SECT I. SIR ,

HAving this Week at Oxford met with , July 27 1677. and perused the book intituled , The Reconcileableness of Gods prescience of Sin , &c. I now address my self , according to my promise , to give you my thoughts of it , and that briefly ; being willing to be thrifty and sparing both of your time , and my own .

In the general , I much dislike the stile and terms therein used ; especially those which express God and his Attributes more like an Heathen Platonist , then a Christian Divine . I know not to what purpose Plato's Notions and Terms , which as he had no certain grounds for , so many times ( I believe ) he understood them not himself ; I say , I know not why these should be so affected by Divines , as if they were ashamed of the Notions and Language of Holy Scripture . It was the Apostles Caution Coloss . 2.8 . Beware least any man spoyl you through Philosophy and vain deceit : The Platonists seem there to be intended , who were most in repute with the Graecians , and who did Philosophise most about God , and the Angels , though they had nothing to guide them in their search of them , but the weak dim lamp of corrupted reason , and the rotten clew of Tradition ; which was so often broken , and so ill tyed together again , that it could seldome guide them to truth , and then but uncertainly . It was Platonick Philosophy that first corrupted Christian Divinity in the second and third A. ges of the Church , and was the Root whence sprang all the ill Weeds of Pelagianisme : and I cannot think but they are more or less addicted to Pelagius , who in these days would fain have Plato baptized and be made a good Christian ; yea , and examine some of the most abstruse points of Christianity by Plato's principles . Of this kind is that so much dispersed through this Book concerning the Emanations of Gods Nature ; Gods seing infinite congruitys in things which inclines him to act thus and thus ; as if God were some way necessitated by his own disposition to deal with , and dispose of his Creatures as he doth ; and hence they measure God by the nature of man , at least by the best men and what is rational and good according to their judgment and affections is thought also to guide the purposes and actions of the infinite God ; but the Nature of God , i.e. his Being , Substance , and Disposition , ( to speak in our language ) is not only unknown , but impossible to be known in this World , where we know nothing , but by comparison with the creatures , which are not at all like him , but really infinitely below him ; and those negative perfections of infinity , immensity , &c. which we atrribute to him are but removing the imperfections of the creatures from him ; and the scriptures also , which give us the only certain knowledge of him , express him according to our capacity ; either attributing to him the chiefest perfections of the creatures , or removing from him their imperfections : but they do not declare him as he is in his own Being and Nature . I am that I am , or I am who I am , was all the name God would give to Moses of himself , whereby ( I think ) is meant Gods transcendent and singular Being to which nothing is like , and therefore not expressive of him , that identical proposition , God is God , or he is what he is , though it may not be good Logick , the Praedicate not explaining the subject , yet it is good Metaphisick and Divinity , there being nothing to express God by but himself . His Word and Works express what he is and will be to us , that is , in what tenour and by what Law he will govern his reasonable Creatures ; not what his Nature and Essential Properties are ; thus when it is said , God is Lord , it is not meant of his Being or Essential Property , but of his gracious purposes and promises in Jesus Christ . If God were absolutely free to make or not to make the World , then he was as free to make it in what manner , and to govern it in what order he pleaseth : If God were the infinite and absolute original of all things , then there was nothing which could be a reason or motive to him , to do any thing but what proceeded from his own will , he saw no congruitys in things , but made them ; nor is there any thing better or worse in respect of Gods ordering things to his ends , ( though we in common speech say this and that is best ) but all things are ordered according to the counsel of his Will ; they have their connection among themselves , and their conducibility or fitness for his ends all from him . It is from the infinite perfection of God that whatsoever he doth is infinitely wise , holy , just , and good , and becoming himself ; not that there are any measure or rules of Wisdom , Goodness , or Justice in things themselves antecedently to the Law and order which God subjected them to ; so true is that , The Will of God is the rule of all Justice : so it is of Wisdom and Goodness also . It is indeed said in the Schools , that some things are commanded , because they are good in themselves ; and some are good because they are commanded ; and so some are good antecedently to the Will of God , and some consequently , being made good because he wills them ; but this must be understood cautiously , namely , of the promulgated Will , or Law of God , i.e. that some things were good and therefore commanded , in respect of that nature and order which God had newly created and established in the World ; for having made Men and Angels of such a nature consentaneously to their Creation , he gave them Laws sutable to their Nature , which should therefore be immutable , and the actions and qualitys which were conformed , or contrary to those commands , are said to be good or evil in themselves ; because they are founded in , and suited to , the nature and original order of things , and are not to be changed while the present order of things in this World continueth : On the other side some things are good only because they are commanded ; as all the positive institutions of the Old and New Testament ; because they have no necessary connection with the nature and Primitive order of rational creatures , and therefore may be prescribed and limited , prohibited or left indifferent , according to the Wisdom and Pleasure of the great Law-maker , who can make them useful by his grace when he commands them ; and when he doth not promise his grace to make them useful , they can be of no use . But this must not be extended to the natural and essential Will of God ; as if that were guided by the internal qualities of Creatures , when the Creatures and their qualities do absolutely depend upon Gods Will : Entity is before Bonity , either Metaphysical or Moral ; therefore things must be supposed to have a being in the divine Idea and purpose , before they can be apprehended to be good with any degree of goodness ; and the will of God as it is before their being , so much more before their goodness ; and in this sense every thing is good , because God willed it so to be ; and he doth not will any thing because it is good : after the same manner must we understand that Metaphysical Axiome : the essences of things are eternal : and there is a non repugnancy betwixt their parts and praedicats , which is eternal , and the foundation of a necessary prerequisite to their actual production v. g . It was prerequired to the Creation of Man , that there be no repugnancy in his being a rational creature , else he could never have been made so : that there was no contradiction or inconsistency between all the predicats and parts of his Being , as now they are , else they could never have been united and reconciled into one essence : and this non repugnancy or suitableness of parts and predicats was eternal and increated , this is to be understood thus , that before the actual production of things , there is presupposed a congruity of their predicats and parts , and aptness for conjunction : It is presupposed in nature , not in time , and so negatively to be eternall , that is , not to begin in any time , but when ever things were made , ( though it had been earlier or sooner in infinitum ) yet still it must be presupposed in nature , that their parts and predicats were compatible and convenient to be joyned . But the first original of the most simple predicats , and all their congruitys and incongruitys , compatibilities and incompatibilities among themselves , were from the Architective Idea of Gods understanding , and the purpose of his will to give them such a Being , and then to compound such things of them as were consistent with that nature he had given them ; if there were any natural connections and conveniences of praedicates and the essences of things , or moral congruitys , conformities or decencies in their qualities and actions , and the contrarys of these antecedent to the divine Idea , and will , then they are as eternal as God himself and independent of him , then he is not the first cause of all things , not of their essences , and tendencys and inclinations , but only of their actual existence : he indeed brought them forth into the world , but he could make and order them no otherwise then he hath , he brought them forth into the light , but conceived or formed them not in the womb of his Decree or Idea , but had his pattern before him from their own independent natures . To return , When God hath made things , there is a harmony and congruity amongst them , and whatever laws he prescribeth them , and in what way soever he governeth them , all is most agreable to their natures , and the order he hath constituted among them ; else he should contradict his own ends and undo his own work in giving them nature and inclinations of one kind , and the overruling them by his Laws and Power another way different from their nature ; so that that nature and those inclinations should be given them to no purpose , but there were no foreseen congruities or incongruities in things which should incline God to rule or govern them in this or that manner antecedent to his , own purpose of making them so , any more then those things had had a foreseen Being , antecedent to his Will and Idea , by which all things were formed . And thus whatever God hath done in permitting the Fall of Men and Angels , in giving his Son to redeem Man , and whatever he doth or will do in governing and guiding men to their eternall condition , it all proceedeth from his most free and sovereign pleasure , ordering all with infinite Justice and holiness , that is becoming himself , and with infinite Wisdom , that his works should harmoniously conspire to set forth his most infinite excllency , and not to clash and jarr amongst themselves in their tendency to his supream and universal end , though they may be contrary to each other in respect to the particular subordinate ends to which particular things and actions are directed . But there were no reasons from the things themselves to move him , nor from his own transcendent and incomprehensible Nature to oblige him to take this course and to order his creatures in this manner ; nor did he choose this way because it was best , ( though we must account it best now he hath chosen and appointed it ) but because it was his sovereign pleasure to glorifie himself this way : Infinite Wisdom and Infinite Sovereignity and Goodness can no more act ad ultimum , then Infinite Power can . If notwithstanding all God did , or will make , his Power can do infinitely more , then notwithstanding all the contrivances and products of his Counsel and Goodness , his Wisdom and Goodness can infinitely vary in the expression of themselves , and that which guideth and boundeth all the exercifes of his Power Wisdom and Goodness is his absolute sovereign Will and Pleasure . Having premised this general reflection , I shall come to the main matter of the book , and that I may give my thoughts more diflinctly , I shall reduce what I have to say to these four Questions .

