
,
and
that
I
despair
of
proving
to
you
that
the
Sun
shines
at
Noon
day
.
I
do
not
wonder
considering
all
these
circumstances
,
that
Mareschal
de
Boufflers
should
look
upon
His
Majesty's
Enterprize
,
as
a
piece
of
Rashness
.
The
whole
Garrison
had
the
same
Opinion
,
untill
the
attack
of
Coquelet
,
in
which
a
double
Retrenchment
well
Pallissado'd
and
Defended
by
5000
of
your
best
Men
,
who
could
every
Moment
receive
fresh
Succors
from
the
City
,
were
not
capable
to
stop
the
Eagerness
of
our
Infantry
.
The
resistence
of
your
Men
,
the
mines
and
Fougaes
which
they
sprung
only
serv'd
to
animate
ours
the
more
,
who
remain'd
masters
of
the
Retrenchments
,
and
pursued
those
who
guarded
them
to
the
very
Counterscarp
of
the
City
.
After
that
attack
,
all
those
we
made
,
had
such
good
success
,
that
we
had
reason
to
question
whither
the
Consternation
of
your
Forces
had
not
almost
as
great
a
share
in
it
,
as
the
Bravery
of
ours
.
The
besieged
made
neither
Sallies
nor
any
other
Vigorous
Actions
.
We
took
with
little
loss
both
the
first
and
second
Counterscarp
,
the
Counter-guard
,
and
the
Dam
.
We
made
our selves
masters
of
the
Abby
of
Salsines
,
and
of
the
House
of
the
Ballances
,
which
were
Posts
of
great
consequence
for
the
attack
of
the
Castle
,
in
which
we
met
but
with
very
little
Resistance
.
In
short
,
we
drove
the
French
out
of
the
great
Retrenchment
cut
into
of
the
Rock
,
without
losing
any
Men
in
that
Action
except
a
few
of
those
who
were
a
little
too
eager
in
the
pursuit
of
them
.
So
many
successes
astonished
the
besieged
,
and
oblg'd
them
to
surrender
the
Town
before
we
had
made
our selves
masters
of
the
Ravelin
,
or
of
any
of
the
Bastions
of
the
first
Wall
.
This
event
enabled
his
Majesty
to
send
a
considerable
Reinforcement
to
the
Prince
de
Vaudemont
.
But
as
I
have
more
sincerity
than
you
,
I
will
own
that
that
Reinforcement
could
not
come
soon
enough
to
prevent
the
Bombardment
of
Brussells
.
The
Mareschal
de
Villeroy
had
already
made
himself
master
of
Posts
in
order
to
the
Execution
of
that
Enterprize
,
out
of
which
it
was
impossible
to
force
him
.
I
will
examine
in
another
Letter
,
whether
France
has
acquir'd
much
Honour
and
Advantage
by
that
Expedition
.
Permit
me
,
Sir
,
at
present
to
return
before
the
Castle
of
Namur
,
which
Mareschal
de
Boufflers
seconded
by
Monsieur
de
Megrini
did
propose
to
defend
much
longer
than
he
had
done
the
Town
,
expecting
no
less
than
to
force
us
to
raise
the
Siege
.
He
did
ground
those
hopes
chiefly
on
the
positive
assurances
your
Court
gave
him
of
a
speedy
Relief
.
And
indeed
that
design
was
become
publick
.
They
talked
of
the
succors
of
Namur
at
Versailles
,
as
of
an
infallible
thing
:
and
the
people
reckon'd
already
that
this
new
success
of
their
King's
Arms
would
oblige
the
Confederates
to
sue
to
him
for
a
Peace
.
All
things
were
in
motion
in
the
Kingdom
for
the
Execution
of
that
great
Project
.
A
Detachment
form
the
Army
of
Germany
,
the
Forces
of
the
Coasts
,
the
Guards
and
Mousqueteers
which
had
been
kept
for
the
Guard
of
the
King's
Person
,
the
Arriere
Ban
,
the
Militia
,
all
in
a
word
,
even
the
very
Guards
established
for
the
Subsides
of
the
Salt
marched
to
the
same
Rendezvouse
.
