Observations
VPON
THE
EFFECTS
OF
FORMER
PARLJAMENTS
.
SIR
,
I
Have
,
according
to
my
small
abilitie
,
and
the
shortnesse
of
time
,
fulfilled
your
command
,
in
sending
to
you
this
briefe
and
plaine
Discourse
concerning
the
ancient
opinions
and
estee
me
of
English
Parliaments
(
for
that
was
all
which
you
desired
)
without
any
reflection
upon
the
proceedings
of
this
present
Parliament
:
accept
it
only
as
aplaine
peece
of
common
talke
,
which
I
would
have
delivered
,
had
I
been
present
with
you
:
Such
discourses
need
no
dresse
of
Rhetorique
.
THe
constitution
of
our
English
Monarchy
is
by
wise
men
esteemed
one
of
the
best
in
Europe
,
as
well
for
the
strength
and
honour
of
the
Prince
,
as
the
securitie
and
freedome
of
the
people
;
and
the
Bas●
,
on
which
both
are
founded
,
is
the
conveniencie
of
that
great
Councell
,
the
High
Court
of
Parliament
.
Without
which
neither
can
the
Prince
enjoy
that
honour
and
felicitie
,
which
Philip
de
Commines
,
a
forrainer
,
so
much
admires
,
where
he
delivers
what
advantages
the
Kings
of
England
have
by
that
repersentative
Body
oftheir
people
,
by
whose
assistance
in
any
action
they
can
neither
want
meanes
,
or
loose
reputation
.
Nor
on
the
other
side
,
can
the
people
have
any
possibilitie
of
pleading
their
owne
rights
and
liberties
.
For
in
the
Interim
betweene
Parliaments
,
the
People
are
too
scatrered
and
confused
a
body
,
to
appeare
in
vindication
of
their
proper
interests
;
and
by
too
long
absence
of
such
assemblies
they
would
lose
all
.
For
(
as
Iunius
observes
)
Populus
authoritatem
suam
tacite
non
utendo
amittit
;
sic
plerumque
accidit
ut
quod
omnes
cura●●er●ntur
curet
nemo
,
quod
omnibus
commissum
est
,
nemo
sibi
commendatu●
pu
〈…〉
The
People
insensibly
lose
their
power
for
want
of
using
it
:
for
so
it
happens
,
that
what
all
should
look
after
,
no
man
does
;
what
is
committed
to
all
,
no
man
thinkes
his
owne
charge
.
And
in
that
Interim
it
happens
,
that
those
Optimates
Regni
(
as
hee
speakes
)
who
under
the
Prince
are
entrusted
with
government
,
m●●ning
Councellours
,
Judges
,
and
other
great
Magistrates
,
either
through
feare
,
flatterie
,
or
private
Corruption
,
doe
often
betray
the
peoples
rights
to
the
Prince
.
The
state
of
government
standing
thus
;
If
distempered
times
happen
to
be
(
as
our
Chronicles
have
shewed
some
)
whereby
dissention
betweene
Prince
and
People
,
the
Kingdomes
ruine
hath
beene
endangered
,
it
doth
not
so
much
prove
that
the
English
government
i●
not
the
best
,
as
that
the
best
government
may
be
abused
.
For
in
every
Monarchy
,
how
limited
soever
,
the
Prince
his
person
is
invested
with
so
much
Majestie
,
that
it
would
seeme
a
mockerie
in
State
,
if
there
were
no
considerable
power
entrusted
into
his
hands
;
yea
,
so
much
as
that
,
if
he
be
bad
or
weake
,
he
may
endanger
the
ruine
of
the
Kingdome
;
so
necessary
is
it
for
all
humane
ordinances
,
how
wise
so
ever
,
to
leave
somewhat
to
Chance
,
and
to
have
alwayes
need
of
recourse
to
God
,
for
his
assisting
or
curing
Providence
.
And
though
the
Kingdome
of
England
,
by
vertue
of
the
government
thereof
,
will
be
as
hardly
brought
into
a
confusion
,
as
any
in
Europe
;
yet
there
is
no
warrant
against
the
possibilitie
of
it
.