1. Whether God doth give a predetermining influence to actions that have sin or deformity annexed to them ?

2. Whether it can be defended , that God doth efficaciously concur to all good actions , and not at all to evil actions ? whether the former be not as inconsistent with liberty , as if he should concur to the latter ?

3. Whether there can be any such indefferent power or influence of God upon the Creature as must be determined by it , and may be used or not used as the Creature pleaseth ? as the Author affirms .

4. Whether a bare speculative prescience without Predestination or predetermining influx , be more reconcileable with Gods Moral proceedings with men , then his Decree and predetermination is ?

SECT II .

THE first Question is , Whether the influence of God upon the Creatures doth determine them to all their actions , and particularly to those that have sin annexed to them ? For the better understanding of this I premise some things .

1. That God had wise and holy ends in suffering sin to enter into the World . None deny that God could have prevented sin in all or in any man if he had so pleased , and therefore it could not have entred into the World unless he had permitted , or suffered it , and he is so holy & good that he would not have suffered it , if it were not for wise and holy ends . Hereby he takes occasion to magnifie his Wisdom and Mercy in redeeming his Elect by the death of his Son , and to magnifie his Power and Gracein changing their hearts , subduing their lusts , and enabling them to overcome the Flesh , the World , and the Devil , and to forgive and bare withthem till they come safe to Heaven ; on the other side he declareth his Justice and Greatness , in leaving the rest of men to the ways of their own hearts , which they have chosen , and at last justly condemning them for their voluntary apostasie from him , and final impenitency in it : he also discovereth manifold Wisdom and Power in governing the World and every particular person in it and all their actions , notwithstanding their unruly and tumultuous will , and affections . It is true God had no need to declare his Justice , Holiness , Majestie and Wisdom in this way , neither had he need of the manifestations of his creating power in making , or of his bounty and conserving Power in so richly furnishing and setting forth his creatures and all his providences about them ; but if the infinite sovereign God pleased to make himself known , then it was consequentially or hypothetically necessary , that he should make intelligent creatures , who might be capable to understand him by his works ; if he pleased to shew the exceeding greatness of his goodness in their Creation , it was needful he should make them perfect and innocent : If he had a further design to magnifie free pardoning mercy and restoring-grace in the Redemption and Intercession of his Son , there could have been no place for it unless he had suffered man to fall , and to plung himself into sin and misery : If he would also shew his Justice and severity against sin ; some must be left in their sins , and justly to perish by them : And lastly , if he be pleased to magnifie both his grace and severity in a wise mixture or attemperation , it was necessary that he should neither cut off those whom he intended to leave in their sins as soon as they were capable of sinning , nor remove his Elect to Heaven as soon as he had sanctified them ; but that he should leave many of both sorts in this World to be objects of the various exercise of his grace and severity . God needeth not the exerci●e of any of his Attributes ad extra , out of himself , being infinitely and eternally happy in , and satisfied with himself ; but if he please to exercise and manifest them , it is agreable to his Wisdom to design objects capable and fit whereupon they may be exercised . Who can shew a reason why God may not permit sin , to make these uses of it for his own glory , as well as effectually to have prevented it in innocent man ? seeing he oweth the Creatures nothing ; and as his holy Will is the rule , so his glory is the end of all things . Rom. 9.22.33 . Rom. 11.36 .