The
Mareschal
de
Villerey
proud
of
those
Reinforcements
,
advances
towards
Gemblours
,
with
a
train
of
Artillery
consisting
of
a
hundred
pieces
of
Cannon
.
't
is
given
out
that
he
has
positive
orders
to
fight
the
Confederates
whatever
Post
he
finds
them
in
.
The
French
talk
with
all
the
confidence
imaginable
,
of
the
success
of
the
Battle
he
is
going
to
Fight
.
They
give
out
every
where
,
that
he
is
going
to
relieve
Namur
at
the
head
of
a
100
Thousand
Men
.
The
Prayers
of
fourty
Hours
are
order'd
more
for
form-sake
,
than
out
of
any
doubt
of
the
Event
.
They
study
before
hand
what
siege
they
shall
form
,
after
having
raised
that
of
Namur
.
In
a
word
,
the
two
Armys
are
in
sight
of
each
other
,
and
the
great
Day
appears
on
which
the
Fate
of
Europe
is
to
be
decided
.
How
many
Fathers
are
going
to
Weep
for
the
loss
of
their
Children
,
and
Wives
for
their
Husbands
?
But
let
them
lay
aside
their
Fears
,
and
let
the
Prudence
of
Mareschal
de
Villeroy
secure
them
.
If
he
be
within
sight
of
our
Army
,
he
is
the
better
able
to
judge
the
Imposibility
of
attacking
it
.
He
discovers
the
wise
precautions
our
Great
King
has
taken
to
fortify
the
Avenues
of
his
Camp
;
and
whilst
he
hears
160
pieces
of
Ordinance
,
and
40
Mortars
thunder
against
the
Castle
of
Namur
,
he
without
Intermission
sees
that
our
Army
of
Opposition
has
above
a
100
Guns
in
Battery
to
receive
him
,
and
that
being
almost
equal
to
his
in
Number
of
Men
,
it
must
be
consider'd
as
superior
to
it
by
the
Advantage
of
the
Post
.
It
is
not
therefore
to
be
wondered
at
that
he
should
retire
without
Fighting
at
the
sight
of
so
many
difficulties
.
Neither
is
he
justly
to
be
blam'd
for
his
Retreat
;
but
the
Noise
which
your
Court
has
so
unseasonably
made
of
the
great
design
which
they
had
projected
is
to
be
condemn'd
.
What
will
all
Europe
say
which
expected
the
even
:
of
that
Important
Grisis
?
What
will
the
Northern
Crowns
think
who
had
been
prepar'd
for
a
very
different
success
by
your
Ministers
?
What
will
your
People
say
in
the
just
dread
of
seeing
a
Continuation
of
the
War
by
the
Repugnancy
which
your
Court
will
doubtless
have
to
consent
to
the
new
pretentions
which
the
Conquest
of
Namur
does
authorise
us
to
form
?
What
will
even
your
Court
say
to
excuse
the
Confidence
where
with
they
have
spoken
of
the
relief
of
that
place
?
Were
they
ignorant
of
the
force
of
the
Posts
were
they
pretended
their
Army
was
to
force
us
?
Were
they
no
informed
of
the
precautions
we
might
take
to
preserve
them
?
Had
they
a
false
Idea
of
our
Forces
?
I
own
,
that
if
they
have
really
thought
them
to
be
as
considerably
lessen'd
as
your
Gazettes
have
published
it
,
they
had
reason
to
believe
that
we
were
no
longer
in
a
Condition
to
make
head
against
the
Mareschal
de
Villeroy
.
In
Truth
,
Sir
,
this
is
a
dismal
passage
for
you
;
those
who
will
give
themselves
the
trouble
to
calculate
to
what
the
loss
amounts
,
which
you
pretend
we
have
sustained
before
the
Town
or
Castle
of
Namur
,
will
find
that
it
amounts
to
upwards
of
40000
Men
killed
or
Wounded
.