For
it
was
ever
heretofore
seene
,
that
our
Parliaments
were
rather
a
strength
and
advantage
to
an
honourable
wise
Prince
,
than
a
remedy
against
a
bad
or
weak
one
;
or
,
if
we
change
the
expression
,
they
were
rather
an
excellent
diet
to
preserve
a
good
raigne
in
strength
,
than
Physick
to
cure
a
bad
one
;
and
therefore
have
been
as
much
loved
by
sound
and
healthy
Princes
,
as
loathed
by
them
that
were
out
of
temper
;
the
later
having
thought
them
a
depression
of
their
dignitie
:
as
the
former
have
esteemed
them
an
advantage
to
their
strength
.
So
that
in
such
times
only
the
true
convenience
of
that
great
Councell
hath
been
perceived
by
England
,
and
admired
by
Forraigne
Authors
:
in
the
other
times
it
was
,
that
those
wittie
complaints
have
beene
in
fashion
(
as
Sir
Robert
Cotton
speakes
of
a
bad
time
)
that
Princes
in
Parliaments
are
lesse
than
they
should
be
,
and
Subjects
greater
.
But
on
the
contrary
,
that
they
have
been
an
advantage
to
Kings
,
the
constant
Series
of
our
Historie
will
shew
.
1.
By
those
great
atchievements
which
they
have
enabled
our
wise
Kings
to
make
,
who
were
most
constant
in
calling
them
,
and
consenting
to
them
.
2.
That
no
one
Prince
was
ever
yet
happy
without
the
use
of
them
.
It
may
therefore
seeme
a
Paradox
,
that
any
Prince
should
disaffect
that
which
is
so
high
an
advantage
to
him
,
and
a
great
wonder
,
that
some
Kings
of
England
,
not
vicious
in
their
dispositions
,
nor
very
shallow
in
their
understandings
,
have
so
much
kicked
against
Parliaments
.
And
that
such
have
been
(
before
we
shew
what
reasons
may
be
of
it
)
see
the
characters
of
some
Princes
,
whose
successe
and
fortunes
are
knowne
to
all
that
read
the
histories
,
as
they
are
delivered
by
Polydore
Virgil
,
who
in
his
sixteenth
Booke
speaks
thus
of
Henry
the
third
:
Fuit
ingenio
miti
,
animo
magis
nobili
quàm
magno
,
cultor
religionis
,
adversus
inopes
liberalis
.
He
was
of
a
gentle
nature
,
a
mind
rather
noble
than
great
,
a
lover
of
Religion
,
and
liberall
to
the
poore
.
In
his
eighteenth
Booke
thus
of
Edward
the
second
;
Fuit
illi
natura
bona
,
ingenium
mite
quem
primò
juvenili
errore
actum
in
leviora
vitia
incidentem
,
tandem
in
graviora
malorum
consuetudines
&
consilia
traxerunt
.
Non
deerant
illi
animi
vires
,
si
repudiatis
malis
suasoribus
illas
juste
exereuisset
.
He
was
o●
a
good
nature
and
mild
disposition
,
who
first
by
the
errours
and
rashnesse
of
you●h
falling
into
small
faults
,
was
afterwards
drawne
into
greater
,
by
the
societie
and
counsels
of
wicked
men
.
There
was
not
wanting
in
him
a
strength
of
mind
,
if
avoyding
evill
counsell
,
he
could
have
made
a
just
use
of
it
.
And
in
his
twentieth
Bo●ke
thus
of
R●chard
the
s●cond
;
Fuit
in
illo
spi●itus
non
v●lis
quem
consociorum
improbitas
,
&
insulsitas
extinxit
.
Hee
was
of
a
spirit
●o●
low
or
bas●
,
bu●
such
as
was
quite
destroyed
by
the
wickedn●sse
and
folly
of
unhappy
Cons●crates
.