2. There is therefore no reason for that overscrupulous caution of some , who deny that God hath any will at all concerning sin ; or is any way concerned about its coming into , or being in the World : this opinion seems to have been common in Lombards time , insomuch that he having proposed the reasons on both sides , thought not fit to determine ●ny thing in the point Lomb lib . 2 sent dist . 37. Quest . A.B.C.D. unless perhaps ( which I think more probable ) hewould not determine , because he , as the rest of the Schoolmen after him , attributed too much to the liberty of mans will ; some also of late have took up this opinion , against whom Dr. Twiss disputeth strongly Vin , Gra . lib . 2. part 2. Lib . 2. P. 2. Dig . 4. Dig . 4. Lombards reason is very weak , viz. without him nothing was made , sin is nothing ; Ergo , sin was made without God : but we may say , hic magister communiter non tenetur . Bonaventure , cited by Dr. Twiss , saith , that in his time it was generally agreed , that God did will sin , sc . by permitting it and ordering it to the end of his own Glory : So also Alensis sum . Part 2. Qu . 84. Memb . 3. Ar. 6. And so most of the Schoolmen , the Jesuists not excepted ; Augustine , in Enchir . Ut Deus naturarum bonarum optimus est Creator ; ita malarum volunt atum est justissimus ordinator , and if God did no way will sin , then all sin were accidental and contingent to him ; and so the greatest part of his Government of the rational Creatures was a contingent uncontrived thing . The fallen Angels and Man continued but a short space in their integrity , and the fall was contingent , and all their actions natural , civil and moral , so far as either altogether sinful or any way irregular , excessive , or defective , together with all their omissions of duty are accidental contingences to God : so also what is occasioned by them , the punishments of sin both temporal and eternal , all the overruling providences bridling the lusts of men , or guiding them to higher ends : yea , the sending of Christ to redeem the World ; and all the co-operations of divine grace in the Elect must be accidental emergences upon present occasions not contrived and ordered in Gods eternal counsels .

3. Though God permit sin and order it for his own glory , yet all agree that he is not the Author or efficient cause of sin , either of the habit or of the act : though the contrary opinion be ascribded to Florinus of old , and to some late Phanatical braines , yet no sober Divine ever affirmed it , for sin as sin , is a defect or want of conformity to the Law of God , and this formally considered hath no efficient cause , but is caused by the creature , voluntarily omitting or falling short of its duty ; but how to make it clear , that God governing and influencing all his creatures in all their actions , doth no way incur the guilt of being the author of their sins is a great difficulty : in sins of omission the matter is easie , for there being no act , but the want or pollution of an act which ought to be , it is apparent they are caused by the creatures neglect together with the suspension of divine influence , which should cause them to act : also the sinful defects of good actions , being a partial privation of full conformity to the rule , proceed from the weakness of the creature , God not affording that full influence which should keep them from all defect ; here therefore is no efficiency : the matter is harder in acts , altogether sinful , which have a tendency to an undue object there must be an efficient cause of the act ; and if God doth efficiently concur to the act , how shall he be excused from any influence upon the defect also ?

4. Therefore Durandus , and some few others , deny any efficient concurrence of God to the acts of the creatures , thinking it is enough that God hath given them a being and faculties to act , and all other things requisite , as objects , motives , opportunity , &c. and doth uphold these by his conserving power ; this is of late revived by Du Hamel , de confensu Cap. 4. The . 14. Cum Deus movet creaturam , nihil aliud quam eam in varits locis tuetur & creat , &c. Quid efficiet ? utique conservabit eas in tali loco aut tempore juxta earum exigentiam idque erit concurrere cum creatura , This they think freeth God from all communion of sin , seing he only preserveth the creature and its principles of being and operation , and the creature acteth alone , therefore they say further , that this conservation is an universal indeterminate assistance of God , which the creature useth as he pleaseth . Du Hamel again Ibid . Actio illa Dei qua creat , tuetur , & conservat causam secundam universalis est motio praevia indeterminata . Quid illam determinat ? exigentia creaturae quae sola nec subsistere potest nec agere , &c. But if God only upholdeth the creature in its being and faculties and concurreth not to its actions , then God doth no more for the creature when it acteth , then when it acteth not ; for he upholdeth it in its being and faculties when it acteth not ; and then God did no more in the Caldeans and Sabeans taking away Jobs Cattel , in the Lightning that burnt his Sheep , or the Wind that threw down the House upon his Children , then if all these had been quiet and exerted no such act , or then he did in the other neighbours who medled not with his substance : how then could Job say , the Lord hath taken away ? and yet the Text commends him , In all this Job sinned not , nor charged God foolishly , Job 1.

5. Others therefore , and that generally , admit , that God doth activly influence the creatures in all their opperations , which they call his concurse with the creature viz. that God doth not only uphold them in their being , but doth also assist them with his power in their acting , and that the creatures having once received their beings and faculties from God , might as well subsist and continue without his conservation , as act without his co-operation . Lib . 2. P. 2. Crim . 3. Sect . 23.25 Vin . Gra . Arminius as is cited by Dr. Twiss acknowledgeth , that God concurreth to the act of sin , and saith , that it is necessary from the nature of the creatures , from the law of creation , and that therefore the divine moral law prohibiting sin must not take off Gods assistance to his creatures , which he had engaged himself to by the law of creation , before the moral law was given , or sin was in the World , And our Author seemeth to acknowledge as much , when he describeth Gods influence upon sinful actions to be his affording such a power to the creatures as that they may act or suspend their actions as they please , if then the creature acteth , Author Pa. 44. it acteth by the virtue and assistance of that power afforded to it , yet seing the creature acteth freely and may refrain acting if it will , and sin is not an act , but a desect in the action , they think this acquiteth God from being any cause of sin : though by the way , I understand not why this Author sayeth , that some acts are intrinsecally evil , as the hatred of God , &c. when the act of hatred as an act is only the aversation of the mind from an object apprehended as evil : if so , it is indifferent to moral goodness or evil ; if the object be really evil the hatred is good ; but if the object be good , the hatred is evil : therefore all the moral qualifications of actions are from without , viz. from the object , end and circumstances , and the natural being of them is indifferent , neither morally good or evil . Nor can I conceive how it helpeth his cause ; for if the act be intrinsecally evil , and the power of God concurs to it , how is God excused from being the Author of an evil act , though the creature doth voluntarily abuse his influence ?