I
could
easily
prove
it
to
you
by
a
faithful
extract
of
each
of
your
Gazetts
of
the
Months
of
July
,
August
and
September
,
but
that
would
be
a
useless
trouble
since
they
are
in
the
hands
of
every
Body
.
Moreover
it
is
certain
that
our
Army
of
opposition
,
and
that
which
was
employed
at
the
Siege
,
did
not
consist
of
more
than
one
Hundred
Thousand
effective
Men
,
even
after
the
arrival
of
the
Detachment
from
Germany
.
This
is
also
a
fact
,
the
g
]
DESC
=
"
missing
"
extend
=
"
1
span
"
truth
of
which
is
to
be
found
in
your
Gazetts
,
when
you
make
the
Calculation
of
our
Battallions
and
of
our
Squadrons
.
Of
these
100000
there
were
but
70000
Foot
,
out
of
which
we
must
bate
near
30000
which
the
Siege
had
already
cost
us
according
to
your
Reckoning
,
when
the
Mareschal
de
Villeroy
drew
near
to
fight
us
.
His
march
towards
the
Mehaign
,
did
not
make
us
discontinue
the
Siege
,
to
the
carrying
on
of
which
,
about
20000
Foot
remained
constantly
imployed
;
insomuch
that
on
the
30th
.
of
August
we
gave
a
general
Assault
to
the
Works
of
the
Castle
with
15000
men
,
as
you
relate
it
in
your
Gazette
of
the
10th
.
of
September
,
so
that
our
Army
,
besides
the
Cavalry
which
was
of
no
use
for
the
defence
of
our
Retrenchments
,
could
not
according
to
your
Calculation
exceed
the
number
of
20000
Foot
.
Give
me
leave
to
tell
you
,
Sir
,
that
you
have
but
little
regard
to
the
Mareschal
de
Villeroy's
Reputation
.
What
?
with
120
Battallions
gathered
from
the
four
corners
of
the
Kingdom
,
he
contents
himself
with
barely
viewing
lines
made
in
hast
,
and
only
defended
by
20000
Men
,
whom
he
has
a
positive
order
to
attack
?
He
suffers
a
Place
to
be
taken
before
his
Face
of
such
Importance
to
his
King
,
the
Garrison
of
which
deserves
so
well
to
be
succored
by
the
Noble
Defence
you
say
they
have
made
?
But
that
is
not
all
yet
.
You
add
in
the
same
Gazett
of
the
10th
.
of
September
,
that
the
15000
Men
which
had
given
the
Assault
on
the
30th
.
of
August
,
being
repulsed
with
the
loss
of
near
6000
,
we
made
a
second
Assault
on
the
1st
.
of
September
with
20000
Men
.
Without
doubt
,
Sir
,
those
that
were
remaining
of
the
15000
men
which
made
the
attack
on
the
30th
.
of
August
,
were
too
much
disheartened
,
and
too
much
fatigu'd
to
make
a
new
Assault
two
days
after
it
.
Therefore
the
20000
Men
which
were
imploy'd
on
that
new
attack
,
must
of
necessity
be
taken
out
of
our
Army
of
Opposition
,
at
least
the
major
part
of
them
.
And
thus
this
Army
is
reduc'd
to
nothing
,
and
I
defy
you
,
according
to
your
Calculation
,
to
find
6000
Foot
remaining
there
.
Nevertheless
the
Mareschal
de
Villeroy
is
present
with
100000
men
without
endeavouring
to
improve
so
favourable
an
Occasion
,
and
though
as
you
say
,
we
have
9000
men
killed
and
wounded
in
this
2d
.
Assault
,
and
are
repulsed
every
where
,
Monsieur
de
Boufflers
desires
to
capitulate
that
very
day
,
and
Monsieur
de
Villeroy
retires
the
very
next
towards
Mons
with
the
utmost
Speed
.
Do
not
you
fancy
,
Sir
,
in
reading
this
,
that
Miracles
are
not
ceased
,
and
that
all
this
has
been
done
by
Inchantment
?