A
reason
of
th●s
accident
may
●e
,
that
th●ir
soules
,
though
not
vicious
,
have
not
beene
s●
large
,
nor
their
affections
so
publick
;
as
their
great
cal●ing
hath
requ●red
;
but
being
too
much
m●nc●patd
to
private
●●●cies
and
unhappy
Favourites
,
and
long
flattered
in
those
aff●ctions
under
the
specious
name
of
firmnesse
in
friendsh●p
,
(
not
being
told
that
the
adaequate
object
of
a
Prince
his
love
should
be
the
whole
people
,
and
that
they
who
receive
publike
honour
,
should
returne
a
generall
love
and
care
)
they
have
too
much
neglected
the
Kingdome
,
and
grow
at
last
afraid
to
looke
their
faces
in
so
true
a
glasse
as
a
Parliament
,
and
flying
the
remedy
,
encrease
the
dis●ase
,
till
it
come
to
that
unhappy
he●ght
,
that
rather
than
acknowledge
any
unjust
action
,
they
str●ve
for
an
unjust
power
to
give
it
countenance
,
and
so
by
a
long
consequence
become
hardly
reconciliable
to
a
Parliamentarie
way
.
Such
Princes
(
though
it
may
seeme
strange
)
have
beene
a
greater
affiction
to
this
Kingdome
,
than
those
who
have
been
most
wicked
,
and
more
incurable
for
these
reasons
.
1.
They
have
not
been
so
conscious
to
themselves
of
great
crimes
;
and
therefore
not
so
apt
to
bee
sensible
of
what
they
have
beene
accidentally
made
to
doe
against
their
people
by
evill
counsell
,
whose
poyson
themselves
did
not
perfectly
understand
.
And
therefore
they
are
more
prone
to
suspect
the
people
,
●s
unkind
to
them
,
than
themselves
as
faultie
,
and
so
the
more
hardly
drawne
to
repent
their
actions
,
or
meet
heartily
with
a
Parliament
.
2.
The
second
reason
is
from
the
People
,
who
naturally
looke
with
honour
upon
the
Prince
,
and
when
they
find
none
,
or
few
personall
●ic●s
in
him
(
not
considering
that
the
true
vertues
of
Princes
have
a
●●ger
ex●ent
than
those
of
private
men
)
will
more
hardly
be
brought
to
thinke
)
though
themselves
feele
,
and
suffer
for
it
,
that
he
is
faulti●
;
and
therefore
sometimes
(
which
would
hardly
be
beleeved
,
if
experience
had
not
shewed
it
(
the
People
have
been
so
rash
as
that
to
maintaine
for
the
King
an
unjust
Prerogative
,
which
themselves
understand
not
,
they
have
to
their
owne
ruine
,
and
the
Kings
too
(
as
it
hath
after
●roved
)
deserted
that
great
Councell
whom
themselves
have
chosen
,
and
by
whom
only
they
could
be
preserved
in
their
just
rights
;
untill
too
late
,
for
the
Kings
happinesse
and
their
owne
,
they
have
seene
and
repented
their
great
folly
.
Such
a
desertion
was
too
sadly
seene
at
the
end
of
that
Parliament
of
Edward
the
second
,
where
the
two
Spencers
were
banished
,
and
the
tragicall
effects
that
followed
,
when
the
King
found
so
great
a
partie
both
of
Clergie
and
La●●t●e
,
as
enabled
him
to
call
home
againe
his
banished
Favourites
,
and
proved
fatall
to
so
many
Parliamentarie
Lords
,
as
the
like
execution
o●
Nobilitie
had
never
before
beene
seene
in
England
:
over
whose
g●aves
the
People
afterwards
wept
when
it
was
too
late
,
and
proceeded
further
in
their
revenge
,
than
became
the
dutie
and
allegeance
of
Subjects
.
It
is
therefore
a
great
mis-fortune
to
England
,
and
almost
certaine
calamitie
,
when
the
distempers
of
government
have
been
let
grow
so
long
as
that
for
their
cure
they
must
need
a
long
Parliament
.
For
there
are
no
wayes
,
how
just
,
how
moderate
soever
they
be
,
which
that
great
Councell
can
take
(
if
they
go
far
enough
to
make
the
cure
)
but
will
provoke
,
either
by
the
meanes
,
or
the
length
of
them
,
the
Prince
his
impatience
,
or
the
peoples
inconstancie
.
For
the
first
;
the
Delinquents
must
needs
be
many
and
great
and
those
employed
,
and
perchance
highly
favoured
by
him
,
besides
the
reflexion
which
is
made
upon
his
judgment
by
their
sufferings
,
and
that
will
be
one
reason
of
his
impatience
.