6. Thus far most Writers being agreed , itseemeth further highly rational to many , that as the Creature cannot act without Gods assistance , so neither can it move or incline it self to act , or determine it self either to act , or to suspend , to act in this , or that manner , unless God also doth secretly influence , incline , and determine it . This also our Author admits in actions spiritually good ; Pag . 32.44 but whether he will allow it in natural or civil actions , I know not , but he detesteth it in sinful actions , that God should incline and determine the creature to them , even the matter of them , or the natural act which is the subject of sin ; this he loadeth with all the hard terms that Julian the Pelagian used against the Orthodox in those days , which however have more of passion then of argument . Sect . 24. Arminius also , ut supra , earnestly contends for the same , viz. that though God concurs to the act , yet he doth not influence the will : but that he holdeth hls power and influence , as it were in suspence , till he know which way the creature will act , and then he is ready to concurr with it , they are very confident that God must be the Author of sin , Arm. ut supra Sect . 23 and cannot be consistent with himself , in his Laws and Government ; yea , that Heaven and Earth must be mingled together , if God determine the creature to sinful actions : This therefore is the Question now to be explained and proved .

SECT III .

WHEN we say , God doth predetermine the Creature to sinful actions ; we mean only , that he doth incline and guide them to the substance , and matter of the acts , not to the sinfulness which cleaves to them : the acts themselves , as the natural operations of mans understanding and will , or of the inferior saculties ( so far as subject to the will ) are naturally good , proceeding from the faculties which God hath made , and tending to the use and benefit of man ; thus they are from God the Author of all good , and there is neither moral good , nor evil contained in them , as they are the meer exercise of natural faculties , about their natural proper objects : But further , as these faculties come under the Law and Command of God ; so they are capable of moral good or evil , by being conformed to , or dissenting from his Law ; this is an external relation , or denomination of actions from the respect they have to the Law , neither intrinsecal to them , nor inherent in them : e . g . An act of hatred is good , as it is an aversation from evil , it is necessary for man that he may decline that which seems hurtful to him , thus far it is from God as a natural action : when it is exercised upon that which God requires him to hate , then it is morally good ; and when that is hated , which is commanded to be beloved , then it is morally evil ; therefore the moral good and evil of the act of hatred , is but a respect to , or denomination from the command , which it obeyeth , or disobeyeth : God therefore inclineth the Creature to this , and all other acts , so far as it is the natural exercise of the will towards an appearing evil : but that this act is morally evil , is , because it breaketh the command of God , or tendeth to an object which ought to be beloved ; and this proceedeth from the ignorance , or malice of mans heart , God not preventing that error or disobedience . By determining the Creatures to their actions , we mean not , that God doth compel or force them to act ; For then their Natures and Faculties would be given them in vain ; not that the creatures are meerly Gods instruments in acting ; they are his moral instruments , as they are all subject to , and used in his moral government of the World : they may be called his instruments improperly , as they can do nothing without him , nor nothing , but what he pleaseth shall be done ; but they are not proper and natural instruments without any activity in themselves , but only acted by God ; for then all the distinction of natures were vain ; what need the diverse faculties and virtues , and organs of creatures , if they can do nothing with them , but are all used by God , as helpless instruments are by man : but by predetermination we mean , that God in an unconceivable manner doth incline and guide his creatures to every action , as well as help them in acting , and that powerfully and effectually ; so that there is nothing acted by the creatures , but what God doth by his power incline and determine them to ; this he doth immediately by himself , being every where present , not only with , but in the creatures , and as near to them as their own faculties in respect of place , though not of nature , and he doth this in a way agreable to the nature of every creature , so as not to be inconsistent with the principles which he hath given them : with natural and necessary agents he so concurreth and determineth them , that yet they act according to their own inclination : A Stone falls down necessarily from its own gravity : and a Plant grows from its plastick virtue , though both are determined to those actions by God : and creatures that have knowledge , and some power to govern themselves more or less act according to their own inclination , and apprehension , though God incline them to that . Thus as natural agents act from an internal necessary principle , and not as meer Machines and Brutes from their own knowledge and inclinations , notwithstanding predetermination , so men act rationally and freely according to their nature , though always predetermined by God in their actions . If Man acted not freely , his actions were not humane actions , and so not capable of reward and punishment , not his , but Gods : On the other side , if God can determine natural and sensitive agents without violence to their nature , without superseeding their internal principles ; he can also , by his infinite power so determine man to his actions , as to preserve his reason and will inviolate in judgment and liberty , and doth so ordinarily ; though in some extraordinary cases , he doth overrule and overpower them .