Therefore
it
follows
of
necessity
,
either
that
the
Mareschal
de
Villeroy
is
the
most
unworthy
General
that
ever
was
,
or
that
you
are
a
great
Romancer
without
Truth
or
Judgment
.
I
am
very
apt
to
believe
,
Sir
,
the
storm
will
fall
upon
your
own
head
.
The
Capitulation
of
Namur
is
a
sad
Commentary
for
your
Gazetts
,
and
I
am
of
Opinion
that
many
men
will
curse
you
for
the
disappointment
of
the
hopes
they
had
built
upon
your
false
Relations
.
As
for
the
Mareschal
de
Villeroy
,
it
will
be
easy
for
him
to
justifie
himself
,
and
to
prove
that
while
we
gave
a
general
Assault
to
the
Castle
with
10000
men
(
and
not
with
15000
as
you
relate
it
)
we
had
95
good
Battallions
and
upwards
of
200
Squadrons
behind
the
Lines
which
he
was
ordered
to
force
,
he
will
prove
that
he
could
not
give
a
Battle
without
exposing
his
Army
to
an
absolute
Defeat
,
and
that
he
was
in
the
right
not
to
hazard
the
success
of
so
rash
an
Enterprise
.
But
that
which
in
my
Opinion
,
Sir
,
is
of
most
dangerous
consequence
for
you
,
is
,
That
some
Fool
or
other
may
chance
to
have
a
Crotchet
to
make
a
Description
of
the
Siege
of
Namur
,
exactly
according
to
the
relation
of
your
Gazetts
.
That
would
certainly
afford
a
large
field
to
turn
you
into
redicule
;
for
instance
,
it
would
be
easily
prov'd
,
that
in
the
Assault
of
the
30th
.
of
August
,
our
Forces
were
not
repulsed
every
where
since
they
took
the
Counterscarp
of
the
Castle
,
and
that
of
the
Cochorn
Fort
,
and
that
they
lodged
themselves
at
the
foot
of
the
Breach
of
that
last
Work
,
which
oblig'd
the
besreged
to
Capitulate
within
two
days
after
it
.
It
would
be
easy
to
convince
you
that
you
must
bate
upwards
of
4000
of
the
6000
men
which
you
pretend
we
lost
on
that
occasion
.
Monsieur
de
Boufflers
himself
could
witness
that
there
was
no
attack
at
all
the
1st
.
of
September
,
and
that
nothing
happen'd
considerable
that
Day
,
but
his
desire
to
Capitulate
.
And
therefore
,
that
the
second
Assault
which
you
mention
,
made
by
20000
Men
,
which
cost
us
9000
Men
and
you
3000
,
and
in
which
the
slaughter
was
so
great
,
that
there
has
been
none
like
it
,
as
you
say
,
in
Europe
for
upwards
of
an
Age
;
is
nothing
but
a
fiction
of
your
Brain
,
and
so
poorly
invented
,
that
no
Man
of
common
Sence
could
ever
be
persuaded
that
our
Army
of
Opposition
should
have
weakened
it self
by
so
considerable
a
Detachment
,
at
a
time
when
they
were
still
Lyable
to
be
attacked
by
yours
.
We
could
make
you
sensible
how
ridiculous
it
is
to
say
that
the
besieged
had
the
Advantage
of
the
Sally
they
made
the
Night
between
the
19th
.
and
20th
.
of
August
,
in
which
you
maintain
that
they
ruin'd
divers
Works
towards
the
end
of
the
Trenches
,
and
that
they
routed
those
who
did
defend
them
,
whereas
they
were
repulsed
themselves
,
and
pursued
as
far
as
the
Counterscarp
of
Coehorn
Fort
,
where
they
retired
in
disorder
,
not
having
been
able
to
sustain
the
Vigour
wherewith
they
were
charged
by
the
Spanish
Dragoons
,
whose
Bravery
our
Chiefs
did
Reward
,
by
giving
each
Dragoon
two
Pistols
,
and
advancing
the
Officers
who
did
command
them
,
which
is
a
convincing
proof
that
we
had
reason
to
be
pleased
with
the
success
of
that
Action
.