Another
is
,
that
many
prerogatives
which
were
not
indeed
inherent
in
the
Crowne
,
but
so
thought
by
the
Prince
,
and
by
him
and
his
bad
Councell
long
abused
,
to
the
prejudice
of
the
People
,
with
some
seeming
advantage
to
him
(
though
well
weighed
they
brought
none
)
are
then
after
a
long
sufferance
called
in
question
.
For
the
People
are
used
to
entrust
kind
Princes
with
many
of
their
owne
rights
and
priviledges
and
never
call
for
them
againe
till
they
have
beene
exremely
abused
.
But
at
such
a
time
to
make
all
cleare
after
so
long
a
reckoning
(
and
those
long
reckonings
in
State
being
commonly
fatall
;
for
Parliaments
have
seldome
beene
discontinued
,
but
by
such
Princes
whose
governments
in
the
Interim
have
been
verie
illegall
)
they
usually
question
so
much
,
as
that
the
Prince
thinkes
himselfe
hardly
dealt
withall
,
such
a
Prince
as
we
spoke
of
,
who
not
bad
in
himselfe
,
but
long
misled
by
wicked
counsell
,
was
not
enough
sensible
of
the
injuries
he
had
done
.
The
second
obstacle
that
such
Parliaments
may
finde
is
the
Peoples
inconstancie
;
and
what
age
is
not
full
of
such
examples
which
before
we
name
,
let
us
consider
whether
there
be
any
reason
for
it
?
This
perchance
may
be
one
,
that
the
People
naturally
are
lovers
of
novelty
,
affecting
with
greedinesse
every
change
,
and
again
loathing
it
when
it
ceases
to
be
a
novelty
.
Long-discontinuing
and
reforming
Parliaments
seems
to
carry
the
face
of
a
change
of
Government
,
and
those
things
may
then
happen
which
doe
in
the
shift
of
Princes
,
that
some
people
may
for
a
while
flatter
themselves
with
new
and
strange
hopes
,
that
prove
frustrate
;
or
else
with
quicker
redresses
of
inconvenience
,
than
the
great
inconvenience
;
than
the
great
concurrence
of
so
many
weighty
businesses
can
possibly
admit
,
how
industrious
soever
that
great
Councell
be
,
distracted
with
so
great
a
variety
;
and
the
people
after
some
time
spent
grow
weary
again
of
what
before
they
so
long
had
wished
to
see
.
Besides
,
the
people
are
more
and
more
poysoned
daily
by
the
discourses
of
the
friends
,
kindred
,
and
retainers
to
so
many
great
Delinquents
,
as
must
needs
be
at
such
a
Parliament
:
who
,
though
they
be
no
considerable
party
in
respect
of
the
whole
Common-wealth
,
yet
ply
their
particular
interests
with
more
eagernesse
than
most
do
the
publick
.
They
subtilly
perswade
the
people
,
that
whatsoever
the
Parliament
does
against
those
great
Delinquents
is
aymed
against
the
Kings
honour
,
and
that
he
is
wounded
thorow
their
sides
.
And
this
opinion
is
somwhat
furthered
▪
when
the
people
see
how
many
prerogatives
of
the
Prince
(
as
wee
said
before
)
are
after
long
enjoying
called
in
question
.
So
that
by
this
means
their
inconstancy
seems
to
be
grounded
upon
loyalty
to
the
King
,
and
they
(
perchance
with
honest
,
but
deceived
hearts
)
grow
weary
of
the
great
Councell
of
the
Land
.
Another
reason
may
be
,
that
the
Prince
himselfe
averse
from
such
a
Parliament
,
for
the
reasons
aforesaid
,
can
find
power
enough
to
retard
their
proceedings
,
and
keep
off
the
cure
of
State
so
long
,
till
the
people
●ired
with
expectation
of
it
,
have
by
degrees
forgot
the
sharpnes
of
those
liseases
,
which
before
required
it
.
By
this
means
at
last
accidentally
a
miracle
hath
been
wrought
●ft●r
a
●ong
Parliament
,
which
is
,
that
the
people
have
taken
part
with
the
great
Delinquents
against
the
Parliament
,
for
no
other
reason
,
than
because
those
Delinquents
had
done
them
more
wrong
than
the
Parlament
could
suddenly
redresse
.