I therefore lay down this Thesis , That though man act rationally ond freely , yet God doth incline and determine him to act by his almighty power . This I shall prove generally of all actions , and particularly of sinful actions . Jer . 10.23 . The way of man is not in himself ; It is not in man that walketh to direct his steps , Junius , Non penes est hominem via ejus , &c. mans way is not in his power : The Vulgar after the Septuagint , Non est hominis via ejus &c. mans way is not his ; If mans ways be not in his power , then it is God that determineth and guideth them : to direct mans steps lyeth mainly in determining him to act , and which way to act ; then it is not in him that walketh or acteth ; and experience sheweth how unable men are to determine themselves in ordinary actions , and for extraordinary , the wiser men are to foresee difficulties , and to weigh reasons on every side , the more they hesitate what course to take . And what meaneth that we pray to be directed in every thing , by committing our ways to God , and not leaning to our own understanding , by trusting in him and acknowledging him in all our ways , Psal . 37.5 . Pro . 3 . 5s 6. If we can determine and guide our selves , if God cannot determine us without overthrowing our nature ? for all external providences of opportunities , motives , &c. will not determine or direct us , without an inward influence upon our will : nor yet can there be a concurrence of determining circumstances without a determining power upon these creatures . Acts 17.25 , 26. He giveth to all life , and breath , and all things , &c. and hath determined before the times , and the bounds of mans habitations . Where do Men use more liberty then in chusing their dwellings and imployments ? yet these were determined from eternity , and then they must be determined in the choise of them , or else they would be uncertain . Again , God giveth men not only their beings , but all things that belong to them , and one thing necessary is , to guide all their actions : the Apostle here proveth , that God must not be worshipped by material Temples , &c. or mans device ; because he needeth nothing , but giveth man all things . But it may be said , Man may chuse whether he will worship him or no , his actions are wholly in his own power ; and so God may receive something from him . This cannot be without God give him all things , even the determinations of his will , to worship him , as well as a law to serve him by . I pass the 28 ver . usually alledged in this Argument , because it speaketh of Gods Omnipresence with men , not of his co-operation . Rom. 11.36 . of him , and through him , and to him are all things , &c. of God , as the first cause and principle , making and designing them to himself as the last end ; and through him , as guiding and carrying them to that end : I observe the Apostle saith , all things , thereby excluding nothing ; and the occasion of these words was a discourse concerning the rejecting of the Jews , the calling of the Gentiles . and the final uniting of Jew and Gentile in one Church with all the Providences , whereby all these things should be brought about ; wherein are contained all the moral actions of men , and those which should be least determined by God ; and yet all are of him , either as the Author , or as the Designer of them , and all are designed to the end of his glory ; and if he hath designed all things to himself to a certain end , as the sovereign disposer of all ( as the context from v. 32 imports ) then all must be through him , i.e. brought to pass by him , and ordered to his ends ; as he that wills the end must will the means also ; so he that brings about the end must use the means also , and influence them : nor may it be said , that Gods foreseing mens sins , the Jews rejecting of Christ , which is the instance here , did thereupon resolve to make this an occasion of calling the Gentiles , and the furtherance of it , and their call at last , a means of recalling the Jews ; for the Apostle saith v. 32 God hath concluded them all in unbelief , that he might have mercy upon all . {αβγδ} hath shut , or locked them upon unbelief : and there are innumerable other actions which must be determined by God , to make this means work to this end ; and why not their unbelief also ? and how are all designed by him , brought to pass by him for himself , if not the Jews unbelief , as well as their rejection ? or how else doth this clear Gods proceedings , which is the Apostles intent , viz. that God is the sovereign first cause and worker of all things for himself as his last end . What needs this to silence carnal reason , unless God determine to all actions both good and evil ? I further argue ad hominem , if God concurr to every act , then he also moveth and determineth the will to act ; for the Creatures having a Being , and Faculties , Objects , and all things requisite to act ; is as able to act without any influence from God , as to determine it self whether it will act or no without him ; why may not the Object , and Motives , and Natural Principles be sufficient to the operation without God , as well as to the determination ? surely we find most weakness in this : we are apt not to regard the object , not to heed the motives , not to be moved by them , to forget them , and after consideration to be uncertain which way to take : moreover , if the creature may act without Gods concourse , why may it not exist without actual conservation ? seing Being is a more stable thing then the actions of mutable faculties : if God could make creatures independent in their operations , ( as this Author contends ) why may he not make them independent in their being , i.e. give them a being , which shall need no more influence from himself ? and this to do be as great a perfection in God , as to do the other ? and so God having given the Creatures their being and faculties , and all things convenient for them , must have put them out of his own hands ; can work no more upon them , unless miraculously overruling the principles he had given them , and breaking the order which he had made . He requireth us to prove , That it implyeth a contradiction , that the Creatures should be independent , ( I suppose he meaneth in operation ) which is not reasonable ; for in most truths we cannot easily shew their connection with the first truths , so as to reduce the contrary ad absurdum , though we confess that every falsity doth imply and may at length be reduced to a contradiction . Yet I shall attempt it in two Reasons .

1. If a creature may be independent in its existence , so as to need no conserving power from God : then a creature may be so made , as that God cannot unmake or anhilate it ; and that a creature should receive its whole being from God , and he be the absolute first , and original cause of that Being , and yet not be able to take away that Being , is ( I think ) a contradiction . How is he the absolute fountain of being , if any thing can uphold a Being , not only without him , but even against his will and power ? I prove the consequence : Annihilation is only the taking away of a Being , or making the thing cease to be ; and therefore cannot be wrought by a positive action , but meerly by withdrawing that which upholdeth the being : now then if God do not uphold the Being of the Creatures , he cannot annihilate them by withdrawing that sustentation , and therefore not at all : In like manner , If a creature may be independent in oparation , then God cannot hinder the operations of the creatures ; he cannot hinder them by a positive act ; for a positive act must have a positive term and effect , not the meer hindrance or not being of an act : he must therefore hinder them only by suspending his influence or not at all : if you say , he may destroy the faculty , that also must not be done by a positive act ; but by substraction of influence : now that God having given his Creatures faculties to act , should not be able to hinder them , and yet be the author of life and breath and all things , is surely very near a contradiction , as well as against Scripture , and experience , which tell us that God hindreth men in their designs and actions , by hiding Wisdom from their eyes , by causing them not to see things , and not to find heir hands , &c.

2. If the Creature depends upon God for assistance to its action , but not to be determined and moved by him to act , then the Creature determineth God whether he shall assist or no , viz. to assist if it please to act ; and to forbear if it be not minded to act . And thus a great part of Gods Providence over men shall depend upon men ; which is a contradiction to his Being the first mover and sole Governor of all And further , if the Creature determine God to its assistance , and to what kind of assistance he shall give according to the nature of the act , which it will exert , then the act of the Creature is in nature before the assistance of God : for God waiteth to see which way the Creature will act , before he affordeth his assistance : and then the second cause acteth in nature before the first , though it cannot act without him ; and the first cause is subordinate to the second in Operation , and must concur as an inferiour less principal cause : As when the principal Workman begins to move and act , the less principal that are to help him , and to concur to the same act , ( suppose to lift or draw ) take there hint , when to act with him . But to ascribe any of these things to God maketh him no first cause , and so implys a contradiction . But that God determineth the will of Man or causeth it to act , as well as assisteth it in acting , I thus prove ; when God assisteth the will in acting , he is the cause of the Act , as well as the will ; not partial , for then the act is partly Gods , and partly mans ; therefore a total cause , not co-ordinate ; for their cannot be two total co-ordinate causes of the same act , that should equally and totally cause that act ; therefore God is a superiour cause , and the creature subordinate to him : Now if God do cause the act of the will as a superiour total cause : What is this but to cause the will to act ? and that is to determine it : he doth not produce the act in the will , as a meer passive power ; but together with it produceth the act , as a Superiour cause . Wherein lyeth this superiority , unless he cause the will to act ? how else is he in any sort above and before the will in the act ? and this is the previous determining influence I was to prove . Vid . Twiss . Vin . Gra . Lib . 2. Digr . 8.