Neither
can
I
omit
to
observe
that
the
other
Sallys
which
you
make
so
much
noise
about
,
have
never
exceeded
30
or
40
Men
,
who
after
having
made
a
Discharge
at
a
great
distance
towards
the
place
where
they
heard
our
men
at
Work
,
retir'd
immediately
into
their
Forts
.
It
would
be
easy
to
demonstrate
to
you
that
the
attack
of
the
Retrenchments
of
the
Castle
in
which
you
make
us
lose
several
Thousand
Men
,
did
not
cost
us
above
200
,
who
in
the
heat
of
the
pursuit
advanced
as
far
as
the
Counterscarp
of
your
Works
.
But
what
might
not
one
say
about
the
Assault
which
was
made
,
as
you
say
,
on
the
25th
.
of
August
by
12000
Men
,
who
having
attacked
the
Cazotte
and
the
Coehorn
Fort
were
repulsed
three
several
times
,
and
of
which
4
or
5000
were
killed
wounded
or
taken
?
With
what
confusion
would
you
be
forced
to
own
that
the
said
attack
was
wholly
of
your
own
invention
,
and
that
it
must
be
reduced
to
the
taking
of
a
small
Redout
,
in
which
we
took
a
Lieutenant
and
16
Soldiers
,
without
losing
above
three
of
ours
.
That
which
is
most
Blame-worthy
in
your
Behaviour
,
is
that
you
never
disabuse
the
Reader
in
your
Gazetts
of
the
falsities
you
have
imposed
upon
him
in
the
preceeding
,
and
that
on
the
contrary
you
continue
to
suppose
that
they
are
all
Truths
which
are
not
in
the
least
to
be
questioned
.
In
looking
back
on
the
Siege
of
the
Town
we
should
find
several
other
Examples
like
these
of
Impudence
and
Disingenuity
.
You
suppose
an
imaginary
attack
on
the
Eminence
of
Bouge
the
Night
between
the
12th
.
and
13th
.
of
July
.
We
lost
500
Men
there
at
the
first
on-set
,
according
to
your
Calculation
,
and
being
,
as
you
say
,
returned
to
the
Attack
with
six
Battallions
,
the
besieged
abandoned
that
Post
;
but
having
soon
after
it
put
fire
to
the
Bombs
and
Granado's
which
they
had
buryed
there
,
and
falling
upon
the
Confederates
with
Sword
in
Hand
,
they
beat
them
out
of
it
,
and
killed
upwards
of
900
Men
,
and
did
not
lose
above
4
or
5
Soldiers
themselves
.
In
Truth
,
when
Men
of
Sence
read
things
like
these
,
they
are
at
a
loss
to
think
which
is
the
most
surprising
,
to
find
that
there
are
Writers
who
have
Impudence
enough
to
tell
them
,
or
to
see
that
there
are
Readers
so
credulous
as
to
believe
them
.
For
every
one
knows
that
there
was
no
Attack
the
Night
between
the
12th
.
and
13th
.
of
July
,
and
that
the
first
of
all
was
that
of
the
18th
.
which
you
have
not
had
much
reason
to
boast
of
;
since
your
men
were
driven
out
of
the
Retrenchments
they
had
on
the
Eminence
of
Bouge
,
and
that
ours
lodged
themselves
there
.
It
is
most
certain
that
this
Vigorous
Action
did
not
cost
us
1500
men
,
and
that
your
Garrison
lost
upwards
of
2000
there
.
Nevertheless
allowing
your
disingenous
way
of
relating
that
Action
,
according
to
your
wonted
custom
,
it
is
amazing
to
think
,
that
an
Army
so
considerably
weakn'd
as
you
suppose
ours
to
have
been
in
that
Action
,
should
have
been
capable
to
continue
the
Siege
,
and
to
make
so
many
other
Attacks
,
and
so
much
the
more
seeing
that
in
the
Sally
which
the
besieged
made
that
day
upon
the
Trenches
of
the
Brandenburghers
,
you
make
us
lose
1200
Men
.