And
so
the
multitude
of
those
great
Delinquents
crimes
hath
turned
to
their
own
advantage
.
But
in
such
reforming
Parliaments
,
upon
whom
so
much
businesse
lyes
,
not
only
the
inconstancie
of
the
people
hath
beene
seene
in
History
,
but
the
unstedfastnesse
of
the
Representative
Body
it selfe
:
and
the
distractions
of
that
Assembly
,
whilst
they
forsake
each
other
under
so
great
a
burden
have
left
that
burden
fall
dishonorably
to
the
ground
.
The
most
unhappy
instance
in
this
case
,
was
that
Parliament
of
Richard
the
2
begun
at
Westmanster
,
and
adjourned
to
Shrewsbury
in
the
nineteenth
yeere
of
his
Reign
;
a
Parliament
that
discharged
their
trust
the
worst
of
any
that
I
read
of
;
where
there
was
as
much
need
of
constancie
and
magnanimity
as
ever
was
,
to
redresse
those
great
distempers
which
were
then
growne
upon
the
State
;
and
as
much
mischiefe
ensued
by
their
default
,
both
upon
Prince
and
People
,
which
might
have
been
well
prevented
,
and
his
happinesse
wrought
together
with
their
own
(
in
the
judgement
of
best
Writers
)
if
they
had
timely
and
constantly
joyned
together
in
mayntayning
the
true
Rights
of
Parliament
,
and
resisting
the
illegall
desires
of
their
seduced
King
.
But
being
fatally
distracted
,
the
major
part
of
Lords
and
Bishops
wrought
upon
by
the
King
,
and
the
House
of
Commons
too
far
prevailed
with
by
Bushy
the
Speaker
,
and
his
Instruments
,
they
utterly
deserted
the
Common-wealth
,
and
looking
only
upon
the
Kings
present
desire
,
assented
to
such
things
as
made
the
Prerogative
a
thing
boundlesse
;
that
he
himselfe
(
as
the
Story
reports
)
was
heard
glorying
to
say
,
That
there
was
no
free
and
absolute
Monarch
in
Europe
but
himselfe
.
Upon
which
,
the
same
bad
counsell
which
had
before
brought
him
out
of
love
with
Parliaments
,
brought
him
to
as
great
an
abuse
of
that
power
which
he
had
now
gotten
over
a
Parliament
.
And
then
followed
the
blank
Charters
,
and
other
horrid
extortions
,
besides
the
suffering
of
some
Lords
,
whom
the
people
most
loved
;
and
shortly
after
,
by
a
sad
consequence
,
his
own
ruine
.
Nor
do
wee
read
that
any
of
those
Lords
,
who
under
colour
of
loyalty
and
love
(
as
they
called
it
)
to
his
person
,
had
trodden
down
the
power
and
priviledge
of
a
Parliament
under
his
feet
,
had
afterwards
so
much
loyalty
to
him
,
as
to
defend
his
Crown
and
Person
against
the
force
of
an
Usurper
,
who
without
any
resistance
or
contradiction
unjustly
ascended
the
Royall
Throne
:
the
sad
occasion
of
that
miserable
and
cruell
civill
war
,
which
in
the
following
ages
so
long
afflicted
the
Kingdom
of
England
.
This
was
the
worst
example
of
any
Parliament
;
but
in
other
times
,
though
bad
too
,
they
have
proved
better
Physik
than
any
other
earthly
wayes
or
meanes
could
be
;
yet
their
greatest
vertue
and
excellencie
is
seen
,
when
they
have
been
used
as
a
diet
by
honourable
and
just
Princes
,
such
as
this
Nation
hath
beene
often
blest
with
;
and
such
who
have
thought
it
no
disparagement
or
depression
of
their
dignity
,
to
be
ruled
by
the
sway
of
that
great
Councell
,
than
a
wise
Guider
of
a
Ship
would
think
it
to
follow
his
Compasse
,
or
any
Mathematician
to
be
directed
by
his
necessary
Rules
and
Instruments
.
FINIS
.