In the next place it is to be proved directly , That God doth predetermine man to the matter of sinful actions , though he concurreth not to the vitiosity of them : Give me leave to premise one consideration , viz. If God predetermine natural agents to their natural actions , ( as is generally acknowledged ) and yet concurreth not to the defects of them , or to the monstrosity or deformity of their effects , though he be with the creatures the cause of the effects themselves ; why may we not with the same reasons say , that God doth predetermine man to those actions , wherein he is morally defective , and yet God be no cause of , or chargeable with that defect ? and further it is confessed , that God doth concur to the act both in naturals and morals , to which the defect cleaveth ; So that he is a cause , a total cause of that act , together with the creature : Now , If the defective action may really proceed from God as a proper efficient cause , and that most principally , and yet the defectiveness not be ascribed to him , how shall he be chargeable with those defects and deformities , meerly for inclining and determining the creature to act , without which it can no more determine it self , then it can act without his concourse ? But I prove it by Scripture : God sent Joseph into Aegypt , when his Bretheren sold him : He hardened Pharaoh's heart , when Pharaoh hardened it : It was of God that Elie's Sons hearkened not to their Fathers counsel : Nor Rehoboam to that of the Old Men : God gave to Absolon his Fathers Wives , and when he lay with them on the House top , God did it : He commanded the evil Spirit to deceive Ahab , and said he should prevail : The Assyrians and Caldeans were his Rod , yet they sinned in spoyling Israel : The Jews and Pontius Pilate in killing our Saviour , Acts 4.27.28 . did but what God had determined should be done ; and those Jews who were disobedient to Christ , 1 Pet . 2.8 . were before appointed to it : These Scriptures and the like do at the first appearance hold forth some Ordination and prevalent Influence of God upon sinful actions , and not only an idle permission , or such a co-operation as leaveth the creatures indifferent to act , or not to act : But I shall single out two or three of these instances , and argue from them .

1. In the case of Pharaoh , It is eight times said , that God would and did harden his heart , that he might not let Israel go ; from Exod . 4.21 . to the end of that Story , Chap. 14. where it is to be observed , that when God sent the first message to him , he foretold Moses , that he would harden Pharaohs heart , Ex. 7.13.9.12 . that he should not hearken to all the signs he should do : and afterwards when it was said , God did harden his heart , it is twice added , as he had said unto Moses : here is a prediction , that God would harden him , and his actual hardening was reported as the fulfilling of that prediction ; sure this implyeth more , then , that God would permit him to harden himself if he would , and that he knew he would do it . p. 27. But the Author sayth , The Hebrew Phrase has a more soft signification , and might be more mildly expressed ; Yet Interpreters generally render it by the Term hardening , : And we shall see how the best Interpreter ( the Scripture it self ) understandeth it . It is also said that Pharaoh hardened his own heart . i . e . he resolved not to let Israel go , and to that end he strengthened himself by all the reasonings and pretences that he could , that he might not be moved by the messages and miracles of Moses ; but whether or no God might influence in guiding and inclining him , let the Apostle be judge Rom. 9.17 . &c. where having laid down this position . v. 16. as the result of his argument , from the instance of Jacob and Esau , viz. That Election is not of him that willeth , or of him that runneth ; but of God that sheweth mercy : wherein is implyed , a pari , that non-election also is not of him that willeth or runneth well or ill ; but from the sovereign pleasure of God : this latter part he proveth by the instance of Pharaoh , that his non-election or reprobation was not of himself ; but of the sovereign will of God , because the Scripture testifie , that God raised him up , ( made him , prepared him , as others render . Exod . 9.16 . ) on purpose to shew all his wonders upon him , and to glorifie his power in his just destruction : God did not therefore barely suffer Pharaoh to harden his heart , but he did intend to harden him , and from thence to take occasion to manifest his Power and Justice ; therefore the Apostle inserts from this instance v. 18. that God sheweth mercy on whom he will , in designing and preparing them for mercy , and whom he will , he hardneth , though not with the same manner of efficacy : that he softneth those whom he saveth , yet not without an efficacious Decree and Influence ; else why is the act of hardening ascribed to him ? or what ground were there for the objection ensuing , v. 19. Why doth he find fault ? Who hath resisted his will ? if God had no will at all , or active influence upon the sins of men , but only suffered them to act , or not to act , and perhaps foreknew what way they would take . The Answer to the Objection is yet clearer , v. 20. Nay but , O Man ! who art thou that answerest again to God ? which is forbidden to Servants towards their Masters Titus 2.9 . Shall the thing formed say to him that formed it , why hast thou made me thus ? Here the matter is clearly resolved into the will , the active forming will of God , which is confirmed by the similitude of the Potters disposing of the Clay , according to his pleasure , for honorable or dishonorable employments , v. 21. Now the Potter doth make a positive discretion or difference betwixt several parcels out of the same mass for several uses ; one parcel he intendeth for honorable , and the other for dishonorable uses ; and then he formeth and fitteth them to his own purpose ; he doth not make up some , and lay others upon the Wheel , waiting to see which way they will determine themselves , whether for better or worser sort of Vessels , and then strike in with them according to their own determination : and thus also the Apostle calls them Vessels fitted , made up , or fashioned for destruction , {αβγδ} . I know God acteth not up on the wills of the ungodly in the same manner as the Potter doth on the Clay ; but if he had no ordinative or determining influence upon them in their sinful motions , then were there no similitude at all , betwixt Gods acting upon men , and the Potters upon the Clay , and their disposing of both : nor had it been at all pertinent , for the Apostle to have alledged the incomprehensible sovereignity of God to solve the objection , when he might readily have said , God hardeneth no man , but only leaveth him to dispose of himself either to hardning or softning as he pleaseth : if it be said , the Apostle speaketh here of the Decree , not of the act of hardning ; I answer , If God decree to harden a man , it followeth , that he doth actually do it in time , and in the instance of Pharaoh the Argument is from the execution to the Decree ; God did harden Pharaoh's heart , and the ground of it was ; because he intended him and raised him up on purpose to magnifie his power and severity on him : therefore God did more then onely suffer Pharaoh to harden his own heart .