It
is
true
that
they
must
be
reduced
to
less
than
200
,
and
that
those
who
made
the
Sally
did
not
lose
much
less
in
making
their
Retreat
,
but
that
is
a
Circumstance
you
have
thought
fit
to
suppress
.
You
talk
just
in
the
same
manner
of
the
Attacks
that
followed
,
for
you
tell
us
that
the
Attack
of
the
first
Counterscarp
cost
us
4000
men
,
and
that
of
the
second
near
5000
,
tho'
the
truth
is
that
we
did
not
lose
900
in
both
Actions
.
Moreover
it
is
observable
,
that
in
all
those
different
occasions
,
the
besieged
according
to
your
Relations
,
never
lost
but
a
very
inconsiderable
number
of
Officers
and
Soldiers
,
for
I
do
not
reckon
3000
men
you
pretend
to
have
lost
in
the
general
Assault
of
the
1st
.
of
September
,
since
I
have
already
proved
that
it
never
had
a
being
but
in
your
Imagination
.
Nevertheless
,
after
a
Siege
of
two
Months
,
that
Garrison
which
at
first
consisted
of
14
or
15000
men
,
and
has
suffered
so
little
in
all
the
Attacks
,
is
according
to
your
Gazett
of
the
10th
.
of
September
reduced
to
5003
Soldiers
,
of
which
there
are
but
2300
in
a
condition
to
Fight
,
while
those
poor
Confederates
of
whom
you
barbarously
kill
and
wound
upwards
of
40000
foot
,
are
yet
strong
enough
to
take
Namur
within
sight
of
an
Army
of
100000
men
,
who
dares
not
attack
them
.
I
will
not
insist
in
this
place
to
prove
that
the
loss
of
the
besieged
has
been
far
greater
than
that
of
the
Besiegers
,
tho
I
could
easily
convince
you
of
it
,
desiring
you
only
to
reflect
on
the
great
Fire
of
our
Cannons
and
of
our
Bombs
,
and
upon
the
good
success
of
our
Attacks
;
neither
will
I
reflect
on
the
extraordinary
praises
you
bestow
on
the
Garrison
,
saying
,
that
they
have
made
the
most
glorious
defence
that
ever
was
heard
of
.
Others
will
put
you
in
mind
that
we
only
began
to
batter
the
Castle
in
order
to
make
a
breach
on
the
17th
.
of
August
,
and
that
they
desired
to
capitulate
on
the
1st
.
of
September
.
tho
we
had
not
as
yet
taken
any
of
their
Works
,
but
only
the
Counterscarp
of
2
Forts
.
For
my
part
,
Sir
,
I
am
willing
to
grant
,
you
,
that
the
besieged
have
done
as
much
as
it
was
natural
to
believe
they
would
do
;
they
did
Capitulate
at
a
time
when
they
had
lost
all
hopes
of
relief
,
at
a
time
when
the
Breaches
were
so
large
,
and
the
small
remainder
of
the
Garrison
so
tyred
and
so
dishearten'd
,
that
unless
they
would
have
run
the
hazard
of
being
taken
by
Storm
,
they
could
not
have
sustain'd
a
second
Attack
.
Moreover
,
I
will
grant
you
,
if
you
will
have
it
so
,
that
they
have
defended
themselves
like
Hero's
,
since
that
will
place
the
Princes
who
have
Triumph'd
over
their
Resistance
above
the
degree
of
Hero's
.
What
may
be
said
without
flattering
any
Body
is
,
that
it
is
no
small
mortification
for
your
Court
to
be
convinced
by
the
loss
of
Namur
,
that
the
Confederates
can
take
Towns
as
well
as
the
French
.