2. Concerning Absolon's Incest God saith , 2 Sam . 12.11 , 12. I will raise up evil against thee out of thine own house ; I will take away thy Wives ; I will give them to thy Neighbour , he shall lye with them ; I will do this before all Israel , and before the Sun. Here I observe the event Absolons Incest certainly foretold and threatned , as that which should infallibly come to pass , ; and that not out of a speculative prescience , God barely forseeing it would be ; but out of a practical and firme purpose , that it should come to pass for punishment to David , and also that God doth three times ascribe it to himself , as that he would bring to pass , Vid . Davenant Animad . p. 1812. and all to humble David the more : how small a thing would it have been , if he had said , thy Son will defile thy Wives , I foreknow it , and I will permit him to do it , i.e. I will not hinder him : seeing for all this it had been in Absolon's power to have committed the sin , or to have forborn as he pleased ; where then would have been the certainty of that event ; or the penalty of it to David ? or why doth God in so many express words ; take it upon himself , when he meant no more then not to prevent it by his almighty power ? whereas it was still indifferent in the respect of his purpose and in respect of Absolon , the immediate cause , whether it should have been , or not have been : for by this Doctrine , as men sin without any determining influence upon their wills , or actions , so they avoid sin ( as oft as it is avoided without any effectuall grace ) by their own self motion and determination , without any influence from God inclining them that way : and thus Absolons sin must have been meerly indifferent and uncertain , notwithstanding the prediction and threatning , if God had no influence upon the natural actions , which were the subjects of his sin . Like to this is that 1 Kings 22.22 , 23. where God commandeth the lying Spirit to goe forth into Ahab's Prophets to perfwade him to go up to Ramoth-Gilead ; and promiseth that he should persuade him and prevail , and it is added , that the Lord had put a lying Spirit into the mouth of all his Prophets . Now to pass by what is Dramatick in this Story , and so not fit for argument ; it is manifest that God did purpose that the lying Spirit should inspire Ahabs Prophets , and not only permit him to do it if he would when he might also have forborn , if he had pleased : likewise that God resolved and foretold Micaiah , that this lying Spirit should persuade and prevail with Ahab , that Ahab should go up to Battel , and should fall there by the unjust hand of the Syrians . Whence could these indifferent and free effects have any certainty of future election , unless God had a determinning influence upon them ? for as to second causes they were all indifferent and uncertain : will they say , God only permitted them , and foresaw them : that he meant not that the Spirit should prevail ; as if he would make it prevalent , but that he foresaw it would prevail ? let us remember that prescience and bare permission have no causality , nor make any thing certainly future ; but this seduction and fall of Ahab , are not only foretold , but penally threatned , as things determined to come to pass ; therefore there was a causal influence upon these acts , and not a bare prescience and permission of them . Parallel also , is the 2 Thes . 2.11 , 12. God shall send them strong delusions , that they may believe a lye , that they all may be damned who believe not the truth , &c. This also is penal and certainly appointed and threatned , not barely foreknown ; the meritorious cause was , That men received not the love of the Truth , [ believed it not ] but had pleasure in unrighteousness : The means whereby these errors were wrought , were the unrighteous deceits of Antichrist , with all deceivableness in them , &c. v. 9. the end , that they might be damned , for their self-deceiving and opposing the truth : but what made these errors take with men ? why could they not escape them , at least the most gross and damning of them ? surely if in these things they were so free that they might act or not act , they might escape : but the reason why they cannot is , God shall or will send them [ {αβγδ} ] efficacious error ; therefore God in his righteous judgment makes it effectual , and prevalent , by influencing the acts of their understandings , & will , and leaving them to the obliquity .

3. Acts 4.27 , 28. The Jews and their Rulers in killing Christ did , Whatsoever the hand and the counsel of God determined should be done : I will not lay much stress upon the distinction of the words hand and counsel ; But I thus argue : All that the Jews did in killing our Lord were wicked actions , and yet all predetermined and appointed by the Decree of God ; but whatsoever God decreeth shall be done , he doth in some manner bring to pass by his power , and influence ; therefore God had a powerful influence upon these wicked actions of the Jews . To this the Author answereth : That God foreknowing that the Jews would murder Christ , did determine the circumstances , and how far they should go . But did not God decree and appoint the death of Christ , and in what manner , and in what place , and by whom he should be slain ? did he not promise it to the Church of old , that by his stripes they should he healed , and that upon him , should be laid all our iniquities ? did God foresee the Jews would kill him , and then order that the ends and effects of his death should be salvation to his Elect ? did not God send him into the World on purpose to dye ? he was delivered , Acts 2.23 . {αβγδ} given up by the determinate counsel of God , before the Jews could kill him : If God did not determine the death of Christ , then was it uncertain , and he might , or might not have been slain , for any thing the Providence of God did to bring it about ; and then the whole Work of Redemption was uncertain also ; for that depended on Christs death , and his death depended wholly upon the undetremined fickle will of Man . Moreover , If God determined how far the Jews should proceed , ( as is granted ) I ask , Is this meant positively , or negatively ? if positively , that they should do such things to him v. g . scourge him , blaspheme him , crown him with thorns , Crucifie him , &c. then he determined sinful actions should be done , and so must influence the doing of them : If negatively , , that God foreseeing all the Jews would do , only determined that they should goe no farther , e.g. not brake his bones , not keep him in the grave , &c. then it would follow , that God restrained and withheld them from doing , and willing these things ; even such as were in their power to do if they pleased ; and then there is a prededetermination of the will , even without grace . You will say , This determination was to hinder sin , not to sinful actions : True , but if no determining influence were needful to those actions , whereby all the promises and prophecies were fulfilled in his death and circumstances thereof , what needeth a predetermination to restrain the Jews from doing more then was foretold ? might not their will have been trusted in the one as well as in the other ? or did God foreknow , that they would have done more , if he did not determine to prevent them ? then there are futurities , which God never decreed ; or God foreknoweth what never shall be . Other Scriptures I pass by for brevity sake ; only remarking that the harsher terms , which are used to express Gods Providences about sin by some Divines , and so tragically exagitated by others , are for the most part taken out of Scripture : and therefore it would become a Divine , that excepts against the Doctrine and the expressions , first , solidly to answer the Scripture from whence they are taken . Give me leave to add one Argument or two .