The
World
has
beheld
a
Train
of
Artillery
at
this
Siege
far
superior
to
any
your
King
has
ever
been
able
to
assemble
at
any
of
the
Sieges
he
has
made
;
Ingeneers
who
have
immediately
found
the
weak
side
of
the
place
;
and
what
seems
almost
incredible
,
a
Castle
taken
in
Ten
Days
time
,
which
your
Garrison
had
boasted
they
would
defend
three
Months
.
It
has
beheld
our
Infantry
,
performing
all
maintaining
the
Posts
they
had
taken
with
an
equal
Bravery
.
It
has
also
seen
the
English
march
with
so
much
undauntedness
,
that
we
may
assure
our selves
that
for
the
future
,
whenever
your
Forces
shall
Engage
with
them
,
they
will
conclude
themselves
vanquished
before
they
Fight
.
But
that
which
is
yet
far
more
surprising
,
(
though
it
is
no
Novelty
to
us
,
)
the
World
has
beheld
a
King
there
,
whose
sacred
Life
is
so
precious
to
Us
,
exposing
his
Person
every
Moment
,
visiting
the
Trenches
twice
every
day
,
present
in
all
the
Attacks
,
and
by
an
Indefatigable
care
Triumphing
over
Difficulties
which
offered
themselves
in
Crouds
.
In
short
,
it
has
beheld
an
undaunted
Elector
,
passing
whole
Nights
in
the
Trenches
,
and
sharing
the
Fatigues
and
Perils
of
the
Siege
with
his
Soldiers
.
These
without
doubt
are
strong
Arguments
to
oblige
your
Court
to
fear
the
continuation
of
the
War
;
but
yet
these
are
not
the
only
Reasons
they
have
to
fear
,
since
the
Low
Countrys
are
not
the
only
place
in
which
France
has
appeared
inferiour
to
her
Enemies
.
She
has
abandon'd
part
of
her
Conquests
in
Catalonia
.
She
has
labour'd
under
strange
disquiets
for
her
Army
in
Germany
,
even
so
far
as
to
reckon
its
having
been
able
to
pass
the
Rhine
without
being
beaten
as
a
kind
of
Victory
.
Infine
you
have
lost
Cazal
,
a
place
of
the
utmost
consequence
which
you
had
Bought
and
Fortified
with
so
much
Treasure
,
and
in
which
you
had
such
a
Noble
Train
of
Artillery
.
You
have
not
been
happier
on
the
Sea-side
.
All
your
Coasts
allarmed
from
Nice
to
Dunkirk
,
your
Maritime
Provinces
ruin'd
by
the
Marches
and
Countermarches
of
your
Forces
,
and
of
your
Milicias
,
St.
Malo
,
Calis
and
Grandville
Bombarded
:
Your
Trade
in
the
two
Seas
ruined
,
and
your
Fleet
disarmed
and
shut
up
in
Toulon
,
are
speaking
Instances
of
your
weakness
,
which
even
you
,
Sir
,
(
and
that
speaks
all
)
dare
not
deny
.
If
you
do
but
cast
your
Eyes
on
the
Future
,
it
looks
far
worse
yet
.
It
is
most
certain
that
the
great
Events
of
this
Campaign
will
increase
the
Union
of
the
Confederates
,
and
will
induce
them
to
prosecute
the
War
with
more
Vigour
than
ever
.
Besides
those
that
are
acquainted
with
the
interior
state
of
France
,
who
know
the
misery
of
the
People
,
and
to
what
degree
the
Finances
are
exhausted
will
hardly
be
persuaded
that
they
can
be
able
to
resist
the
Forces
of
the
Confederates
much
longer
.
Therefore
since
you
seem
to
be
acquainted
with
the
Ministers
,
I
will
tell
you
like
a
Friend
,
that
you
will
do
well
to
advise
them
,
to
dispose
your
Court
as
speedily
as
can
be
,
to
be
satisfy'd
with
a
reasonable
Peace
,
for
otherwise
they
may
chance
to
be
reduced
to
accept
less
advantageous
Conditions
.
I
am
,
Sir
,
Yours
,
&c.
Sept.
the
25th
.
1695.
FINIS
.