1. If God certainly foreknows all the sinful actions of Men , ( as is granted by our Author ) then these sinful actions were certainly future ; else Gods foreknowledge were not infallible : If they were certainly future ; whence had they that certain futurition ? not from divine prescience , that supposeth them future , but doth not make them so ; nor from second causes , they were future before these had a Being ; and when they do exist , they are free , and there is no certainty whether they will act good or evil : and in particular actions there is no certainty whether they will act or not : There is therefore nothing that maketh sinful actions future , and so the object of presciscience , but that which giveth futurition to all things ; the Decree or Purpose of God , that those actions should be , and that he will permit the creature to act them inordinately : And if God Decree that sinful actions shall be , then his power and influence doth concur to the causality of them : as physical actions ; for what God decreeth shall be , he decrees by his own Providence to bring to pass . The Author by way of prevention to this Argument saith , That the manner how God foreknows things is unsearchable , and and not at all necessary for us to know : and is it necessary that we should know the manner how God predetermineth the will to all its actions ? or do we indeed know the manner of any of Gods acts , either immanent or transient ? and yet Scripture and Reason may shew us that there are such actions : Scripture tells us God foreknoweth all things ; and Reason tells us , that cannot be foreknown , or known to be future , ( which is all one ) which is not future : nor can any thing be future ; but what God determineth shall be , because all things are of him , Rom. 11.36 . therefore there is a Decree and a providential Influence about sinful actions . Nor will the Jesuists scientia media , avoid this argument , viz. That God doth not foreknow contingent things , either as future absolutely , or as meerly possible : but he knoweth them conditionally future , i.e. supposing such and such circumstances , he knoweth what will follow e.g. God did not know that Adam would Fall as a certain future event , nor did he look upon it only as possible , that he might fall ; but he knew if the Serpent tempted , and his Wife persuaded in that manner , and with those circumstances which afterwards came to pass , that then he would yield : If this were true , then he hath no certain foreknowledge of contingent things , but only a probable conjecture at events : then how was Cyrus his Name and Victories ; Alexander's Success ; and all the circumstances of our Saviours Birth and Death so punctually foretold ? but further , Is it indeed certain , that men will act in some certain manner , if such circumstances do concur ; that Adam would fall in those circumstances , which afterwards surrounded him : how then is the will indifferent to act , or not to act in the moment immediately before it acteth , notwithstanding all motives and circumstances , which they contend to be essential to it ? and if it be not certain that Adam would fall in those circumstances ; then it was only certain that he might fall if he would , and God did not prevent ; and so his fall was but a meer possibility . Once more , I would fain know , how God did foresee the various circumstances of the second causes ; if as future , then he determined that such circumstances should befal the creatures , and then knew , what they would do in those circumstances , which is all one as if he had determined what they should do : as if God foresaw Adam would fall , if he were so tempted , if he did not hinder him ; and he did purpose to suffer him to be tempted , and not to prevent his fall ; because he had purposed to permit it . But if God foreknow the contingent circumstances of second causes in a middle way , i.e. what these circumstances will be , supposing other circumstances , then the question will return in infinitum : it remains then , that he must know them only as possible , viz. that God knew Adam might be tempted , and that if he were tempted , that he might fall : by the same reason , God knew only , that the Devil might tempt him ; and that the Angels might fall , and become tempters ; or that man might be tempted some other way ; or sin without temptation , and so God foreknows no contingent things , but only knoweth them to be possible , i.e. that they may be if he please ; and so this overthrows instead of salving Divine prescience . Nor doth the new device , which our Author seemeth to savour , viz. the divisibility of Gods eternity , succeed better : for if God know all things , only because he is successively coexistent with them , and so beholds them as they are ; then he did not foreknow them from all eternity , or before they did exist , nor in one eternal simple act , but by many successive acts ; this may be called knowledge and intuition if they please , but it is not foreknowledge .

2. If God do not determine mens wills in evil actions , as to the acts themselves , this would greatly weaken our submission to God , and our forgiving of men , when evil befalls us ; for we cannot say , that men are Gods instruments : that God took away Jobs Cattel ; but the Chaldeans , for they might either have done it , or forborn , for any influene God had on them ; nor could God hinder them without a miracle ; so that it was wholly they , not God that did it : nor can we say , God for holy ends hath purposed and suffered these things to come to pass ; for if God hath no influence upon the will in acting them , he did never purpose them or design them to his own wise ends ; but foresaw that creatures would do them , and resolved to let them alone , and at the most , resolved only to put some bounds and limits to them . If God do not influence the wills of men , we are much more at their disposal , yea at the disposal of the Devil , then we would willingly be .

3. God raiseth up the Wicked to punish the sins of his people ; as the Assyrians Isa . 10. The Caldeans Habak . 1.12 , and many others : and this is expressed by calling for them , appointing , anointing for this work , ordaining and establishing them for judgment and correction , Job 1.12 . stirring up their spirits , raising them up to be enemies , &c. wherefore God calls them his servants , because they do the work he hath appointed them ; though they thought not so ; but were for the most part Invaders , Usurpers , and the Disturbers of the World : If God did not determine their wills , then they were indifferent to do , or not to do , these things , for all the appointment and providence of God : besides punishment , and correction , are judicial acts , such as God might justly execute , yea must , in the ordinary course of his government of the World ; it is not therefore unbecoming him to appoint his executioners , who shall fulfil his will , and to cause them to do it , though they mix their own sins and passions in doing it ; or think not of any thing less , then pleasing God in what they do . If God only foresee what the wicked will do , and permit them to do it against his people , then he doth not appoint these afflictions for sin , but only permit them ; nor is it certain , that ever those judgments will come , because it is in the power of the instruments to be , or not to be , the Authors of such calamities . Thus much for the proof of the Question .